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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One often meets the view that economic regulation should be understood in
terms of Pareto efficiency. Economic theories of law have traditionally focused
on concepts such as market failure, efficiency, and inefficiency. Proponents
assume that under the conditions of perfect competition, rational economic
actors will enact courses of action that tend to induce Pareto outcomes. The
idea of perfect competition means that markets which are competitive will
induce efficient outcomes. The perfect competition approach has focused on
the conception of market failure as the foundation for designing regulatory
policy. Until recently, lawyers overwhelmingly relied upon a model of
economic contract, developed over the last two decades in law and economics,
as a normative structure to guide efficient decision-making.
As will be explained in this thesis, I do not share this view. While market
failure views on the study of regulation have yielded a rich set of results on
a number of areas centering on the implementation of market-like techniques
for removing impediments to regulation, this research program has not dealt
with complications that arise from incomplete information or the defects in
institutional design. Yet, I believe that there is a political economic method
for studying economic regulation - a method that can be employed for
studying a wide array of regulatory relationships, from social regulation to the
framework of financial markets. This method seeks to link two bodies of
literature: the learning from the field of public regulation which seeks to
highlight the formative role that process and structure rules play in the
influence on the policy process and the new model of information economics
which makes reference to limitations of policy choice due to asymmetrical
information and strategic behavior (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Whether it takes
the form of the contractual view of the corporation or focuses on the produc-
tion of local public goods, I shall assess, throughout this thesis, the implica-
tions of this combined perspective for the nature and direction of regulatory
policy and its implementation.
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This thesis provides a new framework for thinking about the regulation of
corporations and other kinds of institutions. In the past decade we have
witnessed a transformation in the research on economic regulation. The
changed emphasis has been influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, policy
makers have been increasingly concerned with the stepped up performance of
regulation, and how diverse regulatory processes impact the performance of
industry. Second, the emphasis on regulatory performance has highlighted the
concern that regulation has distributive consequences for the various industry
groups and that the growing importance of regulation for many industries has
generated a body of research which takes into account the political influence
activities which invariably accompanies political choice and policy implementa-
tion. At a general level, the emergence of a new regulatory literature reflects
a need to move away from an exclusive concern for correcting market failure
to an approach which focuses on policy choice and implementation.
As we will see throughout this thesis, the political economy framework views
regulation as demanded and supplied. The notion that there is a 'dual demand'
aspect to regulation is taken to mean that the emergence of regulation in a legal
system need not arise in response to correct a market failure. The basic idea
of the new regulatory theory is that there are a number of features in the
regulatory environment ranging from asymmetries of information to the choice
of institutional structures which has complicated the design of regulatory
mechanisms. Previously it was thought that we could avoid tackling the
distributive consequences of regulatory policy by focusing on regulation
through general equilibrium lens. But, due to the new body of research
economic research in microeconomics and political science of organizations,
which has taken into account moral hazard, adverse selection and political
opportunism into the analysis of economic policy choice, our present set of
analytical tools has improved our understanding of the set of regulatory
possibilities. In this regard, the political economic approach acknowledges that
certain aspects of regulation will be the result of opportunistic political
behavior on part of either the regulatory agency or the regulated firms, or on
the part of political interest groups. The fact that regulatory policies are subject
to pressure has led to the rise of regulatory strategies (eg., actions) which
attempt to limit opportunistic behavior by hardwiring institutional structures
or developing incentive structures which make it possible for regulatory
agencies to commit to a policy programme for an extended period (Laffont and
Tirole 1993).
The application of the political economy approach to the study of regulation
is the concern of this thesis. The chapters that follow do not seek to offer an
exhaustive account of the new approach to the study of regulation. Rather the
INTRODUCTION
approach taken here is limited to a study of how regulation has been developed
and influenced by distributive influences. This thesis also will attempt to
introduce the theory of repeated games in order to develop insights into the
study of regulatory policy. This approach provides a means, in the presence
of incomplete information, to determine which bargaining situations might
provide a basis for the introduction of second-best regulatory policy. That is,
repeated game models can assist in the search for a focal point which might
yield a stable regulatory relationship. Finally, an attempt will be made to
introduce the new generation of formal models concerning regulatory competi-
tion. These models redeploy the theory in a second-best world. In so doing,
they sap the strength from the efficiency claims made in the context of legal
federalism. Attention will also focus on the new models of regulatory capture
which address the problems of informational asymmetry and provide produc-
tive grounds for altering the institutional features to make regulatory policies
less sub-optimal.
1.2 Contractarian Theory
In the first part of the thesis I explore a form of economic regulation that treats
the modern corporation as a 'nexus of contracts'. The 'contractarian' concep-
tion of the corporation is based on the insight that the firm is no more than an
collection of contracts between labour, management, shareholders, and credi-
tors. According to this view, the corporation does not differ in the economic
sense from ordinary contractual relationships.
1.2. 1 The Political Economy of Corporate Control
There are a cluster of economic theories of the firm which have contributed
to the understanding of the law and economics of the corporation. The common
core of these new ideas is that the institutional structure and internal govern-
ance are key elements in the firm's strategy, which determines its competitive
success. Unlike the managerialist theories inspired by Berle and Means (1932),
these micro-economic theories treat management as an agent for shareholders,
and emphasize that internal and external monitoring devices are necessary to
ensure the convergence of interests within the corporation. The managerialist
theories had already emphasized the asymmetries of information due to diffu-
sion of share ownership and managers' expertise and superior access to
information, especially about the firm's assets. Yet the microeconomic theories
went further when they emphasized the primacy of information for the optimal
accountability of management. This account of the firm notes the important
role of distorted information in the decision-making processes of management.
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This new 'neo-classical' approach split between the institutional and the agency
strands. The former emphasizes transaction costs, and concentrates on design-
ing governance structures to deal with contractual hazards and the problem of
bounded rationality. Agency theory, more radically, views the firm as a legal
fiction serving as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among factors of
production. It insists on abandonment of the notions of power and hierarchy
within the firm, and sees management as involved in bargaining and carrying
out a successive contracts. Since managers's functions of interpreting objectives
and formulating plans may have given them considerable discretion for acting
in their self interest, and given also the self-interest objectives of other agents,
the governance task is to devise a set of incentives structures which tend to
promote efficiency. Such pursuit of career concerns becomes a dominant theme
as a typical cost associated with the principal-agent relationship, and provides
a different angle on the analysis of the firms' structures, including hierarchy,
as essential to reconcile the role of managers and others in the firm in relation
to the residual risk-bearers.
In the 1980s, agency cost theorists argued that one of the primary mechanisms
for disciplining management is the market for corporate control. The effective-
ness of this technique has been the subject of considerable debate within the
legal, economics, and finance literatures. The theory of corporate control is
based on the proposition that where agents have specific human capital invest-
ments in the firm, their firm-specific wealth is threatened by a hostile acquisi-
tion of the firm that may bring in a new management team. Proponents of the
benefits of efficient corporate restructuring, most notably Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel (1991), argue that the treat of takeover itself is sufficient
to induce managers to align their strategic action to meet the needs of share-
holders. However, as I show in chapter 2, the empirical evidence of the market
control is contradictory, and contains many ambiguities. In the first place, it
has concentrated on the issue of whether the threat of hostile takeover reduces
the non-value-maximizing actions of agents. Yet, I demonstrate that the post-
merger studies in the US and UK show only slight differences in profitability
between companies that became takeover targets and those that did not. There
has been much less attention given to the extent to which takeovers provide
a means for managers to maximize self-interest by value-reducing strategies,
such as poison pills and other forms of dilution of capital. While this last point
is an interesting one, there is recent evidence that suggests managers, despite
the presence of the takeover mechanism, are able to entrench themselves
further by making value-enhancing investments (e.g., takeovers) beneficial to
the shareholder and incumbent management team respectively.
The structure of this latter argument is discussed, in chapter 2, in connection
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with John Coffee's (1987) differential risk hypothesis. Coffee offers an alterna-
tive account for rapid rise of the market for corporate control in the 1980s:
the asymmetry of risk between managers and shareholders. The relation
between risk and the bargaining problem between shareholders and manage-
ment is not confined to economics. While the pursuit of economic wealth
undoubtedly motivated the bust-up merger movement of the 1980s, Coffee also
offers a non-economic theory of corporations and the socially optimal level of
risk in society. An argument can be made that the 1980s takeover wave
introduced a higher level of risk for corporate stakeholders which, in response,
created a ground swell response in political society for the protection of non-
shareholder constituencies which were harmed as a result of the transfer of
risk. Coffee argued that there were sufficient incentives for the corporations
to lower their cost by paying compensation for the competitive harms caused
to the losers from takeovers, since it has more to lose from the action of these
interest groups. In chapter 2, I argue that Coffee's proposal does not have the
stabilizing effects anticipated since managerial employees, the target of
Coffee's proposal, have more effective means of protecting their interests in
the takeover context.
Let me briefly point out that the relation between economics and politics in
this case of takeovers was straightforward. I believe that the conflict over
economic wealth formed the power base for political activity. There is enough
evidence to demonstrate that the political structure of corporate decision-
making was responsible for protecting stakeholders from shareholder opportun-
ism in the late 1980s. I return to these issues in chapter 4 below. Here I only
want to note that Coffee has made a powerful argument concerning the appro-
priate level of risk in the firm. In doing so he has also contributed to the
joining of political science and economics into the political economy of corpor-
ate regulation. In simplest terms, this means the linkage of two lines of analy-
sis to show that political and economic forces must be understood to contribute
to shaping the structure of institutions. In this context, one might argue that
on general theoretical grounds that there is a tendency in society for corpor-
ations to be influenced by market and political forces is not quite specific
enough to explore the more technical questions concerning how the economic
system produces regulatory institutions which respond principally to manage-
ment-centered interests at the expense of other interests within the firm. In
chapter 4 I examine more closely the capture theories of regulation which
/ provide a useful basis for explaining the confluence of interests that promote
corporate lawmaking that enhances both the professional intermediaries and
managements' interests. In this thesis, I endorse an approach to law and
economics that opens up the 'black boxes' of the maximizing models of
individual economic and political behavior. One means of addressing the
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obstacles to the design and implementation of long-term policy making is the
introduction of contractual incompleteness and power to understand some
important economic arrangements. I will touch on these concerns in chapter 3.
1.2.2 Incomplete Corporate Contracts
Corporate law theorists also look to the new economic theories as a framework
for analyzing the conflicting interests within the firm. Proponents emphasize
that there is no single a priori governance structure which is appropriate for
all businesses. Rather the claim is that entrepreneurs must decide which
combination of rules attract the highest level of corporate investment by
interests outside the firm. Failure to locate the optimal mix of rules will result
in higher costs relative to other firms,and in the long run only the least-cost
corporations will survive. This approach, advanced by Easterbrook and Fischel
(1991) combines two related theories (eg., agency cost and efficient market
hypothesis), and states that managers have a high powered set of incentives
to create legal rules and corporate structures that mimic the market.
Let me briefly point out that for proponents of contractarian theory, the
/ primacy of contract implies that corporate law should contain no mandates,
( only default rules. In general terms the function of corporate law, on this view,
is to design an efficient set of default rules (to deal with the potential for
information asymmetries and barriers to collective action) to govern the rights
and duties among directors, shareholders, and investors. It follows, therefore,
that an efficient set of governance structures would include those background
rules to which most parties would agree after a complete round of bargaining.
The intuition behind this argument is that the legal-decision-making respecting
firms should be treated as an exercise in contractual gap-filling pursuant to the
'hypothetical contract' principle, a universal norm to guide decision-makers
in supplying default terms and filling gaps. Here, the hypothetical contract is
based not on actual but counterfactual consent, i.e., what rational, forward-
looking parties with perfect information would do for achieving these goals.
Under the principle, the legal system supplies the rule which both parties to
the contract would have adopted had they addressed the matter ex ante in a
costless world. The contract terms which follow will be efficient in all circum-
stances. And, because the theory's operative class of contracts includes any
and all voluntary economic relationships, the field deemed appropriate for
application of its regime of ex ante default rules and gap fillers is quite large.
In the final contractarian picture we get a complex of contract terms that
govern all future contingencies, all derived ex ante, either in fact or hypoth-
esis.
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The contractarian paradigm has significant shortcomings. Contractarians
assume that rational, well-informed parties will bargain to optimal contractual
provisions. Let me mention that this argument assumes a theory of perfect
bargaining (eg., complete information and perfect competition). It is clearly
common that parties have less than perfect information. Moreover, the transac-
tion costs approach has already shown that the presence of frictions often
makes it difficult for parties to design contractual provisions. In chapter 3, I
argue that the contractarian description of bargaining remains firmly tied to
the complete contracts concept. Having explained in some detail the problems
with a corporate governance system, based on a complete contracts picture of
the firm, I move on to offer an alternative to the ex ante bargain approach to
efficient corporate contracts.
From the foregoing characterization of contractariamsm, it is clear that the
fundamental theoretical task facing proponents is that of addressing the prob-
lems which arise when the idealistic construction fails. Under contractarians,
parties are defined by certain normative ideals (i.e., rationality, utility-maximi-
zation, etc.) and their environment is designed to insure that their contract
choices are consistent with their preferences. But we have reason to suspect
that there are problems with the descriptive status of individual rationality
under the theory. Contemporary game theory notes that rationality requires
individuals to maximize their utility functions. Yet, in contemporary economies
[there are a variety of circumstances under which rationality fails or there is
( a determinacy problem with respect to the expected value of a choice. The
"contractarian account makes no attempt to provide a plausible explanation of
complex rationality which individuals arguable seem to possess. The problem
of rationality is more fully discussed in chapter 10.
In contrast to the complete contracts approach, one can work from the para-
digm of incomplete contracts. In incomplete contract theory, the theorists
assumes that it is difficult for parties to anticipate all the possible state
contingencies that might arise, and design contractual provisions to deal with
them. Proponents observe that even if the parties could specify all the relevant
contingencies, the parties may find it difficult, if not impossible, to specify
these future states in order to draft contract terms. Logically speaking, there
may be so many contingencies to thwart the efforts of the parties of write them
into the contract. In the case of verification and enforcement, it may be quite
rational for parties to minimize their costs. Observe that these costs change
the situation of ex ante contracting in that cost barriers may prevent parties
from negotiating a complete ex ante solution to all problems.
The theory of incomplete contracts goes beyond demonstrating the limits of
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complete contracting. From the point of view of corporate law theory, we
introduce the 'first principles' paradigm of incomplete contracts as an alterna-
tive to contractarianism. Much of chapter 3 is devoted to a further analysis of
this idea. Here I only want to stress that the first principles claim brings the
notion of incompleteness to bear on a more precise notion of contract. To have
an ex ante incomplete contract is due to the formal nature of the contract in
addition to the costs of complete specification. What distinguishes the transac-
tion cost approach from the first principles perspective is, first, the theorist
looks to situations where a contract must be explicitly specified by its parties
in order to be recognized as such and enforced. Secondly, I go on to argue that
we have a contract if the contract terms are capable of computing all the
possible future states. The fact that we lack the appropriate technology necess-
ary to plan for certain contract problems implies that there are circumstances
in which rational parties may proceed to trade without writing a contract at
all.
In making the case for the first principles vision of corporate contracting, it
might be said that we are arguing that optimality breaks down under uncer-
tainty. Yet knowing that optimality breaks down does not necessarily prevent
the theorist to defend an first-best equilibrium strategy. In order to address this
concern, I introduce non-cooperative game theory as a technique for showing
how coordination failures often shape the results of contractual bargaining.
Broadly speaking, some game theory models are able to show that: (1) rational
parties can adopt any one of a number of mutually consistent arrangements and
market forces may fail to ensure that only the efficient pattern emerges from
the possibilities; (2) that community supplied social norms may, under condi-
tions of uncertainty, induce cooperative outcomes where no contract exists.
I should point out that I have embraced game theory as a means to overcome
some of the problems in the normative theory of corporate contract theory. To
be sure, the theory of finitely and infinitely repeated games may not be capable
of handling all the problems. Chapter 3 is largely devoted to a discussion of
how game theoretic models of information can be imported into the real world
of incomplete firm contracts.
The game theoretic approach provides a framework for a fundamental critique
of the contractarian paradigm, ie., it builds on a model on the firm on actual
arms length contracts and builds firm hierarchies on open-ended, non-contrac-
tual transfers of power. One may then move on to the insight that the game
theoretic models, having shown that production follows from the possibility
that trust may be reposed in an honorable actor, reveal that contracting can
be neither expected nor demanded. That is, if we take into account contractual
incompleteness, it becomes just as easy to assume that a contract might not
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emerge from the bargaining process. Assuming, then, that these cases exist,
we know that a functional justification for positive law is based on the insight
that, since actors will not necessarily devise thorough-going contractual
structures, the law should facilitate the production of a handful of mandates.
Here, the introduction of traditional fiduciary standards is justified on norma-
tive and strategic grounds: they look to the firm's internal expectation's picture
and broader notions about appropriate conduct in the world of firms.
The game theoretic approach is an advance on the earlier theory of contract-
arianism. I have mentioned that the contractarian perspective assumes that
corporate law's only function is to save costs by supplying an ex ante terms
which the parties would agree to under costless bargaining. Ex ante contracting
is thought to be cost effective and sufficiently complete to solve the problem
of self-interest by providing a satisfactory guarantee of legal protection. I will
show in chapter 3 that complete contractual protection is not cost effective
because, in the real world of complex contracting, there is unlikely to be a
complete solution to contractual incompleteness. My suggestion is that the
incomplete contracts paradigm, with its emphasis on information asymmetries
and the recognition of multiple equilibria, opens up the way for the evolution
of ex post incremental rules that might provide a more consistent and effective
treatment of particular situations than the prohibitively expensive ex ante
default rules. In the last section of chapter 3, I offer a typology of ex post
default rules. This discussion closely parallels the discussion in the first part
of chapter 3 about the relation between incomplete contracting and the solution
to contractual incompleteness.
1.3 Regulatory Competition
The following discussion anticipates that of chapters 4 and 5, which provides
further expositions of the central notions of devolutionary federalism. Here I
only shall consider the assumptions of the theory and, in particular the respect-
ive paradigms of regulatory competition. I will leave to chapter 5 an evaluation
of the efficiency view of regulation that favors competition across juridical
limits as the basis for providing decisive support for devolutionary initiatives
and first-best outcomes. Most of the policy implications are also more fully
discussed in later chapters.
The reduction in barriers to trade and the liberalization of financial markets,
transportation and telecommunications, have created the basis for the increase
of flows of factors of production between jurisdictions. As countries move to
a more liberalized domestic economy, questions of competition between
jurisdictions abound. With the prospect of increased capital mobility, it is
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becoming conventional wisdom that national governments should perform their
economic policy functions more effectively since governments which yield
optimal levels of public goods may be more successful in the competition
between governments for attracting mobile resources. The concern to attract
mobile resources has shapedentire areas of governmental policy and plays a
determinative role for firms locating new plants. Arguments in favor of
decentralization follow from the economics of competition between jurisdic-
tions. Its influence has recently begun to be felt in other areas due to change
of economic or political climate. Whatever the area, to consider the encourage-
ment or discouragement of regulatory competition is to compare the relative
benefits and detriments of allocating regulatory authority at a higher, including
supra-national, or lower level of government.
These questions have long been relevant to the federal regime of the conti-
nental United States. They are now increasingly relevant to the emerging
institutions of regional integration in the European Union, to other less
developed regional integration processes, and to global institutions such as the
WTO. Over the past few years most discussions of regulatory competition
make frequent reference to the efficiency effects of decentralized policy-
making. It hardly needs stressing that decentralization has many meanings and
involves many separate issues (Stiglitz 1994: 154-56). We can refer to
decentralization in terms of the assignment of decision-making from a central-
ized to a decentralized or local government. The theory of regulatory competi-
tion tells us that allowing for more decentralization helps to remove much of
the asymmetrical information problems, reduces the prospects of capture, and
enhances the introduction of a range of alternative solutions for similar prob-
lems. The economic advantages of decentralization undoubtedly provided a
strong argument for politicians within federal systems to introduce the dynamic
of diversity as a counterbalance to the discretion of central government (Wein-
gast 1995: 21-2).
Regulatory competition is an economic theory of governmental organization
that equates decentralization with first-best efficient results. The theory make
an analogy between law and commodities, and then asserts that lower level
government - local, state, or national, as opposed to federal or supra-nation -
al - should compete for citizens and factors of production when they regulate.
It predicts that such competitively-determined regulation will satisfy citizen
preferences. The prediction has a normative implication for legal and political
theory: Just as price competition disciplines producers of private goods for the
benefit of consumers, so regulatory competition promises to discipline govern-
ment producers for the benefit of taxpaying citizens. Regulatory competition
has been brought to bear on the entire range of federalism discussions, usually
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to support a devolutionary initiative or to oppose a proposal for federal inter-
vention. The theory originated in public economics with the publication of the
Tiebout model in 1956, which, in turn, influenced its own field profoundly.
Theoretical arbitrage to legal contexts occurred early in the history of law and
economics. But, in contrast to regulator competition's development in its home
field, where it remained closely tied to the study of the production of public
goods by state and local governments, lawyers in the United States have
applied it across an expanse of subject matter, from corporate law to banking
to environmental law and trade law. The cumulation of these exercises trans-
formed federalism theory - regulatory competition came to be acknowledged
as a basic federalism value.
After thus becoming a fixture on the landscape of American federalism,
regulatory competition expanded to venues world-wide. It has been brought
to bear within other federal and quasi-federal systems. Most notably it has
figured in discussions on strategies for integration with the European Union
(Easterbrook 1994: 12), especially in the context of the centralization versus
subsidiarily debate crucial to many countries in the Union. The European
Union Treaty agreed by the European Council at Maastricht in 1991 provides
that a number of regulatory functions should be placed at the local and not at
the central government level. Yet, a prominent feature of the Maastricht Treaty
is the transfer of a number of regulatory functions to the Community level.
One justification for this policy is that market integration requires that national
monetary and fiscal policy be co-ordinated by a centralized institution (Ed-
wards and Kenan 1996).
The post-Maastricht debate has given rise to two divergent positions concerning
the optimal allocation of political and economic power in the EU. The debate
over the appropriate location of power is conducted in the domain of efficien-
cy, equity, and accountability. On the one hand, the decision to centralize
policy at the federal level is primarily defended on the basis that it permits the
Community to internalize significant spillovers by redistributing the risk across
regions (Inman and Rubinfeld 1996). There are also some theorists who regard
liberalization as a strategy which leads to pressures to reduce the level of
protection on social-protection issues (Langille 1996). On the other hand,
decentralized policies provide incentives for states to commit to efficiency-
enhancing regulation. Subsidiarily favors the view that economic policy making
should be restricted to lower-levels of government unless there exist credible
circumstances for regulatory power to be centralized (Woolcock 1996: 290).
What subsidiarily captures is the sense that the competition between jurisdic-
tions provides a counterbalance to the drive for enhanced integration based on
centralized co-ordination of national laws and policies (Bratton et al 1996).
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In the debate over whether to undertake regulation by a central or a lower level
authority, proponents of legal federalism look to the economic theory of
jurisdictional competition to provide decisive support of devolutionary initiat-
ives. Proponents of deregulation insist that there is a strong connection between
decentralization, competitive behavior and efficient results. Regulatory compe-
tition is thought to follow from a robut economics that supports two general
assertions. First, competitive forces shape a wide range of regulatory outcomes
at state and local levels because menus of regulation figure significantly in the
location decisions of citizens and factors of production. Second, the competi-
tion results in a market that equilibrates regulatory outcomes and citizen
preferences. Two conditions must obtain, however - the lower level regula-
tion must not generate significant externalities and borders must remain open
for the free movement of capital and labor (Easterbrook 1994: 127, 129).
Given satisfaction of the conditions, the lower level market for regulation (if
left free to operate by central government) will provide an 'empirical answer'
to important policy questions, since only the public goods and regulatory
restrictions for which citizens are willing to pay will survive (Weingast 1996:
5). Central government intervention inhibits the operation of the market, and
therefore is at best unnecessary and at best worst results in deadweight anti-
competitive costs. There emerges a presumption in favor of locating regulatory
authority at lower level units (Revesz 1992).
Yet, devolutionary federalism is highly contestable. By that I mean that current
economic theory, in fact, supports neither the sequence of assertions nor the
bottom line presumption in the theory outlined above. In doing so we do not
deny the existence of regulatory competition, however. There are entire areas
of law which manifestly have been shaped by competition. State and local
governments also making taxing and spending decisions where competition
clearly plays a determinative role - stadium deals for professional sports
teams and tax breaks for firms locating new plants being the obvious examples.
Nor do we deny that competition can have beneficial effects. Nor does our
argument imply wholesale rejection of the body of legal scholarship on regula-
tory competition. To the contrary, we argue that situation-specific legal
applications provide a useful source of material for demonstrating the theory's
shortcomings. We even argue that regulatory competition appropriately may
be term a federalism value, at least at a broad structural level.
But we do argue that legal regulatory competition theory takes the occurrence
of competitive behavior within federal systems as the basis for making two
unjustified predictive leaps. The first is its general prediction that decentra-
lization by itself assures that competition will be the formative influence on
the terms of regulation. In our view, this finds no support in either the recog-
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nized set of competitive lawmaking situations or the economic theory of
regulatory competition. Although some regulatory subject matter is structurally
suited to competitive influence, much regulatory subject matter is not so suited.
The theory's questionable prediction is that, assuming a decentralized regula-
tory regime subject to competitive influence, competition will lead to a first-
best regulatory equilibrium. Current economic theory, however, presents no
solid basis for predicting any regulatory equilibria at all, much less first-best
ones. The theory, in short, overstates the connection between decentralization,
competitive behavior, and efficient results, There is no economic support for
global pronouncements about the location of relative regulatory advantages
within a federal system. Similarly, if we move to regional and even global
levels, economic theory does not necessarily support leaving regulatory
authority at the nation-state level. Under certain conditions, regional or global
governance may produce better outcomes. The EU, NAFTA, APEC or even
global institutions such as the WTO may be first best alternatives, but these
cannot be simply understood through theories of regulatory competition.
1.3. 1 Paradigms of Regulatory Competition
Among lawyers there is a widespread resistance to evaluate the assumptions
of regulatory competition theory. Some of the reasons underlying this attitude
are quite respectable, others are less so. Some are quite general, others are
more specific. They will become much clearer as I proceed with a general
account of the theory, which I shall return to in Chapter 5.
The leading economic model of regulatory competition (Tieb out 1956) centers
on a different mobile factor - the individual, taxpaying citizen. It focuses on
citizen-voter tastes for local public goods in the hypothetical context of a city
resident contemplating a move to the suburbs and choosing among a number
of towns. The model makes three assertions. First, locational decisions will
reveal individual preferences for public goods and levels of taxation. Rational
forward-looking individuals, after surveying the range of available choices,
will act in accordance with their preferences for location-specific bundles of
public goods. Second, a local public goods equilibrium can be established if,
like producers of private goods, local government units compete with their
public goods offerings to attract in-migration. Third, the promotion of competi-
tion between local governments should lead to an optimal balance between the
level of taxation and the provision of local public goods. Given all this, there
arises a general presumption favoring the provision of public services at the
local level.
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1.3.1.1 The Public Interest Theory of Regulation and the Race to the
Bottom
When the Tiebout model first appeared four decades ago, it must have sounded
a jarring note in the context of the prevailing 'public interest' theory of
regulation. Public interest theory emphasized the government's role as a
benevolent maximizer of social welfare in the provision of traditional public
goods and as economic regulator (Laffont and Tirole 1993: 476). Centraliza-
tion often seemed to be the best way to realize the public interest. It was
particularly likely to be the appropriate remedy for market failures - events
deemed likely to occur by those who subscribed to this theory of government.
And, given a democratic political framework, centralization was not of itself
deemed to have dangerous properties. Any expansionary tendencies would be
checked as citizens expressed their preferences in the context of interest group
competition in the political process.
If one takes this public interest perspective, regulatory competition under the
Tiebout model threatens betrayal of the public interest. With competition, the
context of regulation and level of public goods and taxation are dictated by
private preferences of a narrow, arbitrarily identified class of at-the-margin
consumers, instead of following from a dispassionate and responsible calcula-
tion of the public welfare. Policy inquiry is diverted from a proper focus on
the quality of the rules to an exclusive preoccupation with the processes that
bring the rules into existence.
This negative response expands into a race to the bottom picture of regulatory
competition. The race goes downwards because competition forces the pursuit
of policies farther and farther removed from the public trust. The American
corporate law system has been held out as the leading example. Under this
view, charter competition has the perverse effect of causing the states to adhere
less and less strongly to a productive shareholder norm of shareholder wealth
maximization. And the remedy suggested is centralization-chartering by the
national government (Cary 1974).
The race to the bottom characterization invites advocacy of pre-emptive
centralization initiatives. If a race must go to the bottom, then the regulatory
subject matter should be removed to a higher level of government, whether
or not competition presently determines the content of regulation at the lower
levels. Stewart (1977) used this argument to justify the federalization of US
environmental law. According to Stewart, without centralization, competition
for production factors would leave the states in a prisoner's dilemma respecting
environmental standards. Each state would be deterred from promulgating
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standards at its preferred level of strictness by threat of a loss of production
factors to a defecting competing state. The more intense the competition for
factors, the greater the disparity between the level of environmental protection
in the public interest and that evolving in practice. Furthermore, given the
multiplicity of states, the transaction costs of collective action would prevent
co-ordination; the prisoner's dilemma accordingly ripens into a conimons
dilemma.
American regulatory conflict has been widely discussed in Europe (Majone
1991). It is not surprising, therefore, that the concern that the competition
between governments could lead to a race to the bottom influenced EC policy-
makers in developing an approach to regulation that limited the intensity of
competition between governments. In the EU, the introduction of relatively
high regulatory floors would reduce the ability of national governments to
compete for mobile factors of productions. Article 1 OOa of the EEC Treaty set
forth minimum essential standards with respect to consumer protection,
environmental protection, health and safety. Similarly, the EC adopted a 'new
approach' to harmonization which sought to overcome the limitations of the
ex ante harmonization approach while providing a loose form of European-
level regulation. The effort to introduce minimal levels of regulation is expect-
ed to restrict the outbreak of competitive deregulation by member states. It
must be stressed that the 'new approach' requires transfer of regulatory
authority to a centralized regime. But this does not mean that the harmoniza-
tion of essential minimum rule leads to uniform regulation. Mutual recognition
of national regulatory requirements ensures that, once common levels are
established, national regulators can provide different menus of regulation
tailored to preferences of consumers. Evidently, the aim of mutual recognition
is to stimulate the competition among national governments in order to provide
for flexibility and innovation. In this regard, the 'new approach' creates a
dynamic of interaction between national rules and Community-level harmonized
regulation (Woolcock 1996: 292-97).
1.3.1.2 Public Choice, Social Choice, and the Race-to-the-Top
The public interest perspective that prompted objections to the claims of
regulatory competition theory itself came to be challenged by two other
theories of government - public choice and social choice. These took the
position that the 'public interest' cannot be meaningfully articulated in the first
place, much less utilized as a template for regulation (see also chapter 5
below).
Social choice theory, as originally articulated, asserted that the public interest
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does not emerge in political practice because voting paradoxes prevent the
emergence of a preference ordering for public goods, and predicted that no
technical adjustment of democratic processes could solve the problem. Regula-
tion, accordingly, does not embody a 'public interest' in the sense of an
aggregation of the preferences of the electorate. Public choice theory added
that actors were likely to misrepresent their preferences in the discourse of
democracy. The free rider problem that comes up in the arena of collective
political action makes it rational for an actor to misstate the level of his or her
demand for public goods.
Public choice theory goes ont to account for the substantive content of regula-
tion as the reflection not of the public interest but of multifarious private
interests. The theory asserts that actors rationally employ the government and
form groups to influence it. Lawmaking in tern follows the demand patterns
of these interest groups as risk averse lawmakers respond to the dominant
voices (Olson 1965). Producers, in particular, are likely to seek to register
demands on lawmakers, looking for subsidies, import quotas, tariffs, price
regulation, or government-created barriers to entry, such as licensing require-
ments (Stigler 1971). This private rent-seeking activity prompts competition
among government actors to become rent distributors and receive interest
group favors (Buchanan 1980; Tollison 1982). Dead-weight social losses result.
Furthermore, government actors, particularly central government actors, tend
to assume a monopolist's position respecting the provision of public goods and
pursue the objective of governmental revenue maximization (Brennan and
Buchanan 1980: 17-24). A positive relation obtains between the degree of
centralization and the size of government, measured in terms of the budget.
Given the uncertainties of majority rule cycling, the rational ignorance of
voters, and confusion amongst politicians (ibid.; Mueller: 268), political
controls will not be equal to the task of containing government growth. Thus,
the provision of public goods will reflect not the utility level of the average
taxpayer, but that of the expanding state.
Under this social choice/public choice diagnosis of the infirmities of democratic
government, capture and excess government growth flourish when discourse
about the public interest prevails in lawmaking contexts. The rhetorical equilib-
rium (Easterbrook 1994: 128) conceals the determinant rent-seeking. At this
point, the Tiebout model, with its local public goods equilibrium prompted by
jurisdictional competition, appears in the picture to offer a theoretical cure.
The cure follows from the microeconomic proposition that market transactions
are the most accurate allocators of social resources. Law, accordingly, should
arise not from discussion of the public interest but from the response of at-the-
margin producers. At the same time, the model's market-driven lawmaking
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equilibrium solves the problem of preference aggregation that social theory
identifies.
The Tiebout model also implies a practical recommendation tracking that of
public choice analysis. But look to devolution of regulatory authority to lower
levels of government. Regulatory competition presupposes horizontally-situated
government units; regulatory competition theory adds that the revenue enhance-
ment constrains that prompt competitive response to citizen (and customer)
preferences are likely to be felt with more intensity at lower levels of govern-
ment. By increasing the lower units' subject matter jurisdiction, decentraliz-
ation expands opportunities for competitive lawmaking.
Significantly, many of the benefits thus claimed for centralization obtain
whether or not it precipates an outbreak of competition. Reducing the size of
the regulating unit narrows the variance in the distribution of preferences,
reduces the likelihood that preferences will be bundled and ameliorates some
problems of asymmetrical information. Regulation, thus adapted to local
conditions, is more likely to approach the ideal consonance with citizen
preferences. At the same time, decentralization increases the chance that a
diverse range of preferences will come to be manifested in regulation prompted
by one or another jurisdiction. The localized experimentation thus fostered,
makes it possible for a range of regulatory strategies to appear, while simulta-
neously limiting the negative impact of unsuccessful experiments.
Finally, decentralization reduces the scope of central government monopoly
and ameliorates the negative effects of regulatory capture. Capture leads to
bigger dead-weight costs when authority is exercised at higher levels of
government. Local authorities have a lesser capacity to damage the economy.
They cannot impose tariffs and quotas on imports; their licensing arrangements
have a limited reach; and their limited resources reduce the capacity to offer
significant subsidies. Incentives to interest groups, accordingly, decrease as
authority vests in lower levels. Of course, these units remain subject to small-
scale influence activities. But, at this point, horizontal competition can have
a disciplinary effect that minimizes the losses stemming from capture arrange-
ments. Given mobility of people and factors, the imposition of costly and
restrictive interest group legislation in one jurisdiction benefits a neighboring
jurisdiction with a less costly regime. As the factors vote with their feet, they
affect the incentives of lawmakers - inefficient wealth transfers to favored
groups become less attractive than regulations that enhance the wealth of the
larger population.
The list of relative advantages of decentralization and competition coalesces
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into a race-to-the-top when projected into the standard Darwinian evolutionary
framework of microeconomics. Thus extended, the Tiebout model promises
an efficient allocation of industrial activity among horizontally-situated juris-
dictions (Revesz 1992: 121-22). In a dynamic environment, the competitive
forces that achieve this result should assure that only efficient regulation
continues in effect (Trachtman 1993). Over time, then, competition raises the
standards of all regulation.
1.3.2 The USA Corporate Law as a Paradigm Case
Chapter 4 articulates the building blocks of the state law system of corporate
law as a self-regulatory system composed of firms and state lawmaking institu-
tions, in which competition among the states ensures the system's capture by
corporate management influence. This chapter draws on political and economic
theory to provide a guide for dealing with the system's capture by management
influence activities.
US corporate law is a subject matter uniquely-suited to the evaluation of the
presumption that market controls ensure that efficient governance structures
result as the states respond to managements' demands. because it is a rare
jurisprudence which has been shaped by competitive forces for an extended
period. Of course, competitive forces actively shape many regulatory regimes
within the US, the EU, and internationally. But these cases can be subdivided
into two broad categories, with structural impediments to competition bearing
more or less strongly depending on the category. In the first category, conflict
of laws rules allow firms or individuals to select among a number of jurisdic-
tions for the situs of a legal relationship, and the jurisdictions compete for their
business. In the second category, public or private product competition across
jurisdictional lines prompts competitive lawmaking by governments either
pursuing new residents or factors of production or attempting to confer com-
petitive advantages on existing factors. With the first category it is relatively
easy to show that limited mobility, information asymmetries, product bundling,
and government incentives present no insurmountable barriers to competition;
with the second category no such presumption obtains and any showing falls
into the first category, along with family law, and such phenomena as offshore
tax havens and international ship registration.
American corporations may choose their state of incorporation without regard
to the location of the firm's physical assets - the commerce clause of the
federal constitution was interpreted to assure this result. At least as to larger
firms, conditions for competitive lawmaking clearly obtain. Mobility, which
is effectuated through reincorporation to another state, is not costless, but is
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relatively cheap for larger firms; large law firms effectively serve as informa-
tion intermediaries; the legal product offered is unbundled because
reincorporation triggers only the application of the chartering states' corporate
law; and an incentive to compete can be identified on the supply side, at least
in the case of Delaware, the market leader. Delaware has been competing
actively for chatering business for a century, along with a handful of less
successful states. It offers reincorporating firms an attractive code and ancillary
services in exchange for franchise tax revenues. Other states over time tend
to bring their codes into line with that of the market leader.
A long-established division between federal and state regulatory functions has
let this competitive process go forward with substantial interference from
central government. State competition began in the 1890s, when New Jersey,
followed by Delaware, enacted codes designed to appeal to the interests of the
then new mass-producing corporations. Although some observers took a dim
view of this management-friendly legal regime, its effects were not generally
deemed to be incompatible with national economic policy pursued under
antitrust and other federal regimes. But the climate became less favorable when
ownership and trading of corporate securities became widespread beginning
in the 1 920s. A new centralized initiative occurred with the enactment of the
federal securities laws in the 1930s. Even this, however, was structured so as
to leave the state authority over internal corporate matters largely unimpaired.
Federal regulation of the securities markets coincided with a renewed debate
over management legitimacy. This debate had negative implications for the
competitive state system and its management customers. Berle and Means
constructed an influential, politicized picture of the large corporation. They
identified management as a powerful group, and showed that its power
stemmed from a juridical model of corporate structure grounded in state law.
The traditional state law model of corporate ownership and structure, combined
with the new development of widespread and passive security holding, had left
management in an unintended position of strategic dominance and accountable
to no one. Cary brought this Berle and Means perspective to bear on a study
of Delaware's regulatory product and concluded that the race had gone 'to the
bottom'. To Cary, corporate law implicated the public interest; therefore,
revenue maximization was an inappropriate motive for the state taking the lead
in its creation. He suggested federal preemption as a remedy.
Regulatory competition theory stood ready to provide the basis for a
counterstory. Winter drew on it to assert that charter competition had resulted
in a 'race to the top'. Under this view, the chartering system is a market in
which firms purchase corporate status and corporate codes in exchange for
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franchise tax payments. Reincorporating firms are the markets marginal
consumers, with the firms presently incorporated in each state holding out a
constant threat of departure through reincorporation. The result is a constraint
on the ability of any state to impose inefficient regulations and a system that
efficiently matches the preferences of corporate consumers with the terms of
regulation.
The 'race to the top' view strongly influences US discussions of corporate
regulation. Corporate competition is generally recognized to have desirable
results. But significant negative effects of shareholder value also are acknowl-
edged. During the 1980s the states raced to accommodate the management
interest with antitakeover legislation, impairing the operation of the principal
market check on the agency costs of corporate organization. Delaware, histori-
cally the leading jurisdiction respecting management-protective innovations,
took and uncharacteristic follower's role with these and related innovations.
These two developments - the systems's ready provision of interest group
legislation detrimental to the interests of equity investors and Delaware's
position as a follower respecting these legislative innovations - present key
problems for the current discussions. The solutions eventually articulated will
have important policy implications for regulatory competition theory as a
whole. Here is a competitive lawmaking regime little impaired by problems
of limited mobility, asymmetric information, bundling, and a lack of entrepre-
neurial incentive.
Yet, even the regime's proponents agree that it has not fulfilled the theory's
promise of lawmaking free from undue influence. In addition, no consensus
has emerged on a precise description of the incentive structure that determines
regulatory outcomes within the system. Until that consensus emerges, debate
will continue on the question whether the system makes good on the theory's
promise of regulatory innovation directed to the preferences of the actors with
interests at stake.
1.3.2.1 Supply-Side Problems in the Production of US Corporate Law
As noted earlier, regulatory competition theory promises diminished regulatory
capture and product innovation. Questions about the charter competition
system's delivery on the former promise have been asked since Cary leveled
the charge of a race-to-the-bottom. In chapter 4 these questions are addressed.
Regulatory competition theory lost some of its explanatory credibility for
corporate law when its proponents were forced to carve out an exception for
the renewed management-protective antitakeover legislation of the 1980s.
INTRODUCTION	 21
Renewed allegations of regulatory capture followed. Bebchuk argued that
transactions in the charter market are directed only to the preferences of the
managers who control reincorporation decisions, and those preferences do not
necessarily serve as proxies for the result that maximizes shareholder value.
As a remedy, he revived Cary's suggestion of federal fiduciary standards. We
expand on Bebchuk's analysis, but reach a different conclusion respecting the
appropriate remedy.
We begin by arguing that the conflicting interests of shareholders and managers
make reincorporation a form of mobility that does not effect a matching of
regulation and consumer preferences. Although firms can exit from unsatisfac-
tory jurisdictions, their shareholders have no power to force them to do so.
Most state codes contain mandatory process rules assuring this result. Chapter
4 looks to capture theories of legislation and administration to explain this
arrangement.
With reincorporation as the at the margin transaction, process rules that vest
that exit decision in management bond the chartering state to continue solici -
tude to the management interest. Given a state thus bonded, management has
no collective action problem when it comes to securing legislation favoring its
interests - the state's organized bar performs that job voluntarily. The system
at the same time exacerbates the collective action problem of the shareholders.
Dispersed in the first place, they have no necessary ties to the chartering state.
The bar shares their interests only to the extent that litigable, fee-generating
legal rights result, but has no stake in designing a legal system that minimizes
agency costs. Meanwhile, a constant threat of federal intervention, a negative
development in the eyes of the systems's advocates, ameliorates the capture
problem. A weak dual demand model results: Delaware, the state with the
most to lose in the event of federalization, makes gestures in the direction of
shareholder protection in order to defuse the threat.
However, we part company with the critics of the system who advocate that
the federal government follow through on the threat and impose national
fiduciary standards. Federal intervention could destroy the principal benefits
of the Delaware-based system. With state corporate codes in substantial
harmony, Delaware maintains its position by providing a corporate dispute
resolution center of extraordinary sophistication. The incentives and rents that
support its position as an information repository would dissipate with
federalization. It is suggested that a dual demand model constituted of share-
holder threats rather than federal threats would improve matters and that the
federal government intervene to effect this result. Drawing on administrative
law models that recommend interest group empowerment as a remedy for
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agency capture, they recommend federal preemption of process rules that
prevent shareholder initiatives to amend corporate charters and effect
reincorporation.
A new group of players on the American corporate stage (eg., the politicized
agents of investment institutions) is looked to provide a class of entrepreneurs
who would put such an initiative privilege to use. It is projected that a grant
of standing to these shareholder representatives to set the legislative agenda
within corporations would reorder the incentives of state politicians and law-
yers, forcing them to listen to the shareholder voice. Corporate law would
remain subject to state subject matter, but managers no longer would have
unilateral power to set the agenda. Accordingly, competition and the benefits
following from its, far from being stifled by this central government mandate,
would intensify.
The introduction of role of institutional investment managers as crucial players
in the contestability game has additional consequences. The new players, once
institutionalized, can become an effective force in causing corporations to
become more effective. The commitment to introduce conflict into the regula-
tory game plays a central role in the collection of information and the provision
of incentives in corporations as well as in public life. The implication of our
theory is that a form of conflict is crucial to the development of a highly
effective regulatory regime.
1.3.3 The Limited Liability Company and Regulatory Competition
So far I have discussed the leading paradigms of regulatory competition in
respect to whether competitive lawmaking can discipline governments that
produce law and come up with innovations that better satisfy the preferences
of taxpaying citizens. I evaluated the general assertions of the competitive race-
to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom in the context of US corporate chartering.
We have shown that the corporate law example reveals that a distortive
incentive structure can operate. The capture risk runs contrary to the general
assertion that devolution of regulatory authority leads to competitive efficiency.
In this context, it becomes very difficult to defend the idea competing jurisdic-
tions produce first-best law. In chapter 6 considers the suggestion that the
Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) is efficient due to the presence of com-
petitive influences in the state law system. In this section, I now want to focus
on some of the economic arguments upon which the efficiency claims rest, and
point to some of the arguments against the presumption that the LLC is
evolving so as to provide cost-effective limited liability for small firms.
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The past decade has witnessed the dramatic emergence of a new business form
in the United States. The LLC which is a combination of one-tier tax treat-
ment, limited liability, and flexibility respecting governance terms, appears to
improve the menu of business forms in certain respects. The LLC brings us
to the final stage of in the evolutionary abandonment of the historical associ-
ation of, on the one hand, limited liability, corporate governance norms, and
two-tier tax treatment, and, on the other hand, unlimited liability, partnership
governance norms, and one-tier tax treatment. The substantive justifications
for bundling the first trio lost their force many years ago when limited liability,
quasi-partnership governance norms, and one-tier tax treatment became avail-
able to actors who elected Subchapter S status and made full use of close
corporation provisions in state codes. At the same time, corporate law has
abandoned mandatory imposition of its board-level, collective decisionmaking
norm without concern for the resulting expansion in the number of firm
enjoying limited liability. Thus, there appears no compelling reason against
the expansion of the menu of governance options available to firms doing
business under the shield of limited liability.
1.3.3.1 The Law and Economics of Limited Liability
Before I turn to consider the LLC's proponents assertion that regulatory
competition justifies the efficiency effects of the ownership structure, let me
say something about the economics of limited liability. There would appear
to be three main premises underlying the concept of limited liability. On this
view, limited liability is thought to foster efficiency by lowering the cost of
shareholding monitoring, reducing the risk of investment, and creating the
conditions for the free transferability of shares. These effects are said to permit
shareholder portfolio diversification which in turn prompts more productive
investment policies within firms.
The thinness of this efficiency view becomes apparent when reference is made
to a contrasting law and economics theory, the pro rata hypothesis. Proponents
of this view assert that most of the problems of unlimited liability identified
by efficiency theory are solved if a regime of unlimited liability abandons the
joint and several rule of partnership law in favor of a rule of pro rata liability
based on and limited by the proportion of equity owned by each shareholder.
The advantages of the pro rata regime rest on three assumptions: (1) investors
would not have to monitor one anothers' levels of wealth and would have
incentive to diversify; (2) the present system's perverse incentives to invest
in suboptimally risky production functions would be eliminated; and (3) the
prospect of unlimited liability will not adversely affect the role of shareholding
in the financial system and could serve to enhance firm performance. No doubt
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the pro rata view directly and strongly challenges all the justifications for
limited liability for small firms. Yet, LLC proponents thus far have failed to
address this hypothesis.
I now want to inquire into the more substantive economic aspects of limited
liability. The larger context of efficiency theory is derived from assertions
prominent in the theory of the firm as propounded ten or fifteen years ago.
Efficiency theory is rooted in these assertions today. The fact that the theory
of the firm has moved on has implications for the assertions central to the
claims of efficiency theory. The central claim behind the efficiency theory is
the idea that there is a connection between a single firm ownership structure
and the maximization of firm value. From the point of view adopted here,
there are good reasons for thinking that there is little evidence to support this
relationship. More specifically, some models show that an incentive device can
provide a sufficient economic basis to align management incentives and limit
the effects of risky decisions. Other models show that under certain conditions
concentrated shareholding may have productivity advantages. Together these
models sharply controvert the assertion that limited liability enhances produc-
tivity by discouraging concentration and by encouraging diversification. Much
of the first part of chapter 6 is devoted to a further analysis of these models
with regard to the relationship between liquidity and monitoring. Here I only
want to stress that the efficiency theory's claims about diversification and
productivity may be countered by line of inquiry which suggests that unlimited
shareholder liability is feasible and holds potential productivity benefits for
large firms.
I now turn to the encounter with the LLC proponents contention that the econ-
omic theory of regulatory competition justifies the adoption of LLC statutes
on a nation-wide basis. Here I only want to re-state that, based on our earlier
discussion of the manifest case of market failure in charter market, proponents
of the market-based race school cannot plausibly rely on a black box inquiry
into the LLC market that avoids inquiry into the incentives of government
actors. Given this perspective, the second part of chapter 6 goes on to analyze
the LLC situation in terms of a domestic law as product situation with regard
to the classic race to the top story in which fifty states compete to supply cost-
saving business forms to an undifferentiated class of discriminating consumers.
The difficulty with this claim is that the characterization does not correspond
to the empirical facts.
As a preliminary step to understanding the states' rapid movement to enact
LLC states, we survey the influence of special interests that shaped the pattern
of legislation. Having surveyed some of the potential class of objectors as well
INTRODUCTION	 25
as interests in support of the legislation, we look at the role of business lawyers
in the enactment process. They have a high-powered incentive to persuade the
legislature to enact the LLC statute in order to increase fee revenue. There
appears to be a one-period pent-up demand that lawyers can satisfy stemming
from the existing inventory of partnerships, limited partnerships, and corpor-
ations that will opt to transfer to the LLC status. The desire for incomes
extends into the subsequent period when lawyers presumably gain to the extent
that new firms that otherwise would organize as partnerships choose the more
formal and expensive LLC form and also benefit to the extent of new capital
formation. To be sure, lawyers will lose to the extent that firms that otherwise
would organize as more expensive corporations or limited partnerships select
the LLC form. Thus, lawyers will have little problem in mobilizing to procure
the legislation and their bar associations will routinely step in to solve prob-
lems of collective action respecting enactment of beneficial legislation, serving
the drafting functions as well as the lobbying functions. Conversely, the
projection of income reduction to plaintiff's lawyers stemming from the
difficulty of collecting judgments against LLC's amount to a distant period
problem which could discount the number of lawyers in favor of prompt
enactment of the legislation.
Based on the survey of competing interests, we offer a 'just so' story of the
speedy enactment of an LLC statute. By this I mean, the historical proliferation
of LLC legislation has been attributed to the initiative of state bar committees
rather than to the initiatives of legislators themselves. State treasurers, even
if they have objected, were overruled. The banks and the plaintiffs bars appear
to have taken no interest in the matter. Thus, in practice, the business lawyers'
high-powered incentives appear to have carried the day. Here, the supply-side
interest procure the legislation in the usual manner of interest group capture
and the demand being satisfied stems in part from a perverse incentive to
externalize accident costs. We should like to note that, given the incentives,
the innovations respect the LLC statute will continue in the successive periods.
As the practioners learn the defects of the statute they are likely to demand
revisions to the law in order to satisfy client demand for lowest possible
organization costs. The 'just so' story explains the rapid evolution of the
prevailing forms of the LLC statutes.
I shall not say much about whether regulatory competition can be accorded a
primary place in an explanation of the proliferation of the LLC statute. In
terms of whether there will be a race to the bottom, there is no per se evidence
to suggest that the intense competition between the states leads to a prisoner's
dilemma. It is more likely that wider the spread between the benefits and costs
of liability in each state, the more probable it is that a given state will have
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an incentive to move to a limited liability regime. Given such a first move,
a race to the bottom among the remaining states in a federation may or may
not ensue, depending on the cost-benefit posture of each state. We should note
that the presence of out-of-state alternatives does not by themselves dicate the
conclusion that a particular body of law relates from the competitive disposi-
tion of the legislature. In a world of interest group politics, competitive
incentives on lawmakers' part cannot be assumed. In describing the diffusion
process of competitive lawmaking against the background of interstate move-
ment of factors of production, we conclude that it is necessary to describe the
incentives must be described with particularity before a finding can be made
as to whether regulatory competition or anything is responsible for the prolifer-
ation of LLC statutes.
1.4 Creative Lawyering and the Production of Regulation
It follows from what I said in the previous section about lawyers that in some
cases, the origin of particular legislation or regulation may be significantly
influenced by the bar and individual legal professionals. It is the presence of
significant supply-side incentives (i.e., fees and reputation) which stimulates
lawyers to invest heavily in the lawmaking process. Chapter 7 offers a example
of this perspective in the context of US legislation on the development of
insider trading regulation.
1.4.1 Bourdieu and Legal Autonomy
A rich literature has developed around the nature and process of lawyering
itself. The sociology of the professions perspective has been extended by a
sophisticated post-structuralist perspective set forth in the work of Pierre
Bourdieu (1987). This theory has focused on the competition between lawyers,
where the struggle among lawyers to distinguish themselves has resulted in the
production of an autonomous legal system. The idea of legal autonomy is not
itself a novel creation of Bourdieu. Rather, the fundamental insight of Bourdieu
is that the legal system, while it possesses its own abstract and formal nature,
guaranteed by legal norms and doctrines, does not possess the principles of
its own dynamic. The legal field is constructed by reference to the strategic
behavior of the professionals, and the operation of the legal institutions.
Bourdieu's view of the legal system is supplemented with a theory regarding
how the indeterminacy of legal rules enable the various groups of competing
legal professionals to use their respective resources and techniques to generate
alternative rules, which can be deployed to support the contrasting strategies
of organized groups within society. Hence legal professionals perform the
function as mediators between the realm of formal law and the economic and
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social practices of their clients. This approach offers another way of thinking
about the dynamics of regulation.
The basic model of the theory of professional conflict, as applied to regulation,
begins with the observation that the indeterminacy of legal rules is functional
since it provides the flexibility and adaptability. It is assumed that the lawyer,
who possesses high-powered incentives, can be expected to pressure for
changes in the patterns of behavior by creating a new rule or norm. As we
have seen in the context of the LLCs, the most influential supporters of new
innovations in the law were the corporate lawyers who have moved first by
undertaking to invest in local corporate law reform. Yet, not all lawyers will
support investment in legal innovation on an ongoing basis. For example, in
the case of corporate law changes, local firms will tend to free ride on legal
research provided by national committees unless an investment in a local code
has obvious rent implications.
From this perspective, it is legal professionals who may set in motion the
dynamic of regulatory change. If regulation is approached from a norm
entrepreneurship approach, this in turn implies that analysis can not be con-
fined to the study of legal professionals employed in private firms. This is the
traditional approach taken in the sociology of the professions literature. The
process of regulatory innovation must be situated in a wider context. Chapter
7 seeks to examine the relationship between the process of regulation and the
competitive process between government and securities lawyers over the
establishment of a new norm concerning the opportunity to use undisclosed
material information for securities trading. Until the 1980s there were few
cases brought against insiders trading on non-public information. Throughout
the 1980s, government lawyers, through a series of high profile cases,
attempted to aggressively extend the rule against insider trading to a significant
range of trades. Despite judicial ambiguity concerning the misappropriation
theory, government lawyers, with the tactical backing of certain sectors within
the securities industry, were successful in their efforts to establish a clear
standard against the use of non-public information in securities trading. As is
further argued in chapter 7, this process of legal innovation may also be the
product of the changes in regulatory structure brought about by Congress. As
we shall see in the next chapter, it is inevitable that the challenges to the pre-
existing patterns of regulation of insiders is assumed to be the work of private
interest groups which influenced the politicians to enact new legislation. Yet,
the content of regulatory change, as I will show in chapter 8, is also affected
by the behavior of opportunistic public officials and the institutional arrange-
ments for administering regulatory policy.
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1.4.2 Interest Intermediation and the Supply of Regulation
The following discussion anticipates that of chapters 8, which provides a fuller
exposition of the public choice perspective to regulation of a legal field. This
chapter is concerned not so much with the instruments of regulatory policy but
with an approach to policy which takes account of the features of interest
groups, regulators, and politicians when explaining the emergence and imple-
mentation of regulation. Here I shall consider the perspectives of demand-based
models of lawmaking, and contrast that approach with additional body of
literature, the supply-side story. The supply-side approach focuses on legisla-
tors as suppliers of regulation. The incorporation of the supply-side dimension
introduces a number of features of political structures which has the potential
to explain lawmakers' responses to demand pressures.
Analyses of regulation that are based on public choice theory make intensive
use of abstract models that describe the strategic interaction between the key
private actors and government regulators (Peltzman 1976). This approach,
conceived in terms of an efficient competitive political process, reflecting the
diverse and contrasting preferences of the private actors and regulators,
concentrates exclusively on the competition between the private interest groups.
This simple demand model of capture asserts that lawmaking follows the
lawmakers' response to demand patterns (Tollison 1988). Particular responses
depend on interactions between the lawmakers' risk profiles and the projected
benefits of legislative action (Becker 1983). The lawmaker, being risk averse,
tries to avoid conflicts - given no demand for legislation, nothing is done;
given organized demand, the lawmaker attempts to satisfy the interest group
making the demand with beneficial legislation.
An additional body of public choice theory supplements this demand model
with a supply-side story. Exclusively demand-based models of law production
tend to treat the political process as a black box and, as a result, do not attempt
to describe how legislative trades are accomplished and enforced (Weingast
and Marshall 1988). This is a problem, since legislative trades, unlike well-
drafted private contracts, can be undone at the subsequent behest of a compet-
ing group. Supply-side explanations of interest-group dealmaking confront this
problem of political insecurity by drawing on the organizational economics to
show that institutional arrangements have an impact on outcomes. This body
of work disaggregates the government into a complex of principal-agent
relationships (Macey 1992). In these stories, legislatures develop process and
structure machinery to control the opportunistic conduct of both career bureau-
crats and legislators (Baron and Ferejohn 1986). These devices include the
legislative committee system, which helps to overcome problems of asymmetric
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information between legislative principals and bureaucrats through ex post
monitoring, and process requirements for rulemaking, which provide advance
notice of noncomlying conduct. The processes of the legislature also contribute
to transactional stability: Legislative procedures and committee jurisdictions
give the congressional gatekeeper the ability to resist short-term internal
pressures (Shepsle 1992).
Chapter 8 draws some lessons from the supply-side approach to retell the
regulation of insider trading story. Many discussions of the proliferation of
insider trading laws attempt to explain it fully in terms of the need for
worldwide uniformity of regulation. This chapter seeks to consider the context
in which there has been a sustained demand for insider trading regulation. I
show that the demand stems from the changes in the competitive environment
of international securities trading which led to a new environment in which
banks and financial firms operate. Tighter trading margins and stepped-up
competition have led market makers and institutional investors to square off
against corporate insiders, whose activities were proving increasingly costly
to the former. It is argued that Congress saw potential benefits in supply new
rules, given constituent demands and the state of public opinion in the face of
market scandals. Supported by Congress, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) in turn proposed increased enforcement in exchange for in-
creased budgets and powers. Yet, the SEC was able to manipulate the situation
by providing a framework of rules and enforcement procedures which were
sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy its own heterogenous constituents: market
makers demanding change, corporate insiders who were targeted by the new
regime, and incumbent corporate managers who wished to limit the power of
market makers in takeover battles. Throughout this chapter I assess the impli-
cations of the SEC's attempt to develop regulatory strategies which expand its
influence and enforcement powers. In this context, I outline the SEC's attempt
to develop international regulatory strategies, based on reciprocity and harmo-
nization, with foreign regulators. Despite the apparent convergence around US
style norms against insider trading among EC member states, I attempt to show
that the prevalence of highly differentiated enforcement standards tends to
reflect the contrasting nature of interest group participation in the process of
government intervention of the securities industry in each country.
1.4.3 Policy Choice and Democratic Decisionmaking
As indicated earlier, much of the political economy of regulation approach has
been developed to understand how the choice of policy is influenced by
distributional influences on both the supply and demand considerations. In this
regard, the theory is normative since it is concerned with the design of regula-
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tory policies which can limit opportunistic behavior and hence provide greater
long-term benefits for groups making investments. In chapters 9 and 10, I
extend the insight of political economy model to explore decisionmaking in
fields of public law and constitutionalism.
In public law and constitutional theory, there is an influential perspective that
purports to offer an account about how political institutions develop. The
rational choice paradigm relies on an instrumentalist account of preferences
to show how the conflicts over political choices can lead to coordination
problems. As we have seen earlier with market contractarianism, the rational
choice proponents argue that political institutions evolve to equilibrium based
on the optimal selection of social choice rules. The theory, derived from earlier
work of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, attempts to determine the goods which
could be secured by people based on rational agreement. It asserts furthermore
that the terms of agreement (i.e., principles of justice) serve as the neutral
standpoint for assessing social structures. Ironically, proponents argue that the
principles of justice, despite the lack of actual bargaining, are the product of
a bargain between the parties in an original choice situation.
In chapter 9, 1 focus on the English public law arguments relying on contract-
arian arguments as a basis for democratic legitimation. There I show that
modem constitutionalism, in contrast to the contractarian story, is based on
a set of political and legal structures which provide a standpoint to launder the
preferences of diverse interest groups. Chapter 10 examines contractarian
theory in terms of the instabilities created by ethnic conflict, redistributive
policies, and other deep cleavages in society can be accommodated by the
traditional range of democratic mechanisms. I argue there that the contractarian
approach suffers in that it relies on a single mechanism (eg., the hypothetical
contract) for the evaluation of democratic institutions. The theme of these
chapters is to offer a political economy perspective concerning the design and
implementation of democratic arrangements which take into account the diverse
individuals and bargaining processes.
1.5 Conclusion
The political economy perspective introduces a powerful new way to evaluate
the structures of political and regulatory institutions that have, until recently,
survived critical examination. It is hoped that these chapters provide a founda-
tion for further development of the second-best framework.
CHAPTER 2
RISK, TRUST, AND THE MARKET
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL'
2.1 Introduction
In the 1980s the American corporate economy experienced a massive increase
in liquidity. This increase was linked to two sources: (1) an increase in inter-
nally generated funds within firms which were employed for the purposes of
strategic acquisitions; and (2) the introduction of high-yield bonds which made
possible the acquisitions of large corporations by relatively small firms or
groups of investors (Jensen 1987). As a result of this massive increase in
liquidity, there was a huge wave of hostile take-overs (Jarrel! eta! 1988). The
emergence of a 'self-regulating' market for corporate control redefined the
traditional relationships among shareholders, managers, and non-equity stake-
holders.
Business scholars, lawyers, and economists alike argue that the market for
corporate control fundamentally changed the legal and corporate landscape in
the United States and, to a certain extent, Britain in the 1980s (J. Gordon
1991; Coffee 1991; Jensen 1987; Coffee 1987; Chiplin and Wright 1987). In
support of this proposition, evidence is offered regarding the scale, intensity,
and efficiency gains of the merger activity. For example, Jensen observes that
during the mid to latter half of the 1 980s, corporate control transactions
exceeded the 100 billion dollar mark each year (Jensen 1987: 314). These take-
overs were dominated by a particular driving force: the desire to bust up the
conglomerates formed during the merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s, which
contributed to the furious pace of the market activity in the mid-1980s.2
 The
This chapter appeared in J. Mc Cahery et al (eds.), Corporate Control and
Accountability (Oxford: Clarendon 1993).
2 During the 1960s and 1970s most mergers were conglomerate, not horizontal (Scherer
1986). It is well documented that the conglomerate strategy was a dismal failure: '[Ljarge
scale movement of U.S. manufacturing toward unrelated diversification is now thought by
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conglomerate structure was an attractive target because it was easier to value
(J. Gordon 1990). However, there were only a small number of conglomer-
ates which were actually dismantled and whose assets were spun off to their
most valued user (Gilson and Kraakman 1991); furthermore, directors and
managers themselves, in response to the stock-market's judgment that the
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s was, in effect, an economic mistake
(ibid.), restructured their asset portfolios by spinning off unrelated divisions
which were obtained during the conglomerate acquisition phase. There is
evidence to suggest that managements' motive for restructuring the corporate
asset and ownership structure reflects their desire further to entrench them-
selves, by improving their bargaining position, at shareholders' expense (Dann
and DeAngelo 1988).
The changes involved in these transactions have been the subject of intense
debate (see generally Bhagat et al. 1990; A. Auerbach 1988). Economists have
attempted to determine whether take-over activity promotes economic effi -
ciency or not (Franks et al. 1991). More specifically, some economists have
attempted, with varying degrees of rigour and success, to measure the relative
efficiency of take-overs as a means for redeploying assets. Indeed, one school
of thought, heavily identified with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party
in the USA, argues that take-over activity damages the productivity of firms,
causing managers to plan for the short term, resulting in a reduction of expens-
ive (but necessary) investment in human capital, R & D, and fixed capital and
a long-run decline in economic productivity (see, e.g., ShJeifer and Summers
1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1988). These critics argue that proponents of the
many observers (including Porter) to have been unsuccessful. The high level of divestiture
of peripheral businesses by diversified corporations beginning in the mid-1970s is almost
surely a response to that failure' (Shleifer and Vishny 1988: 13).
To be sure, there were other considerations behind these acquisitions-tax gains, man-
agement entrenchment, strategic investments, etc.-although the dominant consensus is that
the 1980s movement was motivated by the liquidation value of the target's assets. Certain
commentators note, however, that the 1980s take-over movement was primarily motivated
by firms acquiring businesses with similar assets. On this view, corporate managers, despite
the threats of take-overand other disciplinary and market pressures, invested firm resources,
even if they were not ex ante value-maximizing, in order further to entrench their firm-
specific investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1989:126). Also, a study by Bhagat et al. (1990)
of 62 hostile take-overs between 1984 and 1986, in which the price paid or offered was
higher than $50 million, shows that while tax savings, lay-offs, and strategic investment
cuts were important reasons for the efficiency improvements in the post-take-over experi-
ence, 60% of the efficiency gains, according to the authors, came from transferring the
target's assets to their most valued use.
Coffee (1984: 1148 n. 5) summarizes dissenting views; see also (Tirole 1988: 43-4).
RISK, TRUST, AND THE MARKET
	 33
market for corporate control rely on an especially narrow conception of
efficiency, 5
 limited to notions of improvements in management or gains from
organizational synergy. Herman and Lowenstein (1987), for example, argue
that acquisitions motivated by the undervalued market values of the firms do
not function solely to remove inefficient managements or to improve the
deployment of assets, but rather reflect an operational flaw in the share market
and its valuation process. Furthermore, these critics argue that the initial vision
of the control market (offered by Manne 1965), which characterized the control
market in terms of competing managers attempting to acquire assets in order
to put them to their most efficient use, has been fundamentally reoriented by
several factors, essentially by the competitive nature of the market and the
attraction of premium short-term earnings.
Shleifer and Vishny (1988), for example, have endorsed the externalities
perspective, arguing that most transactions have both winners (shareholders
of the target, raider, etc.) and losers (non-management constituencies such as
employees, suppliers, communities, and creditors). In the wake of the hostile
take-over, they argue that acquiring shareholders appropriate stakeholders' ex
post rents in the implicit contracts, which accounts for the efficiency gains.6
They argue that the existing efficiency studies on take-overs are theoretically
suspect, because they evaluate the wealth effects solely in terms of shareholder
wealth. Embracing the property rights view of the firm (which conceives of
Take-overs, according to Tirole, often produce perverse incentives for managers, and as
a result are inefficient, e.g., the existence of the threat of take-over reduces a manager's
incentive to make long-term investments, since she will not have an opportunity to capture
her future rents. Moreover, the increased risk injects a new level of insecurity into the firm
for junior and senior management. In response, managers disinvest in firm-specific assets,
and are over-concerned about their career prospects, which may lead them to make decisions
which are contrary to the interests of the residual risk-bearer. Finally, because the relation-
ship between worker and manager may be short, the element of trust may not develop
between them.
E.g., L. Summers (1990) argues that the reallocation of assets, which he speculates must
logically involve the transfer of earnings from where they carry a low price/earnings ratio
to where they carry a high ratio, must result in increased value only for those agents
involved in the transactions. He cautions that the alleged efficiency gains which occurred
as a result of take-over activity in the I 980s should be set against the background of a share
market which tripled. Summers argues that the real source of value may be traceable to the
ability of the acquirers to obtain reasonably cheap sources of financing for purchase of the
stocks at an attractive rate. However, it is not at all clear that the value captured in such
take-overs derives from efficiency gains, since other sources of value (e.g., lost tax revenue
or undervalued human resources) may be very high, and dwarf the efficiency effects.
6 This argument has also been advanced by Shleifer and Summers (1988). For critical
accounts of the logic of this claim, see Holmstrom (1988) and Williamson (1988b).
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the firm in terms of a set of ex ante incomplete contracts, in which the owner-
ship of the asset confers certain ex post rights, which affect the bargaining
power of the players and the ex post distribution of the organization's quasi-
rent), 7
 Shleifer and Vishny go on to argue that shareholders, when making a
hostile purchase of an asset, are not in fact acquiring the rights to maximum
feasible profits, but rather, are obtaining control over an asset which cannot
assure them a satisfactory return on their investment.
Ocher theorists, by contrast, argue that take-overs improve the overall
productivity of the economy. Proponents of the market for corporate control
offer diverse reasons for the efficiency gains that result from hostile take-overs.
For example, Jarrell et al (1988) argue that shareholders of target companies
clearly gain significant wealth. In particular, some empirical work suggests
that the source of value in hostile take-overs is not traceable to the stock-
market underpricing stock or short-term myopia (J.C. Stein 1988). Further-
more, empirical evidence shows that labour cost saving following hostile take-
overs is a marginal component of the apparent wealth gains from take-overs.8
There is considerable controversy over the tax gains in take-overs. However,
the view that tax gains are embodied as trapped equity has attracted few new
proponents since recent share repurchase data failed to confirm the tax gains
hypothesis (J. Gordon 1990). Commentators generally agree that the major
source of value results from the reallocation of assets following the completion
of the take-over (see, e.g., Bhagat et al 1990: 34-44; Jarrell et al 1988: 57-8).
Furthermore, the evidence of the 1980s seems to show that friendly take-overs
largely function in order to reallocate assets to firms operating in related
businesses. The value gains from these strategic acquisitions may result from
efficiency gains in production and distribution, as well as from other gains
such as white collar lay-offs, tax savings, and R&D cutbacks (Jarrell et al
1988: 57).
Against this background, the efficiency consequences resulting from these
transactions are directly realized by the wealth transfers to the shareholders.
The external costs appear to be low compared to the efficiency gains. L.
The property rights theory of the firm has been developed in Grossman and Hart (1986);
0. Hart and Hotmstrom (1986); Tirole (1988); 0. Hart (1989); Milgrom and Roberts
(1990); Kreps (1990); Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). For a critical appreciation of the
property rights standpoint, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Williamson (1990, 1991h).
See Bhagat et al. (1990: 52-4) arguing that savings are especially important in the case
of leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and management buy-outs (MBO5), Gilson et at. (1987); A.
Auerbach and Reishus 1988 (dismissing the role of taxes as a source of value based on the
tax procedure of combining losses with profits). But see L. Summers (1990) (rejecting
Auerbach and Reishus's investigation, since everyone agrees that the ability to combine
losses with profits is insignificant).
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Summers (1990), however, suspects that a closer empirical investigation might
reveal that the efficiency gains obtained from horizontal acquisitions, which
were the main type of transaction in the 1980s, are more closely tied to other
sources of value, which would mean higher external costs. 9 Furthermore, it
is difficult to ascertain whether the post-merger efficiencies are the result of
increased market concentration and market power or the result of lower
transaction costs. Theorists on both sides of the divide concede, however, that
the strategic combinations of the 1 980s resulted in abnormal increases in stock-
market prices, which indicates that there was a source of value created. Central
to my discussion is the claim made by proponents of the implicit contracts
theory that take-overs are motivated by the wealth gains from breaching
implicit contracts. In particular, Coffee argues that much of the shareholders'
wealth gains are the result of the rents captured from stakeholders (Coffee
1987: 111; see also Shleifer and Summers 1988: 42-3; but see Holmstrom
1988: 57-8).
The debate among economists is concerned with the existence, size, and
location of the wealth gains. My focus in this chapter concerns the related, but
rather different, legal issues: specifically, the strategic relationship between
managers and shareholders in the firm and how the 1980s market changed that
conflict.
Hence, I wish to consider the primary justification for the market for
corporate control: the market as an effective check on managerial discretion.
In section 2.2, I examine the historical dimension of the debate, concentrating
on the managerial theorists and their explanation of why managers prefer to
satisfice rather than maximize profits. In the next section, I link the discussion
of managerial theories with Coffee's differential risk hypothesis. Coffee's
theory is analyzed in detail, since it constitutes the controversial claim for the
1 980s hostile take-over movement that the asymmetry of risk between manager
and shareholder explain the rapid changes in the market for corporate control.
I attempt to show that Coffee's model of risk asymmetry provides only a
partial explanation of the 1980s merger movement. I argue that the conflict
between manager and shareholders is an unsteady game, which depends on
risk, resources, and time, and that the competition for control over the firm
is dependent upon the outcomes of this continuous struggle, which often
involves political lobbying by threatened managers to protect their firm-specific
capital from expropriation (Romano 1990). Critical discussion of the differen-
tial risk model is particularly relevant to recent debates regarding the impact
' Certain theorists have argued that the value gains from hostile take-overs might reflect
a market overestimation of the value of the strategic acquisitions, and therefore the level
of gains could be questionable (Bhagat, et al. 1990: 57-8).
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and justification of statutes protecting stakeholders who are not equity partici-
pants in the firm (Coffee 1990; Rock 1992). The new normative vision of
corporate control challenges the shareholder maximization norm by emphasiz-
ing the legally enforceable obligations of stakeholders. The articulated political
logic of the stakeholder coalition model is qualified and supported by the
device of the implicit contract (Rock 1992: 545-8).
2.2 The Historical Antecedents
In this section I survey the development of the modern firm. This is a well-
travelled path (Bratton 1989b). The aim of this discussion is to demonstrate
that the problem of control within the firm is long-standing and is connected
with the modern changes in the internal organization of the firm.
The early development of corporate theory was concerned with the question
of how to resolve the alleged problems which occur as a result of the separ-
ation of ownership and control of the firm. The consolidation of the corporate
firm in the 1920s, and the survival of such firms following the crash and the
great depression, was the historical background against which the emergence
of managerialist theories of the firm can be understood. In the United States,
the growth of the firm was facilitated by the departure from the unanimous
shareholder approval rule, which introduced the flexibility necessary for
management to consolidate small firms into large, multi-divisional ('M-firm')
companies (Note 1989a: 824). The rapid growth in firm size was accomplished
principally through public issuance of shares which, over time, further dimin-
ished the leverage of shareholders to alter management's power within the
firm. As a result, the changing position of the shareholder altered the legal
theory of the corporation, giving management enhanced control and relative
independence from individual shareholders)°
The growing importance of the firm, the increasing dominance of managers
and the passivity of shareholders, and the failure of neo-classical theory to
'° Dan-Cohen (1986) provides support for this account. He states that research conducted
since Berle and Means's classic study 'confirms the radical separation of stock ownership
from control in the large corporations which these authors have emphasized' (Dan-Cohen
1986: 18 n. 20; see also Blumberg 1975). Moreover, Dan-Cohen notes that, along with the
decline in the classical picture of the corporation, there has been a dramatic decline in the
significance of the individual shareholder. The extant empirical studies indicate that,
historically, investment funds available to corporations were generated either from a firm's
internal free cash flow or by institutional investors. Thus, the historical insight which
follows is twofold: first, the splitting of the ownership atom provides a degree of autonomy
from the individual shareholder; and secondly, the individual shareholder is no longer
anchored to a single firm, but rather is spread across many firms.
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explain the development of the firm formed the practical and conceptual
background against which Berle and Means wrote The Modern Corporation
and Private Properly. In their classic work, they observed that shareholders
were effectively powerless to exercise control over the firm, because ownership
was so dispersed and because the residual risk-bearers were, in effect,
incapable of co-ordinated action against incumbent management." The decline
of the single-owner firm, as the story goes, dissolved the significance of the
individual entrepreneur as both residual risk-bearer and manager. Thus, with
the 'splitting of the ownership atom', the professional manager commanded
greater control over the firm's resources (Coleman 1990: 457).
Due to the change in investment patterns, Berle and Means suggested that
there is a problem of corporate control.' 2
 Recently, Bratton (1989b: 191-4)
has interpreted the Berle and Means thesis as offering a combined institutional
and contractual mechanism for confronting the problem of the fractured
ownership structure. For Berle and Means, management is responsible for
deployment of the firm-specific factors of production, whereas shareholders
functioned as residual risk-bearers and suppliers of equity. In turn, the share
market functions as the institution of mediation between management and
shareholder, providing both monitoring services and exit for any discouraged
shareholders. Hence, the corporation is conceived as a bureaucratically con-
Berle and Means detected that shareholders have a collective action problem. The
dispersion of shareholders leads to rational apathy, in which each shareholder has a
preference, in the absence of incentives, to avoid the costs of monitoring management.
There can be little doubt that by the 1920s and 1930s management and shareholders had
reached an implicit agreement that managers would 'maintain stable dividends in return for
the freedom to pursue a growth strategy' (Bratton 1989b: 1492-3). Bratton argues that
this agreement permitted managers to raise capital internally, and thereby avoid market
review of their performance.
2 Williamson (1971: 346) notes that the corporate control issues which Berle and Means
pointed to have been alleviated as a consequence of the changes in organizational structure
of the firm. In particular, Williamson (1983: 3601) argues that most large firms in 1932
were large functionally organized (U-form) business firms. The expansion of U-form firms
'(1) results in greater control-loss experience, and (2) the utility function of the firm is
augmented to include the expense-preference inclinations of the functional divisions'.
Williamson argues that the reshaping of the U-form firm into a divisionalized (M-form)
firm, in which strategic and operating purposes were separated, significantly reduced the
inefficiency in information, and reduced the opportunism of management, by introducing
a firm-wide competition for resources which, at the same time, facilitated the selection of
investments that created greater returns to residual risk-bearers. However, Coffee challenges
Williamson's explanation for the M-form on the grounds that the development of the
conglomerate had more to do with management's preference for growth than with the
lowering of transaction costs (Coffee 1987: 89).
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trolled organization which is tied essentially by contract to shareholders via
the securities market. Bratton argues, however, that the contract is implicit,
since there is no effective means of enforcement. Thus, Berle and Means set
forth the fundamental premise of managerialism: the growing separation of
ownership and control of the corporation displaces the owner-entrepreneur
from the helm of the firm, which is now taken by the manager.' 3 The separ-
ation of functions has created a series of potential conflicts within the firm
(Coleman 1990: 456-65).
2.2. 1 Origins of Corporate Control
Following Henry Manne's (1965) paper 'Mergers and the Market for Corpor-
ate Control', the study of the market for corporate control officially began.
Manne articulated a powerful challenge to the conventional 'managerialist'
approach to the study of merger activity, which understood merger activity in
terms of increased managerial power, by stating the simple proposition that
the corporate merger might serve to discipline management discretion. Follow-
ing Berle and Means's (1932) explanation that the firm is characterized by the
separation of ownership and control, Manne argued that the disciplining of
inefficient management is best handled by an outside take-over by share-
holders; hence, the stock-market operates as an external monitor of manage-
ment, in that the share value of the firm reflects the relative efficiency of the
management. Thus, the market for corporate control operates to discipline
3 Coffee (1987: 81) observes that nearly everyone who has written on the firm since the
1930s has employed Berle and Means as a conceptual springboard to introduce the modern
picture of the firm. He notes, however, that most writers depart from the Berle and Means
characterization of managers as potentially autonomous. In effect, the vision of the firm
offered by Berle and Means is a gross exaggeration of reality, since the separation of ow-
nership and control did not entirely release managers from activity in the interest of the
residual risk-bearer. Coffee certainly argues persuasively that managers over time have
rationally chosen less autonomy (in the form of bonding and monitoring devices) in order
to increase the value of the firm. Generally, he is claiming that shareholders rationally rely
on managers to offer guarantees in order to attract external capital, since the economic
welfare of managers depends on their ability to attract future shareholders. The second point
of departure from the Berle and Means thesis, and one endorsed by Coffee (1990), is that
the image of the shareholder as owner of the firm should be replaced by a conception of
the firm understood in terms of an equilibrium position achieved through successive rounds
of strategic bargaining between shareholders, creditors, and managers. Coffee's theory of
the firm, which will be explored in some detail later, operates within the orbit of the
managerial game-theoretic conception developed by Aoki. Like Aoki (1988), Coffee
emphasizes the importance of ex ante relative bargaining power in the ex post distribution
of the residual.
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managements which fail to act in the interests of shareholders. Managers who
do not reduce the agency costs to shareholders are subject to the threat of take-
over, which clears the way for more responsive managers to organize better
returns for investors.
Yet Manne's neo-classical approach to the shareholder-manager conflict was
not the dominant explanation for merger activity in the 1960s and 1970s.
Rather, as Bratton has noted, the managerialist interpretation was the dominant
theory of merger activity during that period. Seeing management as being at
the helm of the firm, managerialists argued that, by virtue of their expertise
in decision making and control over the firm's information rents, managers
possessed considerable discretion. The managerialist view was premised on
certain behavioural assumptions. H. A. Simon (1955), for example, argued
that managers operated in a world of bounded rationality, and, as a result,
managers satisfied rather than profit-maximized. On this view, because the
external constraints on managers are weak, shareholders' return to capital is
necessarily sub Pareto-efficient. Thus, the separation of ownership and risk-
bearing functions provides the space for managers to design strategies which
work against the welfare interests of the residual risk-bearer.
The Berle and Means thesis also provided the basis for the more developed
managerial theories of the firm of the 1950s and 1960s, which attempted to
explain the workings of the management controlled organization on the basis
of various hypotheses. The managerial discretion hypothesis essentially holds
that the profit motive does not explain the structure, organization, or perform-
ance characteristics of management (Aoki 1984: 35). Instead, it is argued that
managers maximize their own interests, based on the pursuit of power, pres-
tige, and higher remuneration associated with the growth of the firm. The
managerial utility hypothesis assumes that management is resourceful and
capable of using its position within the firm to grab a significant portion of the
firm's rent.' 4
 Early theorists of the firm, for example Baumol and William-
son, observed that management had only a minimal constraint on its
opportunistic use of the firm's capital. In fact, Marris offered perhaps the most
interesting analysis of the managerial utility function, stating that managers
used their power to expand the firm beyond the size which maximizes share-
" Dennis Mueller notes that since profits are to some degree the property of the residual
risk-bearers, managers are forced to grab the firm's residual funds in a manner that appears
from the outside to be a legitimate transaction cost. Thus, because there are few ways
legitimately to absorb pecuniary funds, Mueller contends that managers most often take
residual profits in a non-pecuniary form (D. Mueller 1986: 44). In order to maximize their
managerial utility function, Mueller claims that managers will, in the context of uncertainty,
seek to acquire information so as to increase the probability of their obtaining their personal
pecuniary and non-pecuniary objectives.
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holders' wealth. On this theory, managers deploy the firm's free cash flow to
expand the growth of the firm, and lessen the degree of managerial insecurity
within the firm.
Marris was the first to claim that managers' security-seeking behaviour is
constrained by the threat of hostile take-over (Aoki 1984: 39). The work of
Marris and the economic managerialists can best be understood in terms of
managers attempting to diversify their portfolio within the firm (Coffee 1987:
81). Thus, a growth policy pursued by senior managers (and supported by
junior executives) is a rational strategy if and only if, it succeeds in reducing
psychic tension and the personal risk of their finn-specific investments (Aoki
1984: 41). Marris argued that the threat of take-over was the best constraint
on manager's pursuit of their growth policies. However, he stated that the
market for corporate control was not fully constraining, because the take-over
threat did not threaten all goals such as growth which were favoured by
incumbent managers. Because of market and organizational failure, Marris
argued that the modern firm tends to deviate from the model profit-maximizing
firm.' 5
 Marris's managerial growth model was heavily criticized by Solow
(1971) as being indistinguishable fromvalue-maximizing models, because firms
with different goals will respond in precisely the same manner to changes in
data; i.e., tax rates, interest rates, wages, and firm subsidies. This criticism,
while analytically telling, misses the most crucial insight provided by the
model: namely, that managers of large corporations prefer growth over
profitability, and that this preference is evidenced in the expenditures directed
toward mergers (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; P. Auerbach 1988: 122;
Williamson l987b: 160).
2.2.2 The New Management Environment Thesis
How insightful is Marris's model today? Coffee (1987: 88), for example, has
recently argued that despite the model's dated theoretical assumptions (that
firms are static structures and that the external constraints on managers are
weak), Marris accurately described managers' preference for growth over
short-run maximized profits of the firm. In support of this proposition, Coffee
argues that the recent trend toward the bust-up take-over in the late 1980s is
' Marris and Mueller (1980) argue that Marris's original thesis, that there is 'consider-
able slack in the take-over mechanism', has been confirmed by all available empirical
studies conducted up to the time they drafted the article. Based on pre-1980s take-over data,
they argue that the market for corporate control has failed to drive out non-shareholder
welfare-maximizing behaviour and the opposite result has been instantiated (Marris and
Mueller 1980: 44). This argument has been endorsed from a slightly different vantage-point
by Shleifer and Vishny (1988).
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ironically telling evidence in support of the managerial growth hypothesis.
Coffee speculates that the reasons for the bust-up trend are connected to the
fact that firms in the l960s and 1970s had grown to a sub-optimal size, or that
managers failed to pay out more of the residual cash flow to shareholders in
the form of dividends.' 6 By contrast, he offers a more subtle and original
interpretation for the 1980s era of bust-up mergers. He argues (Coffee 1987:
78) that the emergence of the hostile take-over in the 1980s '{a]ltered the
character of the American corporation, both in terms of its goals, span of
operations, and the behaviour of its managers and in terms of its ability to
compete with foreign rivals' In particular, he argues that the 1980s move-
ment constituted a return 'to the apocryphal era that Berle and Means assumed
once existed where managers were in fact dutiful agents to shareholders'
(Coffee 1987: 83).
Coffee's argument proceeds on two analytically related levels. First, he
suggests, following Jensen and Williamson, that the central legal conflicts
between shareholders and managers have been resolved by a series of bar-
gained compromises which obviate the concerns expressed by Berle and
Means.' 8 Secondly, Coffee argues that the central conflict between managers
To a certain extent Coffee relies on Jensen and Meckling's (1976) thesis in support of
this observation. Unlike property rights theorists, who attach theoretical significance to the
distribution of resources in calculating the costs of co-operation between owners of property
rights, Jensen and Meckling are concerned with how to align principal and agent interests.
For them, agency costs are inevitable, since contracts are not costlessly written or enforced.
Against this background, the rational interest of the agent is to reassure investors that the
firm has an institutional structure which reduces agency costs, since their information rents
depend on future shareholder support. The market for corporate control operates to reduce
agency costs. The threat of take-over is thought to be sufficient to overcome an agent's
shirking tendencies. More recently, Jensen has argued that the central conflict between
principal and agent is over the firm's free cash flow: managers tend to retain the free cash
flow for their own use, and shareholders attempt to get management to disgorge the capital
as dividend, and this conflict partially explains the recent trend in hostile take-over activity
(Jensen 1987: 314).
' A recent empirical study, however, indicates that hostile take-overs do not significantly
restructure the firm (Bhagat et al. 1990: 57).
The proposition that most legal conflicts between shareholder and manager have been
resolved is not entirely persuasive. Let us consider the assumptions Coffee makes. Like
transaction cost and property rights theorists, he assumes that certain terms of the employ-
ment contract between managers and shareholders are incomplete. Coffee stresses that if
parties find it in their interest to agree, given imperfect knowledge of the gains from
strategic behaviour and the ex post costs of negotiations, they will be disposed to cooperate.
However, this cooperative game framework is limited, since a player's normative as-
sumptions about strategic costs will affect that player's normative position with respect to
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and shareholders concerns the degree of leverage or risk in the firm) 9 Coffee
makes a major contribution to the theory of the firm by showing how the
concern for risk is central to both managerial and nexus-of-contracts theories20
and by connecting this problem to the larger areas of conflict in society
regarding the debate over socially acceptable levels of risk.2'
2.3 Risk and the Firm
In this section I will begin by analysing Coffee's risk aversion model, so as
to develop some general points about the bargaining problem between man-
agers and shareholders.
It was the higher level of risk created by the junk bond funding of hostile
a parties disposition to co-operate (Katz 1990; see also Elster 1989).
9 Unlike contractarians who are concerned only with welfare, Coffee (1987: 113-14)
directs his analysis to the distinctively normative question of whether the law should
encourage wealth transfers from non-shareholder to shareholder classes. His concern is
normative, because he is guided by the fairness of the actions of shareholders and the
relative positions of the parties. To be sure, Coffee, like contractarian theorists, is not
anxious to craft public policy interventions that sub-optimally redistribute assets. Rather,
his justification for addressing the conflict in the first place is to offer a structure whereby
the parties might design welfare-maximizing private agreements.
20 The corporate law world is dominated by the nexus-of contracts view of the firm. More
a metaphor than a theory (Bratton 1989c), it has become almost mandatory to refer to the
corporation as a nexus of contracts, which involves treating the firm as a legal fiction. The
strength of this approach is that it brings into focus the fact that the firm is constituted by
a series of contractual relations between employees, managers, suppliers, creditors,
shareholders, and bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This approach has recently
come under attack from a variety of perspectives. Property rights theorists, e.g., argue that
the nexus-of contracts perspective does not explain the firm, but, rather, 'leaves the question
open why certain standard forms are chosen ... [and] begs the question of what limits the
set of activities covered by a standard form"' (0. Hart 1989: 1764). In the context of
corporate law, certain critics have noted that the metaphor does not correspond to corporate
practice. Further, the nexus-of-contract vision suffers from many technical problems when
applied to corporate contracts; thus Kornhauser (1989: 1452-7) argues that the conditions
of 'full information' and 'costless contracting' which define the ideal contract for Easter-
brook and Fischel (1989) are undermined by the complexity of corporate decision making.
21 The 1980s take-over wave created a ground swell response in state assemblies for the
protection of non-shareholder ('stakeholder') constituencies-i.e., managers, creditors,
bondholders, and communities-which were harmed as a result of the transfer of risk. The
promulgation of non-shareholder constituency statutes extended the traditional doctrine of
fiduciary duty, which provides that a director's only duty is to the shareholder, to a new
class of beneficiaries (see Rock 1992; Gavis 1990).
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take-overs that threatened the position of stakeholders in the firm during the
1980s. As a response to this situation, Coffee advanced the general proposition
that non-shareholders' interests should be protected from the effects of corpor-
ate restructuring. His proposition is based on a normative argument which
claims that the cx post distribution of the shareholders' take-over premium is
justified on efficiency and equity grounds. Coffee defines risk here in terms
of the unbargained-for contingency which certain stakeholders are unable to
insure against in the context of a hostile take-over. He challenges the alleged
efficiency effects created as a result of increased risk in the firm. In terms of
the efficiency claim, Coffee insists that the increased leverage does not lead
to the most efficient redeployment of assets, through either financial restructur-
ing or the market for corporate control. Secondly, the effect of the greater
leverage creates diseconomies at both the state and the community level.
Coffee's argument is based on a normative concern: namely, how to protect
those stakeholders in the firm who have failed to safeguard their firm-specific
assets from post-contractual opportunism in the form of wealth-maximizing cx
ante agreements (see generally Shleifer and Summers 1988).
Let us first consider Coffee's proposition that the struggle over the level
of risk is the fundamental conflict between shareholders and managers in the
firm. Risk is an important concept in economic theory. It is normally defined
as 'that part of future uncertainty that is relatively systematic and predictable,
but which is still dangerous because it can bring financial ruin' (Shepard 1990:
251). Simply stated, risk is defined in terms of the probability of some hazard
occurring. Another aspect of risk is its severity. The analysis of risk is not
confined to economics, however. Indeed, risk theory has been extended to the
institutional analysis of modernity in general. For example, sociological
theorists offer a wider conception of risk, defined in terms of disappointment.
Consider, for example, Niklas Luhmann's (1975) theory of risk. For Luhmann,
risk is a key concept for explaining how a social system, defined in terms of
an autopoietic system which is recursively organized and self-referentially
closed, learns and evolves. Risk is connected to trust, which presupposes an
awareness of risk. For Luhmann, a person who consciously engages in a
course of action in order to avoid disappointment embraces trust. So, for
example, a litigant who selects a course of action, such as pursuing a legal
claim to its conclusion in the face of a settlement proposal, and is upset by the
outcome, may be disappointed if she acknowledges that she was partly to
blame. As a result of disappointments, the system learns.
To be sure, Coffee's use of risk is complex. I would argue that it is located
somewhere between the sociological and economic approaches we have just
discussed. For Coffee, risk is understood in the context of a bargaining
process. The firm is defined as a bargaining site on which several co-operative
arrangements are possible, and the parties have conflicting preferences over
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them. Coffee rejects the fashionable view that the conflict between managers
and shareholders is based on an attempt by the shareholders to monitor and
control moral hazard, which is inevitable, given the problem of bounded
rationality and the existence of transaction costs. The threat of a hostile take-
over induces managers, who are normally risk-averse, to take higher risks, in
order to avoid losing their future information rents. On this account, risk is
understood in terms of contingency.
Coffee argues that the economists' moral hazard explanation is too coarse-
grained to explain the increase in leverage. In its place he offers certain results
from prospect theory. That theory provides that players will select low-risk
strategies only if they are currently performing above their aspiration level,
and, correspondingly, will alter their risk preference to a high-risk strategy
when they are operating below their aspiration level. This insight is applied
to the corporate decision-making context to explain the higher incidence of
leverage in the firm. Taking his cue from the managerialists, Coffee contends
that managers were able to price-satisfy until the late 19705, because they met
their expectation levels and could select low-risk strategies based on growth.
He argues however, that the completion of the corporate control market
changed that pattern and that, as a result, most managers, even those operating
highly efficient finns, have altered their preference for low-risk strategies in
order to avoid forced exit and the loss of their future rents.
Coffee maintains that under certain assumptions posited by modem financial
('portfolio') theory, that rational shareholders hold well-diversified portfolios
and that fully diversified institutional investors dominate the share market-
place, rational managers tend to be highly risk-sensitive compared with share-
holders, who are theoretically risk-neutral (Posner 1986). Three arguments
are offered in support of this proposition. First, managers have an implicit
contract for quasi-permanent employment, based on their assessment of their
relative merit and their expectations of the growth of the firm. Moreover,
managers highly value this employment relationship, and fear the potential loss
of the firm's rents. Secondly, the manager has a high level of personal, as well
as asset-specific, wealth invested in the firm and, as a result, is over-invested
in the firm as compared with the shareholder with her diversified risk. Thirdly,
managers may face personal and criminal liability for bankruptcy, fraud, or
22 Economists argue that shareholders do not suffer the most risk, because they are able
to spread their risk across investments through a portfolio strategy. The dispersed nature
of shareholding creates the classical free-rider problem: given the diffused shareholding in
the firm, how do shareholders induce managers to act in their interests when the rational
shareholder has no incentive to monitor management. Agency theorists argue that the
executive labour market and the market for corporate control are the strongest mechanisms
for curbing managerial misconduct.
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securities manipulation, whereas shareholders are, for the most part, effectively
shielded. On this theory, managers have little shield against firm-specific risk,
so are highly risk-averse; whereas shareholders are theoretically risk-neutral.
However, Coffee argues that this asymmetry is not wholly undesirable, since
it reduces the moral hazard problem. Coffee seems, in the end, to support the
increased level of shareholder power but, at the same time, wishes to protect
those interests most exposed to the new level of risk.
Before addressing the asymmetry hypothesis, I want to mention some of the
implications of Coffee's managerial risk hypothesis for an understanding of
the problem of moral hazard and, more concretely, the market for corporate
control. As regards moral hazard, Coffee contends that managers, because they
are over-invested in the firm, have an incentive to entrench themselves further,
rather than make ex ante value-maximizing investments. Echoing the
managerialists, Coffee believes that two propositions appear to follow: (1) the
introduction of high risk into the firm is an incentive for managers to maximize
growth size and not to maximize profits (Coffee 1987: 83); and (2) managers
tend to minimize risk by financing growth though internalized funds, and
generally avoid, as far as possible, external contracts for finance (see generally
Gintis 1990). Thus corporate managers are committed to non-value-maximizing
decisions, which explains certain general features of modern corporations: (1)
their excessive earnings retention; (2) managers' preference for fixed, as
opposed to entrepreneurial variable, wage contracts. 23 The main point to be
made here is that managers, because they are unable to diversify their risk,
deploy the firm's assets sub-optimally (0. Hart 1989: 1769) . 24 Indeed, Coffee
parts company with the managerialists in part because of their failure to
appreciate the external, market pressures on managers to make efficient
decisions. He argues that the managerialist growth hypothesis explains the
conglomeration movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the fierce defensive
response of managers in the 1980s to avoid the harsh effects of the restructur-
ing movement.
23 This argument appears odd, since it seems that most managers do not actually select
their own form of compensation package. Indeed, the agency literature argues that principals
and agents draft ex ante agreements which include incentives, in order to align agents'
interests. On this theory, even under an optimal incentive scheme, managers wilt tend to
pursue their own interests.
24 Hart argues that since moral hazard is ineluctable, expropriation problems can be
avoided either by writing ex ante profit-sharing agreements or by parties sharing investment
expenditures. Both suggestions may be insufficient to avoid moral hazard, since verifiability
and ownership problems may create differentials.
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2.4 Ex Post Settling Up
Let us now ignore the moral hazard question and ask how the implicit contract
provides a justification for ex post redistribution of the shareholders' take-over
premium. Here Coffee is drawing on the economic theory of the firm which
characterizes the firm as a nexus of contracts. In this model, the firm is
defined as a set of explicit and implicit contracts. Most of the terms of these
contracts are incomplete, since they cannot be costlessly drafted and enforced
(Charny 1991; Williamson 1985). A contract may be incomplete for another
reason; for example, in that it is insensitive to economically relevant future
events (Ayres and Gertner 1989: 92 n.29). over the length of these agreements,
the parties will bargain over the incomplete terms (Charny 1991; Milgrom and
Roberts 1990). In this model, managers and shareholders develop a set of
expectations which are the result of continuous bargaining. In cases where the
parties are unable to agree or clarify their differences about a missing term,
the court is called in to fill in the gap (Ayres and Gertner 1989). Coffee
contends that in the event of a hostile take-over the missing term for mana-
gerial compensation should be interpreted by reference to what the parties
would have bargained for ex ante. This approach is flawed. That is, the simple
bargain framework may lead to results which are either inefficient or unfair
(Ayres and Gertner 1989; Charny 1991). To be sure, Coffee fully admits this
strategy is limited. In the alternative, he offers an argument for a broader
extension of fiduciary duties towards stakeholders generally. The difficulty
with this argument is that it encourages managers to further protect their
interests at the expense of shareholders. A more explicit argument against
extending fiduciary duties to stakeholders is that it offers protection to groups
who can obtain contractual protections and, as a result, it diminishes share-
holder protection (Stetson Law Review Symposium - J. Macey 1991: 40-41).
On the first level, as noted above, Coffee draws on the implicit contracts
literature to justify the ex post distribution. To be sure, he acknowledges that
this literature was originally devised to explain why employers of low-wage
labour made adjustments to demand by changing the quantities of labour rather
than the price (Coffee 1987: 84). Here, Coffee attempts to extend the concept
of the implicit contract to explain one feature of the internal managerial labour
market-namely, the tendency of risk-averse managers to trade off some portion
of their current wages in exchange for increased job security. This strategy has
limitations. Collins (1993) complains that the contractualist approach attempts
to explain internal wage variations in terms of supply and demand. However,
he argues that internal market wage rates are set not merely by market forces,
but by reference to social and administrative norms. Collins's point is that the
internal labour market wage might be tied to a norm, rather than to the fluctu-
ations of supply and demand. He attempts to generalize this claim, but his
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attempt is only partially effective, since it assumes that all internal labour
market wage rates are set by either norm or organization. To be sure, certain
segments of the labour market will be market-influenced, and this seems
especially true in the case of professional markets where there are sellers'
propensities (Gilson and Mnookin 1990: 222-5).
The differential risk model has been challenged from a different perspective
by Oliver Williamson (1987b: 159). In the first instance, the concept of an
implicit contract is questioned, since it appears ambiguous and conceptually
confused. More centrally, Williamson contends that the contractual problems
of the firm are best understood in terms of ex ante contracting problems.
Employing insights from transaction cost theory, the contracting problems
between managers and shareholders can be addressed either in terms of
incentives, including severance payments, or by recourse to a governance
structure which can help resolve disputes. With this background, Williamson
contends that in the context of a hostile take-over, in which the earlier contrac-
tual equilibrium has been disrupted, risk-averse managers are more likely to
protect their firm-specific investment from hazard by recourse to contractual
mechanisms. Williamson argues that the successor management should not be
expected to renegotiate on the same terms, even if certain changes have
occurred. To be sure, Williamson notes that the changed environment will
produce at least one of three different changes: (1) a reduction in managers'
firm-specific investment; (2) increased inducements to accept higher levels of
hazard; or (3) insurance against loss of the firm's rent. It seems to me that
Williamson's arguments are powerful, but could be usefully supplemented by
an additional set of arguments against Coffee's implicit contracts thesis.
Coffee challenges certain aspects of Williamson's claims. First,
Williamson's approach is unsatisfactory, since it assumes that the level of firm-
specific capital explains the actions of managers. In particular, it is not at all
clear that all managers have a particularly high level of firm-specific capital
in the firm; furthermore, the existence of the executive labour market indicates
that managerial skill is transferable, and not tied to a specific firm (Coffee
1987: 91). Coffee's major point is that the success of the firm in creating
contractual incentives for managers to align their interest with that of the
principals makes them more risk-averse, and explains their preference for
growth and their aversion to debt.
The resort by Coffee to the implicit contract model invites a final comment.
Rather than limit himself to a narrow claim that certain managers might be
entitled to a premium share for an unforeseen risk, Coffee attempts to extend
the point to address the normative question regarding whether anything should
be done to offset the increased risk which certain groups, including the state
and the community, have absorbed as a result of the hostile take-over. In order
adequately to address this question, Coffee attacks the neo-classical vision of
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the firm and the shareholder sovereignty doctrine. Both theories place the
shareholder-principal at the centre of the firm, and state that, as the risk-
bearing entrepreneur, the shareholder is entitled to control over the residual,
and is the only group in the firm which is owed fiduciary duties. I suspect that
Coffee's use of the implicit contract hypothesis requires some unpacking on
this point.
Coffee, in the main, aspires to offer a theoretical account of the firm which
might provide an alternative foundation for corporate law. This approach is
based on the following claims. First, as mentioned earlier, Coffee defines the
firm as an imperfect and unstable risk-sharing arrangement, which translates
into a more flexible vision of the firm. The principal is displaced from the
centre of the firm, and the ex post struggle over the residual profit is not
determined by one party but is a bargained-for outcome (Coffee 1990; Rock
1992: 545). Following the insights of the implicit contract thesis, Coffee argues
that the shareholder is not the only risk-bearer in the firm. Because managers
are risk-averse and are unable to get full insurance, they are highly exposed
and, as a result, unable to protect their firm-specific assets. Against this
background, managers make implicit contracts to protect this investment,
which are breached by the hostile take-over. Arguing from fairness, managers
should be compensated in the form of ex post devices like the golden para-
chute. The cx post devices are defended on the grounds that it is difficult to
evaluate managers' behaviour ex ante, and that by offering ex ante incentives
managers, might have an incentive to act opportunistically.
Coffee's account is not fully convincing. At this point, I will consider the
economic arguments that Coffee employs in support of his claim justifying ex
post distribution of the premium share. First, it might be equally well argued
that the management compensation package negotiated by managers, in most
instances, would include an insurance premium against the risk of forfeiture
of future information rents. This would most certainly be the case for those
managers hired since the hostile take-over market reached maturity in the early
1980s (Eisenberg 1987). Even if certain senior and junior managers did not
sign complete contracts, one would expect that the principal calculated the
costs for all imaginable future hazards into the terms of the contract (ibid).
Coffee justifies the ex post compensation for managers in terms of effi-
ciency. The claim here is that take-overs are necessary to reduce opportunism,
but that management should receive a share of the take-over premium in order
to compensate them for the unbargained-for risk as well as to smooth the
transition. The efficiency grounds for this proposition are challenged by
Brudney (1988: 153), who rightly argues that 'the case for management's need
for more protection at take-over time is hard to see in the light of the immense
discretion that it has during the operation of the company to reward itself
generously for its sacrifice in limiting its talents to firm-specific dimensions'.
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Brudney's point is that the aim of take-overs is not to supply management with
more rewards, after it acts against shareholders' interests.
Two observations are relevant to our discussion. First, managers tend to
make manager-specific contracts because they are harder to monitor and
punish •u These implicit contracts are usually based on the reputation of the
manager, and are part of the manager's own human capital (Aoki 1988; Kreps
1990; but see Williamson 1992). On this theory, if a manager can arrange for
implicit contracts with the firm's most valuable employees and suppliers, he
can extract a higher wage from shareholders. The degree of entrenchment
depends on how highly the firm's assets are dependent on the incumbent
manager's skill and knowledge. On the other hand, if the board removes the
manager, he is able to exit with his contracts and commit himself to another.
As a result, the fact that the incumbent firm stands to lose certain rents if the
manager exits indirectly commits the shareholder to a reward rather than a
punishment policy.
This model explains managers' objectives in terms consistent with those
elaborated by Coffee. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) contend, like Coffee, that
managers tend to further entrench themselves because they are overinvested
in the firm. At every level of selection there is always a group of employees
that have an interest in entrenching themselves. As a result, managers that are
inefficient are least likely to be able to move between firms and have an
interest in taking actions that are value-reducing to shareholders. The main
insight is that managers collecting rents attempt to do whatever they can to
collect their future rents. Thus they will tend to make value-enhancing invest-
ments beneficial to the shareholder only if this choice further entrenches them.
Several insights suggest themselves. First, Coffee, like Shleifer and Vishny,
believes that the hostile take-over is an inefficient weapon for disciplining
managers, and may have the opposite effect. Second, a highly organized group
of managers will mobilize, as they did in the 1980s, to influence legislation
which protects them from potential loss of their firm specific capital (Macey
1988). Taking these points together, the effectiveness of incumbent manage-
ment to protect its interest should not be underestimated.
2.5 Conclusion: Trust and Implicit Contracts
The differential risk hypothesis attempts to justify ex post compensation to
managers on the grounds of efficiency gains. In particular, Coffee claims that
ex post compensation is necessary to pay off the losers, in order to reduce the
Manager-specific investments include acquiring and divesting businesses which add to
managers' position and making implicit contracts with the firms' employees and clients.
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inefficiencies that result from managements' defensive responses to hostile
take-overs, and at the same time to maintain the loyalty of managers. Such
payments should protect the most risk-averse managers and restore the equilib-
rium between the various interests in the firm. However, Coffee does not
explain the basis for such implicit contracts. This question has been addressed
by theorists who rely on a notion of trust or reputation.
Proponents of the rational reputation or trust approach explain, like Coffee,
that complete contingent claims contracting is expensive, hence shareholders
prefer to rely on implicit contracts with stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers
1988: 37). The problem is to explain what motivates stakeholders to sink
investments in firm-specific capital if there is no mechanism to sanction
shareholders who breach their promises to stakeholders.
Trust is relevant to implicit contracting, because it recognizes that individ-
uals act opportunistically, and it explains the circumstances in which individ-
uals will honour a promise or agreement (Elster 1989: 274-5; Dasgupta 1988:
53). The concept of trust is defined in term of credibility.
A related approach in terms of rational reputation (Kreps 1990) is based on
insights from non-co-operative game theory. This assumes a Continuous
bargaining game with a high probability of repeated bargaining rounds. Kreps
argues that managers honour implicit contracts because it gives them a good
reputation: 'I will begin by trusting you hoping that you will honour that trust.
Indeed, I will continue to trust you as long as you do not abuse that trust. But
if ever you abuse that trust, I will never again trust you' (Kreps 1990: 102).
In a repeat game, if the manager adhered to the implicit contract in the earlier
round, the manager will continue to honour the contract, since it generates a
reputation for trust and hence increased capital for the firm. Limitations to the
Kreps model are that it assumes that the only reason to trust a manager is her
reputation (Shleifer and Summers 1988: 39), and assumes that a shifting
constituency such as shareholders knows what a manager did in the earlier
round (Williamson 1992: 167).
The role of trust has been applied to the take-over context by Shleifer and
Summers (1988). They argue that hostile take-overs disrupt the implicit long-
term contracts between shareholders and stakeholders. They refer to psycho-
logical evidence which they claim shows that people trust others for reasons
other than reputation. Since this cannot explain trust, they argue that share-
holders tend to select trustworthy managers, because this maximizes utility.
While it is not clear what the selection mechanism may be, they claim that
managers must pass through a 'loyalty filter' before promotion to positions of
trust. Applying this model to take-overs, they argue that the extent to which
managers are able to defend the implicit contracts made with stakeholders
depends on their level of entrenchment and their willingness to honour those
agreements. Shleifer and Summers see take-overs as rent-seeking devices, and
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challenge the view that net efficiency gains are achieved. While they concede
that there may be some efficiency gains, they contend that there may be greater
long-run efficiency losses due to the loss of trust which facilitates long-term
contracting.
This argument turns on the view that shareholders prefer trustworthy
managers who will entrench themselves and honour implicit contracts with
stakeholders. Holmstrom persuasively challenges this claim, arguing that the
fact that a manager is trustworthy does not ensure commitment (Holmstrom
1988: 57-8). Further, it seems that the entrenchment claim fails to explain why
the present shareholders do not capture the rents from the implicit contracts.
Holmstrom prefers to explain managerial behaviour in terms of managers'
rational concern for their careers. Hence, they act to maximize their position
within the firm, and respond only to the groups with the most voice or the
greatest power. However, this self-interest model does not square with trust.
Finally, a major difficulty with the breach of trust claim is that it is without
empirical support. As we have seen earlier, the recent empirical studies
analyzing the large gains in shareholder wealth that arise from take-overs
shows that the primary source of wealth is related to the anticipation of the
post-take-over divestitures of the target firm's assets. Added to this point is
the finding by Bhagat et al. (1990) that the reduction in labour costs and
transfers from bondholders amounted to an insignificant aspect of the wealth
increase overall. Based on these considerations, my conclusion is that the
implicit contracts model is inaccurate in empirical terms and its normative
foundations are questionable.
CHAPTER 3
REPEATED GAMIs, SOCIAL NORMS AND
INCOMPLETE CORPORATE CONTRACTS
3.1 Introduction'
Recent legal theories of the firm tend to build on a foundation of economic
contract. This chapter shows, first, that there are sharp differences among the
economic models of contract available to lend content to these contractual
firms, and, second, that the descriptive and normative implications of these
differences have yet to be fully appreciated in the legal literature.
We begin with the contractarian firm, the economically-grounded descrip-
tion that has become standard in contemporary American corporate legal
theory. We move on to describe and contrast an incomplete contracting model
of the firm that follows from a very different set of economic assumptions. We
then combine this model with basic points from the literature of repeated
games. Taken together, they support two assertions. First, under certain
conditions rational actors will not ground their firms in contracts. Second,
contracts made in connection with firms are likely to be so incomplete as to
render any available theory of contract inadequate as a basis for a law of the
firm. We argue that this incomplete contracting model provides a more plaus-
ible basis for describing corporations than does the contractarian model. We
also explore some of its normative implications.
In section 3.2 we draw on our incomplete contracting model to show why
firm contracts do not function in the fashion predicted by the contractarian
approach. There we also situate our approach within the existing range of
incomplete contracts models. All of these describe contracting problems which
leave parties with less than the information necessary to approximate their first-
best expected utility. But they offer different conceptual techniques for dealing
with these problems. Some closely resemble the contractarian theory of the
William Bratton and Morten Hviid collaborated with me on writing this paper which
appeared in: C. Willet (ed.) Fairness in Contract (London: Blackstone Press 1996).
54	 INCOMPLETE CORPORATE CONTRACTS
firm in seeking to complete incomplete firm contracts by approximating a
theoretical contract that succeeds ex ante in describing all future states of
nature. Our model of incomplete contract draws on a different body of econ-
omic literature to insist that the very fact that parties are limited by what they
can put into a contract denudes the attempt at ex ante approximation of feasibil-
ity. A regime in which legal decision-makers take an ex post perspective that
supersedes the bargain of the parties becomes inevitable.
The suggestion that a legal-decision maker legitimately might supplant the
parties' bargain (whether actual or hypothetical) creates a considerable problem
for an economic theory of the firm. Without the bargain (actual or hypotheti-
cal) as a base point, the theory lacks an obvious source of normative content
for the ex post gap-filling exercise. In section 3.3, we suggest that game
theoretic models of repeated games can be drawn on to solve this problem.
Here we outline the basic features of repeated game models and their implica
-
tions for understanding long term production relationships. We show the robust
pictures of private enforcement strategies and relational stability that have
evolved in the repeated game literature. These now can help us understand
how, given conflicting parties in situations where contract is not feasible, trust
and co-operation can emerge to benefit the parties.
In section 3.4 we expand on the literature of repeated games to examine its
points of influence on recent discussions of corporate contract theory. This
discussion shows that the process of breaking with contractarianism already
has begun, but that the full implications of the repeated game models and
related principles of incomplete contracting have not yet been articulated in
the corporate law context. Section 3.4 completes this discussion by drawing
on a new line of social theory. This approach, which also draws on game
theoretic models of co-operation, offers a behavioural description in which
trust and rational calculation co-exist and complement one another. We argue
that this description provides the basis for a theory of the firm that admits both
contract and a positive law of fiduciary duty as independent elements.
3.2 Contractarian Theory
Under the contractarian theory dominant in American corporate law during the
past fifteen years, the firm has been viewed as a set (or 'nexus') of incentive
contracts (see Bratton, 1989). This theory derived from the principal-agent
theory earlier developed in economics and extended it in a number of direc-
tions. 2
 According to the contractarian theorists, the primacy of contract
More specifically, contractarian theory combines two related theories (agency costs and
the efficient market hypothesis), and states that managers will have an incentive to create
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implies that corporate law should contain no mandates, only default terms. In
addition, legal decision-making respecting firms should be treated as an
exercise in contractual gap-filling pursuant to the 'hypothetical contract prin-
ciple', a universal norm to guide decision-makers in supplying default terms
and filling gaps. Under the principle, the legal system supplies the rule which
both parties to the contract would have adopted had they addressed the matter
ex ante in a costless world. Terms that follow the principle, says the theory,
will be efficient for all situations. And, because the theory's operative class
of 'contracts' includes any and all voluntary economic relationships, the field
deemed appropriate for application of its regime of ex ante default rules and
gap fillers is quite large.
The literature on contractarian theory begins with rational, well-informed
actors and asserts that prevailing governance systems result from their efficient,
equilibrium choices. The presence of competition makes this assertion plaus-
ible: We can assume that existing arrangements, whether nominally stemming
from contract or positive law, result from efficient, equilibrium choices
because, in the long run, only efficient choices will survive (see Johnston,
1993). Contactarian theory then shifts its time reference to future arrangements
to assert that contract trumps mandate because rational, well-informed actors
contracting ex ante can be expected to do a better job at economizing on
transaction costs and devising safeguards against opportunism than can legal
decision-makers intervening expost (see Williamson, 1993). The legal regime's
only function is to provide ex ante cost economies by providing pre-packaged
default rules formulated under the hypothetical contract principle (see Easter-
brook and Fischel, 1991). In the final contractarian picture we get a complex
of contract terms that govern all future contingencies, all derived ex ante,
either in fact or by hypothesis. 3 A normative admonition greets a party who
shows a loss ex post caused by another's opportunism: Since you could have
contracted to protect yourself, you should have done so. The positive law of
the firm serves only to open a field for self-regulation, and intervention to
impose duties on corporate actors pursuant to juridical notions of responsibility
should be avoided as unproductive.
But the contractarian description has a significant shortcoming. It gives us
legal rules which mimic the market. In general terms, the function of corporate law is to
design an efficient set of default rules to govern the rights and duties among members of
the firm. Thus conceived, corporate law, as a set of efficient default rules, reduces the costs
of contracting. See, Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991.
A complete contract is a contract that all the relevant and foreseeable contingencies are
foreseen and that the parties have agreed on efficient provisions for each state contingency.
Es ante completeness also assumes that the parties will implement the contract and not
renegotiate ex post the terms of the agreement. See generally, Moore, 1992.
56	 INCOMPLETE CORPORATE CONTRACTS
ex ante contracts across-the-board and thereby makes corporate governance
entirely contractual without providing a description of the processes by which
corporate actors make contracts (see Johnston, 1993). It avoids the necessity
of a theory of bargaining with two assumptions - that bargaining is relatively
cheap and that competition will force parties to bargain their way into efficient
arrangements .
3.3 From the Complete Contracts Firm, through the Incomplete
Contracts Firm, to the Firm Without Contracts
Incomplete contract models deal with the problems that arise when contracting
parties possess less information than is necessary to approximate their first-best
expected utility. Most work on incomplete contracts falls into one of two basic
paradigms: the transaction costs approach and a contrasting approach which
derives incompleteness from first principles. The transaction costs approach
already has received the complete attention of those who work on the theory
of the firm, and, indeed, has been assimilated into contractarian theory. The
component ideas of the first principles approach have only just begun to show
up in legal commentaries. 5
 We argue in this section that they suggest a thor-
ough-going, process-based challenge to the contractarian paradigm.6
Under the transaction costs view, the problems which arise from attempting
to write ex ante contracts are due to a diverse range of transaction costs. First,
it is difficult for parties to anticipate all the possible state contingencies that
might arise, and design the contractual provisions to deal with them. Second,
even if the parties could specify all the relevant contingencies, it may be
impossible for the parties adequately to specify these future states in order to
forge an agreement. Third, there are too many contingencies making it difficult
for the parties to write them into a contract. Fourth, the costs of verifying the
performance of the party may make create disincentives to write a complete
contract. Fifth, the enforcement of the contract is expensive. The transaction
costs model asserts that the cumulation of these costs prevents actors from
The mandatory/enabling discussion in US corporate law developed on the weakness of
these assumptions, concluding that information asymmetries, along with shareholder
collective action and rational apathy problems, prevent effective bargaining and make certain
actual contracts suspect. The apparent weakness of the contractarian approach left open a
place for normative mandates in the field of corporate governance. However, mandates were
subsumed in the larger complex of hypothetical contracts.
See e.g., Ayres, 1991.
6 In the discussion which follows, we will use the term incomplete contracts approach
to cover situations where there are asymmetries of information and possibly problems of
third party verification or private information.
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negotiating a complete ex ante solution to all problems. But it goes on to take
on entirely ex ante perspective in dealing with the problem, asserting that
actors putting capital at risk still can be expected to design ex ante governance
structures that minimise the costs of future uncertainty. Furthermore, it insists
that legal decision-makers assisting the parties by providing terms ex post
should cast those terms from an ex ante time perspective in order to guard
against disruption of the parties' allocation of financial risk and to minimise
future transaction costs. As a result, it tends to join contractarian theory at the
normative bottom line to counsel self-protection through explicit contract and
impose an overwhelming presumption against legal intervention to protect
dependent actors.
What we term the 'first principles' paradigm of incomplete contracts begins
with the same definition of incompleteness as the transaction costs approach
but goes on to make a number of contrasting claims, both substantive and
procedural. The substantive claim brings the notion of incompleteness to bear
on a more precise conception of 'contract'. More specifically, ex ante incom-
pleteness is due to the formal nature of the contract in addition to the costs of
complete specification. Thus, unlike the transaction costs approach and its
inclusion of any voluntary economic relation within its notion of contract, the
first principles approach usually looks to situations where a contract must be
explicitly specified by its parties in order to be recognised as such and
enforced. That is, to have 'contract' terms that govern future states, those
contingent states must be specified and the future outcomes must be
computable. Since some future states of nature clearly are not computable,
transacting parties as a result lack the technology necessary to enable the
negotiation and composition of a contract term ex ante (see Anderlini and Felli,
1994). Indeed, under certain conditions problems concerning specification of
future contingencies become so intractable that rational parties in search of
gains from trade may proceed to transact without writing a contract at all.7
The first principles approach also draws on bargaining theory to recognise
the collection of process infirmities that also limit the utility of contract.
Bargaining theory models the problems that come up when relational economic
actors transact. It asserts that, even where parties could cost-beneficially
specify a contract term, information asymmetries and strategic behaviour may
prevent them from so doing. This implies that bargaining processes often shape
contractual results, and in turn leads to the question whether a viable set of
This literature takes seriously the idea that there may be no contract. We should note
that there are varying degrees of contractual incompleteness: in particular: it assumes
intermediate forms of incompleteness which limit transaction costs by resorting to third
parties to ex post decide the contractual outcomes; see Tirole, 1988.
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governance provisions for a firm can be derived through any available model
of contract. Some bargaining models show co-ordination failures: Rational
actors can conceivably adopt any one of a number of mutually consistent
arrangements and market forces may fail to assure that only efficient patterns
emerge from the range of possibilities. 8
 Other models identify costs of bar-
gaining that prevent efficient results. Consider a price negotiation over the sale
of a nonfungible product. A buyer seeking a greater share of the gains of trade
might invest in quality information to gain a bargaining advantage. Such an
investment in a pure distributional advantage is inefficient, since only total
benefits and costs matter from an efficiency standpoint (see Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990). In the alternative, each bargaining party stands to benefit from
the communication of information about its own preferences. The resulting
informational uncertainty can result in the loss of a beneficial transaction, and
induces inefficient informational investment in any event.
The first principles approach thus recognises three limitations on the zone
of ex ante contracting-technological failure, private information and strategic
behaviour. Taken together these limitations permit us to see that the contract-
based vision of corporate law suffers from two fundamental limitations. First,
contrary to the nexus of contracts approach, the firm cannot plausibly be
described as a sum of contractual parts. 9
 The reason is simple-costs and
technological limitations prohibit bargaining across the range of pertinent
contingencies (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Second, fundamental questions
must be asked about the viability of the central contractarian assumption that
contracting agents will bargain to optimal arrangements if left to their own
devices. It is this premise that permits the theory to complete the incomplete
contracts that actors conclude in the real world by drawing on the hypothetical
contract principle, and to recharacterize corporate law's set of positive instruc-
tions as contract terms (see Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). If, as the first
principles approach suggests, information asymmetries may cause the parties
to fail to bargain their way to an efficient term even in a costless environment,
The standard assumption that markets will overcome co-ordination problems give
competitive supply conditions is not safe where multiple goods are involved and more than
two parties must agree in order for exchange to go forward.
The contractarian approach relies on the principal-agent theory as a framework for
analyzing governance issues which involve members of the organization. (See Easterbrook
and Fischel 1991 pp 1-39). Principal-agent theory addresses the central problems of
economic organization and motivation through the design of optimal contracts which
distribute incentives and risk-sharing effectively. These contracts are ex ante complete in
that they speci1' for the relevant foreseeable contingencies. Hart points out, however, that
the complete contracting assumption necessarily excludes a role for corporate governance
in that there is no role left for a mechanism to decide residual issues of control: Hart, 1995.
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(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), then it follows that the existence of mean-
ingful hypothetical contract terms cannot be assumed. Further, given the
complexity of corporate situations, actual negotiated corporate contracts will
not necessarily be optimal even where they exist in the real world-the parties
(and by implication the economists who write about contracts) quite simply
lack the technological wherewithal to create such ideal governance arrange-
ments. If contracting can be inefficient, then its frequent absence in the
practice of real world corporate actors makes complete sense, and the choice
of legal institutions, as opposed to that of contractual terms, can be the primary
influence on the efficiency of the outcome (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
We note that this analysis implies a modification of contractarian theory's
descriptive and normative bottom lines only to the extent that bargaining costs
and effects of technological failure are nontrivial. As to bargaining costs,
competition certainly will assure triviality in some cases. But the bilateral
monopoly situation that accompanies firm-specific investment strongly suggests
that the bargaining costs of firm governance are nontrivial (see Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990). The same conclusion should follow for technological limita-
tions if recent experiences with standard American corporate contract forms
may be taken as a guide. The inadequacy of the standard terms employed in
contracts governing senior securities is widely acknowledged. The inadequacy
of the stock of terms governing junior equity investments is acknowledged even
more widely. Here investment proceeds under contract terms and state-supplied
governance structures that leave open such constant risks of opportunistic
exploitation that contractarian theory, even at its high point, never quite
succeeded in delegitimating American corporate law's apparatus of fiduciary
protection.
Once contract's significant bargaining costs and technical limitations are
acknowledged, serious questions start coming up about contractarian theory's
basic assertions. How, given contract's institutional limitations, can we safely
assume that rational actors ground their firms in ex ante contractual risk
allocations? And if that assumption is unsafe, how can the law be left to follow
the contractarians advice and remit actors to ex ante contracting, when so
doing would invite them to dissipate resources?
But these questions can be countered with other questions: If not contract-
ing, then what? How, given opportunism, can co-operative production go
forward without a complete backstop of state-enforced promises, actual or
hypothetical? One answer, according to non co-operative game theory, lies in
reputational incentives. Game theoretic models of spontaneous order suggest
that, given reputational incentives, rational actors can produce co-operatively
without any contracts at all (see Boot, Greenbaum and Thankor, 1993). By
providing a working description of the economics of production in the absence
of contracts, these models provide us with a theoretical base point for a theory
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of the firm that admits an ex post approach to the incomplete contract - an
approach pursuant to which an intervening court legitimately could supplant
the parties' bargain. This approach, by recognising that the parties are limited
in what they can write into a contract,'° would invite legal decision-makers
to consider a range of possible default rules as supplements for the bargaining
process. Ultimately, it would even sanction the use of corporate law's inherited
normative framework in the e post solution of non-contractible problems.
3.4 Repeated Games and Folk Theorems
Sovereign enforcement is a problem for all contracting parties, at least in the
absence of a mechanism that instantaneously and costlessly translates counter-
party breach into a present payment of correctly calculated damages. Even
given a perfect ex ante specification of an aggrieved party's rights, a breach
may turn out to be difficult (and costly) to observe or, even if easily observed,
may be difficult (and costly) to verify to a legal decision maker. These prob-
lems tend to become more serious, and sovereign enforcement less and less
feasible, as the contract becomes more incomplete. As a result, informal
enforcement mechanisms such as reputation become essential components of
such contracting relationships. Indeed, given a completely effective reputational
enforcement mechanism, parties can dispense with the institution of sovereign-
enforced contract all together. The medieval merchant guild is said to provide
an historical illustration of such a mechanism: the merchant guilds were
established to create a reputation mechanism in which merchants overcame
rulers' commitment problems (see Grief, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994 and
Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990).
Today, game theory's models of repeated games offer theoretical descrip-
tions of the behavioural and structural requisites for stable, informally enforced
co-operative relationships. These models seek in terms to provide a formal
theory of relational exchange in the absence of contract. In so doing, they have
the incidental benefit of enhancing our understanding of the behavioural and
structural components of incomplete contracts (see Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). They confirm the feasibility of incompletely specified relationships and
also enhance our appreciation of the useful support provided to these relation-
ships by both social norms and legal intervention grounded in noncontractual
presuppositions (see Kandori, 1992).
Here in section 3.4 we examine some ways in which repeated game models
show how trust and co-operation can emerge absent contracts and despite
'° Hence, central to the idea of incomplete contracts is the role of courts in interpreting
gaps in contract. Cf Schwartz, 1992, pp. 76-108; see also Tirole, 1992 pp. 109-113.
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conflicting interests. Section 3.4.1 begins with an introduction to the basic
elements of repeat games. Section 3.4.2 shows how these models' description
of reputational enforcement has become more robust over time. In section
3.4.3 we compare the properties of finitely repeated games to those of infinite-
ly repeated games. In sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 we report on the terms of some
cutting edge models that make notable moves in the direction of realism as they
identify strategies likely to enhance co-operation. Section 3.4.6 describes a
repeat play theory of the firm.
3.4.1 The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games
We turn first to the Folk Theorem for repeated games. A repeated game is
defined as a T-fold repetition of a particular (stage)game. In the simplest
version, at each stage the players know the past history of the game including
the past actions by all players. Loosely speaking, the Folk Theorem states that
if the players are sufficiently patient and the game is repeated for a sufficient
number of periods, all outcomes of the stage game which are individually
rational" and feasible can be supported by some punishment strategy.
We can illustrate this by outlining the repeated trust game of David Kreps.
The stage game, which is to be repeated, has a sequence of two moves in each
round (see Kreps, 1990). Party A has to decide whether to put herself at
hazard by trusting Party B. If Party A accepts the hazard and trusts Party B,
Party B then has to decide whether to honour or abuse A's trust. The payoffs
are set so that the trust/honour outcome maximises the joint gain, but that B's
immediate gain is maximised through abuse of A's trust. In a one shot game
the trust will be abused, and Party A, being rational, will not place herself at
risk in the first place absent an enforceable contract protecting her investment.
But, as noted above, high drafting and enforcement costs may preclude that
alternative. Repetition of this situation increases the number of equilibria.
Given enough repetition, trust will emerge and Party A's investment can be
made without a contract. The repeated game scenario works as a self-enforcing
trust/honour arrangement so long as there is a high probability that each round
will be followed by a succeeding round: B's expected playoffs from future
rounds deter defection and induce co-operation in the present round, provided
that A can see what B is doing and stands ready to discontinue play, punishing
B, if B ever defects from co-operation. (Note again that an important aspect
of the model is that the players can observe one another's actions in each
repetition, so that the deviations from equilibrium strategies are detectable.)
An outcome is individually rational for a player, if it gives that player a pay off at least
as high as its minimax payoff.
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Given an ex ante projection of this repeat play scenario, investment in a
protective contract by the parties would be irrational.
We can sum up by abstracting a relatively simple idea from the Folk
Theorem: if the game is repeated a number of times and the transaction's
profitability is high, it is likely that a co-operative strategy which is an efficient
equilibrium will emerge. A player will invest in his reputation and co-operate
so long as that player values the returns from co-operation over time higher
than the short-term gains of opportunistic behaviour. Thus the player's self-
interest serves as the mechanism that overcomes the collective action problem;
here self-interested rationality and co-operation are synchronised. But a couple
of requisite conditions must also be noted. First, the reputational interest that
makes co-operation consonant with self-interest emerges within the context of
repeated transactions.'2
 Second, the model presupposes credible threats and
assumes that they can inform and shape current behaviour; self-enforcement
will be effective only where there exists a retaliation mechanism for players
who transgress.
3.4.2 Strategies which Support Co-operation'3
One of the earlier approaches to the study of perfect folk theorems relied on
a severe and unforgiving punishment strategy to deter each player from
cheating. Following a deviation, all players revert to choosing their myopic
best reply forever. In the trust model, if a deviation is observed by player A,
it refuses all future co-operation. The problem with this approach is that,
because punishment goes on forever, there is in some sense too much punish-
ment.
Dilip Abreu made an important contribution towards the elimination of this
problem by successfully introducing the possibility of forgiveness. He con-
structed a simple set of punishments (the Stick) and rewards (the Carrot) that
yield the maximal cooperation which can be supported given the possibility
of defection (see Abreu, 1986). The theory is based on a punishment path
which punishes harshly for just enough periods so as to wipe out the original
gain from cheating and then forgives totally and reverts to the co-operative
path. Any deviation from the punishment is met by restarting the punishment.
Significantly, only a very simple informational structure is needed to sustain
collusion under this strategy. All you need to do is calculate the stick, the
carrot, and the length for which the stick must be wielded.
2 But the number of such transactions need not be infinite--reputation also emerges in
short-term relationships. Tirole, 1992.
For a summary, see Pearce, 1992.
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Other models introduce uncertainty and informational asymmetries and show
that they mainly pose a technical challenge, with folk theorem-like results
appearing despite the introduction of modifications. For instance, if a player
only receives a garbled signal about what the other player has done and hence
does not know this period's result is due to dishonesty or bad luck, a punish-
ment phase will have to be initiated in some cases. Hence, we will observe
sporadic bursts of punishment where information is incomplete. But this should
not be interpreted as the end of co-operation, but rather as a sign that co-
operation can work in less than perfect conditions.
Credible punishment strategies also have presented barriers to the develop-
ment repeat game model with robust implications for the world of practice.
The problem with the punishment strategy that supports co-operative outcomes
is that in many cases both the guilty and the innocent are harmed by the
punishment. The punishment phase is still credible because any failure by party
A to punish results in party A being punished. But a problem remains. Punish-
ment itself hurts party A because it entails foregoing a higher co-operative
payoff. The guilty party B therefore has an incentive to seek more immediate
forgiveness and party A has an incentive to give it. This (although the parties
proceed here without a contract) is termed the problem of 'renegotiation' after
a deviation. The possibility of forgiveness through renegotiation threatens the
overall co-operative outcome - if deviations from co-operation are not punished
co-operation will break down.
This analytical tension has led some researchers to look for punishment
strategies which are proof to renegotiations. The resulting literature is prob-
lematic, however. A large number of possible definitions of renegotiation proof
equilibria has emerged reflecting different (and conflicting) interpretations of
what renegotiation proofness means. But regardless of which definition of
renegotiation proofness is used, renegotiation proofness does reduce the
number of possible outcomes, although is some cases not by very much and
in others by too much if no renegotiation proof equilibrium exists. In effect,
the jury is still out on this concept and one should proceed with care.'4
This discussion of renegotiation mirrors a discussion familiar in the field
of contract law. As is well known, even complete specification of terms and
sovereign enforcement do not cure the problem of incentive to forgive breach
where the victim of the breach has an economic interest in continued per-
formance. The contract law solution is of course a rule of unenforceability for
4 Pearce (1992) argues that the appropriate definition is case specific. Furthermore, if
renegotiation is really a concern, it should be modelled explicitly, i.e. it should be part of
the description of the game that at certain points in time the original agreement can be
renegotiated.
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a class of suspect modifications. Such a rule permits the victim of opportunism
who renegotiates to counter-defect at a convenient future time and thus deters
breach ex ante. From the point of view of contract doctrine, then, the extent
to which renegotiation proofness is a real worry depends on the courts attitude
to contract modifications (see Baird, Gertner and Picker, 1994).
But it must be noted that, even assuming a successful doctrinal solution,
renegotiation proofness will remain an economic problem in the world of
transactions so long as contract enforcement is costly and many contracts are
incomplete. An alternative theoretical suggestion, is thus worth considering:
A social norm entailing punishment for cheaters would clearly support co-
operation and accordingly would prove useful (see Deakin, Lane and Wilkin-
son, 1994). It follows that the contrary social norm of forgiveness, which is
often preached but rarely followed to the letter, might be detrimental to
society's ability to sustain co-operation. Note also that this social norm against
cheating serves to introduce a second, alternative technique of informal
enforcement (see Kandori, 1992). The first mode, employed in all the models
described up to now in this part, is personal enforcement. Under this enforce-
ment against defection is ensured by repeated interaction among the players
themselves. Under the second mode, the community supplies social norms in
order to achieve efficient, co-operative outcomes.
3.4.3 Finitely Repeated Games
Significantly, the co-operative equilibrium does not prevail for those scenarios
in which the number of projected plays, however large, is finite and known
(see Kreps, Milgrom Roberts and Wilson, 1982). In order to see this point,
let us return to the trust game and let it be based on a finite repetition. In this
case Player B's incentives revert to defection at the last round. But Player A
will anticipate this and will not trust Player B in that last round. As a result,
the penultimate round becomes the last round from B's point of view. Player
A in turn anticipates this shift, and will not offer trust in the penultimate
round. The third-to-last round then becomes the last round, and so on. Ulti-
mately, this process of backward induction leads to the collapse of the whole
scenario of co-operation, and defection becomes the dominant strategy ex ante
(see Benoit and Krishna, 1985). Central to the idea of self-enforcement,
therefore, is the insight that co-operation is not likely to emerge if the end
period is known (see Baird, Gertner and Picker, 1994).
Before we go on, we should note that finitely repeated games suffer from
a limitation that makes them a case that approximates only a special class of
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real life finite repetitions. 15
 The limitation is the fact that the identity of the
last play is by definition specified ex ante. Such advance specifications are not
always present in real world finite play situations. To see this point, compare
a bond and a share of publically-traded common stock issued by the same
corporation. The bond, with its due date, is a real world investment that does
roughly resemble a finitely repeated game. Unsurprisingly, bond investments
are made under relatively complete (albeit imperfect) contracts - a legally
enforceable promise to repay on the termination date must be there at a
minimum. Now compare the conditions surrounding investment in the stock.
No member of either of the groups of parties to the corporate equity relation-
ship - the shareholders and the managers - may anticipate an infinite duration.
Yet all of these parties nevertheless may operate with an indefinite, long-term
time horizon lacking a fixed termination date) 6
 Infinitely repeated games in
which the duration of play is at any given stage stated probabilistically closely
approximate these conditions.
Putting these caveats to one side, it is worth noting that with some restruc-
turing of the base of assumptions, co-operation can emerge in finite play
situations. There turns out to be a material difference between finite play
models where the stage game has a unique equilibrium, such as the trust game
and more generally the Prisoner's dilemma, and models where the stage game
has multiple equilibria. In the former case, co-operation does not emerge. With
multiple equilibria things work differently. One can construct good and bad
endgames consisting of different selections of the stage game equilibria. The
best endgame then becomes the carrot and the worst endgame becomes the
stick. The length of an endgame needed to wipe out any gain from deviation
is independent on the actual number of repetitions. Hence by increasing the
number of repetitions, we can get as close as possible to the outcome which
would emerge with an infinite repetition (see Kreps 1985).
There also is another way to avoid the non-co-operative result in the finite
repetition situation. Again the assumptions are changed. The model dispenses
with the assumption that the players know the exact characteristics of the
player they are facing.' 7
 To see the implications of this strategy, let us return
to the finite trust game, modifying it so that players have incomplete informa-
' See for instance the discussion by Rubinstein, (1992).
6 Special end period situation such as mergers and tender offers are exceptions.
Unsurprisingly, American fiduciary law has articulated a special set of stricter rules for
these situations.
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson, 1982 developed a model in which they intro-
duced a one-sided asymmetric information in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. They
showed that if they only introduced a small amount of information about one player's type,
it will have a large impact on the players tendency to cooperate.
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tion about who Player B really is: There is some small chance that Player B
is not a rational economic actor at all, but is an irrational type who will respect
trust despite self-interest. A very small probability that a given type of Player
B is an irrational type will restore the trust/honour outcome for most of the
game so long as the number of repetitions are large enough. As the probability
that Player B will respect trust increases, Player A's investment is more easily
induced. Interestingly, in this class of games, the particular patterns of co-
operative results hinge on particular assumptions about the type of 'craziness'
about which the Player B is attempting to generate a reputation. Given the right
type of 'craziness', a unique outcome can emerge in contrast to the folk
theorems. But by choosing another type of 'craziness', the same set of equilib-
ria can be supported as in the folk theorems.
3.4.4 Co-operation amongst Mortals and over Generations
We return to infinitely repeated games to take up the relaxation of another
important limiting assumption. In the models we have described up to now,
the cast of players always has remained the same and all players have stayed
in the game forever. This rigidity as to the players' identities limits the model's
potential as a source of practical learning, since the world of long-term econ-
omic relationships tends to present situations where finitely lived agents come
and go against the backdrop of an infinite time horizon. Happily, these condi-
tions have successfully been introduced to the infinite repetition models. With
these modifications, the literature begins to produce the components of a theory
of the firm.
Allowing for differences in the identity of the players over time turns out
to be a minor modelling problem. There is now an extensive literature on
games with one long-run player and a series of short-run players (see Fuden-
berg, 1992). The problem to be surmounted concerns the short run players'
lack of an incentive to punish on behalf of future short run players who later
will be matched with the long run player. The long run player's reputational
interest in attracting participation by future short run players solves the prob-
lem: The current behaviour of the long run player affects beliefs and hence
the reputation for honesty may disappear if the long run player takes present
advantage of a short run player.
We can employ Kreps' trust game to illustrate the point (see Kreps, 1990).
The repeated trust game can admit of multiple Players A, each of whom makes
a one shot transaction with Player B. So long as the As can observe B's past
transactions and B has a financial incentive to co-operate with new As in future
rounds,- contract will be unnecessary to sustain the co-operative relationship.
Player B's incentive to preserve her reputation for in future rounds provides
the necessary guarantee of performance. The game can be extended to multiple
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Players B as well as multiple Players A by introducing the device of the firm.
New Players B purchase interests in Firm B from departing Players B: Firm
B's reputation induces investment by new Players A; new Players B have an
incentive to continue to honour commitments to Players A because defection
will ruin the firm's reputation and result in a loss of their investments. The
firm emerges as an intangible reputation bearer, operating successfully so long
as the actors making its decisions have a vested interest in its reputation.
Kreps notes that we can reach the same result - a sequence that admits new
Bs and new As - with a conventional contract simply by having each new B
post a bond to be forfeited in the event of abuse of trust reposed by a transact-
ing A (see Kreps 1990). But that arrangement will depend on the costs of
contracting and after the fact of enforcement. Even if ex ante contracting is
cheap, ex post enforcement may not be. If it is not, the threat to go to court
has no credibility. And information problems may make enforcement difficult.
If honour and dishonour are observable but not verifiable, or are too expensive
to verify, then contract will not induce investment. The self-enforcing arrange-
ment, in contrast, depends on observabiity only (see Kreps, 1990).
Finally, we consider overlapping generations of players. Kandori has studied
how co-operation can be obtained in an overlapping generation framework (see
Kandori, 1992). In this model agents have a finite life, but at any given point
in time there are several generations in the game. It turns out that here self-
enforcing arrangements evolve with difficulty. Kandori, resorts to the device
of self enforcing contractual understanding in order to get a co-operative result.
He sets this 'bond' as follows: Either the older members of society are paid
off by the young (assuming that everybody has behaved co-operatively so far),
or, the old want to sell on their rights (i.e., their business) to the youngest (or
emerging) generation. The idea that up front bonding can solve incentive
problems is well known from the franchising and efficiency wage literatures.
3.4.5 Co-operation and Mixed Strategies
Another type of model which allows the identity of players to change is the
random matching literature. Kandori, for example, considers a situation where
agents change their partner over time, (see Kandori, 1992), with players in
each stage being matched two and two using some (possibly random) matching
process. For co-operation to emerge in this situation the second mode of
informal enforcement must be invoked and dishonest behaviour against one
partner must cause sanctions by other members of society. The model thus
recalls the law merchant literature: With the Law Merchant system, norms held
by the group encouraged merchants dealing with strangers to behave honestly.
Here the repeated game literature reaches the same result as a formal proposi-
lion.
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One might predict that the information requirements necessary to co-ordinate
the social sanctions are very demanding but, as shown in Kandori, co-operation
can be obtained given the following simple structure. Each agent carries a label
and the necessary information is transmitted by the agents' labels. After each
stage, the label is updated using only the original label and the action at this
stage. This is referred to as local information processing as only local informa-
tion is used. That is, the labels contain information sufficient to permit the
agents to act without having to use any other information they might possess.
This ensures that the equilibrium does not depend on the set of information
known to the broader society. Furthermore, the equilibrium should not depend
on the manner in which agents are matched nor on the number of agents.
Although these are demanding requirements, Kandori proves a folk theorem
in which the strategies have a particularly simple structure. Four strategies are
needed. The strategies include: (1) an honest agent meeting honest agent; (2)
an honest agent meeting a guilty agent; (3) a guilty agent meeting another
guilty agent; (4) a guilty agent meeting an honest agent. In addition to these
strategies the equilibrium requires a mechanism which updates the label. A
guilty agent carries that label for T periods, and, provided that he or she does
not sin again, is then restored to a label saying 'honest'.
3.4.6 Multiple Equilibria, Hierarchies and Focal Points
As noted above, in many cases in the world of repeated games there is a very
large (possibly infinite) number of outcomes which are better than the non-co-
operative outcome and which can be supported by some combination of
promises and threats. These persistent multiple equilibria give rise to questions
respecting the viability of the reputation effects model of co-operation (even
as modified to allow for changing rosters of players) to provide the basis for
a theory of the firm. Quite simply, the number of equilibria predicted vastly
outnumber the number we would expect to observe in the real world. This
creates the problem of predicting an outcome from these potential equilibria.
Some theorists have resorted to norms or conventions as a means of select-
ing equilibrium outcomes and solving the indeterminancy problem. One such
approach is taken by Kreps as he goes about expanding the trust game into a
theory of the firm. The first step in the expansion is Kreps' assertion that the
trust game implies an hierarchical firm. To illustrate this point, he presents
a fact pattern keyed to the distinction between observation and verification.
The amount of B's future compensation depends on the nature of B' perform-
ance, and B's performance, while observable, is unverifiable. Given this, the
practical result is that one of the parties will have to specify the payment
amount ex post. It is the specification power that makes the transaction hier-
archical. Significantly, the reputational model allows for such a transaction
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structure absent verifiability: one party will willingly take an hierarchically
inferior position - that is, an A will extend to a B a power to make a determi-
nation respecting B's performance - so long as observability can lead to
punishment in the case of an opportunistic determination. The more transparent
the performance the better the arrangement works; but it may go forward even
with partial observability, with inefficiency creeping in as limited information
makes punishment episodic.
These hierarchical arrangements, says Kreps, are also well-adapted to the
treatment of unforeseen contingencies that resist contractual treatment ex ante:
The parties may specify a procedure pursuant to which the hierarchical
superior later determines a provision covering the unforeseen event, with the
hierarchical inferiors relying on reputation and self-enforcement in dealing with
that determination. But how will that later evaluation be evaluated, given that
its character is by definition unforeseen? And how, ex ante can a firm com-
municate a commitment to later fidelity to the inferiors' interests?
Kreps at this point draws on Schelling's concept of a focal point (see
Schelling, 1960) - a generally stated behavioural principle that evolves through
experience on which actors can draw in reacting to new situations. Corpor-
ations, he suggests, will articulate such principles and communicate them to
hierarchical inferiors ex ante, giving them an idea as to how the organisation
will react to unforeseen contingencies. These focal point principles reduce the
number of future possible equilibria by lending identity to the orgamsation,
and even provide a means by which to measure the performance of hierarchical
superiors. They constitute a 'corporate culture' that evolves over time and
provide a point of friction that generates predictable outcomes. Past experience
determines its shape, but its principles are redefined as unexpected events
occur.
3.5 The Game Theoretic Models of Private Information and Their
Implications for Corporate Legal Theory
Kreps' expansion of the repeated game models into a theory of the firm offer
a picture in marked contrast with that of contractarianism. Since co-operation
evolves over time in these models, emphasis shifts emphasis away from ex ante
planning respecting future events about which actors know little or nothing to
ex post adjustment conducted when the actors have the pertinent information.
The producing actors, sceptical about both the efficiency of bargaining and the
possibility of writing complete contingent claims contracts, place their activities
under a centralised authority and thereby economise on the costs of contractual
specifications.
But, as argued in Williamson, (1993) Kreps' model of production as sponta-
neous order is not outfitted for direct transportation to the legal context. A
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game theoretic exercise such as this is, by definition, a stylised, assumption-
laden search for equilibria that are credibly self-enforcing, undertaken without
reference to contract or direct legal mandate. In practice, actual firm contracts
exist in some situations, and the game theory does not suggest that informal
punishment strategies are somehow intrinsically superior to them. Moreover,
game theory deploys the same rational actors as does the contractarian model,
bolstering the case for their self-reliant capabilities by modelling co-operative
production without any state protection at all.
However the game theoretic firm need not be transferred to legal contexts
on a stand alone basis. It holds a set of basic assumptions in common with the
first principles approach to incomplete contracting described in section 3.3.
The two approaches can be combined to provide the basis for an alternative
legal theory of the firm that breaks with contractarianism. Section 3.5.1 lays
out this argument, showing how the insights of the game theoretic models can
be interpolated into our understanding of real world incomplete firm contracts.
But we also acknowledge that the composition and direction of the questions
prompted by the game theoretic models depend to some extent on the disposi-
tion of the questioner. There is an alternative view pursuant to which these
models import scepticism respecting some contractarian assumptions and
techniques, but do not imply abandonment of the overall approach. For
purposes of contrast, section 3.6 describes points made in some precedent and
much more incrementalist corporate law applications of points from the game
theoretic models.
3.5.1 Fundamental Questions About the Contractarian Firm
Although, the game theoretic model does not compel a fundamental critique
of the contractarian paradigm, it does provide the basis for one. The contract
model builds the firm on layers of arms length bargains actual and hypotheti-
cal. Power is transferred so as to create hierarchies, but through contractually
controlled delegations: The shareholder is the principal and the manager is the
agent. The incomplete contracts paradigm undercuts the base of hypothetical
arms length bargains with its assertion that rational economic actors may not
be able to contract their way into governance structures. The game theoretic
models, having assimilated that point, build firm hierarchies on open-ended,
noncontractual transfers of power: Here the manager is the hierarchical
superior, and (in the finitely repeated game models) production literally follows
from the possibility that trust successfully may be reposed in an honourable
actor. Rational self-protection is not absent; but it manifests itself in non-
contractual refusals to deal rather than in contracts.t8
' Williamson 1992 objects that Kreps' attempt to model the firm as a spontaneous
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Of course these models describe a framework that completely avoids
reliance on legal enforcement. Any negative implications therefore appear to
lie equally against the contractarian model and the traditional legal model in
which trustworthiness is imposed through fiduciary responsibility. But now let
us change an assumption: Although informal punishment works in the repeated
game models, in practice some sort of legal enforcement is needed. Now,
given this, hypothesise that legal enforcement can be made available in only
one of two forms: It can either be conditioned on actual and exhaustive
contracting by the actors or can proceed under a minimal set of state-supplied
legal standards. What form of legal intervention will work best, given the
model?
If, as the game theoretic models assume, contracting can be neither expected
nor demanded, then, as between the two, the state-supplied rules might facili -
tate production better (see Aghion and Hermalin, 1990). Recall that under
contractarianism the law serves only to save the actors incidental costs by
providing contractual provisions in advance. It assumes that absent these
default provisions the actors would spend the money to create them. But if we
take into account the causes of contractual incompleteness - technological
limitations, private information and strategic behaviour - it becomes just as
easy (and perhaps easier) to assume that this might not happen. The actors,
accordingly, might prefer a few state supplied standards supplemented by
noncontractual reputational enforcement over contract. 19
A functional justification for the positive law firm follows directly: Since
actors will not necessarily devise thorough-going contractual structures, the
law should facilitate production with a handful of backstop mandates, leaving
open a field for contract to the extent that the actors can manage it. The
mandates protect the extension of trust by hierarchical inferiors, thereby
encouraging production. The protection stems from the transfer of the non-
contractual punishment function from the firm participant to the legal decision-
maker (Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990).20
organization underplays the element of intentionality that distinguishes hierarchical produc-
tion from market exchange. That criticism can be accepted; in fact Kreps has accepted it.
Arnoud Boot et al. show that financial contracts often exist when there is no legally
binding obligations. In the context of loan commitment, banks supplement their reputational
capital by honouring their contracts. The decision to honour or not will impact the guaran-
tor's reputation. Boot et al. point out that it is the reputation mechanism, embodied in the
form of publicly-observable formal documents, which gives banks an alternative to contract.
Discretionary contracts are useful to banks in that they reveal high and low types, which
offers them a basis to develop their reputation. See A. Boot, et al. 1993, pp. 1165-1183.
20 The transfer of the punishment function to a legal decisionmaker shores up the
assumptional problem with the game theoretic model. It has been suggested that relentless
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The overlap between the game theoretic model and the traditional legal
model, thus established, thickens with a reference to Kreps' focal points. In
his model, these serve (in the absence of contract equilibria) as co-ordinating
concepts on which the noncontractual firm grounds it reputation. Nothing
prevents them from continuing to do so when the noncontractual firm is
coupled to the legal firm: To the extent that legal enforcement is costly, the
firm will remain concerned about its reputation. Given a 'legal firm', the focal
points serve an additional function. They provide a practice referent on which
to ground the substance of the mandate. Indeed, Kreps' focal points lend
themselves to recharacterization as old-fashioned legal norms. 2 ' Like tradi-
tional fiduciary standards, they come to bear in response to transfers of
authority, they are directed to the expectations of dependent parties, and they
are instantiated and reshaped through a process of ex post application. 22 One
point of difference should be noted, however. Kreps' focal points represent
a normative regime that is completely internal to the particular firm. The
norms of corporate law, in contrast, look both to the firm' internal
expectational picture and broader notions about appropriate conduct that
circulate in the world of firms in general. That is, they combine the Kreps'
focal points with the mode of social enforcement we see in Kandori's model
of randomly matched players.
Recall also that Kreps introduces focal points into his model in order to
support the reputation that literally holds his noncontractual firm together. The
element of functional necessity, taken together with the device's resemblance
to the legal norm, suggests a challenge to the contractarian assertion that the
burden of proof always lies against regulation. If firms need co-ordinating
norms and contract cannot be assumed to provide them, then a global
deregulatory presumption is unjustified. Consider the legal problem presented
when a plaintiff asks that a new legal standard be extended to cover an unfore-
seen development. Under Kreps' analysis the determination presumably would
be left to fact specific determination either way, rather than automatically
forward punishment in the event of a defection is not safely assumed in repeat games - in
the next stage the defecting actor will request forgiveness, and future returns may make it
rational to accede to the request. See, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991. The mandate imports
renegotiation proofness even if facilitates ongoing play.
21 Kreps acknowledge this point (see Kreps, 1990), pp. 143-145.
22 We reject the idea, advanced by Clayton Gillette, that the ex post discovery of the
appropriate focal point is unrealistic ambition because of the high transaction costs involved
and the fact that there may be too many equilibria for the court to analyze, (see Gillette,
1993). The problem with Gillette's analysis is that it relies on a first-best view of contract
(ie, that the parties will be able to design the appropriate majoritarian default), and does
not investigate the menu of choices available to courts in selecting a focal point.
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resolved in favour of refusal to extend the standard on the ground that the
dependent party 'should' have made a contract.
The challenge to the contractarian burden of proof can be restated at a more
fundamental level. Recall that one function of Kreps' focal points is to provide
standards to guide the firm's response to changing circumstances. But, viewed
from the vantage point of a dependent investor, focal point principles cannot
completely solve the problem of changed circumstances. The dependent
investor remains vulnerable to drastic alterations in the game's payoff structure
that transform the game from an infinite play pattern to one in which the end
period is immediately foreseeable. Here, as is well known, reputation matters
little to a rational actor. The sudden appearance of hostile take-overs and
management buyouts of the 1980s provide an example of such a sudden shift
in the terms of the game.
This possibility of a change in fundamental circumstance makes necessary
a reference to the finite play models. These suggest a cost economics of
investment that succeeds by abandoning the assumption that all actors are
purely self-interested and introducing the possibility of honourable conduct.
Of course, the modification is a limited one: An A's trust of the Players B
need not be thorough-going; trust is based on a probabilistic appraisal as to
type and A is ready to punish defection. Even so, the model displays a con-
ceptual tie to the traditional mode of the fiduciary relation. It invites us to
divide the world of economic interaction into two broad categories. In one
category, ex ante contracting is cost effective and sufficiently complete to solve
the problem of self-interest by providing a satisfactory guaranty of legal
protection. In the other, complete contractual protection ex ante is not cost
effective because of informational asymmetries and a long list of possible
future relational problems. Complex transactions, accordingly, will depend on
noncontractual enforcement techniques. But, given real world informational
asymmetries and changing circumstances these are unlikely to provide a
complete solution to the problem of contractual incompleteness. These transac-
tions as a result will require an extension of trust by one or both parties; and,
absent a population of honourable types, these transactions may not occur.
Doubts about the prevalence of honour in the population can be mitigated by
a backstop regime of legal protection that enforces honour.
23 A resemblance to Ian MacNeil's division of transactions into discrete and relational
categories is noted.
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3.6 Incrementalist Contractarian Applications: Default Rule Analysis
Contractarian theory asserts that corporate law's only function is to save costs
by providing default rules in advance, with the terms for which a majority of
parties would contract in a costless world leading to the greatest cost savings
(see Easterbrook, and Fischel, 1991). The incomplete contracts paradigm, with
its emphasis on informational asymmetries and recognition of the presence of
multiple equilibria, rebuts the second part of this assertion. The literature
articulating this rebuttal is well-developed. It moves us from a legal discourse
limited to the determination of what most of parties would want in a costless
world to a discourse directed to the comparative assessment of the contractual
equilibria that result from alternative defaults (see Ayres, 1992). Instead of a
single state-supplied corporate contract, we get menus of regulatory possibil-
ities (see Ayres 1992). Suppletory rules that the parties would not have chosen
for themselves, called 'penalty defaults', may prove to be more efficient than
majoritarian defaults because they force parties to share information as they
bargain around them.24
Models of bargaining under asymmetric information even support unquali-
fied legal prohibitions of certain contract terms (see Aghion and Hermalin).
A third alternative, the high cost of contracting ex ante for unforeseen contin-
gencies supports default rules framed along the lines of the vague standards
of existing fiduciary law.
Ian Ayres, arguing the latter point, brings an openness to expost consider-
ation of the import of events to bear against contractarianism's insistence of
24 Ayres and Gertner suggest the 'penalty default' in corporate gap-filling contexts. Under
this, the contractarian judge departs from the hypothetical contract principle to introduce
a term to which the parties would not have agreed in order to prod the party with greater
information into disclosure. The function of a default rule is to supply the best possible
pooling equilibrium term. The choice of penalty default depends upon the features of multip-
le Nash equilibria in the asymmetric model design being considered (Ayres and Gertner,
1989). Ayres and Gertner also open up the distinction between tailored and untailored
suppletory rules. In the former case the judge ascertains what the parties in the case would
have contracted for, a particularistic exercise. In the latter case, the judge constructs a single
off the rack standard for all legal contracts. Ayres and Gertner suggest that in the particular
case, the selection of the particular suppletory rules will be complex, depending on the
contract cost picture and the effects of the different possible supplementing rules. Ayres'
claim that penalty defaults can be extended to corporate contracts is challenged by Klausner,
who argues that, due to network externalities, contracting parties may reach suboptimal
bargains. Because penalty defaults may produce a wide range of responses, firms are less
likely to co-ordinate their actions so as to capture network benefits. (See, Klausner, 1995,
pp. 757-852).
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terms based on complete allocation of risk ex ante (see Ayres, 1992). Since
the corporation is a long-term relational contract that must cover all future
states of the world, and costs prevent ex ante negotiation of these terms,
judicial intervention ex post promotes efficiency by supplying the necessary
terms. Fiduciary law's 'muddy' (or open ended) defaults occasion these
interventions by providing for judicial determination of duties after the fact,
when circumstances can be verified. Furthermore, argues Ayres, such terms
may be cost efficient even if a majority of firms would prefer clear rules that
explicitly permit or prohibit stated conduct. Muddy rules of reasonableness are
prohibitively expensive ex ante because they can be articulated only over time
through judicial treatment of particular situations. Clear rules, in contrast can
be stated cheaply in advance because information about the state-of-the-art file
of clear legal forms is cheaply available. Forcing the majority to opt into the
clear rules as it reacts to the body of judicial precedents thus saves costs
overall 26
Ayres' treatment is incremental and stays well clear of the traditional
doctrinal theories that justify fiduciary intervention. It validates fiduciary
methodology within a framework that stays with contract at the bottom line:
Here ex post judicial intervention is legitimated only on the basis of an ex ante
default rule that has been justified on a contractual cost-benefit analysis. 27
 The
penalty default concept works similarly. Under it, the legal rule gets its
substance by reference to its effect on an assumed bargaining process insofar
as it leaves terms open until relevant information is available.
Game theoretic exercises in this incrementalist mode have an indeterminate
aspect. Here, game theoretic techniques work together with contractarian
assumptions, and the latter can come to dominate the mix. The penalty default
concept, although generally assumed to import support for protective rules,
Ayres states that 'Muddy defaults make contractual obligations contingent on circum-
stances ("states of the world") that are verifiable by courts expost, buy prohibitively costly
to identify ex ante.
Carrying Ayres' point a step further, it can be argued that 'muddy' fiduciary determi-
nations provide a useful positive law base point for the articulation of private per se rules
overtime. Situational judicial precedent provides information respecting changing relational
contingencies. Absent this experimental data, information costs could loom larger in the
drafting of clear prohibitions.
27 Klausner contends that the muddy default analysis is for the most part consistent with
a network externalities perspective. Muddy defaults are preferable to untailored default in
that they are more likely to reduce the probability of a suboptimal uniformity. Indeed, the
expost tailoring of defaults is more likely to reduce network externalities for heterogeneous
firms. Moreover, muddy defaults may, to the extent that new information is fed back into
the customizing process, promote optimal contract networks for homogenous firms.
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can be deployed to the opposite effect. Jason Johnston's model of close corpor-
ation bargaining brings this possibility into view (see Johnston, 1992).
Johnston's analysis leads to a default recommendation that cuts against a
protective standard that has evolved in American close corporation cases.
Johnston takes up a two party problem that recurs in disputes over fiduciary
duties in close corporations. 28
 An entrepreneur provides the financial capital
and controls the corporation through majority stock ownership; a manager
contributes human capital and owns a minority of the stock. If the two co-
operate, returns will be maximal. But both are in positions of exposure to the
other's opportunism. A bad entrepreneur will fire the manager after the
manager has made a firm specific investment of labour. A bad manager will
shirk and, when justifiably fired, bring a bad faith lawsuit alleging breach of
fiduciary duty. The parties have to decide whether to include a term providing
that the manager can be terminated only in good faith at the time of corporate
organisation. The outcome of this negotiation will bear on the firm's later
operation, affecting the entrepreneur's decision whether to divert firm specific
assets and the manager's decision whether to make firm specific investments.
The situation, thus outlined, presents a variant of the prisoners' dilemma
combined with an ex ante signalling game. Here both the information asym-
metry and exposure to opportunism are double sided each party has an oppor-
tunity to defect and each lacks knowledge as to whether the other is an honour-
able or dishonourable person. The bad entrepreneur will divert the manager's
investment, the good manager will make specific investments. A good faith
termination term plays out differently depending on the probabilities as to type.
The good faith term or fiduciary duly encourages investment by the good
manager, but provides a basis for the bad manager's bad faith lawsuit. Bargain-
ing over the term signals as to type.
Johnston's detailed analysis concludes that fiduciary protection is not
efficient on most fact patterns. 29 Even so, bargaining should result in a pro-
tective term in many cases - a good entrepreneur can be expected to propose
it as a way of signalling a trustworthy character to the manager whenever the
risk of the bad faith lawsuit is tolerable. Strict limits on the implied in law
duty, says Johnston, thus help good managers find good entrepreneurs. They
also increase the chance that bad people will reveal their type, destabilising
comparative ventures that should not get past the formation stage.
28 See Jordan v. Duff and Phelps Inc., 815 F. 2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
29 In his view the situation in which a hypothetical contract case for a duty can be made
out is narrow. Three factors must combine: A bad faith managerial law suit must be
unlikely, managerial investment must be very sensitive to levels of legal protection, and
firm specific investment by the entrepreneur must be unimportant. In all other cases the
parties should be left to bargain for their own term. Johnston, 1992, p. 323.
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These conclusions are reached despite the recognition that an implied in law
duty would reduce rewards to bad people ex post. Significantly, Johnston
reaches this result only after making a pair of contractarian assumptions. First,
he assumes that actors are well-informed and rational and will attempt to
bargain into such responsibilities as suit them at the formation stage. Second,
he assumes that courts acting in litigation contexts do a bad job of determining
what the parties would have wanted ex ante. Johnston contrasts and rejects an
alternative assumption under which the parties simply trust rather than treat
trustworthiness as an information problem for solution through bargaining. In
such a world of probabilistic 'degenerate beliefs' in the certainty of trustworthi -
ness, says Johnston, a legal regime with broad fiduciary duties is 'simply a
shorthand for what the parties actually believed and expected'. Expost interpo-
lation of duties has no effect on ex ante incentives of parties modelled in this
trusting mould because they do not bargain in the first place.
Thus, Johnston withholds ex post protection on a penalty default basis even
while recognising that most parties may be trusting. 3° He thereby brings the
penalty default device into alignment with the contractarian norm of forced
bargaining. His approach must be questioned in a number of respects, how-
ever.
First, references to the incomplete contract paradigm and to the evolution
of practice respecting close corporations make it possible to reverse Johnston's
penalty default. Consider his assumption that parties will be rational and
disposed towards contract. This does not exclude the possibility that an exhaus-
tive contract may be prohibitively costly, even given a strategic legal stick.
Nor, given past legal patterns, does a disposition to bargain by itself support
a penalty default. Historically, corporate law placed the burden of protection
on close corporation actors themselves. It learned to intervene on behalf of
those injured in dependent positions at the same time that it learned to broaden
the field for self-protective contracting. An extensive file of protective contract
forms became available as a result. This evolutionary pattern makes it hard
to argue that a penalty default is needed to prompt reference to the form file
by actors already disposed to do so. The judicial good faith duty seems unlike-
ly to remove their incentive to contract, given the high cost and uncertainty
of enforcement.
Second, Johnston's assertion that courts do a bad job at reconstructing ex
ante bargains should be compared with Ayres' defence of muddy defaults.
30 A determining contractarian norm is implicit. Presumably,, in an evolutionary context
determined by the survival of the fittest, the trusting 'degenerates' will perish in time. Then,
with a legal regime keyed to ex ante strategic problems, we will have an ideal population
of good people who are also well informed two-fisted bargainers.
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Following Ayres, it becomes possible to assert that the value of the courts'
contribution does not turn on their relative ability to reconstruct non-existent
ex ante bargains. Their job instead is to apply general principles to the per-
formance pattern that emerges in history, so as to facilitate adjustments in
subsequent generations of contracts.
Finally, it seems unsafe to assume that forced contracting will prompt
beneficial informational exchanges as good actors seek out other good actors
at the formation stage. It could be that the honourable dispositions that enhance
productivity are not easily flicked off for purposes of negotiation and then
flicked back on when performance starts later on. Just as a good entrepreneur
signals trustworthiness by proposing a fiduciary duty, so may a good manager
signal trustworthiness by waiving the opportunity to enter into a two-fisted
negotiation. Moreover, the contractual matching of good types leaves unsolved
the problem of unforeseen events. Fidelity to a joint and productive project
is not a permanent given. Good types in long-run performance situations can
stumble into misunderstandings; objectively opportunistic actions may follow,
even as both actors remain sure of their own goodness. Their reciprocal
commitment needs periodic modification and reconfirmation as the commercial
situation changes in a dynamic environment. The more stable the environment,
the better its chances for sustenance (see Frank, 1988). The legal backstop
imports stability for contracting actors even as it protects more trusting
types 31
3! mplied in law duty does not change the ex ante bargaining context. The parties must
contract to opt out rather than opt in, and strategic barriers make this difficult. Presumably,
the bad entrepreneur would be signalling his or her type by suggesting opting Out. The good
entrepreneur might be afraid of a bad type lawsuit and wish to pare down an implied duty,
but be chary of sending a wrong signal as to type. But since the legal duty promotes
investment, there is a compensating benefit under Johnston's model. Indeed but for the
problem of the bad faith lawsuit, legal protection is an unalloyed positive. To the extent
that Johnston overstates the disincentive properties of the lawsuit, there is every reason to
resolve doubts in favour of fiduciary protection so long as the parties remain free to opt
out.
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3.7 Contrarian Possibilities: Trust, Social Norms, and A Complex
Model of the Actor
Game theoretic models of co-operation have inspired a new line of social
theory. This offers a behavioural description of co-operative production in
which trust and rational calculation coexist and complement one another. This
description, having included trust as an independent motivation, goes on to
recognise that normative constraints play a role in the formation of economic
institutions. And it claims to achieve this result while respecting the self-
interest incentive and the power of rational expectations analysis. Thus framed,
this approach inadvertently tracks the traditional model of fiduciary law.
This socio-economic theory of the firm begins with the game theoretic
model of co-operation, but shifts its emphasis so as to bring the extension of
trust into the centre of the description. In the retold story, one actor in the co-
operative venture ends up in a dependent position, necessitating assurances
against defection on the dominant actor's part (see Williams, 1988). The
dominant actor' reputation, which grows from behaviour over time that reveals
the actor's honourable disposition, provides this assurance. The reputation
gives rise to trusting expectations respecting the dominant actor's future
conduct (see Dasgupta, 1988). The trust compensates for the dependent actor's
informational advantage. Without it there will be no producing relationship.
But, following game theory, trust will be insufficient taken alone. Since
information is incomplete and the dominant party's reputational incentives will
be subject to change over time, trust will be a fragile commodity. Thus,
credible sanctions for defection also must be present (see Dasgupta, 1988).
Sanctions push the utility of the self-interested dominant party toward ongoing
co-operation, further assuring the dependent party (see Williams 1988). As the
coercive backstop becomes stronger, trust diminishes; but, with a stronger
backstop, less trust will be required to sustain the relationship (see Gambetta,
1988). Given the absence of perfect coercive arrangements, trust emerges as
a social lubricant that makes production and exchange possible. Since neither
rationality nor contract by themselves can assure the emergence of co-operative
arrangements, we should design our institutions so as to bank on trust.
The socio-economic theory then turns to the other side of the trust/honour
outcome, looking to game theory to ground an assertion that social norms must
be included in the description of co-operative production. Norms solve the
problem presented by the repeated games' multiple equilibrium outcomes. As
already noted, multiple equilibria limit game theory's explanatory power it
predicts many more equilibria than we find in the real world (see Dasgupta
1988). Contractarian theory avoids this problem by assuming that competition
pushes actors into first best equilibria. But that approach does not satisfy
theorists who accept the point that rational norm free negotiations cannot
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resolve the uncertainties of bargaining (see Elster, 1989). Game theoretic
models do address the problem they produce thin co-ordinating norms, such
as truth-telling and promise keeping in tit-for-tat patterns. Kreps, as we have
seen, goes farther and suggests that focal points evolve to support equilibrium
strategies in co-operative situations. But the focal point concept is problematic
in Kreps' account since it neither shows us how a significant group of players
comes to follow the focal point as a norm, nor explains what motivates the
players to adhere to it (see Pettit, 1990). The social theorists jump in at this
point. They expand on the 'focal point', using social norms and moral codes
to fill in the missing elements in the description. Norms of reciprocity equality,
and co-operation, like focal points, are points of friction that generate predict-
able outcomes. Since they evolve in history, the matter of derivation is dealt
with exogenously (see Biccheiri, 1990).
More importantly, the norms sustain trust by lending credibility to the
commitments of dominant actors. The credibility lies in the response of
disapproval that follows upon deviance from the norm (see Pettit 1990). The
social threat can prove to be a stronger reputational incentive than the econ-
omic threat of refusal to deal. As the game theoretic models show us, refusal
to deal has serious limitations whenever the aggrieved party's economic
interests lie in favour of more deals and against punishment. If continued co-
operation looks profitable, they might as well forgive (see Pettit 1990). Social
disapproval, in contrast, occurs automatically, without reference to the align-
ment of the money, and involves a wider audience.
At the bottom line, the socio-economic approach offers a picture of produc-
tion in which actors draw on a range of devices to import credibility to com-
mitments to cooperage. Some of the devices, such as precommitment, invest-
ment in bargaining, and investment in reputation, are consonant with a rational
expectations description. On the other hand, there are constraints that gain their
credibility from social norms (see Elster 1989). The norms often coincide with
self-interest as they shape actors' conduct, but they never fully reduce to
explanation in self-interested terms (see Elster 1989).
With this last point, the social-economic theory asks us to reconsider the
rational actor itself. Given the need for trust and the stabilising role of norms
of self-abnegation, it follows that an exclusively egoistic model of the actor
suffices as a basis for explanation no better than does an exclusively altruistic
model. Only a mixed model of the actor works well, a model allowing for
counterpreferential choices to commit to alternatives that make actors worse
off but benefit a project (see Sen, 1982).
This complex actor still may be conceived as a utility maximiser: She may
derive satisfaction from counterpreferential choices, a satisfaction stemming
from a balance of self-interested and social motivations. But, as Frank has
argued, she has disruptive characteristics when considered in the narrower
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framework of economic utility. In Frank's view, the project to reconstruct co-
operative behaviour in rational, self-maximising terms runs afoul of its own
assumption. In reaches an immovable emotional bloc in relational situations
where actors solve contracting problems by committing themselves to future
behaviour that could turn out to be against self-interest. A paradox arises in
these situations the conscious pursuit of self-interest is incompatible with its
attainment. Frank proposes a 'commitment model' to solve these problems:
Co-operative contracting solutions have to be experienced as noninstrumental
in order to work. Significantly, those directly motivated to pursue self-interest
will be less successful as contracting actors than those emotionally disposed
to adhere to commitments in good faith. The honourable actor offers a more
credible commitment and therefore makes a more advantageous contract (see
Frank, 1988). Therein lies the paradox. For the model to work, satisfaction
from doing the right thing must not be premised on the fact that material gains
may later follow; it must be intrinsic to the act itself. If an actor lacks the
necessary motivation, material gains will not follow.
3.7. 1 Conclusion: The Trust-Based Firm and the Traditional Legal Model
The incomplete contracts paradigm and the theory of repeated games together
suggest a fundamental critique of the contractarian firm. With multiple equilib-
ria and bargaining costs, they undennine the assumption that market constrains
a first best equilibrium. By identifying significant bargaining costs, they
counsel scepticism of global contractarian penalty defaults that seek to force
contracting by denuding dependent actors of legal protection. Their alternative
co-ordinating device, the noncontractual focal point, suggests that protective
default rules may work well after all. Finally, their division of the world into
honourable and dishonourable types invites us to drop the assumption that self-
interested behaviour is inevitable.
The socio-economic gloss takes us beyond critique to an alternative model.
Here the game theoretic firm is restated with emphases on a base of trust, the
complexity of the actor it deploys, and the co-ordinating role of social norms.
This trust-based firm has a predictive capacity it the legal context that mani-
festly outstrips that of the contractarian firm. In the trust-based firm, as in the
legal model, self-interest and honour interplay, even though each has an aspect
that negates the other. As in the legal model, neither behavioural characteristic
subsumes the other so as to reach a fusion that provides a clear base for ex
ante arrangements. With the trust-based model, we can account for the evol-
ution of a legal system in which the same conflicts come up again and again
over extended periods, and in which the decision maker serves as an ex post
mediator. The trust-based firm's thicker description also leads to an explana-
tion of positive law with it we can side-step the contractarian conjuring trick
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that turns positive law into contract and protective norms into ex ante bargains.
The trust-based firm thus implies a new endorsement of traditional fiduciary
theory. Business relationships that balance self-interest with honour will have
a potential for instability over time. This cannot be avoided through contract,
because ex ante welfare calculations will never adequately identify ex post
problems of unreciprocal treatment. Given this, normative interventions under
the fiduciary rubric that enforce commitment to honour another's interests play
a co-ordinating role. Fiduciary moralism confirms the norms' presence in the
positive law construct. The norm's transfer from business practice to the law
facilitates its communication to the large numbers of actors involved in produc-
tion in firms. Enforcement of the legal norm supplements the informal sanc-
tions of social disapproval and economic refusal to deal. The functional
significance of legal enforcement increases as the numbers of actors become
larger and collective action problems make informal enforcement less effective.
Finally, the exercise of legal enforcement will be mediative, tending towards
less precise determinations based on a complex behavioural model rather than
attempts to formulate more precise ex ante calculations. Judges will always
lack information necessary for the latter exercise. Moreover, the decision as
to the norm's violation may be non instrumental an attitudal response of
approval or disapproval of conduct that occurs at the moment of judgement.
Social theory and microeconomics influence the trust-based firm equally.
As a result, it remains open to a range of strategies for dealing with firm
hierarchies. Legal intervention is one of these. But the need to trust and rely
on norms is obviated to the extent that contract succeeds. In the alternative,
punishment through refusal to contract may suffice in some situations. But,
in any event, the deregulatory presumption of contractarianism has no place.
The trust-based model invites us to apply the inherited legal framework in new
situations without the assistance of a global presumption either way.
CHAPTER 4
REGULATORY COMPETITION, REGULATORY
CAPTURE, AND CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION
4.1 Introduction
Corporate law currently faces the problem of effectuating contractual govern-
ance in an agency system that insulates agents from market constraints. 2
 This
governance discussion focuses on possibilities for strengthening the share-
holders' role in the ongoing negotiation of incomplete corporate contracts.
Proponents of institutional shareholder participation have taken the lead by
mapping out shareholder-driven strategies for monitoring and compensation
systems that will more effectively control the costs of management influence
activities within the firm. 3
 These strategies force proponents to confront long-
standing economic and legal barriers to shareholder action.
In this Article, we carry this legal confrontation to subject matter so far
largely exempted from the discussion-state corporate law and the system of
incentives that forms it. More particularly, we recommend partial federal
preemption of state law's allocation to management of agenda control over
corporate charter amendments. We argue that this intervention will ameliorate
some of the cost and incentive barriers that impede shareholder action.
This recommendation requires us to confront the theory of regulatory
competition that legitimates the state system. We base our challenge to this
theory on a reinspection conducted without the use of a general equilibrium
This chapter appeared (with William W. Bratton) in vol.73 North CarolinaLawReview
(1995).
2 Cf Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of the nature of the firm on the Theory of
Corporate Law, 18 J. GORP. L. 213, 24144 (1993) (noting that contractarian firm theories
that rely on market constraints provide no account of the mechanisms that will lead to long-
run efficiencies) (citing Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and
Management 192-94, 277-79 (1992)).
See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in
Organization, 94 AM. J. SOC. 5154, 5156 (Supp. 1988).
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lens4-of the internal negotiating structure that forms corporate law. This
reinspection reveals that charter competition results in state laws that inhibit
the negotiation of contract terms that could both alleviate problems of
informational asymmetry between managers and monitors and help to realign
incentives to reduce the costs of management influence. 5 This Article depicts
a self-regulatory system, composed of firms and state lawmaking institutions,
in which competition among the states ensures the system's capture by corpor-
ate management influence. It then draws on political theory to provide a guide
for dealing with the problem. This learning from the field of public regulation
highlights the formative role that process and structure rules play in capture's
amelioration. We adapt it to the private corporate governance situation and
conclude that removing some of the states' mandatory process rules would
create opportunities for shareholder participation in contract negotiation and
for shareholder influence on the formation of state law.
Part I provides an overview of our proposal for agenda access for share-
holder-proposed amendments to the firm's contract. This discussion examines
the objectives and strategies of the shareholder participation movement in the
context of corporate law's historic debates over governance strategies and state
lawmaking systems.
Part II critically reviews the market-based justification of the charter
That is, we do not assume that competition among the states in the production of
corporate law, taken alone, over time will assure the evolution of an optimal legal regime.
Cf Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organiz-
ation of Economic Activity, in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 57, 82 (James
A. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsie eds., 1990) (noting the role of distorted information in the
decision-making process of central authorities). Under Milgrom and Roberts's 'influence
cost' model of the firm, the firm must confront problems of informational asymmetry if
it is to make and support efficient choices. The problem is that decision-makers must obtain
and rely upon information generated by others. Employees and other players, by virtue of
their place within the organization, possess information that could have a significant impact
on decisions made by principals. Absent sufficient incentives to release these information
rents, the agents will use this information to influence the decisions of those above them
in the hierarchy. According to Milgrom and Roberts, the problem for an actor higher in
the hierarchy attempting to monitor these agents is this asymmetric information-the asymme-
try 'prevents easy determination of whether a particular observed action or outcome corre-
sponds to desirable behavior and thus renders the problem nontrivial.' Milgrom & Roberts,
supra note 2, at 156.
Shareholder participation strategies seek to alleviate the asymmetric information
problem in the public corporation with devices such as process reforms (which take the
initiative in the design of internal incentive schemes away from management) and direct
placement of independent monitors in the boardroom. See infra notes 148-24 1 and accom-
panying text.
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respects. First, it understates the effects of regulatory capture because it fails
to recognize that the system does not provide shareholders with either an
effective exit route, or, in the alternative, an adequate opportunity to register
political demands. Second, the market perspective offers an overly simplistic
picture of the incentives that determine the behavior in Delaware, the leading
chartering state. In the capture model presented here, state-federal political
instability emerges as a positive force that occasionally forces Delaware to
confront conflicting demands of managers and shareholders and effect a
somewhat more even-handed mediation between the two groups. The model
also suggests caution in the selection of a legal corrective to the capture
problem: Discrete federal intervention to facilitate shareholder participation
in corporate contracting emerges as preferable to blanket preemption. In our
view, federal preemption that institutionalizes an opportunity to register
conflicting demands on state lawmakers would not sacrifice the relational
advantages that flow from corporate law production in a small, market-sensi-
tive jurisdiction.
Part III examines the theories, accomplishments, and open agenda items of
the institutional shareholder movement. The discussion describes and evaluates
three participatory modes: discrete issue-based voting contests, coalition-based
voting for board seats, and relational investment in large share blocks. Only
the first mode clearly passes the tests of cost-benefit feasibility and
insusceptibility to management capture. In practice, discrete voting contests
have occurred because they require low out-of-pocket costs and serve as
vehicles for reputational gain by a narrow segment of institutional agents.
These agents' reputational interests make them unlikely candidates for capture.
At the same time, reputational interests render managers vulnerable to the
institutions' dialogic activities and, therefore, prone to make concessions.
Contractual modifications have resulted. The second participatory mode,
coalition-based board voting, holds out the promise of high-intensity monitor-
ing with little chance of capture due to absence of capital investment by, and
reputational profiles of' the hypothesized monitors. However, federal regula-
tion impedes experimentation, and there are substantial cost and incentive
barriers. The third mode, relational investing, solves the problems of coalition-
building by making the volunteer monitor a substantial equity investor. In
theory, this volunteer recoups its costs as its equity block increases in value
due to its input into the firm's governance. Also in theory, this volunteer's
public-regarding 6
 profile renders it impervious to the free ride taken by the
rest of the shareholders. Practical feasibility presents no problem in the sense
that large block investments and attendant governance engagements have long
6 That is, activated by the interests of the shareholders as a group.
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occurred in practice. However, a practical problem does follow from the
magnitude of the actor's investment. Large financial stakes make sustained
public-regarding relational engagements unstable. Both capture by management
in exchange for separately negotiated rents and defection into the camp of a
hostile offeror remain structural possibilities.
Part IV asserts that practical barriers to experimentation with the second
and third modes of shareholder participation make it worthwhile to recommend
federal intervention against state-mandated agenda control. This discussion
details the restrictive effects of state law's agenda mandate, describes the
central role of charter competition in the mandate's evolution, and proposes
limited federal intervention to ensure a shareholder privilege to initiate charter
amendments. We recognize that shareholder initiative could lead to rent-
seeking and the emergence of voting cycles. To ameliorate the rent-seeking
problem, the proposal limits access to matters of process and structure. To cut
off the cycling activity, the proposal includes a set of ancillary process rules.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND STATE
CORPORATION LAW
4.2 Deterrent Governance Strategies and State Charter Competition
An unsatisfactory organizational incentive scheme hampers the performance
of large corporations. Opportunistic managers often exert excessive influence
over their governance mechanisms, exploiting a collective action barrier to
effective monitoring by dispersed equity owners. Solving this management-
shareholder agency problem is corporate law's long-standing, unperformed
assignment. Historically, debate over the appropriate solution has centered on
two competing deterrent strategies The first, the 'fiduciary' strategy, is the
corporate version of command and control regulation. It follows from asser-
tions by Berle and Means that shareholders lack any effective means to monitor
the firm themselves, that no adjustment of shareholder incentives will cure the
problem, and that therefore the state must intervene to pick up the slack by
imposing mandatory rules. 7
 Under the strict regime envisioned, process rules
that provide entrepreneurial lawyers with financial incentives to enforce
fiduciary norms address the shareholders' collective action problem. The
competing approach, the 'market' strategy, seeks to deter management shirking
Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
219-21, 241-52 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
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by clearing the field for the operation of markets for products, management
employment, and corporate control. According to this view, economic actors
in free markets can be relied upon to protect themselves, and over time
collective action problems solve themselves as fit competitors survive in a
competitive environment. Here a different sort of entrepreneur, the hostile
tender offeror or proxy contestant, plays the critical enforcement role.8
Most observers agree that an effective legal model must draw on both
modes of deterrence, but proponents of the two strategies dispute the appropri-
ate weighting of the legal mix. Proponents of fiduciary control question the
market's effectiveness in protecting shareholders from management opportun-
ism and see mandatory fairness norms as necessary supports for systemic
confidence. Market proponents see fiduciary regulation as a barrier to the
market's operation in some cases, and otherwise as an unnecessary deadweight
cost, except where intervention proves necessary to facilitate the operation of
free transfers of corporate control.
This debate repeats itself when attention turns to the political structure of
corporate lawmaking. The federal system 9
 leaves matters of corporate organiz-
ational structure and fiduciary standards to the states; corporations remain free
to choose their states of incorporation) 0
 Since corporate charters produce
rents for the states, the states compete to attract charters Proponents of
fiduciary regulation see this regulatory competition as a 'race to the bottom':
Since the managers have captured the governance mechanisms of the states'
corporate customers, competition for charters by the states devolves on the
provision of special benefits to managers, weakening the fiduciary regime.
Therefore, a preemptive, fiduciary-based federal corporate law regime is the
recon-miended remedy." Market proponents counter that market controls
ensure that efficient governance structures result as the states respond to the
managers' demands. This 'race to the top' obviates any need for federal
Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE LJ.698 passim (1982) (applying market strategy to sales of control) with Victor
Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganization,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 passim (1983) (applying fiduciary strategy to sales of control).
American corporate law has evolved with the national government assuming responsibil-
ity only for regulation of information flow in the securities markets; it imposes a mandatory
disclosure regime on public corporations with a combination of administrative and entrepre-
neurial enforcement techniques.
0 American conflict of laws rules respect the law of a corporation's nominal domicile.
See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 (1971).
The most prominent advocate of this view was William Cary. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696-705
(1974).
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intervention)2
4.3 Institutional Investor Participation and a Strategy of Enforced
Self-Regulation
These debates over deterrent strategies and charter competition have been
complicated in practice by two developments, one negative and the other
positive. First, the negative: During the 1980s, state lawmakers took an active
role in impairing the market deterrent, contributing to the collapse of takeover
activity. This prompted reappraisal of the race to the top and race to the
bottom views of charter competition and the emergence of an intermediate view
recognizing that competition has both positive and negative effects. Next, the
positive development: The collapse of the takeover market coincided with the
advent of active institutional investor participation in corporate governance)3
This prompted the articulation of a third strategy for dealing with the agency
problem: enforced self regulation.' 4
 Under this third strategy, shareholders
2 The most prominent advocate of this view is Ralph Winter. See Ralph W. Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
passim (1977).
3 These events had profound implications for corporate legal theory. It became apparent
that the theoretical resources of neoclassical economic analysis of law could not adequately
describe the events taking place. The result was a renewed interest in both the politics of
domestic corporate law and the comparison of foreign institutions. For discussion of the
break and the shortcomings of the comparative inquiry, see Richard M. Buxbaum, Compara-
tive Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance, in Institutional Investors
and Corporate Governance 3 passim (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994).
' IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-04 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite
distinguish between 'enforced self regulation' and 'coregulation' in administrative law. Id.
at 102. Under the former, the state and the regulated firm negotiate over standards tailored
to the firm. The latter, which prevails in the U.S. securities industry, involves self regula-
tion by an industry association with some oversight or ratification by the government. Ayres
and Braithwaite explore possibilities for enforced self-regulation on the theory that the
subcontracting of the regulatory function to private actors under ultimate government
supervision could lead to greater flexibility in the formulation of the terms of regulation
and effectiveness of enforcement. Id. at 102-32.
We think the concept usefully describes the mode of corporate governance envisioned
by proponents of participation by institutional investors. The context is different, of course.
Here the enforcing actor is not a government agency but the firm's shareholders; no
immediately available sovereign mandate skews bargaining positions when the parties
negotiate over governance terms. Thus we do not employ the self-regulation concept to
import a 'public' coloration into a 'private' contractual matter. However, we do take the
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can avoid the need to rely on legal and market deterrents to the extent that they
effectively negotiate the corporate contract themselves and monitor its perform-
ance.
Self-regulatory strategies are not new to corporate governance. Indeed, self-
regulation by means of a legally mandated shareholder vote for the board of
directors is the system's historic base point. Commentators have debated plans
to improve this self-regulatory structure's performance for decades. However,
since those earlier proposals all followed from the Berle and Means assump-
tions, no one expected that independent internal monitors could be imposed
on management by unilateral shareholder directive. Instead, the proponents
sought voluntary acceptance by management of oversight by independent
directors and pursued a dialogic implementation strategy. The proponents
advocated a norm of majority independent board membership and attempted
to have such a requirement inserted into the canon of proper business prac-
tices.' 5
 Success was achieved in form but not in substance: The norm found
its way into the canon only to be subverted in practice by management influ-
ence. By the end of the 1980s, almost three-quarters of American directors
were outsiders; management nevertheless retained control of the selection
process, and sixty-three percent of the outside directors selected were chief
executive officers of other public companies.'6
position that state mandates are already inextricably bound up in the determination of the
potential scope of enforced self-regulation by shareholders and that their readjustment is
an appropriate subject matter for corporate law reform.
Mandatory independent board structure was proposed in the first draft of the American
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, but was cut back to precatory status in later
versions at the insistence of management representatives. Compare Principals of Corporate
Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1982) (proposing mandatory majority of independent directors) with 1 Principals of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3A.01 (1994) (recommending
majority of independent directors as practice suggestion); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Structure of the Corporation: a LegalAnalysis 17-85 (1976) (recommending mandate).
For a review of the politics of the ALl Corporate Governance Project proceedings, see
Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV 1212 passim (1993).
Proponents of both fiduciary and market deterrence strategies took a dim view of
mandatory independent boards. Compare Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-
Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 609-12 (1982) (emphasizing
that the directors' duty of vigilance would be constrained by their need to interact with other
directors) with Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1280-86 (1982) (arguing that use of independent directors is detrimental to
profit maximization).
6 Jay W. Lorsch & Elizabeth Maciver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's
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Institutional investor participation changes this picture, holding out a
prospect of self-regulation enforced by the shareholders themselves. The theory
posits that concentrated institutional equity ownership' 7
 makes joint share-
holder action cost effective) 8
 Practice has begun to validate the theory's
prediction, as institutional shareholders have used their voting power to get
results. Successful publicity and issue-based proxy campaigns against under-
performing companies have prompted management concessions on governance
provisions, and in the most dramatic cases, boardroom shakeups) 9
 Theorists,
however, ask for more thoroughgoing engagements than these discrete and
relatively inexpensive exercises can provide. They have mapped strategies for
sustained relationships between managers and institutional monitors, looking
to the use of institutional votes to nominate and elect expert outside monitors,
and the placement of substantial blocks of shares with public-regarding institu-
tional owners. These more ambitious and costly proposals have not yet been
tested in practice.
Shareholder participation strategies are an attractive alternative to the two
deterrent strategies. The payoff for costly action by shareholder volunteers
comes from improved investment policy and day-to-day management. This
expands on the payoff of the fiduciary deterrent and promises governance
benefits formerly in the market's exclusive preserve. Corporate law's duty of
loyalty focuses on a limited class of moral hazard2°
 problems; its duty of care
avoids inquiry into the adverse selection2 ' problems that lead to unsuccessful
Corporate Boards 17-18 (1989).
' This proportion passed 50% during the 1980s. See Center for Law & Econ. Studies,
Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991 Update, Colum. Institutional Investor
Project, at Table 19 (1991).
IS See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. For an excellent review of the proposals
on the table, see Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation
for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 593-612 (1993).
9 See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
20 Milgrom and Roberts define moral hazard in terms of 'postcontractual opportunism
that arises when actions required or desired under the contract are not freely observable.'
See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 1, at 167; see also Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton,
Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1994)
(suggesting that moral hazard 'stems from the agent's "hidden action'). This framework
can be used to describe corporate law's garden variety conflict of interest transaction: A
board with insufficient information respecting incentives is more likely to approve one-sided
deals; rationally apathetic shareholders will take no action in response.
21 Milgrom and Roberts define adverse selection in terms of the kind of postcontractual
opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has private information about something
that affects the other's net benefit from the contract and when only those whose private
information implies that the contract will be especially disadvantageous for the other party
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business plans. This limited scope follows from limited enforcement resources:
Judges intervening ex post can untangle conflict-of-interest transactions and
structure remedies, but informational complexities put investments and oper-
ations outside their competence. 22
 The takeover, in contrast, addresses all of
these agency problems and, at least in theory, creates value for shareholders
through their elimination. However, its widespread employment during the
1980s gave rise to a perceived problem of perverse effects. It appeared that
prospects for short-term gain could induce the takeover of a well-managed
firm, thereby chilling productive long-term investment. It also appeared that
readily available debt financing could lead to speculative overbidding and
subsequent bankruptcy costs.
Shareholder participation strategies promise to avoid these problems. They
seek a competency payoff by placing effective monitors inside the firm. There,
with access to the full set of information, the monitors will effect necessary
changes through cooperation and persuasion. The deterrent strategies, in
contrast, lead to punishment payoffs. The more widespread their use, the more
a management subculture of resistance to outside regulation becomes
entrenched 23
to agree to the contract. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 1, at 595. In this context, adverse
selection stems from the agent's hidden information. A board with inadequate information
cannot fully evaluate the agent's capabilities and performance, making it difficult to ensure
the selection of the most able agents. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1044.
More generally, fiduciary law is ill-suited to the control of managers' influence
activities that have negative consequences for the firm. In the Milgrom and Roberts model,
influence activity is the time and effort spent by rational, self-interested actors in firms to
influence decisions. Some of this activity may benefit the firm, but it also results in
questionable pay increases, unnecessarily large budgets, acceptance of suboptimal projects
and proposals, and rejection of worthwhile proposals. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note
2, at 5 155-56.
22 This limitation of scope, embodied in the businessjudgment rule, stems from a recogni-
tion of informational constraints on the process of judicial enforcement. The risk-return
calculations
prevailing at the time of initial investment cannot be reconstructed ex post; the fact of failure
invites the ascription of incompetence to conduct better described as considered risk-taking.
Aggressive fiduciary inquiry into investment policy would over-deter risky investment. The
corporate duty of care, accordingly, strikes only at extreme cases of incompetence. See Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 105 1(1983); Barnes
v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). The Delaware Supreme Court has created
an exception by strictly Scrutinizing the process employed in the boardroom of the acquired
firm in a friendly merger. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del.
1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
23 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 19-20. The participation strategy also looks
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This picture of productive relational engagement by shareholders is still
largely aspirational. So far, institutional victories in discrete engagements have
followed from the efforts of agents of public pension funds. These actors take
the role of political entrepreneurs and act from motivations more reputational
than financial. Although agents of private pension funds, mutual funds, banks,
and insurance companies control the overwhelming portion of institutional
equity holdings, they have not emerged as leading players in the game. 24
 It
remains unclear whether concrete cash payoffs can be realized from the loose
cost-benefit projections that support the relational strategies.
A number of sticking points impede testing of the relational models. First,
no one has devised an incentive scheme that integrates investment in govern-
ance participation with the range of agency arrangements that obtain in the
different investment institutions.0 Second, substantial legal impediments to
shareholder collective action remain on the books. Early pressure for reform
has resulted in some significant changes-paternalistic barriers to coordinated
institutional action in issue contests have been removed from the federal proxy
rules, but full-scale testing of relational models of shareholder participation
awaits the implementation of a broader program to curtail the scope of the
federal securities laws. 26
 Third, a nascent incentive problem lies unresolved
in the interplay between self-regulation by shareholders and market deterrence
by takeover. The institutional participation movement has proceeded during
a cyclical low in merger and acquisition activity. An upturn in the merger
cycle and resurgence of hostile activity27
 would reweight the institutions'
reasonable in a loose comparative cost survey. The institutional volunteers do, of course,
incur the up-front costs of campaigning, coalition building, or direct investment. That
investment does not occur, however, absent the prospect of a greater performance payoff,
and that payoff ultimately benefits the shareholders as a group. Meanwhile, significant costs
attend ing the deterrent strategies are avoided. Fiduciary law carries the deadweight cost of
corporate subsidy of hostile, labor-intensive judicial processes even in the meritorious case,
and additional costs from unmeritorious cases stemming from the unsolved problem of
process incentives to plaintiffs' lawyers to hold up firms for quick settlements. Takeovers,
although said to create shareholder value overall, see, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 152-54 (1992),
do not necessarily benefit the shareholders of the acquiring firm, see, e.g., Bernard S.
Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597. 61-15 (1989); Richard
Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 passim (1986), and
entail enormous transaction costs.
24 See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
27 An upturn in the merger cycle has occurred during the last two years, but hostile
takeover activity remains sporadic. See infra note 236.
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payoff pattern away from patient engagement in favor of defection and short-
term gain. That, in turn, would diminish management's incentive to cooper-
ate.28
4.4 A Federally Mandated Privilege of Shareholder Initiative
Recent commentaries on shareholder participation focus on barriers to the
realization of the full relational models. This Article, in contrast, examines the
legal landscape that channels discrete institutional interventions and explores
possibilities for expanding the menu of contractual reforms attainable through
shareholder initiative. In so doing, it constructs a theoretical case for a reform
proposal made in passing many times in the past: 29 federal preemption of state
law's allocation to management of an exclusive privilege to initiate corporate
charter amendments. We revive this proposal with two consequences in mind.
First, recent institutional accomplishments suggest that levelling of the state
law playing field could lead to patterns of corporate contracting that begin to
resemble those resulting between actors at arms' length. Second, the combina-
tion of institutional leadership and shareholder access to the charter could
invigorate the charter market. Given a path for the effective registration of
28 At the same time, new incentives to defect to the management side would arise in a
case in which the shareholder volunteer holds a substantial block of stock and state fiduciary
law proves incapable of policing a side deal. See infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 582 (1990) (proposing a federal requirement for public
companies that a majority of shareholders elect to be governed by changes in state law that
affect the division of power between management and shareholders); Cary, supra note 10,
at 701-03; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and
the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759,
77-77 (1987) (proposing shareholder initiative by the use of proxy statement to opt out of
state rules, amend the charter and change the state of incorporation); see also SEC Concept
Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act Release No. 3-
23486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096, 28,100-02 (1986) (suggesting self-governance exemptions to
specific tender offer rules); SEC Advisory Committee Report on Tender Offers, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH), Special Report No. 1028, at 37A1 (July 8, 1983) (recommending annual
shareholder advisory votes on golden parachutes, standstill agreements, and supermajority
and disenfranchising charter provisions); cf Roberta Romano, The Genius of American
Corporate Law 83-84 (1993) [hereinafter Romano, Genius of Corporate Law (proposing
change of statutory defaults from opt-out to opt-in at the state level); Jonathan R. Macey,
Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the
SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 944 (1994) (proposing that Congress should
preempt state antitakeover statutes, leaving shareholders to make decisions respecting
takeover defenses).
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shareholder demands, states would have an incentive to take shareholder
preferences into account in the construction of corporate law's mandatory
provisions.
It is possible that rent-seeking by shareholder coalition-builders could lead
to perverse effects if an access mandate were extended to matters of investment
and other business decisions. 3° Our goals are modest, however, and their
satisfaction does not require unlimited shareholder access. Accordingly, we
would limit the subject matter scope of mandatory shareholder access to charter
terms bearing on governance process and structure. To prompt the
reorientation of the political calculations of state lawmakers, our operative
concept of permitted amendments would extend to the decision as to state of
incorporation.
This proposal also has a theoretical goal. The program to restructure
corporate law to accommodate the economic possibility of shareholder-enforced
self-regulation implies the adjustment of prevailing notions of corporate
federalism. An inconsistency has developed in the commentary. On the one
hand, no one questions that state law's grant of control of the corporate voting
agenda to management restricts shareholder enforcement opportunities. 3 ' On
the other hand, the law reform movement tends to press against only the
federal side of a two-sided system, foregoing consideration of the state law
(and federalism) implications of shareholder participation strategies 32 This
imbalance is surprising given the consensus view that the competition-driven
state system imposed excessive constraints on the Operation of the market
deterrent during the 1980s.
Two explanations for the imbalance suggest themselves, one practical, the
other theoretical. First, proponents of shareholder participation formulate their
agenda with the urgency of activists, either selecting immediately attainable
improvements33
 or confronting unavoidable barriers to full realization. Char-
3° On this point we follow Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice
and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 376-81 (1991)
[hereinafter Gordon, Shareholder Initiative].
31 See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 825-26 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents.
32 The exception is Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-59, which
concludes that the system confirms the prediction of the market efficiency story.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 900-02 (1994) [hereinafter Coffee, Half-Time Report]
(suggesting implementation by SEC rulemaking); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 865, 883-84 (1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda] (proposing
institutional board monitors by means of shareholder self-help); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just
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ter access for process and structure amendments fits neither profile. The
complicated politics of federal intervention give it a low rank on the feasibility
list, 34
 and, in any event, access promises incremental rather than fundamental
improvement in the agency relationship. Second, conceptual barriers impede
reappraisal of the regulatory allocation between national and state governments.
The reform agenda reflects the view that shareholder-enforced self-regulation
is perversely impeded by federal regulations promulgated long ago by actors
under the influence of Berle and Means. 35
 Historically, suggestions for federal
preemption have followed from the same, discredited36
 set of assumptions.
More recent arguments for federal preemption have taken steps to cure this
infirmity by bringing to bear both a relational contract perspective and the
economic presuppositions of the market deterrent approach. 37
 However, the
cure is incomplete because these new calls for preemption continue to include
the Berle and Means remedy of a state-mandated fiduciary deterrent. 38 Still
unaddressed is the central federalism concern that federal intervention imports
a risk of blanket preemption that destroys the responsive benefits of jurisdic-
tional competition. 39
 As a result, the market competition model of state law
still carries sufficient validating force to discourage consideration of structural
adjustments 40
The federalism discussion should be disaggregated and the benefits and
burdens evaluated in light of the regulatory strategy that informs a specific
proposal for intervention. That step accomplished, a powerful case emerges
for minimal intervention to increase the menu of subjects for shareholder
Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 903-08 (1993) (recommending purely dialogic strategy).
See Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 50, 75-54.
u Or, more generally, it follows from early twentieth century populism. See, e.g., Mark
J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 32-
45 (1991).
Here we speak from the point of view of others. In our view, the Berle and Means
description may or may not carry force in the future, depending on the success of the
shareholder participation movement.
' See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1458-67 (1992); David
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An
American Perspective on the 'Race to the Bottom' in the European Communities, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 442-53 (1991).
38 See Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1500-07.
Rornano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 82-83.
4° For a manifestation of this thinking in a federal lawmaking context, see S. REP. NO.
265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1987) (observing that state corporate laws work well and
that Congress has always decided against federalization).
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initiative. The recent, unprecedented success of the shareholder activists invites
re-examination of legal restrictions on shareholder-voice for the first time since
the restrictions appeared in state law a century ago. 4 ' The charter competition
system prevents states from undertaking this review because it effects the
capture of state lawmakers by management interests. There is, of course,
nothing intrinsically unacceptable about a captured sovereign, as the political
theory undergirding the market justification of the system teaches. Neverthe-
less, nothing in that theory also dictates the conclusion that this particular
situation of capture enhances economic welfare. Previously, that conclusion
was reached only on two assumptions: market constraints in any event cure
the capture's negative effects; and state-mandated agenda control is irrelevant
because collective-action constraints prevent shareholders from availing
themselves of an opportunity to voice preferences internally. Neither assump-
tion is safe today; state lawmakers undercut the first during the 1980s, and
institutional shareholders thereafter rendered the second obsolete.
Thus, the legal terms that perpetuate the one-sided capture of state law need
no longer be accepted as the best available, provided that the proposed adjust-
ment makes both the captured sovereign and the regulated firm more respon-
sive to the excluded shareholder interest. However, any proposed federal
adjustment also must leave unimpaired such benefits of responsiveness to the
preferences of actors in economic organizations as the state system does
provide. The minimal intervention suggested here meets that burden.42
More broadly, a strictly market-based theory of regulatory competition
provides an inadequate framework for appraising the law's role in facilitating
effective organizational incentive schemes. 43
 The market-based model under-
41 See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
42 To keep the discussion manageable, we avoid mentioning the problem of constituency
participation. We acknowledge, however, that this corporate governance problem is closely
related to that of shareholder access and ultimately must be confronted as corporate law
evolves to accommodate institutional investor initiatives. Accordingly, our focus on the
shareholder interest should not be taken to presuppose adherence to the shareholder primacy
norm implicit in much of the governance literature. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional
Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
4 1(1991), notes that institutionalized labor-management cooperation along European lines
need not be a zero-sum game, and we agree. We also think that Buxbaum, id. at 42A5,
plausibly looks to governance innovations stemming from institutional initiatives as a
potential beginning point in the evolution of American analogues to codetermination.
Such schemes allow opportunistic actors to overcome collective action problems in
pursuit of the gains of trade, promoting mutual compliance & post and allowing for credible
commitments & ante. See Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORGS. 106, 122 (Special Issue 1991).
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states the distortions that result from the interplay of multiple sovereigns and
interest groups in the resolution of corporate commitment, information, and
enforcement problems. These problems stem in part from the capture of a
sovereign mandate by one contracting group and in part from the absence of
a contractual avenue for realignment of the sovereign's incentives by the
competing group. This mixed problem of economics and politics calls for a
mixed political and economic solution. Ideally, the political solution should
be shaped to leave the ultimate resolution of the corporate agency problems
to the economic actors themselves, and leave sovereign actors with incentives
to make balanced responses when their preferences conflict. Federal interven-
tion would facilitate that result if it refrained from displacing the states' role
in corporate law creation and instead realigned the positions of the three parties
to the corporate contract-management, shareholders, and state government-to
allocate shareholders a seat at the bargaining table.
II. CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION AND THE PROBLEMS OF
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND REGULATORY RESPONSIVENESS
This part of the Article reconsiders the debate between critics and proponents
of charter competition and proposes a modified description of the system.
From the critics' perspective, the charter market facilitates managerial capture
of state lawmakers and prevents the evolution of an effective fiduciary deter-
rent. The proponents, in contrast, applaud market impediments to the develop-
ment of fiduciary controls and describe a mechanism that assures state respon-
siveness to the preferences of economic actors. We assert that neither position
remains viable in the present environment. The critics tend to overstate the
problem: Capture, taken alone, does not delegitimate a regulatory regime.
They also tend to overplay the solution: By displacing Delaware courts from
their position as corporate law's leading center of dispute resolution, manda-
tory federal fiduciary standards would impair and possibly terminate the
operation of a useful repository of information and expertise. The proponents
tend to understate the problem: They describe a relational contract without
fully exploring its political and process characteristics. This relational contract
contains not only normative mandates, but also process mandates that govern
the alteration of default terms. Furthermore, the capture of the mandating
sovereign by one of the parties has prevented the evolution of both optimal
mandates and effective ground rules for opting out. The proponents also tend
to avoid sustained consideration of solutions: The federal mandate can be
directed to the process side, not only to level the playing field for corporate
contracting, but also to destabilize a structure that affords the states the comfort
of having to respond to the demands of only one affected interest group.
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4.5 The Corrupt Sovereign Versus the Responsive Sovereign
The original case for federal intervention against state charter competition
combined a public interest theory of regulation with a fiduciary strategy for
improving corporate law. Professor William L. Cary's leading article
denounced Delaware, the leading corporate domicile, as a corrupt sover-
eign. He undertook a general review of its courts' pronouncements and con-
cluded that there appeared to be 'no public policy left in Delaware corporate
law other than the objective of raising revenue.' 45
 To Cary, the 'public
policy' at stake was the integrity of corporate managers, and the revenue
objective had led a single state to 'grant management unilateral control
untrammelled by other interests,' 46
 thereby sacrificing the national interest.
He looked to federal intervention to eliminate the firms' incentives to incorpor-
ate in Delaware.47
Cary assumed that regulation could and should pursue a notion of the
general good. By the time he published his thesis in 1974, however, that theory
of regulation had already fallen from favor in the social sciences 48
 and was
replaced by capture theories of regulation. 49
 Capture theories described regu-
lation as an arena in which special interests compete to use government power
for advantage. They also debunked the public interest story of regulatory
motivation-now regulators should be expected to behave no differently than
actors in private economic relations. 5° This shift in political theory, coupled
with the emerging market deterrent view of corporate law, permitted Cary's
Delaware is home to one-half of the largest American corporations, and is the new
domicile of 80% of reincorporating firms. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 225,244 (1985) [hereinafter Romano,
Law as Product].
Cary, supra note 10, at 684.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 702. His proposal included not only federal fiduciary standards, but shareholder
access to the charter and by-laws, the abolition of nonvoting shares, and mandatory
indemnification rules. Id.
See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & OROS. 167, 167 (1990).
Mancur Olson attacked the optimistic public interest orthodoxy of American political
science as built on a misguided conception of the logic of group action. Mancur Olson, jr.,
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 16-22, 117-
3 1(1965). Olson claimed that the liberal view that groups formed organizations based on
common goals ignored free riding by members of the group. I- at 15-16. Since most of the
gains from group formation could be captured by all, there was very little incentive for
groups to organize. Id. at 1-16.
° Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 168-69.
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race to the bottom to be reversed into a race to the top.5'
The 'race to the top' story drew on the central assertion of regulatory
competition theory-that jurisdictional competition ameliorates the distortions
that result as interest groups compete for, and win, political favors. Under this
theory, competition for domiciliaries leads to the matching of government
policies with diverse citizen preferences, and thus fosters innovation. 52
 Citi-
zens signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when they
migrate from regime to regime. Their ability to exit disempowers government
actors, whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking with them votes and
revenues. 53
 Given competition, law production goes forward without losing
time on the task of reconciling competing preferences. The theory also implies
a preference for state over national lawmaking. Since the revenue enhancement
constraint on the national government is less intense, 54
 the national lawmaking
process will be slower, less responsive to productive concerns, and more
susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups.55
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on the assumption
that state corporation codes may be viewed as products consumed by corpor-
ations. 56 In the resulting description, competition for the legal business of
firms forces the states to adapt the law to the dynamic conditions in which the
firms operate. 57
 State lawmaking emerges as a trial and error process suited
to the accurate identification of optimal corporate arrangements.58
Reincorporating firms are this market's marginal consumers. They seek a
predictable legal regime that reduces their costs. Delaware provides this with
' See Winter, supra note 11, at 254-2.
See Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at -6.
See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 142A3 (1991).
Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at -6, 48-51.
Id. at 5. In a federal system, the allocation of lawmaking power to the competing states
also protects individuals from the power of the national government; private organizations
provide an additional check by counterbalancing the power of state governments. National
regulation of corporations would impair this corporate function and thus detract from
individual liberty. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law,
8 CARDOZO L REV. 709, 753 n.97 (1987).
Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 6.
Delaware, the leading corporate law state, excels in this process. Id. at 9.
58 Romano's study of the spread of innovation in corporation codes found that innovations
spread rapidly in a pattern resembling the 5-shaped diffusion curve of technological
innovations. Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 234-35. Her study of state
responsiveness, Id. at 237-40, found that the more responsive states gain more and lose
fewer incorporations, and that state responsiveness bears a significant positive correlation
to the proportion of state revenues derived from franchise taxes, id.
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comprehensive case law, well-specified indemnification rules, and an expert
judiciary. 59
 The firms also seek a guaranty that the new state of domicile will
maintain the desirability of its code, because the reincorporating firm and the
target jurisdiction enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of
opportunistic breach. Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target's
favorable legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics and
transform itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction. 60 The competitive jurisdic-
tion has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible commitment.
Delaware's commitment stems from its dependence on franchise tax
revenues. 6' These revenues are an 'intangible asset' that emerges from the
combination of a large number of incorporations and a small population.
Delaware also invests in real assets specific to its incorporation business-its
case law and its judicial and administrative expertise. These, together with
Delaware's code, constitute reputational capital. Delaware protects this store-
house of capital by imposing internal process and structure rules that deter
political disruption.62
 This store of capital bolsters the state's market position.
Other states cannot credibly precommit to offer superior service, and thus are
deterred from incurring the necessary start-up costs. A first-mover advantage
in Delaware results.63
Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 32-40. Romano has backed this
cost-reduction assertion with a study of public corporation domicile changes between i%0
and 1982. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 242. The study shows that
corporations tend to change domiciles in advance of either a public offering, an acquisitions
program, or the promulgation of antitakeover measures. Id. at 250. They incur substantial
costs in so doing, including the one-time costs of the move, the possibility of appraisal
claims, and, in the case of corporations moving to Delaware, the present negative value
of an additional layer of high franchise taxes. Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra
note 28, at 3-35. The benefits mostly stem from the threat of litigation-all three of the
identified transactional occasions for changes of domicile entail litigation risks.
60 New Jersey did this early in the twentieth century, precipitating a mass movement of
corporations across the river to Delaware. Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's
General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 265-70 (1976).
61 Romano, Genius of CorporateLaw, supra note 28, at 38-39. Franchise taxes amounted
to 17.7% of Delaware's total tax revenues in 1990. Id. at 10.
62 These include its direction of corporate matters to a specialized chancery court, its
practice of appointing rather than electing its judges and limiting them to 12-year terms,
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities in both houses of its legislature for the approval
of corporation code amendments. Id. at 3842.
63 Id. at 4044. The store of capital also fosters reciprocal dependencies between Delaware
and its customers. The lawyers who recommend reincorporation to client corporations invest
in Delaware expertise, and thus have incentives to recommend it as a destination. Their
clients need to economize on legal costs, and thus tend to stay in place. For competing
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As originally articulated, this market-based race to the top validation of state
law bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack of influence over state
lawmaking with a reference to the control market deterrent. The assertion, in
effect, was that the managers' option of exit adequately disciplined the states,
while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile offeror adequate-
ly disciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasiveness as managers and
state politicians collaborated to hamper the market deterrent with the anti-
takeover legislation of the 1 980s This manifest case of charter market fail-
explanations, see Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott, Economics of Corporation Law
and Securities Regulation 111(1980) (finding that large firms go to Delaware); Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28
J.L. & ECON. 179, 190 (1985) (finding that firms with concentrated ownership do not go
to Delaware).
The basic model of the 'first-mover advantage' is that of Michael Spence. See Michael
A. Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534,
534-44 (1977). Under it, an oligopolist must commit resources to a certain level of produc-
tion; a potential entrant can observe this, and must decide whether to enter and produce at
a certain level. Id. at 534. Spence's entry deterrence model assumes a two stage game in
which one firm may enjoy a first-mover advantage if it can choose its quantity first: Because
firm one uses its excess capacity to deter firm two's entry, quantity has a commitment
value. Id.; see also Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 3 17-22 (1988)
(reviewing the Spence-Dixit model and interpreting it as a double capacity game, 'with
production as the first capacity constraint and selling capacity as the second); Avinash Dixit,
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of En try Barriers, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 20, 20-32
(1979) (finding that 'a great absolute advantage in demand (or cost) for established firms
makes entry harder but lower cross-price effects with potential entrants' products make entry
easier').
Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a central-
ly-organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state legislative
process here suggested that the statutes are initiated by threatened managers of local
corporations and their assistants in the local corporate bar rather than by broad coalitions
of business, labor, and community leaders. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.h (1988).
The statutes evolved in succeeding generations. The first generation submitted tender
offers to substantive review by state securities administrators; those statutes were held
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640
(1982). The second generation limited the subject matter scope to regulation of internal
corporate affairs. These statutes tend either to condition the voting right of bidders on the
approval of the shareholders as a whole, impose freeze periods on combinations between
bidders and targets, or require that an equal price be paid in the second stage of a two-tier
acquisition. Some statutes combine these elements. These Statutes survived constitutional
challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987). Another
variety confirms the legitimacy of board consideration of the constituents' interests other
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ure66
 reinforced the opponents' assertion that management capture of the
states leads to suboptimal lawmaking. Following the lead of Roberta
Romano, 67
 the market deterrent school moved to a middle ground position
on charter competition. 68 From that perspective, they defend the state system,
except to the extent that it inhibits the control market.
Others, principally Lucian Bebchuk, returned to the attack. 69 Bebchuk
argued that the middle ground7° result stems from a structural defect in the
competitive system that disables the production of a maximizing legal regime.
The market leads the competing states to focus on the variables that influence
reincorporation decisions. 7 ' There follows from this a concern for manage-
ment preferences rather than shareholder value itself. Accordingly, nothing
deters the states from pursuing policies of management accommodation with
regard to the fiduciary and market deterrents. 72 Bebchuk concluded that
than shareholders in takeover defense situations. For a summary, see Romano, Genius of
Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 53-57.
A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a harmful
effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture that
encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as poison
pills. For a summary of this work, see Romano, Genius of CorporateLaw, supra note 28,
at 60-75.
67 See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 281.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 222 (1991) (concluding that the race to the top stands as refuted, but the
proposition that competition creates a 'powerful tendency' to enact shareholder beneficial
laws remains vital); Ralph K. Winter, The 'Race for the Top' Revisited: A Comment on
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing more confidence in the
view that Cary was wrong than in the view that state competition results in a race to the
top).
Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1458-75; see also Charny, supra note 36, at 456 (promoting
'harmonization,' the promulgation of corporate rules by a central authority); Roberta S.
Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 91-96 (1991)
(endorsing the promulgation of uniform federal corporate law); Joel Seligman, The Case
for Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 97 1-74 (1990) (same); Joel
Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOJ(. L. REV. 1, 63 (1993) [hereinafter
Seligman, New Corporate Law] (same).
° Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1440A1. Bebchuk began his analysis of the problem by
stating his assumption that, absent reasons to the contrary, state competition is more likely
to produce an efficient rule than federal regulation. Id.
71 Id. at 1452-54.
Bebchuk identified a category of 'insignificantly redistributive,' management-favorable
rules that always escape the market constraint. Id. at 1462. Behchuk hypothesized a
transaction undertaken by a $1 billion firm that reduces shareholder value by $1 million
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because of this oversight, federal fiduciary standards should preempt most state
takeover regulation.73
The renewed debate on the desirability of federal intervention continues
among those occupying different middle-ground views of charter competition.
At the foundation of this debate lies the allocation of the theoretical burden of
proof for or against intervention, the assumption being that the side bearing
the burden loses the game. Several points are sharply controverted. Opponents
of intervention point to a body of event studies showing that reincorporation
in Delaware does not reduce shareholder value; proponents argue that conver-
gence among the states on the basic points of corporate law denudes the results
of persuasiveness. 74
 Opponents draw on a contractual theory of the firm and
for the purpose of returning $200,000 to management. Id. at 1463. The transaction is too
small to excite a takeover, but as long as state law opens the door, management has every
incentive to undertake it. Id. In addition, competition can cause the states to use their
lawmaking power to impair the strength of market discipline even thrther, as the prolifer-
ation of antitakeover statutes demonstrates. Id. at 1467-68; see also Coffee, supra note 28,
at 77-72 (discussing the impact of state antitakeover legislation); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (same).
Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1494-95.
' Roberta Romano conducted the leading event study showing that reincorporating firms
experience an increase in value or no significant stock price declines. See Romano, Law
as Product, supra note 43, at 279-80. Proponents of intervention respond with a number
of standard questions about the shareholder vote on which reincorporation is conditioned.
Even though Delaware has value-decreasing rules, the shareholders may approve a move
for several reasons: because the move on the whole increases shareholder value, the
shareholders have inadequate information, or management has tied the move 1883 to another
corporate action they desire. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1471. These problems limit the
normative force of the event studies: The stock prices may reflect the market's reaction to
the developments signalled by the reincorporation rather than the reincorporation itself, and
managers may systematically choose to reincorporate at moments when such information
exists. Id. at 1449-50; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 767-68 (offering a critique of
Romano's analysis); Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 482 (same); Romano, Law as
Product, supra note 43, at 267 (discussing the implications of reincorporation). Romano,
who recognizes the former possibility, responds that it is improbable that information tied
to the move could swamp an otherwise negative stock price effect; rather, if management
were manipulating the process, price-negative rather than price-neutral results should obtain
for firms reincorporating for management-favorablepurposes. Romano, Genius of Corporate
Law, supra note 28, at 18. Bebchuk, following others, anticipates this point: Given conver-
gence among the state codes, the absence of negative returns may only mean that the legal
rules of the original and destination state are equally harmful. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at
1449; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 767-68 (discussing the logical inferences to be
derived from 'statistical noise'); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law,
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point out that new federally mandated fiduciary deterrents would retard the
evolution of contractual corporate arrangements75 ; proponents respond that
the consensus view on contracting out continues to favor fiduciary mandates
in view of the rational apathy that impedes shareholder choices of governance
terms. 76 Opponents argue that the federal political landscape remains as
hostile as that of the states, making perverse effects a likely result of a federal
law-reform movement; 77 proponents respond that the federal venue is mar-
ginally more hospitable and that centralized politics facilitate shareholder
collective action.78
4.6 Charter Competition as Regulatory Capture
This middle ground discussion of federal intervention takes on the binary
quality of the old race to the top/race to the bottom discussion as its partici-
pants iterate positions from the historic debate over market and fiduciary
deterrent strategies. However, as the replay continues, each side has recog-
nized possibilities for both market success and market failure. This more open-
ended theoretical framework allows more flexibility in the diagnosis of the
problem, and the stronger assertions of regulatory competition theory have
dropped out of the picture for the most part. The 1 980s anti-takeover alliance
between the states and the managers has dispelled the notion that identification
of a market phenomenon at a significant stage in the lawmaking process, taken
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1508 (1989); Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 482-83
(discussing the market signals produced by relocation to Delaware). Furthermore, the fact
that reincorporation does not decrease value overall does not prove that competition
produces desirable results on all corporate issues. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1450.
Bebchuk, in sum, argues that the event studies must be seen in temporal perspective.
Id. at 1448-5 1. They do contradict Cary's picture of an ever-lowering race to the bottom
with Delaware in the lead. However, once we accept that point and join Romano on the
middle ground, the probative force of the studies diminishes. The race, in effect, bottomed
out before the studies were undertaken. Id. The prospective question is whether intervention
can cause the numbers to improve. Id. at 1509-10.
In Romano's view, acknowledging disproof of the race to the bottom decides the
debate over intervention. Given agreement on the beneficial effects of competition, she said,
the burden is on advocates of intervention to demonstrate empirically which particular code
provisions harm shareholders and why national legislation would be more likely to alleviate
the problem.' Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 19.
Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 90-9 1.
76 Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1496-99.
Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 50, 75-84.
78 William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U.
TORONTO L J. 401, 432 (1994).
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alone, assures the ideal result of legislation based solely on the exogenous
preferences of individuals. It has become clear that imbalanced interest group
influence in this market-driven lawmaking process prevents that result, divest-
ing regulatory competition theory of a legitimating effect.
Regulatory competition matches individual preferences and legal results
because actors have the opportunity to exit cheaply from an unsatisfactory
jurisdiction. The charter system, of course, does allow for exit from an
unsatisfactory jurisdiction, but, because the exit privilege applies to firms
rather than to shareholders, it does nothing to ameliorate the agency problem.
Corporate law has evolved under charter competition to block shareholder
access to the determination of reincorporation decisions. 79
 Existing market
disciplines offer no way around that barrier because they create no incentives
to encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable jurisdiction. 80
 Suc-
cessful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight, displace one
group of managers with another. The new management, unless it has taken the
firm private, remains in an agency relationship with the firm's shareholders
and thus has no reason to look for a jurisdiction favorable to the shareholder
interest. 8 ' In addition, due to the peculiarities of America' s constitutional
structure, the competing jurisdictions-which lack a balancing incentive-have
national lawmaking power over the shareholders of domiciliary corporations.
In this variant of regulatory competition, then, exit from one jurisdiction
provides no remedy for the dissatisfactions of the disadvantaged interest group.
4.6. 1 Capture Theories of Regulation
The mixed framework invites a retelling of the charter competition story in
See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
80 Cf Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-
the-Boaom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1249 (1992) (arguing that the charter competition process is not defective in itself, but that
the unresolved principal-agent problem respecting the selection of the state of incorporation
makes locational decisions defective).
81 The displacing group that plans to make further acquisitions with the target has an
interest in the removal of state law antitakeover barriers. However, reincorporation to a
hypothetical shareholder-favorable jurisdiction would not help with this problem, since the
law of the target jurisdiction applies in a takeover. The only solution to the acquiring firm's
problem, then, is interest group pressure to work against antitakeover legislation nationwide.
Yet, at this point, conflicting interests among acquiring firms enter into the picture. Today's
acquirer may be tomorrow's target; the managers of large acquirers can afford to be patient
and work around state barriers in making hostile acquisitions, meanwhile enjoying the
prerogatives of the state law regime.
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terms of both the economic and governmental politics of interest groups and
organizations. In this story, charter competition becomes the mainspring of a
uniquely stable arrangement of regulatory capture.
Under capture theories of regulation, interest groups and political decision-
makers enter into jointly maximizing relationships. The simple demand model
of capture asserts that lawmaking follows the lawmakers' responses to demand
patterns. 82
 Particular responses depend on interactions between the law-
makers' risk profiles and the projected benefits of legislative action. 83
 The
lawmaker, being risk averse, tries to avoid conflicts-given no demand for
legislation, nothing is done; given organized demand, the lawmaker attempts
to satisfy the interest group making the demand with beneficial legislation.TM
In addition, interest groups desiring to influence legislation encounter collective
action problems. 85 Different groups have different abilities to overcome them-
the smaller the group and the higher the per capita stake of its members, the
greater the likelihood that the members will work out a collective arrangement
and enjoy the benefits of governmental influence. 86 This activity results,
according to the theorists of the Virginia School, in a social loss from rent-
82 See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 343-44
(1988); see also Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265-68 (1982) (discussing the interest-group
theory).
83 Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,
214 (1976). Benefits can come in the form of resources or favorable consequences for
reelection. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SC!. 3, 10-13 (1971). With corporate law, the benefit tends to be rents from
corporate business.
See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 1983 Q.J. ECON. 371, 39-96 (discussing the impact on the political redistribution
of income resulting from competition among political pressure groups vying for political
favors).
Olson's fundamental insight is that in a large, heterogeneous community, individuals
will prefer not to pay the full cost of the provision of nonexcludable public goods and that,
as a result, they will be undersupplied. A free-rider problem must be overcome if public
goods are to be supplied, and voluntary compliance can be secured only by introducing
selective incentives (such as fees) or sanctions. OLSON, supra note 48, at 50-5 1, 133-34.
The result is that rational individuals are motivated to join interest groups based on individ-
ualized selective incentives. Id at 60-65. Given the free-rider problem, large groups will
have difficulty achieving their goals. Id. at 35-36.
It seems to follow that, in a case in which more than one interest group manages to
compete to achieve influence, the risk-averse legislator will delegate ultimate regulatory
authority to an agency. Once that occurs, the agency becomes the venue of interest group
activities. See James Wilson, The Politics of Regulation 388-89 (1980).
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seeking. 87
 Legislators create rents for the benefit of successful interest groups,
distributing them based on a self-seeking vote calculus.88
An additional body of capture theory supplements this demand model with
a supply-side story. Exclusively demand-based models of law production tend
to treat the political process as a black box and, as a result, do not attempt to
describe how legislative trades are accomplished and enforced. 89
 This is a
problem, since legislative trades, unlike well-drafted private contracts, can be
undone at the subsequent behest of a competing group. For example, an
interest group deal, obtained in the legislature through logrolling and other
trading mechanisms and then embodied in a legislative directive, can be
undercut later by an administrative agency responding to a competing interest
group. In the alternative, representatives can amend or repeal a piece of
legislation later at the request of a competing group. Supply-side explanations
of interest-group dealmaking confront this problem of political insecurity by
drawing on organizational economics to show that institutional arrangements
The Virginia School concentrates on the economic theory of legislation. The idea is
simple: Government creates rent that is captured by interest groups. Politicians pass
legislation that benefits the interest groups that are better organized, and rents are distributed
based on the welfare maximization of the political decisionmakers. The cost of supplying
rents to well-organized groups is passed on to poorly organized groups.
The upshot is a waste of consumer surplus. Governments create rents and can appro-
priate them, and they are likely to squander the rents they capture; as a result, everyone
is worse off. Under this view, the political process is justified only if lawmakers produce
legislation obtained without influence. The task of politics, then, is to create legislation
based on the exogenous preferences of individuals. See Richard S. Higgins et al., Free
Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking, in The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking 127, 128
(Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, in Toward a Rent-Seeking Society 39, 46-47 (James Buchanan et
al. eds., 1980).
Policies are evaluated in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits based on the
assumption of a level of votes for each dollar expended. See William C. Mitchell, Interest
Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 85, 98-99
(1990); Tollison, supra note 81, at 339-50; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional Bureau-
cratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (With Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB.
CHOICE 147, 147-48 (1984).
Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,
133 (1988); see also Tollison, supra note 81, at 347-66 (summarizing supply-side research).
Such models also leave unexplained such phenomena as simultaneous provision of policy
benefits to multiple diverse interests. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in
Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 59, 65 (1992) (concluding that the special
interest model fails to explain environmental legislation).
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have an impact on outcomes. This body of work disaggregates the government
into a complex of principal-agent relationships. 9° In these stories, legislatures
develop process and structure machinery to control the opportunistic conduct
of both career bureaucrats and legislators. 9 ' These devices include the legislat-
ive committee system, which helps to overcome problems of asymmetric
information between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents through ex
post monitoring, and process requirements for rulemaking, which provide
advance notice of noncomplying conduct. The processes of the legislature
also contribute to transactional stability: Legislative procedures and committee
jurisdictions give the congressional gatekeeper the ability to resist short-term
internal pressures.93
° Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 243, 243-44 (1987); Weingast, supra note 87, at 148.
' Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administra-
tive Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 441 (1989).
A related, and more abstract, line of discourse considers the effects of given modes of
voting process on the ordering of preferences among elected representatives, refuting the
chaos scholars predicted under early social choice theory. See, e.g., Peter C. Ordeshook,
Game Theory and Political Theory: an Introduction 2-301(1986) (discussing agenda control
and outcome); David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1181, 1189-98 (1989) (considering closed and open rules of legislative
amendment); Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS
6, 8-9 (1986) (finding that the particular content and contour of institutions determines the
extent to which electoral outcomes reflect popular preferences).
For a formal agency model of information asymmetries and capture relationships
between legislatures and agencies, and between producer groups and public interest groups,
see Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation 480-500 (1993). But cf Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and
Firms (1994) (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1686)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (claiming that approach turning on a
complete information model is not plausible in cases where the problem of inefficiency is
essential to the politicians' performance, such as in state-run enterprises; therefore, corrup-
tion is central to the operation of the firm).
For an application of this approach keyed to legal policymaking, see Jonathan R.
Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORGS. 93, 99-103 (1992). Macey contends that legislators are able to capture
higher rents only if they can surmount the agency problem. Id. at 100. In Macey's view,
& post monitoring and punishments may not be sufficient to solve the agency problem. Ex
ante structuring or 'hard-wiring' of the agency works better, and the interest groups that
pay for the legislation can be expected to attempt to secure it. Id. at l(X-03.
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 245 (1992). Moe, supra note 42, at 122-23, criticizes
this literature for its adherence to a model of motivation grounded in strategic rationality,
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4.6.2 Charter Competition as a Form of Capture
These capture theories of legislation and administration provide a useful basis
for explaining the success of the charter competition system and the preemi-
nence of Delaware. Exit through reincorporation provides a potent ex post
enforcement device to the managers who purchase legislation from the target
state, particularly a small state dependent on charter revenues. Ex ante, the
code the managers purchase provides them with control of the enforcing exit
decision by blocking shareholder access to the charter. 94
 The state's incentive
to collect rents from new incorporations assures that the process legislation
securing the exit route will not be amended in the future to make exit more
difficult. Thus the state's rent incentive joins the deterrent of possible
reincorporation to assure the managers that the deal will stick. The combina-
tion does more than that, however. It also mitigates any collective action
problems the managers might encounter in getting the future legislation. Should
desired legislation not be obtained, exit can be effected unilaterally, and there
will remain up to forty-nine states from which to choose. Furthermore, the
chartering state's rent flow includes fees to practicing lawyers in addition to
franchise taxes. This assures an identity of interests between management and
key actors on the supply side. In this scheme, the organized bar in the charter-
ing state can be expected to act as an effective advocate for the management
interest, without forcing management to organize a trade association to enter
into a formal lobbying relationship. Delaware practice confirms this predic-
tion. 95
 Delaware delegates to its bar association both agenda control and
drafting responsibility for any amendments to its corporate code. The bar and
legislature have a long-standing 'understanding'-amendments to the corpor-
ations code must first be drafted and approved by the bar association's corpor-
ate law section and the bar association itself.96
asserting that a thick description of the motivations of different types of actors provides
knowledge about authority that the principal-agent models do not offer.
See infra notes 259-74 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the interests of the bar and management diverge on the matter
of litigation incentives. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 126-37.
See Andrew G.T. Moore II, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 779, 780-81(1987). Active drafting and discussion is limited largely to the corporate
law section. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 888-92 (1990). The section itself performs the
legislative function of sifting the comments of interested parties. Each of the three largest
corporate servicing firms have representatives to the section. Id. at 888-92, 910.
The legislature rubber stamps the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role
is limited to representation at bar association meetings on invitation. Id. at 888-92; see also
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Capture by charter competition exacerbates the shareholders' collective
action problem even as it reduces that of management. State law not only
blocks shareholder access to the charter, it provides only management with
routine compensation for expenses incurred in voting contests. 97 Meanwhile,
the bar emerges as the only interest group within the chartering state with an
incentive to advance the shareholders' interest in lawmaking processes. Litigat-
ing lawyers promote shareholder welfare as an incident to making a living as
enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. Unfortunately, this confluence of interests
results in a strictly limited set of shareholder benefits. The lawyers have an
incentive to promote lawmaking that strengthens the market deterrent only if
the change would lead to additional litigable disputes. The same applies to
lawmaking that enhances the possibilities for shareholder-enforced self-regula-
tion. Such incentives seem unlikely to arise in practice. Fiduciary breaches that
bring rents to lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market
or self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of working
well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those rents by reducing the
numbers of unproductive influence activities. In addition, the bar's interest
diverges from the shareholders' even within the sphere of fiduciary enforce-
ment, with the bar favoring a system that trades substantial money judgments
to shareholders for substantial attorneys' fees.98
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent incentive linked
to the shareholders' interest in minimizing influence costs within the firm. The
shareholders, then, must self-organize to advance an agenda in state
lawmaking processes. Unfortunately, the charter competition system structural-
ly limits prospects for payoffs that would justify the costs of organization.
Furthermore, any sustained shareholder effort would have to be pursued in
multiple jurisdictions. By default, then, federal law emerges as the preferred
venue for organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures to make firms
operate more effectively.' 00 Federal lawmakers, unlike their counterparts in
David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for
Incorporation Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 665, 682-84 (1987)
(discussing the 1 %7 revision of Delaware corporate law).
It compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and provides no
compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issue contests.
See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). For
discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 passim (1990).
98 For discussion of the role that the lawyers' interest plays in shaping Delaware law, see
infra text accompanying notes 13 1-37.
Shareholders also may rely on independent allies such as academics.
This conclusion obtains even though Delaware's compact and relatively informal
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the states, have not been captured by the management side pursuant to a deal
with sticking power. This is, of course, only a negative qualification that by
no means implies probable success for a shareholder influence campaign.
Process costs still loom large at the federal level, and management retains both
organizational advantages and well-worn paths of influence. But the turf at
least is open. There are no rent incentives tied to chartering decisions, and a
large number of players, each making complex and political calculations in a
dynamic environment, makes it easier to contest management influence)0'
4.7 Conificting Demands on the Captured State
We draw no race to the bottom conclusions from this capture model of corpor-
ate lawmaking. Rather, the model serves to explicate the theoretical implica-
tions of the middle ground framework, putting a different gloss on the same
practices purveyed as productive relational contracting in the race to the top
story. Since many areas of state corporate law find shareholder and manage-
ment interests in alignment, it complicates, but does not displace, the relational
contract reading.
The capture model does suggest exploration of strategies of federal interven-
tion designed to diminish state law's imbalanced supply-side incentives and
imbalanced opportunities to make demands. However, it does not thereby
imply that federal fiduciary standards are the most desirable mode of interven-
tion. Federal fiduciary standards would ameliorate both the supply and
demand-side problems by imposing shareholder-favorable norms. They also
would entail a difficult trade off, because process infirmities could follow from
the appointment of the federal judicial system to the shareholder guardian role.
The infirmities lie in the possibility that a preemptive change in the venue of
corporate common lawmaking from the Delaware courts to the federal courts
would so materially alter the composition of the product sold in the charter
market as to denude Delaware of significant relational capital. The loss of the
first-mover role in common lawmaking would leave Delaware marketing a
lawmaking processes, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, hold out significant process
cost advantages. For a discussionof the relative advantagesand disadvantagesof the federal
venue, compare Romano, Genius of CorporateLaw, supra note 28, at 7581, with Bratton,
supra note 77, at 430-33.
'°' The SEC embodies this possibility: Historically, its actors tend to satisfy the demands
of neither the shareholder nor the management side. In addition, they bring an inherited,
albeit limited ideology of shareholder protection to their ongoing mediative activities. Recent
amendments to the proxy rules promulgated at the instance of institutional shareholder
activists, see infra note 180, concretely demonstrate this agency's continuing receptiveness
to shareholder agenda items.
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product of diminished value and weaken its relational tie with firms. The rents
that support Delaware as a center of information on corporate governance
disputes could dissipate, possibly leading to corporate lawmaking on a level
of diminished sophistication.
Thus, one assertion of regulatory competition theory-that national
lawmaking procedures carry process infirmities that are avoided when the
subject matter is left to the competing states-continues to bear on the debate.
The captured state system can enhance economic welfare to the extent that its
competitive element causes the lawmaker to weigh the regulations' benefit and
harm to the firm as a whole) 02
 Arguably, then, the preferred solution to the
corporate agency problem leaves the subject matter with the states but finds
a means to interpose the shareholder interest into state lawmakers' demand
picture)°3 This would render the capture benign.'°4
Past practice provides a base point from which to begin this reordering of
incentives. Shareholder demands have, in fact, figured into the existing com-
petitive regime in a secondary posture, influencing the shape of Delaware's
fiduciary case law. This result appears surprising if we view state law under
the pure product competition model. To account for it, the model must be
expanded to encompass the political instability that results from the national
attention that Delaware lawmaking attracts because of its dominant market
position.
4.7.1 Delaware Lawmaking and the Threat of Federal Intervention
The deal struck between the chartering state and management can never be
entirely secure because the possibility of removal of corporate lawmaking to
the federal level inheres in the constitutional structure of the United States.
Delaware, as the entity most dependent on corporate law revenues, is the
contracting state most prone to view that possibility as a threat. This structural
constant suggests that Delaware lawmakers may have secondary incentives to
102 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 63- (providing a prisoners' dilemma model
of agency capture).
03 This point can be expanded by analogy to the literature on legislative control of
agencies, under which the question of political control has been addressed in terms of the
economic principal-agent problem. See generally, e.g., McCobbins et al., supra note 89.
A federally imposed fiduciary regime would restrict opportunities for this beneficial
engagement because it would remove the lawmaker from an immediate agency relationship
with the firm.
'° Restating this point, the charter competition problem stems from the same incentive
problems and barriers to collective action that create the corporate agency problem in the
first place.
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respond to shareholder interests.105
It can be plausibly hypothesized that Delaware actors remain averse to
possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power and have incentives
to avoid exciting its application) 06 Federal law reform discussions of the past
105 A number of commentators have recognized this possibility. See Bebchuk, supra note
36, at 1455; Cary, supra note 10, at 688; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512.
06 This dual demand model's plausibility depends on three assumptions. First, actors in
Delaware must perceive that their activities have the potential to excite political action at
the national level. Second, Delaware actors must perceive that the shareholder interest finds
a voice among the actors and groups that influence federal law. Third, the projected federal
political action must have a negative impact either on the charter competition system as a
whole or on the relative place of Delaware in the system to reduce Delaware's rent flow.
As to the first assumption, periodic calls for federal intervention have, over the years,
given Delaware reasons for concern. Although federal intervention has not been a present
prospect since the late 1970s, see infra note 114, the subject has remained a staple of
corporate law discourse. Anecdotal evidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep it in
mind when they take politically sensitive steps. The Delaware bar's concern about federal
responses is confirmed in accounts of its deliberations on new legislation. When the bar first
considered (and rejected) an antitakeover statute, it received comment letters from Martin
Lipton and Joseph Flom warning that enactment might excite federal intervention. Such
worries were expressed at the committee meeting on the proposal. See Alva, supra note 95,
at 906-08.
The second assumption has been the subject of debate. Professor Romano argues that
management replicates its dominant influence in the states at the federal level. She inspected
the federal corporate law reform politics of the 1 980s to show that management voices were
heard the most often. Romano surveyed the content of both federal takeover legislation
proposed during the period 1969-87 and of interest group representation in the accompany-
ing legislative processes. She found that the overwhelming majority of bills had an anti-
bidder aspect and that management voices appeared much more frequently than shareholder
or labor voices. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 7-8 1.
Romano also showed, however, that bureaucratic, political, and academic voices were heard
in quantity during the 1980s. I'L at 77. In any event, to the extent that large stakes in the
status quo make Delaware's lawmakers risk averse, any active federal politics with possible
adverse consequences might prompt them to make a preemptive response.
Regarding the third assumption, the gravity of a federal threat will vary with the
particular form of federal intervention proposed. A discrete provision might impair
Delaware's position only incidentally, blocking a particular management accommodation,
but applying the block to all 50 states. As examples, consider (1) the all holders rule, Rule
14d-1O under section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240. 14d-10
(1994), providing that any tender offer must be open to all holders of the subject class of
securities, preempting the defensive tactic sustained in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); and (2) the special tax on greenmail profits, I.R.C. § 5881
(1991), enacted in 1987, which imposes a 50% excise tax on profit realized in a greenmail
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two decades have given Delaware actors cause for concern because the often-
proposed remedy of federal fiduciary standards would have an adverse impact
on their interests. This vulnerability stems from the competitive evolution of
corporate statutory law. Competition has caused state corporate codes to
converge in their broad outlines. As a result, Delaware's case law, judges, and
speedy process figure prominently in its line of legal I07 Federal
intervention might deprive Delaware of the principal justification for its
premium price, resulting in an outbreak of price competition in the market and
the erosion of Delaware's position as an informational center. Recognition of
a perceived federal threat implies a model in which Delaware faces conflicting
demands, each threatening potential negative consequences. First, the manage-
ment interest must be satisfied to prevent corporate migration out of the state
and entry into competition by competing states. Second, federal actors, as
proxies for the shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid destructive intervention.
The conflicting demands complicate the business of response: Professor
Eisenberg has suggested that the conflict leaves Delaware with an incentive
to avoid taking the lead in adopting rules favoring managers at the share-
holders' expense. Other states have a different incentive. If they offer innova-
tive management-side payments, they may siphon business from Delaware; if
the federal government intervenes to stop them, they lose little. So long as a
given state has a small market share, its actions attract little attention.
Delaware, in contrast, cannot take any significant steps without close scrutiny
nationwide.'°8 It remains under pressure to follow new developments else-
transaction. In either case, Delaware no longer can take a competitive lead on the subject
matter regulated, but neither can any other state. The overall field of subject matter for
competition shrinks slightly, but not enough cognizably to impair Delaware's position.
Furthermore, a federal provision might even result in a short-term enhancement of
Delaware's position. Consider, as an example, the proposals for national antitakeover
legislation made during the mid-1980s. At that time, worries about federal responses
contributed to Delaware's hesitancy to initiate takeover defense legislation. Federal interven-
tion on either side would have settled the matter, removing a threat of competition from
other states.
107 In addition to a large collection of past decisions, Delaware sells a unique, technically
qualified judiciary and speedy determination of new disputes. Bayless Manning identified
Delaware's judiciary as its prime attraction, comparing Delaware to the medieval law
merchant. Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
779, 7-85 (1987).
For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian Ayres, Making
a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1391, 141-15 (1992) (reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991)).
108 Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 15 12-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1455
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where, but emerges m a mediative role.
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing demand
situation, can structure a mediative response without losing business, given a
market still keyed to management preferences.'° 9 Two factors make this
picture plausible. First, no full-service alternative domicile exists, and only
a handful of other jurisdictions have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs
to market a full-service operation. But a potential competitor has no assurance
that a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts,"° and given the low cost
of reincorporation, tm no assurance that its new customers will remain. Sec-
ond, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of self-protective collective
action may effectively deter management reincorporation proposals. Beginning
in the late 1980s, incidents of shareholder resistance caused managers to drop
the assumption of automatic shareholder approval of anti-takeover proposals
requiring charter 12 Thus, departure from Delaware may not be
the open option it used to be.
Evidence of the dual demand model's robustness can be found in the recent
pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory convergence among the states
and the dominance of the management interest, the problems of conflicting
demand rarely show up in corporate legislative process. Anti-takeover legisla-
tion is the principal recent instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late
(pointing out that there remains a range within which states can maneuver without fear of
federal intervention).
09 Delaware's mediative output can be explained in terms of the interests of managers
as a group. Well-timed interventions to protect shareholders serve to defuse the federal
threat and to make Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal interven-
tion. However, the benefits of a mediative jurisprudence are more questionable from the
point of view of individual managers seeking an optimal environment. They have an
apparent incentive to cause their firms to migrate to states adopting less equivocal anti-
takeover policies, free riding on the firms that stay. Of course, if a large number of firms
surmounted this collective action barrier and successfully shopped for a more responsive
jurisdiction, federal intervention would become more likely. The same might occur if a large
number of firms left Delaware, starting a new race to the bottom.
ItO See Daniels, supra note 52, at 182.
See Black, supra note 28, at 551, 574, 586-90.
112 See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text. Romano contributed some evidence
of this phenomenon with a report on the behavior of public corporations subject to the 1990
Pennsylvania takeover statute. The Pennsylvania statute, like most takeover statutes,
included a default rule that applied the statute to all corporations that failed to take affirm-
ative action to opt out. See PA. CONS. STAT. § 257 1-75 (1994). Despite this, pressure
from institutional investors resulted in opting Out by the boards of 127 firms; only 72 firms
stayed in. Romano, Genius of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 68-69. Presumably,
opportunistic reincorporation proposals would excite similar shareholder attention.
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and with caution in putting an anti-takeover statute before its legislature)'3
The conflict becomes more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary cases,
particularly those dealing with corporate control transfersH4 Here the share-
holder interest has found Delaware intermittently responsive. The Delaware
judiciary abruptly changed a long-standing habit of monolithic fidelity to
management interests in 1977," and Cary's 1975 article has been accorded
a role in the break." 6
 The federal threat, thus crystallized, impressed upon
the Delaware courts the practical importance of solicitude to shareholder
interests." 7
 This post-Cary behavior pattern has persisted and still yields
headlines as highly publicized cases articulate surprising new shareholder-
protective applications of basic fiduciary rules." 8 The pattern has been vol-
" See Alva, supra note 95, at 906-08.
114 This is analogous to the allocation of responsibility between legislatures and agencies.
Legislators faced with a conflicting demand problem can avoid confrontation with the
competing interest groups and resort to the expedient of delegating lawmaking authority to
an agency; with state corporate law, the judiciary tends to assume this function. Delaware,
as it responded to sensitive developments in the corporate control market of the 1 980s, kept
open its options by employing equivocal judicial rules in preference to clear cut legislation.
'° See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-80 (Del. 1977) (imposing strict
fiduciary standards on parent firms in cash-out mergers). The Singer rule was in turn
rejected for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
704, 715 (Del. 1983). Oddly, Singer was decided after the immediate threat of federal
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the securities laws had been
removed by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
The story told at the time was that the brush with preemption at the hands of the federal
judiciary and the wider critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others had prompted the
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction and become more accommodating to the
interests of investors to diminish the threat of intervention.
116 The federal threat, and Cary's association with it, appears in accounts of these events.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-66; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1511-13.
17 Prior to Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), there was a cognizable chance
that much conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be found to be 'manipulative' or
'fraudulent' conduct violative of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
rule lOb-S thereunder. The antimanagerial political climate of the time also resulted in the
introduction of preemptive legislation in Congress. See S. 2567. 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
118 See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,46-48 (Del. 1993)
(holding that management has an obligation to achieve the best value reasonably available
for shareholders); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366-7 1 (Del. 1993)
(applying a heightened duty of care scrutiny of boardroom merger decision and suggesting
an expanded remedial concept inclusive of post-merger gain); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing a duty of management
that changed from defending against a tender offer to auctioning the company in limited
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atile," 9 however, and shareholder protective intervention has not been a
constant theme. The Delaware courts' indulgence in this back-and-forth at
apparent cost to a reputation for certainty, predictability, and management
responsiveness confirms the presence of competing demands.
Two caveats must be noted. First, the federal threat does not play an
exclusive causative role in this conflicting demand model. Courts and judges
sell reputations for speed, dependability, and predictability, but they also stake
reputational capital in their working roles. This gives the judges an independent
incentive to protect the legitimacy of the system' 2° by balancing the satisfac-
tion of interest group demands with public-regarding results. Delaware judges,
responding to Cary's well-publicized allegations of corruption,' 2 ' have
declared a commitment to this role integrity.' 22
 They describe themselves
circumstances); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 95-55 (Del. 1985)
(applying an expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under a proportionality test);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-8 1 (Del. 1985) (suddenly expanding the duty
of care to cover board approval of arm's length merger).
" Equally famous cases often appear to restrict the application of the new rules. See
Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (limiting
application of Unocal and Revlon); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57
(Del. 1985) (sustaining 'poison pill defense' under Unocal); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor of a less restrictive process
scrutiny of cash-out mergers).
The legislature, prompted by the corporate committee of the Delaware state bar,
entered in on management's side in one famous instance. After Smith v. Van Gorkom's
application of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a substantial increase
in insurance premiums, the legislature amended the code to permit firms to opt out of the
duty of care by charter amendment. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991)
(permitting opting out of personal liability of directors for duty of care violations).
120 See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORGS. 63, 72-74, 7880 (1994) (offering a repeat-game model of judicial motivation with
infinite time horizons). As occurs with repeat games, the model results in a multiplicity of
equilibria in which the outcome depends on the players' expectations. Id. at 74. In Rasmus-
sen's model, judges follow precedent if there is a self-enforcing system based less on
compulsion than on the need to uphold systemic legitimacy. Id. at 72-74. In the case of
Delaware, of course, systemic legitimacy has pointed in the opposite direction. See also
Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 42A9 (1994) (modelling the preferences ofjudges ona utility
function that includes both a private and a reputational component, with the decision as to
whether to follow precedent turning on a trade-off between the two components, and the
equilibrium rate of adherence to precedent depending on the distribution of preferences
across the population).
121 Cary, supra note 10, at 684, 6-98.
122 See Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-5.
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as mediators between management and shareholders-protectors of market risk-
taking who nevertheless impose ethical constraints.'23
Second, the identification of competing demand should not be taken to
predict a pattern of even-handed mediation. Although the federal threat holds
out the potential of substantial injury, it remains an unlikely event. Potential
impairment of competitive position and loss of incorporations is a more
immediate problem for Delaware, and also amounts to a competing reputational
concern for Delaware judges, given limitations on their tenure.' 24
 If we look
at the pattern the Delaware courts took during the 1980s in charting a course
between competing demands on sensitive corporate control matters, we can
infer that the Delaware courts took advantage of an informational slack'
to develop a body of case law that gave an appearance of greater weight to
shareholder interests than was justified by the actual payoffs. In highly publi-
cized cases, the Delaware courts announced vague standards that held out the
prospect of enhancing shareholder value. But in the less well-publicized cases
that followed, they took the opportunity held out by complex facts to refrain
from applying the standards in management-constraining ways.' 26 The full
set of results tallied by the lawyers who make reincorporation decisions
signalled considerably more room for management maneuver than did the
public profile signalled by the leading cases.
4.7.2 The Litigation Anomaly
Full description of the complex of incentives that shape Delaware law requires
further consideration of conflicting interests on the supply side. We have
23 See Moore, supra note 95, at 779-800 (written while Moore was a Delaware Supreme
Court Justice). They also have acknowledged the federal threat. See William T. Quillen,
The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship Response to Professor Seligman's Call for
Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 129
(1993) (author is former Delaware Chancellor and Supreme Court Justice).
124 The recent refusal of Delaware's judicial nominations committee to recommend the
reappointment of Justice Andrew Moore, a judge with a reputation for solicitude for the
shareholder interest, arguably confirms this point. See Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware Judge
Is Seen as Investors' Friend, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1994, at B2.
' Slack results from monitoring costs that prevent interested parties from observing all
actions taken by a regulator. To the extent slack is present, a regulator is more likely to
be captured by an interest group; a self-interested regulator pursues public regarding policies
only when little or no slack is present. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 183.
126 For a reading of the post-Unocal cases along these lines, see Victor Brudney &
William W. Bratton, Brudney & Chirelstein 's Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance
1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993).
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already suggested that managers implicitly rely on the Delaware bar to repre-
sent their interests in the state. However, the bar's interests are far from
perfectly aligned with management's, since litigation against managers also
provides a source of income. Delaware has a unique collection of process rules
that advance this local interest. These encourage derivative litigation,'27
making sure that the local bar gets a share of the action by requiring Delaware
lawyers to make appearances and filings.' 28
 Competing demands also result
in some systemic concessions to managers,' 29
 but the concessions hardly
counter Delaware's reputation as a fee-generating center for corporate lawyers.
The litigation rules thus stand as the great anomaly in the charter competition
discussion, synchronizing with neither the race to the top' 3° nor the race to
the bottom.'3'
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have explained the litigation rules with
a supply-side account that highlights the impact of internal interest group
politics on the production of Delaware law.' 32 In their account, all groups
within the state have a common interest in producing a marketable legal
regime, but the groups differ on the relative proportions of costs imposed and
revenues earned. The taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs (fran-
chise tax revenues) and lower indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers' interest
in fees would be served by lower direct costs leading to a greater number of
incorporations, and by higher indirect legal costs even sacrificing some incor-
127 Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not requiring plaintiffs in shareholder
derivative actions to post security for expenses. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. Delaware
facilitates service of process on nonresident directors with a broad consent to service statute.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1993). It also is liberal in its fee awards to
derivative plaintiffs' lawyers: Under its nonpecuniary settlement practice, defending
managers can trade a high fee for a small overall recovery. Coffee, supra note 28, at 763.
128 See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12(a) (1); DEL. CH. CT. R. 170.
129 Delaware ameliorates the litigation rules' immediate impact on managers by allowing
for liberal indemnification. Its courts also have been inventive in recent years in placing
procedural barriers in the way of a trial on the merits of derivative claims. See Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 8 13-14 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
781-86 (Del. 1981). For criticism of these and subsequent cases, see Seligman, New
Corporate Law, supra note 68, at 23-26. These defendant-friendly procedures do discourage
litigation.
30 Cary, who favored strict fiduciary-law control of management conduct, explained the
rules as a special exception keyed to the interests of the Delaware bar. Cary, supra note
10, at 687.
Since the rules expand the zone of legal control of corporate actors for the benefit of
lawyers, they arguably derogate from shareholder interests, viewed from the market
deterrent point of view. See Macey & Miller, supra note 71, at 5 10-11.
32 Id at 472.
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porations when the legal fees paid exceed those lost. Macey and Miller assert
that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as a pure profit maximizer would limit
indirect costs to maximize direct costs.' 33 Delaware fails to conform to the
product model's predictions because the bar acts as a small, cohesive interest
group that extracts special concessions from the legislature at the expense of
the general public.'34
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political power.
Yet two factors that align the interests of the bar With those of the rest of the
state need to be added to their description. First, the federal threat may temper
the incentive of Delaware's lawyers to lobby for a reduction in direct charges
to customers. Increasing Delaware's market share substantially above the level
of one-half of public incorporations' 35 would make Delaware even more of
a national lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and vulnerability to chal-
lenge at the national level. Given a state with a monopoly position, traditional
federalism objections to intervention carry less weight. Second, rules that
encourage litigation in Delaware play a secondary role in production.
Delaware's case law and judges figure prominently in its substantive law
product line) 36 Its code's advantages are less distinct than those of its cases,
given statutory convergence among the states, but Delaware does not complete-
ly control the production of case law. The first option on the choice of the
forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff, and in many instances
Delaware law questions can be litigated in other states or in federal courts This
gives Delaware a reason to offer incentives to plaintiffs. Their cooperation
gives Delaware the opportunity to apply its own law, preserving the first-
mover advantage and generating a flow of cases. These, in turn, are products
sold in the charter market.
The need to satisfy the demands of the national plaintiff's bar reinforces the
internal bargaining position of Delaware's bar, further explaining the state's
delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative function) 37 However, the
'° Id. at 498, 502-04.
'' Id. at 506-09. Macey and Miller add an asymmetric information component to this
market imperfection story. They draw on Romano's finding that lawyers (and to a lesser
extent investment bankers) play key roles in reincorporation decisions and favor Delaware.
Id. at 486-87 (citing Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 273, 275 n.72). They
note that information problems on the clients' part may present a barrier to competition
among the lawyers. Id. if the clients have an information problem, then we can account
for Delaware's litigation rules as a shrewd marketing move-a boon to those responsible for
making reincorporation decisions. Id. at 487.
See supra note 43.
36 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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delegation to the bar also helps to stabilize the capture arrangement with
management.'38
4.8 From Threatened Federal Intervention to Shareholder
Intervention-The Strategy of Countervailing Interest
Empowerment
The foregoing survey of the charter competition system highlights three points.
First, although the system can be described as one of voluntary exchanges, that
description does not by itself justify the system because these exchanges entail
the capture of public authority. The states here effectively sell the coercive
exercise of their authority on behalf of a purchasing group.' 39 The system
thereby lacks not only the exit possibilities presupposed by regulatory competi-
tion theory, but also the exit possibilities present when actors freely make
contracts Although the system affords relational benefits, it also channels
distributions within the firms that enter into contracts with the states, making
losers of the principals and winners of the agents Second, the relative stability
of the charter market cannot be completely accounted for with a relational
contract model that recognizes only one possible route of defection by the state
defection to anticorporate interests opposed to the interests of both shareholders
and managers. Contracts in the charter market are also structured to guard
against state defection to the shareholder interest. In addition, in a federal
system, state public authority, once captured, can be recaptured by a compet-
ing interest that manages to invoke federal authority.' 40 Potential federal
intervention makes this recapture a constant possibility in corporate law. Third,
federal-state political instability can have wealth-enhancing properties. Under
the conflicting demand model of Delaware law, the federal threat reinforces
the shareholder voice, moving Delaware in the direction of shareholder value
enhancement. The stronger the threat, the more pronounced the move.
Taken alone, however, the federal threat does not provide a workable basis
for solving the corporate agency problem. Substantial political barriers to
shareholder capture of federal authority keep the threat distant and make it
possible for Delaware to defuse it with minimal concessions to the share-
holders, while providing management with maximum feasible protection of its
own prerogatives. Nor does this threat lend itself to institutionalization as a
component of a federal intervention strategy designed to intensify the conflict-
138 Thus, it may be that the conflict between Delaware's taxpayers and attorneys is either
more nascent than actual or more settled than active.
' See Moe, supra note 42, at 123.
'	 See id. at 124.
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ing demands on the states. Institutionalization implies the congressional man-
date of a prospective and graduated scheme that ripens into preemptive man-
dates only to the extent that some background normative standard remains
unsatisfied.' 4 ' Such a carrot-and-stick approach also implies a fully articu-
lated federal corporate law policy. It is hard to imagine how such a scheme,
once implemented on a national basis, would amount to anything short of
blanket preemption that sacrifices the relational benefits of the state system.
Federal intervention nonetheless could help to place a stronger quantum of
shareholder demand before state lawmakers. In regulatory theory, one expedi-
ent for the problem of agency capture by a producer group is consumer
empowerment through the grant of standing in regulatory processes to public
interest groups.' 42 This tripartite' 43 strategy follows from the insight that
the structuring of conflicts between agents, including third parties, can assist
in the collection of information and the reordering of incentives in a desired
direction. ' Empowerment brings the representatives of the countervailing
interest inside the system. Once inside, they assist legislative principals in
overcoming the problem of asymmetric information in agency control. The
countervailing interest generates information about the agency, supplementing
the costly process of direct supervision.' 45 Empowerment also reorders the
incentives of the agents of the countervailing interest. Their inside position
holds out an incentive to abandon obstructionist strategies and develop cooper-
ative relationships with both regulators and producers. Ideally, they assist the
evolution of win-win outcomes in the ongoing regulatory bargaining game.'46
" Under this 'big stick' theory of regulation, the regulatory authority makes self-
regulation generally available, but holds out a graduated threat of command and control
regulation and punishment for uncooperative parties, thereby building in an incentive to
comply. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 39-40 (discussing the theory in the
administrative law context).
142 In Ayres and Braithwaite's model of 'tripartitism', the public interest group receives
the same information as the regulator, a seat at the negotiating table, and equal standing.
Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 57-58.
'	
'Tripartite' is used id. at 57-60.
Laffont & Tirole, supra note 91, at 611.
" Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms, 28 AM.
j . POL. SC!. 165, 166 (1984), distinguished between 'police patrol' oversight, direct
monitoring of the agent by the principal, and 'fire alarm' protection, a passive form of
oversight in which third parties bear the bulk of the cost of providing information. This
model was extended in Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight:
Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 96, 105 (1994),
with a model of a multistage, single-shot two person game involving a principal and an
agent, showing how the principal learns from fire-alarm oversight.
'	 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 7 1-73.
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Finally, since these public interest figures attain their status as agents in the
world of grassroots politics, they are relatively unsusceptible to capture. Since
their guardianship positions are contestable, reputational incentives make
defection to competing interests unlikely.'47
The strategy of countervailing interest empowerment shares objectives with
the strategy of regulatory competition. Both seek regulatory flexibility and
balanced control of regulatory structures that deter the capture of
regulators.' 48 The choice between the two may depend in part on the situ-
ation. Regulatory competition theory assumes that competition provoked by
exit frees the regulator from interest group control. Interest group
empowerment addresses the capture problem where competition either has been
blocked by regulatory coordination, or, as has occurred in the case of corpor-
ate law, has served as a mechanism to enforce the capture arrangement.
The often-suggested corporate law reform that we revive here shareholder
initiative to amend the charter and effect reincorporation-is the corporate law
equivalent of an interest group empowerment strategy. The avenue of share-
holder initiative makes it possible for the shareholders to make competing
demands on the states themselves, and thereby gain a seat at the table when
state laws are formulated. The problem with this strategy, of course, is the
problem of shareholder collective action. However, as the next part shows,
the gravity of that problem has diminished.
III. STRATEGIES FOR ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION THROUGH
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
Concentrated institutional ownership holds out the possibility that shareholders
can surmount collective action barriers keeping them from governance partici-
pation. Shareholder participation, in turn, holds out the possibility of a transi-
tion from voluntary to enforced self-regulation as shareholders use their votes
to revise the process terms of corporate contracts or to place capable and
independent monitors on the board. Enforced self-regulation, in turn, holds
out the possibility of cooperative gain through relational engagement. The
short-term, arm's length engagement of the shareholder under a deterrent
regime evolves into the long-term, patient commitment of an equity part-
ner.' 49 In theory, this resolves governance conflicts of the 1980s: Effective
"v Id. at 73.
'	 See id. at 59, 71.
See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1038; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as
Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 129
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monitoring reduces the gap between market and intrinsic value that triggers
hostile intervention by market means.'5°
This relational model's realization depends in part on the alignment between
governance benefits and the incentives of institutional agents. This part
describes these incentive problems and identifies the strategies for their sol-
ution. In theory, financial benefits themselves provide sufficient incentives,
given the removal of legal barriers to group action. In practice, shareholder
intervention has been effected by a group of political entrepreneurs, the agents
of public pension funds, who appear to be pursuing reputational gain.
4.9 The Collective Action Problem, the Cost-Benefit Solution, and the
Counter Story
Historically, shareholders of public companies are an Olsonian latent
group.' 5 ' That is, a collective good-active monitoring of management-would
make them better off given proportionate distribution of its costs, but the law
provides no cost-sharing mechanism, and the free-rider problem prevents the
emergence of a volunteer or group of volunteers with an incentive to provide
the good.' 52 Given dispersed shareholdings, the nontrivial costs of active
monitoring, and the alternative of exit through sale, the benefits obtainable
without investment in monitoring exceed the benefits obtainable from invest-
ment.' 33 In addition, rational apathy prevails when the system mandates that
matters be presented for shareholder approval. The rational small shareholder
does not invest in information about governance matters, given the likelihood
that the collective action problem inhibits an effective group response.'54
Collective action theory allows for the possibility that a subgroup of a latent
group will Organize and provide the public good if the benefits from action
to each member of the subgroup exceed the costs incurred.' 55 The increased
(1994) [hereinafter Gordon, Cumulative Voting].
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 985, 1006-49 (1993) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Investment Companies].
'' See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Share-
holder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 455-59 (1991) [hereinafter Rock, Shareholder
Activism] (working the models of Olson and Hardin through the corporate fact pattern).
52 Each member of the group rationally prefers that others in the group incur the costs
of providing the public good.
'	 Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 455-56.
54 See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 910.
'5 Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 457-59 (citing Russell Hardin,
Collective Action 41(1982)).
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concentration of shareholdings in institutional hands makes it conceivable that
institutional subgroups might find investment in monitoring cost beneficial. 156
Concentration of shares also promises to mitigate the rational apathy problem.
The shareholders' decision of whether to seek information about the govern-
ance issue depends on the costs and expected benefits of the effort and the
initiative's probabilities of success. The cost is independent of the number of
shares held. With individual shareholders holding larger proportionate stakes
in the firm, the expected returns from a given information investment go up,
as does the proponent's chance of success.'57
Subgroup formation depends on the size of the group, the cost of action,
and the magnitude of the benefit the subgroup seeks. Proponents of law reform
designed to facilitate shareholder participation direct most of their attention to
the first two factors. Since the number of members needed to form a subgroup
declines as ownership concentration goes up, the proponents argue for a
relaxation of the regulatory barriers that impede the accumulation of large
holdings in given firms by single investors or organized groups of
investors.' 58 The proponents also circulate blueprints for cheap strategies,
since, as the costs of a given initiative go down, subgroup formation can go
forward with a lower level of concentration and a lower projected probability
of success.'
In sum, the proponents assert that, given certain legal adjustments, prospects
for financial gain by themselves will induce governance initiatives by institu-
tional investors. Yet there is a counter story. This asserts that, even with legal
adjustments, governance initiatives realizing the full promise of cooperative
gain through enforced self-regulation cannot be expected. Two points are
emphasized. First, agency relationships within investment institutions create
disincentives that prevent subgroup formation, even assuming a projection of
a positive return to the subgroup from an investment in governance. Since the
individual manager's performance is measured against the performance of the
Id. at 459. As Black argues, shareholder passivity may be historically contingent, the
result of a combination of legal obstacles and past dispersed ownership patterns. See Bernard
S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-examined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 525 (1990)
[hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity.
According to Black, the incentive to become informed increases as the holder's share
ownership level is squared. Id. at 585-89.
58 Id. at 578.
' See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 908-13 (examining the minimum cost strategy of the
'just vote no' campaign). Proponents of reform also stress that scale economies lie in the
application of a single governance device to multiple companies, Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 155, at 584, and argue for rules that transfer the cost of shareholder
initiatives to the firm, see id. at 579-80.
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market as a whole and subgroup investment benefits the market as a whole,
successful governance investments do not necessarily improve the individual
manager's performance profile.6O Second, the benefits of cost-intensive
relational investment remain underspecified. In theory, these lie in
informational access and ongoing constructive criticism by the institutional
monitor.' 6 ' In practice, underperforming companies are publicly identified in
the ordinary course, and standard remedies respecting investment policies,
incentive schemes, and governance structures are part of the conventional
wisdom. To the extent that institutions can cheaply tie the communication of
these points to credible threats against target managers, they can secure the
available set of governance benefits through a discrete engagement. Incentives
for more substantial investments in ongoing relationships remain speculative,
absent a special technical capability on the part of the particular monitor. As
a result, risks of perverse incentives and commitment problems come to the
forefront of the relational picture. A strategically placed institutional holder
could opt for side payments from management in preference to public-regard-
ing informational development, or, given a hostile tender offer, the institutions
in the subgroup could defect from an implicit undertaking by management to
be patient.'62
The practice has tended to fulfil the counter story's predictions. Relational
engagements have been discrete, cheap, and focused on the short term. In
contrast to the proponents' prediction that financial incentives by themselves
will induce subgroup formation, the selective incentive of reputation seems to
drive the practice. This implies that contractual renegotiation of governance
terms will dominate over direct monitoring of investment decision-making as
the means to enhance value through shareholder participation.
160 Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 473-74; see also Jill E. Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 102-25
(1994) (arguing that competitive pressures on institutional performance must be accounted
for in cost-benefit models of institutional monitoring); Helen Garten, Institutional Investors
and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 63 1-32 (1992) (arguing that
it is difficult to increase institutional activism).
161 See infra note 217. It comes as no surprise that the results of empirical studies of
returns on monitoring activities are inconclusive. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 1035 (citing
Lilli A. Gordon and John Pound, Active In vesting in the U.S. Equity Market: Past Perform-
ance and Future Prospects, Report for the Cal(fornia Public Employees 'Retirement System
44 (Jan. 11, 1993)).
162 For exploration of these problems, see Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1036-39;
Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 987, 989-99 (1994) [hereinafter Rock, Dark Side].
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4.10 Selective Incentives and the Pattern of Shareholder Participation
4. 10. 1 The Pattern of Discrete Intervention
Institutional investor activism is the successful grassroots political movement
of American big business. It began during the late 1980s when institutions
became dissatisfied with expanding legal constraints on takeover activity. The
access route was the precatory shareholderproposal,' 63 a medium for non-
binding, shareholder-initiated voting proposals made available by preemptive
mandate under the federal proxy rules. IM The first generation of proposals
163 Management must include in the annual proxy statement precatory shareholder propo-
sals that meet Rule 14a-8 process and suitability guidelines. Proxy Solicitation Rules, 17
C.F.R. § 240. 14a-8 (1994).
The process guidelines, set out in Rule 14a-8(a)(2) to (4), are strict-the proponent is
allowed only one proposal, submission must occur months before the meeting, and the
supporting statement is limited to 500 words. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(a)2 to 3 (1993). The
suitability guidelines are stricter. They were drafted at a time when shareholder proposals
were envisioned as a medium for expression of concern on social issues related to corpor-
ations, and exclude many business topics of prime concern to governance activists. To wit,
under Rule 14a-8(c), matters of 'ordinary business operations', 'election(s] to office',
proposals counter to management proposals, and 'specific amounts of cash ... dividends'
are unsuitable; at the same time, a social proposal 'not . . . significantly related' to the
business also is unsuitable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)5, 7-9 & 13 (1994).
The SEC alters its interpretations of these rules from time to time, opening the door
to issues concerning the operation of the business if it determines that the particular topic
has taken on substantial policy import. The Commission has not been notably consistent
in these determinations. Compare Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, (1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 76,418, at 77,284-87 (Oct.
13, 1992) (finding unsuitable a proposal recommending policy of nondiscrimination
respecting sexual preference in hiring), with Eli Lilly & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCII) 1 76,629, at 77,682 (Feb. 25, 1993) (finding
suitable a proposal recommending adoption of price restraint policy by drug company
suitable) and AT&T, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 20, *2.3 (Jan. 5, 1990) (finding proposal
for elimination of affirmative action programs suitable). This sort of nonsense has gotten
the agency into difficulties with certain courts. See New York City Employees' Retirement
Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining the agency from acting
inconsistently with its own stated policy in respect to the Cracker Barrel proposal), rev'd,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,493 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 1995).
Observers tend to see these suitability rules as manifestly unsatisfactory. See, e.g.,
Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 541; Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to
Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-2 (1993).
"4 Under Rule 14a-8, the proponent bears the expense of making the proposal, including
legal expenses in the event of a management challenge to its suitability, but the corporation
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concerned poison pills, and urged management to exercise its privilege of
redeeming them or to submit them to shareholder approval. 165 The first sus-
tained assault on the pills came in 1987, when a group of public pension funds
discovered the economy of scale and submitted proposals at forty firms. The
proposals received more than twenty percent of the votes cast-significant
returns given the historic pattern of overwhelming votes against shareholder
proposals. '
The activists thereafter broadened the range of their proposals to cover other
takeover defenses' 67 and, with proposals for confidential voting, the voting
process itself.' 68 By 1990, the voting pattern had changed. In that year, 160
shareholder proposals received more than twenty percent of the votes, and
nineteen received more than fifty-percent' 69 the largest number of successful
proposals in the entire history of the device. 170 The voting pattern respecting
bears the expense of including the proposal in the proxy statement. Proxy Solicitation Rules,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1994).
' Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 867-8.
' Rock, supra note 150, at 402. The players were the College Retirement Equities Fund,
the California Public Employees Retirement System, and the Wisconsin Investment Board,
loosely organized through the Council of Institutional Investors. Jayne W. Barnard,
Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1153
(1991).
Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and
the Repeal of Poison Pius: A Practitioner's Perspective, in Institutional Investors and
Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 201-02, makes a counter suggestion. Given the
present control market in which takeovers tend to be strategic moves made by larger players
in a given industry, they argue that the shareholders' interest lies in leaving the pills in place
to facilitate lowercost friendly transactions. Id. at 212. They thus ascribe institutional
pressure for pill redemption entirely to selective incentives. Id. at 211-22.
l67 The proposals suggested prohibition (or requirement of shareholder approval) of
greenmail payments, opting out of antitakeover statutes, and requiring shareholder approval
of placements of large blocks of stock with management-friendly holders. See Gilson &
Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 868.
See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 825-26. Confidential voting assists shareholder
participation in two ways. First, confidentiality prevents management from punishing private
investment institutions that vote against it in the product market. Id. Second, under the usual
procedures, management's proxy solicitors are free to count the proxies as they come in,
identify no-voting shareholders, and resolicit their votes. If the vote seems destined to go
against management, management can withdraw its proposal. Shareholder proponents do
not have this privilege. Id.
'	 Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483.
170 Barnard, supra note 165, at 1156. Poison pill proposals received an average vote of
42%. Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 828.
REGULATORY COMPETITION, REGULATORY
	 129
management proposals also had changed.' 7 ' Although the overwhelming
majority management submitted in 1990 were approved, ten were defeated and
two were withdrawn to avoid defeat) 72
 Anti-takeover charter amendments,
overwhelmingly approved in the early 1980s, now passed with only fifty to
sixty percent of the vote.
Institutional activists had arrived, led by agents of the California Public
Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS) and other public pension funds.
After 1990, the subject matter of their proposals broadened again, to include
process and structure proposals designed to make boards more effective in
monitoring and designing incentive arrangement.' 74
 More importantly, suc-
cess caused the set of cheap strategies to expand. It turned out that managers,
once confronted with majority or near majority votes for the institutions'
nonbinding proposals, or confronted with even the prospect of such a vote,
Management must submit charter amendments and fundamental corporate changes,
including liquidation, substantial asset sales, and some mergers for a shareholder vote. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242, 251, 271, 275 (1994). Executive compensation plans
must be submitted to the shareholders pursuant to exchange listing rules.
172 Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 484.
'	 Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 571.
" Suggested improvements included the separation of the functions of board chairman
and chief executive officer and outside director membership for the compensation commit-
tee. Proposals respecting executive pay also appeared, after the SEC reversed a position
in 1992 and declared the subject matter to be proper under its rule. See Staff Advises
Shareholder Proposals on Pay Includible in Proxy Materials, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA), No. 8, at 250 (Feb. 21, 1992). Shareholder intervention has resulted in changes
in compensation practices at ITT, IBM, Cincinnati Bell, and Avon. Grundfest, supra note
32, at 931.
Institutional shareholder proposals continue to increase in number. See 9 CORP.
COUNS. WK.LY
 (BNA), No. 22, at 4 (June 22, 1994) (reporting a slight increase in 1993
and 1994). In the 1994 annual meeting season (according to Georgeson & Co.), institutions
sponsored 69 proposals, up from 65 in 1993. Id. Of the 1994 proposals, 11 sought to repeal
classified boards, 10 concerned executive compensation, 7 sought poison pill redemption,
and 14 advocated confidential voting. '93- '94 Proxy Seasons Said to Show Slight Increase
in Shareholder Activism, 9 CORP. COUNS. WKLY (BNA), No. 24, at 4 (June 22, 1994)
[hereinafter '93- '94 Proxy Seasonsi. There has been a change in the sponsorship pattern,
however. Labor unions have appeared as sponsors, backing 32 proposals in 1994 versus
9 in 1993. John C. Wilcox, chairman of Georgeson & Co., characterizes the unions as
'gadflies', because they repeat their proposals and do not seek to negotiate with management
before submitting them. Id. In another recent development, CaIPERS, citing an independent
consultant's stock price study, has indicated an interest in encouraging management to adopt
'high performance' workplace strategies that accord workers more rights and feedback. See
id. at 1.
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proved willing to open negotiations and make concessions,' 75 either by volun-
tarily adopting responsive measures or by accepting other policy changes in
exchange for the withdrawal of a proposal.' 76 Proponents took this advantage
and gained negotiating access by generating bad publicity without making
specific proposals. They publicized lists of underperforming companies'77
with-the suggestion that shareholders 'just vote no' in that year's board elec-
tion. 178
Proponents then would meet with management to voice their criticisms and
concerns. Results followed' 79
 - chief executives were terminated at two of
CaIPERS' 1992 targets, IBM and Westinghouse; another target, Sears, took
the institutions' advice about concentrating on the core business and dismem-
bered itself.' 8° A change in the SEC proxy rules, promulgated in 1992 as
See Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483. For example, K-Mart
accepted two proposals in 1990 and seven firms instituted confidential voting in exchange
for withdrawal of proposals. Id.
76 Grundfest, supra note 32, at 932 (stating that in 1992, 31 firms confronted with
shareholder proposals negotiated their withdrawal). Institutional successes also have had
a noticeable deterrent effect on management proposals for self-protective charter amend-
ments. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 828-29.
' See CaIPERS Lists 12 Companies in Effort to Focus Attention on Corporate Reform,
24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at 420 (Mar. 27, 1992).
Grundfest, supra note 32, at 933. The New York State Common Retirement Fund,
the Public Employees Retirement Fund of Colorado, the New York State Local Retirement
Funds, the New York City Retirement Systems, and CREF have joined CaIPERS in these
campaigns. Id. at 867 & n.37.
Grundfest notes the cost advantages of these dialogic campaigns. The analysts collect
the basic information on performance and the costs of drafting and compliance costs of 14a-
8 proposals are avoided. CaIPERS estimates that a 14a-8 proposal can cost up to $500,000,
where a 'just vote no' campaign costs $100,000. Id. at 911-12. However, the device is not
necessarily more effective than the alternative of a precatory shareholder proposal directed
to a matter of process and structure; the latter gained stronger support than the former at
the 1995 annual meeting of Philip Morris, a current institutional target. See infra note 2%.
' Id. at 933. Heads also have rolled at Goodyear, Allied Signal, Tenneco, Shearson,
and Kodak. Id. at 882-94.
8O This sort of institutional pressure continued to be exerted through 1994, with different
results in different firms. K-Mart and Philip Morris were two leading institutional targets.
At K-Mart, institutions pressuring for the separation of non-core retailing divisions caused
the defeat of a company proposal (presented for approval at the annual meeting) deemed
not to go far enough. Months later, the board removed the embattled C.E.O. from the
chairmanship, but it retained him as president. See Joann S. Lublin & Christina Duff, Mana-
gement How Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL. ST . J., Jan. 20, 1995, at
Bi. Philip Morris experienced similar institutional pressure for division of the company,
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a result of institutional pressures, facilitated the new approach by permitting
shareholders to publish their views in the media without prior agency appro-
val)8'
4. 10.2 Explaining and Evaluating the Pattern
The institutional shareholders' record, thus outlined, confirms that concentrated
shareholders are not passive and can coordinate votes to achieve results.
Specifically, the rational apathy problem has diminished substantially,
reputational threats against managers have proved effective, and capture of
institutional proponents has not been a problem. Diverse incentives among the
institutions, however, make the wider attack on the collective action barrier
a tentative one.
4.10.2.1 The Rational Apathy Problem
The rational apathy calculation broke during the 1980s when newly concen-
trated holders encountered takeover-related voting issues with substantial
financial implications.' 82 Institutions thereafter made at least minimal invest-
ments in information on governance issues and showed some discrimination
in their voting.' 83 The network of activist institutions also became a point
but the internal politics worked differently. See infra note 2%.
181 See Proxy Solicitation Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1994). The earlier rules
prohibited solicitation of more than 10 other shareholders without advance clearance. The
revised rules also cut back on management agenda control in the proxy solicitation itself
by (1) permitting shareholders to vote in board elections for a combination of management
nominees and outside challengers, and (2) allowing shareholders to oppose a single manage-
ment proposal without being required to vote for or against an entire slate of proposals. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-4(b) (1994). The former change facilitates the possibility of campaigns
for select numbers of institutionally nominated directors. See Ronald 3. Gilson et al., How
the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a
Minority of Directors, 17 3. CORP. L. 29, 33-42 (1991). The latter change prevents the
bundling of a proposal to which shareholders might object with an advantageous proposal.
It does not, however, prevent management from conditioning the approval of a proposal
on the approval of one or more other proposals. See Fisch, supra note 162, at 1169-70.
The revised rules have had some effect on the pattern of proxy contests. Institutions
now solicit proxies from one another when opposing mergers or corporate restructurings.
See '93-'94 Proxy Seasons, supra note 173, at 2.
82 On this point, then, Black's 'critical mass' has been reached. See Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 155, at 588-89.
83 The institutions articulate voting policies in advance by type of proposal. See Roberta
Romaflo, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
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of information exchange. Their public suggestions that votes in selected firms
be tied to performance entail the sorting of financial information for rechannel-
ing into the voting arena. This ameliorates a problem of Informational
slack' 84 in addition to securing leverage for negotiations. Finally, the
activists' success at extracting governance concessions provided the wider
institutional community with ongoing incentives to stay informed, even as
takeover-related incentives declined in importance after 1989.
4.10.2.2 The Reputational Threat
The record also suggests a revision of the standard list of corporate governance
deterrents As yet, most shareholder initiatives have not employed threats of
direct intervention in the form of mandatory proposals' 85 or opposing slates
of directors.' 86 Instead, action is communicative. The shareholders as a group
are invited to join in a nonbinding request and their cooperation indicates
dissatisfaction with performance.' 87 In the alternative, the proponent
announces performance dissatisfaction directly and invites others to concur.
None of these initiatives entails a takeover threat in the present climate.
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 83 1-39 (1993) [hereinafter Romano, Pension Fund Activism]
(comparing public and private fund voting policies). But cf Louis Lewenstein, Why
Managements Should (And Should Not) Have Respect for Their Shareholders, 17 J. CORP.
L. 1, 19-20 (1991) (surveying the guidelines of one bank and finding that they crudely fail
to discriminate between well and badly run companies to avoid an appearance of favoritism
to bank customers).
184 See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 185-91. CaIPERS 's list of underperforming
firms amounts to a 'fire alarm' mode of oversight that supplements the 'police patrolling'
of the independentdirectors. See McCubbinsetal., supra note 89, at 273-74. The fire alarm
realigns the outside directors' incentives to make them more inclined to challenge the
managers. Id.
85 These are prohibitively costly under state law, and the extent to which the proxy rules
allow for them under Rule 14a-8 is unclear. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
' Dissident investors have successfully conducted proxy contests for board seats in a
handful of cases. See John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1047-50 (1993).
187 It is not clear how discriminating the institutional voters are in this regard. Confidential
voting, once placed as a yes vote in a gnideline presumably results in yes votes in both well
and badly managed companies. See Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 19-20. The value of the
signal depends on the discrimination of the activist gatekeeper. At least one writer has
assured managers that shareholder initiatives can be avoided through good financial
performance over the long run and direct explanation of any short-term problems to the
institutions. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS.
REV. 141, 147A9 (Jan.-Feb. 1994).
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Nevertheless, they result in preemptive negotiations and concessions by
managers,' 88
 and, in some cases, prompt the termination of the chief execu-
tive by the outside directors.
These shareholder threats appear credible because they impact on the
reputational interests of chief executives and independent board members The
campaign declares that the target executives possess undesirable characteris-
tics,' 89
 detracting from their standing in the business community' 9° and,
in some cases, from their marketability. It can be expected that managers will
be extraordinarily risk-averse to such reputational impairment if, as seems
reasonable, we can assume that employment contracts are incomplete and do
not fully compensate for tenure insecurity and the costs of changing jobs.'9'
Preemption by negotiation serves the managers' interest by defusing the threat
and providing them with some control over the settlement process.'92
More broadly, the appearance of a vocal shareholder interest group changes
the manager's institutional environment. The institutions articulate a normative
challenge to the manager's conduct of the business.' 93
 Their challenge has
a more destabilizing effect than ordinary external criticism, due to their equity
investments, long term presence, and ability to marshal votes respecting both
present and future matters for shareholder action. They represent an unstable
sector in the larger domain of institutional relationships with which the man
-
ager deals) 94
 By negotiating, the risk-averse manager' 95
 seeks to stabilize
188 Pound, supra note 185, at 1057-61.
189 Grundfest, supra note 32, at 927-28.
° See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk
Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1413 (1987) (stating that managers are concerned about
their reputations for risk-taking and are eager to discuss the deficiencies of others).
'' See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 158-62.
n See Gilson et al., supra note 180, at 45.
Firms are, from a sociological perspective, normative environments. Institutional
norms are rationalized prescriptions that identify social purposes as technical ones and
specify rule-like means to pursue these technical rationalities. John W. Meyer & Brian
Rowan, Institutional Organization: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J.
SOC. 340, 34344 (1977).
' See Walter W. Powell & Paul J. Dimaggio, The New Institionalism in Organizational
Analysis 30 (1991) (looking to extra-institutional sources of institutional change as a
complement to the internal interest group story of the firm).
195 See March & Shapira, supra note 189, at 1410-14 (suggesting that extreme risk
aversion can be expected). March and Shapira survey empirical studies on attitudes to risk
and conclude (1) that the managers do not see uncertainty about positive outcomes as an
important part of risk, and rather understand risk in terms of negative outcomes; and (2)
that managers do not understand risk as a probability concept, instead understanding risk
in terms of how much they might lose rather than the probability of loss. Id. at 1407. See
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and influence the relationship.
The shareholder threat can also destabilize the relationships of inside
managers and outside directors by reorienting the outsiders' incentives.'
Ordinarily, the outside directors, being corporate players themselves,' 96
 see
that their interests lie in cooperation with management. However, shareholder
intervention gives rise to a public question about the outsiders' effectiveness,
creating a dual demand that has an impact on different components of the same
reputation. If the conflict becomes severe, the outsiders resolve it by forming
a coalition and exercising their board voting power to oust the chief executive.
Thus, publicity and reputational interests combine to effect a transfer of
control.
The occurrence of a number of such transfers in practice bolsters the
activists' credibility. These cases also represent an important achievement:
Since managers become psychologically invested in their past strategies, chief
executive turnover plays a crucial role in prompting disinvestment in those
strategies.' 97 Furthermore, organizational tenure has been accorded a princi-
pal role in explaining the informational diversity, risk, and status quo prefer-
ences of the teams of managers that run corporations. Long-term executives
tend to employ unchanging strategies and rely on customary information
sources. Teams with short tenures are more inclined to adopt diverse strat-
egies, look for new sources of information, and develop new plans.'98
generally Kenneth R. Maccrimmon & Donald A. Wehrung, Taking Risks: the Management
of Uncertainty 77-274 (1986) (reporting on a comprehensive survey of senior business
executives and studying their willingness to take risks).
96 See supra text accompanying note 15.
See Theresa K. Lant et al., The role of Managerial Learning and Interpretation in
Strategic Persistence and Reorientation: An Empirical Exploration, 13 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 585, 588, 603 (1992) (stressing that heterogeneity of top management induces
strategic change and that managers in environments with constant change are more likely
to change than others in less complex circumstances); see also Paul C. Nystrom & William
H. Starbuck, To Avoid Organizational Crises; Unlearn, Organizational Dynamics, Spring
1984, at 53-60 (explaining that faulty cognitive structures developed by top managers
contribute to an organization's inability to deal with crisis, often requiring an infusion of
new ideas in the form of new managers).
98 See Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top Management-Team Tenure and
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SC!.
Q . 484, 486-88 (1990); see also Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizational Demography, inS Research
in Organizational Behavior 299, 320-26 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1983)
(examining the effects of organizational demography on innovation, adaptation and perform-
ance). But see Andrew M. Pettigrew, On Studying Managerial Elites, 13 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 163 passim (1992) (providing a methodological critique of this literature).
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4.10.2.3 Financial and Selective Incentives
Shareholder engagements have followed a discrete, single-shot pattern. Agents
of public and not-for-profit funds take the initiative, select targets, and make
investments in communication and legal compliance. Private sector agents of
mutual funds, private pension funds, management firms, banks and insurance
companies follow the leaders,' 99
 taking a selective, cost-sensitive approach.
Larger private players join in the dialogue when prominent underperforming
companies become successful targets. Otherwise, they discriminate among
specific issues according to projected short-term financial consequences. A
proposition with significant bearing on short-term returns, such as a manage-
ment proposal for a merger with a low payout, might prompt an initiative.
Other issues will not, with the extent of participation in the initiatives diminish-
ing with the payoff: Poison pills rank above compensation plans, which in turn
rank above more general process and structure improvements.200
This division of functions between public and private institutions follows
from differences in the agents' financial incentives and the institutions' product
market vulnerabilities. Public pension funds tend to be internally managed by
civil servants who have relative immunity to threats by managers. These
agents' bureaucratic positions also lead them to pursue risk averse financial
strategies, since the public sector provides no special rewards for exceptional
financial performance, while financial failure can lead to punishment.20'
These funds, as a result, are heavily indexed. 202
 Private sector agents, in
contrast, run the risk of management punishment for uncooperative
conduct. 203
 They also have stronger incentives to pursue upside gain, which
leads them to trade more actively and worry about liquidity. 204
 Some also
' In 1990 public pension funds owned 8.3% of the equity market; private pension funds
owned 19.9%; mutual funds owned 7.2%. All of these percentages had increased by 1992.
See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 848-49.
200 Pozen sets out this pattern of response. Pozen, supra note 186, at 145-46.
201 See Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 17-18.
202 See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 860.
203 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 32, at 913-24. Corporations, particularly corporate
pension funds, are a significant source of business for private managers. A well-publicized
confrontation with one management group can chill a business relationship with a similarly
situated group. Id.
204 Private pension funds tend to be 'defined benefit' plans, giving the corporate sponsor
an incentiye to maximize plan return to minimize the need for corporate contributions.
Public plans sometimes follow a 'defined contribution' pattern, with no connection between
performance and contribution. Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 859. Romano
suggests that possibilities for external political pressures on public pension fund agents
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work under tight cost constraints that stem from fee arrangements structured
on the assumption of governance passivity.205
The different behavior patterns of public and private institutions reverse the
assertion of the financial incentive theory 'of shareholder participation. In
theory financial gain provides the incentive, while in practice the less intense
the financial pressures on the agent, the greater the likelihood that the agent
will take the governance initiative. 206 This odd result dovetails with the more
general point that inevitable sharing of governance gains with free riders makes
governance investment irrational in a world in which the agent's individual
performance evaluation proceeds against the performance of the market as a
whole. 207 Together these points confinn the prediction that shareholder initi-
ative will follow from selective incentives. Public sector actors, as civil
servants, are unimpeded by the private actors' cost, product market, and
reputational disincentives. At the same time, governance activity seems to suit
them as a mode of reputation enhancement. Given this phenomenon of reward
for power exercised over business actors rather than for financial perform-
ance, 208 they are political entrepreneurs in both the traditional and Olsonian
senses 209
would diminish if all took the defined contribution form. Romano, Pension Fund Activism,
supra note 182, at 844-51.
205 Pozen cites 70 basis points per year plus a maximum performance fee of 10 to 20 basis
points for external managers, and notes that all costs of dealing with the proxy process come
out of this compensation pool. Pozen, supra note 186, at 144.
206 There is a counter story to the effect that the indexed investor must invest in systemic
governance improvements due to the absence of the alternative of exit through sale. See
Barnard, supra note 165, at 115 1-52; Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note
32, at 866-67. The problem with this incentive story is that it neither accounts for the
behavior differential between the public and private sectors nor recognizes that inactivity
might nevertheless be a more rational alternative from the point of view of a particular
private sector agent.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
209 If the career patterns of the most prominent actors are any guide, job shifts over to
the private sector also seem to be a possible reward.
209 A second type of political entrepreneur also has appeared. This is a professional
intermediary who makes the good governance case to management from an inside position.
The intermediary argues that voluntary acceptance of a program of internal monitoring
procedures minimizes the possibility of becoming an institutional target. Two prominent
lawyers, Martin Lipton and Ira Milstein, take the prominent roles in this capacity. See
Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance,
48 BUS. LAW. 59, 67-75 (1992) (recommending the separation of the chief executive and
board chairman functions, longer and more frequent board meetings, smaller boards, use
of outside consultants, periodic evaluation of the C.E.O.'s performance, and an annual
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4.10.2.4 Credibility and Possibilities for Capture
A number of factors make public pension fund agents suitable for this 'public-
regarding' entrepreneurship. The credibility of a shareholder who proposes a
cooperative engagement with management is enhanced by a concrete commit-
ment to a long-term investment in the firm. The public agents' indexed port-
folios give them a long-term posture as a structural proposition. Their interven-
tions, accordingly, hold out no possibility of a hidden defection strategy keyed
to exploiting the management vulnerability that follows from public target-
ing. 210 Nor, given indexing and the multiplicity of institutional holders, is
it likely that a proponent or group of proponents could use voting power or
the opportunity of access to management to defect from the wider shareholder
interest in exchange for rents from the target. A particular pension fund agent
has reputational concerns that limit such a possibility to an end period.2 " The
agent's ability to exercise a reputational threat against management depends
ultimately on the agent's ability to rally votes from the wider institutional
community. 212 Since votes against management remain the exception rather
than the rule, the proponent must husband its reputation to continue to play,
selecting targets carefully and representing the interests of the entire group of
shareholders in the engagement with management. Informational slack seems
unlikely to open up any room for self-seeking maneuvers. The institutions
operate in an informal network, and the managers themselves remain ready
to publicize any misconduct. 213
 In short, guardianship here is easily
contested.
meeting with the company's largest shareholders); see also Jay W. Lorsch, Empowering
the Board, HARV. BUS. REV. 107 (Jan.-Feb. 1995) (describing activist board strategies).
The General Motors Board adopted a set of 'guidelines' in 1994, drafted by Milstein.
These provide for annual evaluation of the C.E.O. but little else. See The GM Board
Guidelines, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 1994, at 5.
210 Conflicts over short term gain and long term strategy are entailed in these engage-
ments. These conflicts are discussed publicly, particularly where the issue is the unbundling
of a conglomerate.
211 That is, when termination of a particular relationship is contemplated. Presumably,
an end period results only when a given agent has decided to leave the field of money
management. Cf Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 851 (observing that shareholder engage-
ment is a repeated game, retaliation against cheaters can be expected, and money managers
will rarely be in an end period with respect to one another).
212 Romano conducted a comparative survey of the voting policies of public and private
funds and found no statistically significant differences in voting patterns on process and
structure issues, and a common pattern on most social issues. Romano, Pension Fund
Activism, supra note 182, at 83 1-39.
213 See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 817.
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Competing demands on, and the possible capture of, agents of public
pension funds can more plausibly be hypothesized from a different direction.
The bureaucratic positions of public pension fund agents make them vulnerable
to pressure from constituency interests frequently opposed to shareholder
interests. Management is one of those constituencies. These actors are, after
all, agents of the same governments that managers already have captured, at
least within the production of corporate law. Accordingly, political
contestability makes it imprudent to predict that this form of entrepreneurship
will remain vital indefinitely.
Roberta Romano has suggested that state-based concerns, such as political
pressure to support local firms and engage in other forms of locally directed
social investing, could limit the freedom of action of pension fund agents.214
Certainly a close tie between a state and a particular firm would create a
conflict for that fund agent. As Romano also suggested, however, these
conflicting demand situations are geographically specific rather than systemic.
They therefore differ from the more general threat of management pressure
that still controls private actors. Given a multiplicity of players, the conflicts
can be worked out within the network: The agent disabled by the dual demand
employs the professional's device of refusal, and the other agents go forward.
Romano points to a more systemic threat to the leadership of the public
pension funds when she recounts pro-management political maneuvers to place
pension fund control in the governors' offices in New York and California.215
These maneuvers did not succeed, but they underscore the important point that
managers know how to organize themselves and make state governments
responsive to their wider agenda. Increased fund activism, predicts Romano,
will cause a concomitant increase in political pressure on the funds' governance
decisions.216
It is hard to gauge the likelihood and prospects of a management political
initiative to break the pattern of public fund leadership. Such a campaign
would face several barriers. Here, unlike charter competition, the employee
beneficiaries provide a countervailing interest. In addition, the funds with the
most active postures come from states, such as California, New York, and
Wisconsin, with long-standing antimanagerial political traditions. 2 ' 7
 Finally,
214 Romano, Pension Fund Activism, supra note 182, at 814-20.
215 Id. The governors presumably also had an interest in controlling the funds to be able
to draw on them in closing budget deficits. See Garten, supra note 159, at 639.
216 Romano, Pension Fund Activism, supra note 182, at 852. She concludes that pension
fund activities cannot replace an active control market as a disciplining force. Id.
217 CaIPERS enlisted the press in fighting off the attack against it, charging that the state
was attempting to silence the funds' attacks on management. See Garten, supra note 159,
at 639.
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an initiative would have to succeed on a multistate basis. On the other hand,
since the number of key states is small, it would be possible to knock out the
core players that provide essential resources to the network with an initiative
pointed to the leading jurisdictions. The likelihood of such an attack would
increase if takeovers returned as an issue in a political posture replicating that
of the 1980s.
4.11 Relational Modes of Shareholder Participation
4. 11.1 Institutional Coalitions and Board Membership
Discrete engagements led by public pension funds only begin to realize the
benefits projected by the proponents of shareholder participation. More signifi-
cant results would follow if the institutions formed coalitions and engaged with
management to influence the selection of board candidates, or, if necessary,
proposed and elected their own minority slates. This strategy's objective is not
the acquisition of board control, but the placement of clusters of monitors
whose reputational interests are tied to meeting the demands of the shareholder
interest. These inside shareholder representatives would work to include
performance incentives in compensation schemes, develop additional sources
of information and analysis, bring heterogeneity of opinion to board deliber-
ations, watch the managers closely, and, in cases of persistent failure, build
boardroom coalitions to replace the managers.218
This strategy could be implemented in either of two ways. First, the institu-
tions could voluntarily subscribe to a clearing house that would select candi-
dates and solicit proxies for them. 219 Second, the concentration of institu-
218 See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 133-12. Gordon does not think
that these institutional monitors should be selected with a view to competing with manage-
ment in the creation of investment and management policy. The hypothesized monitors do
not possess company specific expertise; aggressive intervention for structural changes like
downsizing could lead to adverse political consequences. Id. at 13442; see also Barnard,
supra note 165, at 1165-68 (explaining that institutional investors and shareholders lack
necessary expertise to play an effective role in corporate governance); Gilson & Kraakman,
Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 880 (arguing that since institutional investors lack
the expertise for monitoring management, they must delegate this function to outside
directors).
219 Gilson and Kraakman propose an institutional clearinghouse that would develop a pool
of candidates. See Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 883-88. The
amendment of the proxy rules permitting shareholders to split their votes between the
management slate and an opposing slate, see supra note 180, facilitates this strategy by
making it possible to run a slate for a small number of seats.
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tional holdings could increase to a level that would make the formation of
informal institutional voting coalitions more feasible. 22° Unfortunately, no
movement toward the realization of either strategy seems to exist in practice.
No volunteers have come forward to organize a governance association, nor
have the proportionate holdings of individual institutions risen to a point that
small subgroups have a stronger voting influence. 22 ' The present disposition
of institutional incentives heralds no change. All the cost and reputational
disincentives that leave the public institutions in a secondary role in discrete
engagements also deter special investment in monitoring. Additional disincen-
tives deter the taking of larger positions: Institutions continue to value liquid-
ity, 222
 and performance pressures deter risky long-term commitments.3
The same financial concerns deter the extension of public pension fund
entrepreneurship to the board membership politics. Given the nonspecific,
long-term financial gains of effective monitoring, the disincentives make it
unlikely that institutions will invest in board election campaigns in the foresee-
able future.
4. 11.2 Monitoring by Block Holders
Recognition of the difficulties with the coalition strategy has led proponents
of shareholder participation to reconsider the possibilities of an historically
220 An intermediate strategy, the permanent shareholder advisory committee, has not met
with enthusiasm from either the commentators, see Barnard, supra note 165, at 1 165-68;
Gilson & Kraakman, Institutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 87 1-72, or the shareholders
themselves. A proposal for an advisory committee made by Mr. Robert Monks at Exxon
received only 8% of the vote. See Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Anne C. Foster, Exxon
Revisited: The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precatory Proposals
Seeking to Create a ShareholderAdvisory Committee, 48 BUS. LAW. 1509, 1511 (1993).
221 The top 20 institutions hold 21 % of American equities, and concentration falls off
thereafter. See Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 852. The holders of the 21%
hold sole voting authority as to only three-quarters of their blocks. Id. at 854. Furthermore,
the number of mutual funds continues to increase. Id. at 855.
A helpful contrast may be Britain, where the largest 25 institutions hold an absolute
majority of the shares. Id. at 854. A somewhat more active pattern of shareholder
participation follows from the higher level of concentration. In the case of a seriously
underperforming company, the four or five largest institutional holders of British firms
consult informally. The largest holder takes the organizing lead and takes the group's
concerns to the managers in the case of poor performance. See Bernard S. Black & John
C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation,
92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2046-53 (1994).
222 Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 851.
223 See Id. at 867.
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tested mode of relational investing, large block ownership. 224
 The model
block owner is the legendary Warren Buffett, a fundamental value investor who
takes large, underdiversified, long-term positions; monitors carefully; but does
not attempt to interfere with the formulation or implementation of the business-
plan, except in a crisis. 225
 This model actor's large equity investment plainly
provides an incentive for active monitoring. It is less clear, however, whether
there are any incentives that might induce existing investment institutions to
make these large block investments. Relational investors of this type appear
only rarely in American capitalism. 226
 When they do, they are either individ-
ual entrepreneurs; specialized, privately held venture capital firms; or other
large corporations. 227
 Gilson and Kraakman, drawing on the venture capital
model and a Swedish precedent, suggested a vehicle for expanding the set of
these players. They proposed that closed-end investment companies be formed
to take ten to thirty-five percent positions in a number of salvageable com-
panies. These firms would monitor actively and hold for long periods but
eventually would turn over their positions to cash in on the gains of effective
influence. 228
 This proposal arouses standard institutional skepticism about
the projected financial returns: Absent any firm-specific expertise on the part
of the investor, competitive gains seem unlikely as a systematic
proposition.229
4.11.3 Credibility and Possibilities for Capture
Possibilities of capture and defection raise questions about block ownership's
ordinary course suitability as a mode of shareholder participation. Coalition-
based board voting, in contrast, suggests neither problem.
224 Black cites studies showing a positive relationship between Tobin's Q (the ratio of asset
replacement value and market value of equity) and the size of ownership blocks where the
blocks are between 5% and 20%. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor
Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 918 (1992).
225 See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 129-30. Note that the monitoring
strategy duplicates that envisioned with coalition-based board voting.
226 See Louis Lowenstein, Opening Remarks, Columbia University Institutional Investor
Project Conference on Relational Investing New York, N.Y., May 6, 1993: 'More Like
Whom?', 18 J. CORP. L. 697, 704 (1993).
227 For examples, see Rock, Dark Side, supra note 161, at 990-99.
228 See Gilson & Kraakman, Investment Companies, supra note 149, at 995-96. They hope
for a 50% increase in the stock price over the holding period. The closed-end form is
neceSSalY to secure a long-term commitment; the gain must, of course, be net of the closed-
end discount. Id. at 1005-06.
229 See Pozen, supra note 186, at 148.
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With coalition-based board voting, as with public pension fund activism,
the combination of cross-monitoring, reputational interests, and contestability
of guardianship provides a circumstantial guarantee that participants will
remain faithful to the shareholder interest.° Yet circumstantial guarantees
of fidelity to the relational ideal of patience and cooperation are less clear cut.
It seems unlikely that members of such coalitions could, or would, bond
themselves to long-term cooperation by committing, implicitly or explicitly,
to reject a tender offer. Their legal duties and reputational interests lie in value
maximization for beneficiaries, with no fine distinctions being made about
short or long-term means to the end. Even with an implicit commitment to the
firm and institutional internalization of a norm of patience, the incentive to
defect from the coalition and accept an attractive tender offer would be power-
ful.23'
This element of short- versus long-term instability does not completely
undercut the cooperative possibilities of the board voting strategy, however.
The coalition, by hypothesis, has the votes to insert its monitors whether or
not management consents in advance. Thereafter, the structural possibility of
a hostile attack gives management an incentive to cooperate to the extent that
doing so decreases the likelihood of attack.
The block-owning monitor has a similar incentive to abandon management
when faced with a tender offer, but the monitor is also more susceptible to
capture by management. In this situation, management can compete with the
offeror by offering the holder a side deal, exchanging additional returns on
invested capital for a binding commitment not to tender. 232 The holders'
substantial equity commitment creates an incentive to defect to the management
side, and at the same time it undercuts any reputational concerns about serving
the wider shareholder interest. Given financial rather than political
° See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 817, 851, 855; Gordon, Cumulative Voting,
supra note 148, at 171.
' Lowenstein reports that during the 1980s major British funds responded to tender
offers by holding collegial inquiries into the integrity and efficiency of target managers, and,
in fact, rejected a few tender offers as a result. American fund managers, pressed by
competition and fiduciary duty, always tendered. Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 10-11.
Another possible route of defection should be mentioned. The holder can threaten a
tender offer himself, as Mr. Kirk Kerkorian recently did with Chrysler. See Steven Lipin
& Dave Kanas, Offer for Chrysler May Signal Return of the Corporate Raider, WALL ST.
J., April 13, 1995, at Cl.
232 In the standard deal, the block holder receives preferred stock in exchange for a stand-
still, or gives management a call option. Indirect payments can come from investment
banking fees, other product contracts, or access to inside information. Rock, Dark Side,
supra note 161, at 1004-06.
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entrepreneurship, the incentives would appear to lie in the Opposite direction.
In the proponents' story, the block owner charts a course between these
alternative defections. It makes an implicit commitment to management to
reject an offer that lacks a basis in fundamental value analysis. 233
 Thereafter,
it plays a tit-for-tat cooperative game, holding to its commitment to the extent
management performs, but standing ready to defect to an outside offeror if
management fails to deliver. 234
 Meanwhile, a successful cooperative relation-
ship makes a hostile offer unlikely. Since the block owner plays this cooper-
ative game with multiple firms as a going business, it develops a reputational
interest for exercising its judgment in a discriminating way when faced with
a tender offer. 235
 It becomes a gatekeeper for good and bad tender offers.
The problem with this story lies in the complicated mix of elements that
figure into economic accounts of the sources of merger gain. Tender offer
premiums of the 1980s had multiple sources. Under Kraakman's 'joint gains'
explanation, the offeror pays a premium to make up a discount between the
equity's market value and the intrinsic value of the going concern. Given a
competitive market, the offeror must make up the discount. Its profit comes
after the acquisition, from either (or a combination of) synergistic gains, better
management, or the resale of parts of the target in the market for going
concern assets. 236
 Let us assume that all tender offers correctly are typed as
motivated by the pursuit of gains through one of the three strategies, and
consider the position of the block holding gatekeeper as to each.
The tender offer motivated by synergistic possibilities does not seem well
suited to the block holder's business judgment, absent particular expertise in
the given production function. This leads the block holder to a difficult reputat-
ional choice: Its relational monitoring role, narrowly defined, does not require
233 See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1041.
234 CfAyres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 26-38 (hypothesizing a tit-for-tat cooperative
game between government agency and regulated firm).
235 Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1060-6 1; cf Gilson & Kraakman, Investment
Companies, supra note 149, at 1005 (concluding that the block investor that becomes too
activist loses friendly access and cannot Sustain the business).
236 See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of 'Discounted'
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 925-30 (1988). Kraak-
man followed financial economic theory in accounting for the discounts, attributing them
to either management misinvestment of free cash tiows or systematic imperfections in
market pricing. Id. at 907-11. Other commentators abandon the limiting assumptions of
finance theory and cite downward-sloping demand in stock market pricing.
See Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 1053, 1095-97 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1259-75 (1990).
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it to forego a share of the synergy motivated premium. Unfortunately, manage-
ment migl1t view a commitment to patience and cooperation more broadly. A
side payment in exchange for refusal to tender would provide a neat resolution
of the holder's conflict, so long as the holders' reputational interest lies more
with cooperation with managers rather than with a public regarding appearance
in the wider institutional community.u7
The block holder's gatekeeper role would seem better suited to tender offers
motivated by gain through better management or resale of going concern
assets. In this case, the holder's superior information about company practices
enables it to appraise prospects for management improvement; chances for gain
through dismemberment presumably will have been explored in the course of
the relationship. Even here, the holder's loyalty to the cooperative strategy will
be tested if, as Kraakman asserts, most of the premium comes from the making
up of the discount. 238
 If we open up the valuation theory to admit a likeli-
hood of overbidding by the offeror, 239
 the conflict becomes even more
severe. The overbidding offeror leaves the block holder with a choice between
(a) cooperation and a payoff through speculative governance gains that cannot,
in any event, make up the discount between intrinsic value and the market
price of the stock, and (b) a single-shot payoff that not only makes up the
discount but, given overbidding, clearly offers a greater return than that held
out by patient monitoring. Even given a reputational interest in integrity in the
gatekeeper role, the blockholder' s temptation to defect and take end period
gains would be strong, particularly if a trend of stepped-up tender offer activity
held out possibilities of short-term gain in similar investment positions. This
scenario invites a restatement of the two choices above: (1) defect, abandon
cooperation, and go into an end period; 240
 or (2) adhere to the cooperative
commitment and take a side payment.24'
237 We note that hopes for synergistic gains and other management-driven objectives figure
prominently in the recent revival of merger and acquisition activity. A few transactions have
entailed hostile bids, but most have been friendly. See Randall Smith & Greg Steinmetz,
Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Economy and Cheap Financing, WALL ST. J., Mar.
16, 1994, at al; Mergers in America: Something in the Waves, The Economist, Nov. 16,
1993, at 89.
238 Kraakman, supra note 235, at 925-27.
239 Kraakman discounts this possibility. Id. at 893-905. Others take the opposite view.
See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
61-15 (1989).
240 The mid-i 980s experience of bondholders holding portfolios of covenantless paper in
reliance on management's reputational interest in capital market access provides a good
example of this risk.
241 Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1059-61, recognize these problems in suggesting
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4.12 Summary
The foregoing discussion of capture risk respecting block holders dovetails
with the discussion of capture risk respecting agents of public pension funds:
The availability or effectiveness of either mode of participation may be limited
by historical contingencies, with the likelihood of hostile takeover activity
being a salient one. It is hardly a coincidence that relational investing models
found their way into circulation after the lapse of hostile takeover activity in
1989. The disappearance of the market deterrent both ensured an absence of
countervailing interest group demands that might have impaired the public
pension funds' freedom to take a leadership role in discrete participation and
made plausible the projections of long-term cooperative participation by private
institutions. The new cycle of acquisition activity that commenced in 1993
could, but need not, materially change this favorable climate. 242
 Another
salient contingency is the relative level of concentration of institutional equity
holdings. Absent a marked increase of concentration in the industry, we may
not see the emergence of circumstances conducive to the appearance of coali-
tion-based relational participation.
IV. FEDERALLY MANDATED SHAREHOLDER INITIATIVE
The law reform agenda surrounding the institutional investor movement tends
to look in the federal direction. This is partly because the proxy process is
heavily federally regulated. Reform initiatives already have prompted the SEC
to remove barriers to shareholder initiative. 243
 However, the reformers would
like to see additional changes that would shift more of the costs of shareholder
initiatives from the proponents to the firms. The primary agenda item here is
mandatory inclusion of shareholder board nominees in the firm's proxy state-
ment 244
that relational investing might help to forestall bad tender offers. We are less sanguine than
they about the possibility that the problems can be resolved for the benefit of the share-
holders as a group.
242 So far, the new cycle is management-driven and friendly in most cases; see sources
cited supra note 236, indicating no significant change.
243 See supra note 180.
244 Without such a reform, the proponent must invest in its own proxy solicitation, a
prohibitively expensive process absent a control acquisition objective. For a recent sugges-
tion that this reform be undertaken by SEC rulemaking, see Coffee, Half-Time Report,
supra note 32, at 900-02. Coffee argued that multiple slates are unlikely, given the instabil-
ity of institutional voting coalitions, and noted that a minimum support threshold could be
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A broader federal law reform agenda also follows from the financial theory
of shareholder participation. This asserts that present levels of institutional
concentration could give rise to financial incentives sufficient to induce sub-
group formation if the federal government removed ancillary legal constraints
that increase the costs and risks of collective action. 245
 We have no basis for
controverting this prediction, but, looking to the counter story and the practice,
we note a substantial possibility that the present economic structure of the
industry may, by itself, deter the appearance of the requisite financial incen-
tives. In the latter event, institutional shareholder participation can be expected
to persist only in a discrete form, with reputational incentives figuring in
significantly as inducements. The possibility that the future framework for
action will be thus limited implies expansion for the law reform agenda-to
imposed to deter overutilization. He also suggested that access be opened for proposals
counter to management proposals. Id.
Access proposals such as this have a long history. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange
Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 & H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19, 34A3
(1943) (proposal for shareholder nomination in issuer proxy statement); Proposed Tender
Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1987) (holders of 3%
or $500,000 worth of equity to have right to include own proxy materials and board
candidates); see also EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 117-21 (proposing that shareholders
holding 5% have the power to nominate directors in proxy statement); Louis Lowenstein,
What's Wrong with Wall Street: Short-Term Gain and the Absentee Shareholder 209-11
(1988) (proposing that shareholders have right to nominate one-fifth to one-fourth of entire
board); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907-08 (proposing that a committee of 10 or 20
largest holders have exclusive access to proxy machinery).
'Access' implies cost shifting. Cost shifting, however, could be directed without
access, on the assumption that the subsidized proponent proceeds with its own solicitation.
Bebchuk and Kahan recommend compensation for challengers both in board voting contests
and issue contests, with compensation for both board incumbents and challengers made
contingent on receipt of a threshold percentage of votes, and more generous compensation
for challengers in issue contests. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 96, at 1077.
245 The targets are: (I) disclosure requirements imposed on holders of more than 5% of
a class of securities under section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988);
(2) liability of controlling persons for securities law violations of controlled persons under
section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1988), and section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988); (3) short-swing liability for trading profits of 10% holders
under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); (4) restrictions on
capital structures and incentive compensation for advisors of investment companies under
sections 18(d) and 23 of the Investment Company Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I 8(d), 8-
23(a)-b) (1988); and (5) portfolio diversification requirements under ERISA. See Roe, supra
note 34, at 26-27.
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increase the benefits attainable through discrete action in addition to reducing
the costs of relational shareholder participation. Toward this end, we present
the following case for an incremental levelling of the field that state law
provides for shareholder initiative.
We propose a federally mandated privilege of direct shareholder access to
amend the corporate charter at the annual meeting of shareholders, with cost-
shifting to be effectuated through access to the proxy statement for the making
of proposals. 246 We would limit this access privilege to matters of process
and structure and exclude most business matters allocated to the board by state
codes. 247 The boundary dividing process and business would have to be
drawn in the preempting legislation. 248 In drawing it, we would place con-
tract terms relating to management's incentives on the 'process' side. Thus,
whatever the state law status, the federal law would grant access for poison
pill redemption and opting out of any state legislation with an opt out provi-
sion, in addition to traditional process matters such as the structure and
composition of boards and committees. More tentatively, we also propose
access for substantive- proposals respecting executive compensation. 249
 How-
246 There will be ancillary problems respecting the proposal's preemptive reach. States
could nullify a narrow access mandate in numerous ways. For example, a code's system
of process and structure default rules could be reconstituted as a system of mandates. Or
a state could amend the process provision governing charter amendments to differentiate
amendments by source and require a supermajority for shareholder initiated proposals. We
think that the proposal's inclusion of access for reincorporation decisions provides a
circumstantial guarantee against the former possibility. As to the latter possibility, two
drafting solutions suggest themselves. The preempting legislation could either provide that
a simple majority always suffices or provide that the required percentage for a shareholder
initiated proposal be no lower than that provided in respect of a management proposal. The
latter, less intrusive, approach should suffice, on the assumption that no state would respond
by amending its code to require supermajorities across the board.
247 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (1991) (requiring business of corporation to
be managed by or under direction of board).
246 State law draws a working but vague subject matter line between board authority and
shareholder authority that accords the shareholders a privilege of initiative respecting by-
laws, to the extent consistent with the charter and state law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109 (1991). Given the statutory allocation of power over business decisions to the
board, see DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 8, § 141(a) (1991), the scheme implies a distinction
between business decisions and contract terms respecting process. However, the precise
course of this implicit boundary has never been defined. The problem is compounded by
the state codes' designation, see id., of default status to the allocation of business decision-
making authority to the board-the allocation may be constrained or redirected by charter
amendment. As a result, an open-ended mandate of shareholder initiative would hold out
the possibility of shareholder direction of all business matters.
249 These proposals carry a deterrent impact that could give the proponent useful
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ever, cognizant of Professor Jeffrey Gordon's appraisal of shareholder initiat-
ive, we would exclude access to formulation of the business plan, in particular
matters of investment and disinvestment.° Gordon has warned that share-
holder initiatives could have two perverse effects. First, given diverse prefer-
ences, shareholder access could lead to economic losses due to inconsistent
choices; second, access could be manipulated by shareholders pursuing private
gain. We argue that our proposed boundary minimizes these problems.2
Any problems of confusion (or inconsistency) resulting from multiple proposals
can be avoided with simple process rules and a share ownership qualification.
The latter should be low enough to permit a small number of players in the
activist network to qualify a proposal and high enough to exclude the gadflies.
On the technical point as to whether this proposal requires new congres-
sional legislation or could be promulgated as a rule by the SEC, we look to
legislation as a practical matter. The legislative history of section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act provides a basis for a strong argument that the SEC does have
the authority to impose shareholder initiative on the states by rule. 3
 That
maneuvering room in the right case. See infra note 298. Yet they also create special risks
of abuse. The very maneuvering room they could create increases the risk that a proponent
might exchange the withdrawal of the proposal for private rents. In addition, substantive
compensation proposals would be particularly attractive to actors with political agendas
unrelated to shareholder value. Such a hostile, politically motivated proposal, if directed
to an extraordinarily well compensated but effective manager, could destabilize a valuable
working relationship; that deleterious effect need not depend on a high probability of
passage.
We put this component of our proposal on the table for discussion based on an
appraisal that a big stick, placed in the hands of serious proponents, has a value that
outweighs the risks. Shareholders are habitually suspicious of both politically motivated
proposals and intervention against board business judgments; serious proponents,
accordingly, would employ this big stick only in extraordinary situations.
° The combination of a green light for poison pill redemptions, compensation matters,
and opting out and a red light for other business matters could not be achieved as a drafting
proposition simply by excluding from access any amendment that removes authority
delegated to the board under the state code's general delegation. The permitted subjects
would have to be specified. One candidate for specific exclusion would be the corporate
purpose section of the charter. An amendment of the charter to exclude a line of business
presently conducted by a firm would make all of its contracts ultra vires, presumably
necessitating the sale of the line of business.
251 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 361.
252 See infra notes 3 10-27 and accompanying text.
See Fisch, supra note 162, at 1170-74 (marshalling the legislative history in arguing
for shareholder access by rule); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder
Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 146 (1988) (conducting a
REGULATORY COMPETITION, REGULATORY	 149
result depends, however, on the theory of statutory interpretation the observer
brings to bear, 254 and a recent, notably restrictive judicial ruling255 of sec-
tion 14(a) has left the SEC with cause to be reluctant to experiment with new
rules. 256 This uncertainty leaves us expecting that any significant alteration
of the federal-state balance regarding shareholder voting will come through
legislation.257
legislative history of § 14 and concluding that Congress supported 'strong and active
shareholder participation in corporate enterprise within the general framework of manage-
ment-shareholder relations established by the general common and statutory law'). For other
expansive interpretations, see Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 453 (2d
ed. 1988); Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for 'Qualified Securities': SEC
Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 824 (1987).
For a different reading, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws
at Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1112. Bainbridge read the legislative history
to limit § 14(a) to matters of disclosure and leave substantive voting rights unaffected. See
also Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 366 (1986) (noting that § 14(a) concerns disclosure
and process and does not preempt or add to state law on existence, distribution, or content
of voting power).
Compare SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding
that a corporation could not apply a by-law in such a way as to block a shareholder by-law
amendment proposal and implying a federally guaranteed right of access, albeit vaguely),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1948) with Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411-15
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the 'one share, one vote' provision in Rule 19c-4, placing
a limited reading on § 14(a), and distinguishing between procedural and disclosure regula-
tions that facilitate rights to vote granted by state law, deemed to be within § 14(a), and
SEC determinations as to when a vote is required, deemed to be outside the scope of the
rule).
256 Cf Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 876 (noting that the SEC vacillates
on the role of institutional investors).
We note that part of what our proposal seeks to achieve could be achieved by rule on
a relatively secure statutory basis. Specifically, the SEC could (and we think should) amend
rule 14a-8 to include by-law amendments.
In any event, we would recommend that any bill be drafted with specificity to reduce
the chance of & post nullification in administrative proceedings. One grey area would of
necessity have to be left for case by case determination by the SEC. No complete, self-
executing definition of 'process and structure' could be drafted as a practical matter. While
a concrete list of subject matter can be culled from the existing institutional agenda and the
state codes, novel proposals would occur over time, necessitating reliance on agency
administration.
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4.13 Management Agenda Control and State Corporate Codes
4.13.1 Description of the System
Political theory tells us that legislative outcomes in electoral democracies
depend on the collective choice rule utilized by the legislature-different process
rules lead to different outcomes given the same set of electoral
preferences. 8
 It follows that the actor who sets the agenda can control the
outcome, and that a particular process institution's constraints on agenda
formation have systematic implications for outcomes.259
The agenda-setting procedures for shareholder voting in public corporations
have easily-described outcome implications. Control of the proxy machinery
gives management working control over the mandatory shareholder board
vote. 260
 Shareholder votes also are mandated for fundamental changes charter
amendments, dissolution, certain mergers, and significant asset sales. Under
the process rules of most state codes, 26 ' however, these matters may not be
put before the shareholders until the board first approves a resolution. 262 The
condition of board approval amounts to a management vet-to control the
agenda one must control the board. The shareholders have a veto in turn, but
no access to the agenda. This absolute control 263
 over the corporation's con-
tractual agenda is subject to two exceptions. One is the section 14(a) precatory
shareholder proposal, pursuant to which a shareholder who meets suitability
requirements can set an agenda item, but only for a nonbinding vote. 2
 The
258 See William K. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: a Confrontation between the
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 37 (1982).
259 See Kenneth A. Shepsie & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated
Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 67
(1985).
260 As the foregoing discussion of barriers to shareholder voting coalitions implies,
management's practical control is vulnerable only to a challenger willing to invest in a
takeover or full-blown proxy contest.
261 For a survey, see infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
262 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (charter amendments), 251 (b)-(c)
(mergers), 271(a) (sales of substantially all assets), 275(a) (dissolution) (1991).
263 Management's process advantage in the event of a challenge, whether by proxy fight
or shareholder proposal, also remains substantial. It has wide discretion to invest corporate
funds on the defensive side, and with the help of proxy solicitors, maintains a substantial
informational advantage. See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 825-26; Black, Shareholder
Passivity, supra note 155, at 593-94. Despite amendments to the rules under § 14, manage-
ment stillhas some room to manipulate shareholder preferences by bundling proposals. See
supra note 180.
264 See supra note 162. There is an exception to the rule of nonbindingness for proposals
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other is a state law sl1areholder access privilege respecting by-law amend-
ments, 265
 the utility of which is limited. By-laws may contain any provision
relating to the business or its conduct, not inconsistent With the rest of state
law or the charter. 266 This means that coverage of subject matter in the char-
ter preempts contrary treatment in the by-laws, opening possibilities for
strategic tiering of provisions. Management-protective exploitation of this
possibility is a basic corporate lawyering skill, extensively put to use in the
drafting of the antitakeover charter provisions of the 1980s. Some of the items
from the checklist of shark repellent provisions, such as poison pills 267
 and
provisions barring shareholder action without a meeting, 268
 had to be placed
in the charter as a matter of statutory mandate. Others, such as staggered
boards269
 and super-majority voting requirements, 27° might be in the charter
or by-laws at the firm's option. Management chose the charter, blocking
amendment or repeal at the instance of a shareholder challenger not yet in
control Of the board but holding a majority of the stock or a majority of the
proxies. 27 ' Meanwhile, shareholder preferences respecting such provisions
underwent a change between the early and late 1980s-defensive charter amend-
ments were routinely ratified during the early period and resisted later on.272
However, the resistance came too late. Defensive charter provisions were
widespread by the end of the decade. The new shareholder activists can beg
for their removal under Rule 14a-8, but, given the board veto on access to the
charter, cannot compel it.
The charter preempts the by-laws only to the extent that it actually covers
the subject matter in question. Technical possibilities for shareholder-initiated
for new by-laws. See infra note 274.
265 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991).
266 See id § 109(h).
267 See id. § 151(a) (providing that preferred stock contract terms go into the charter;
charter can provide in advance for 'blank check' delegation to management of power to
authorize preferred stock and fill in terms).
266 See id § 228(a).
269 See id. § 14 1(d), (k) (charter, initial by-law, or shareholder by-law; staggered board
has effect of barring action for removal of directors without cause).
210 See id. § 216.
27 At some point, procedural maneuvering by management to frustrate exercise of the
shareholder franchise violates a norm of Delaware law. That point is extreme. Compare
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121-22 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that board
action frustrating exercise of shareholder franchise requires a compelling justification) with
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662-63 (Del. Ch. 1988) (retreating from
requirement of a compelling justification for such board action).
212 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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contracting arise as a result. The charters of public corporations, contrary to
the vision of the contractual theorists, did not contain many contract terms
before the proliferation of antitakeover provisions. The historic public corpor-
ation charter was kept spare to provide management with maximum freedom
of action in formulating process rules. 273
 The charter contained the minimum
terms mandated by the code and terms covering any senior equity securities
issued by the firm; by-laws contained standardized process provisions; man-
agers relied on state codes to fill in the rest. Firm contracting evolved during
the 1 980s mostly to load charters with defensive provisions. The shareholder
agenda of the 1990s includes new areas of concern, such as compensation
schemes, confidential voting, and board and committee structure. As to these,
the charter may provide nothing, leaving open a field for shareholder-initiated
by-law amendments. Read literally, the suitability rules under Rule 14a-8
permit by-law propbsals, making an initiative cost-effective. 274
 Some by-law
initiatives have gone forward under Rule 14a-8, but, unfortunately, this federal
route to contractual access has not proved useful to proponents. Technical
questions of federal-state synchronization have arisen as the SEC has dealt with
management objections to by-law proposals. State law provides little guidance
on these questions, and, at least up to now, management effectively has blown
doctrinal dust into the eyes of the SEC.275
273 This is because charter amendments must by ratified by the shareholders, while by-
laws may be promulgated by the board, in an environment in which shareholder initiatives
respecting contract terms were rare events, it made cost sense to leave the contracting to
the board.
274 See Rule 14a-8(c)(1), which excludes matters that are not a proper subject for share-
holder action under state law.
275 The suitability rules are built on three principles. First, the subject matter must be
proper under state law under Rule 14a8(c)(1). Second, the subject matter must not traverse
a long list of specific exclusions devised by the SEC over the years. See Rule 14a-8(c)(2)-
(13). Third, following Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954), a proposal on a
subject matter reserved to the discretion of the board under the state law delegation of
authority is nevertheless proper if phrased as a request. The three principles do not syn-
chronize well. There are two problems. First, a by-law proper under state law might
nevertheless traverse the SEC list of unsuitable topics. Second, state lawmakers have never
had occasion to draw a clear line between hoard management authority and shareholderby-
law promulgation authority. As a result, the extent to which a by-law may constrain the
board management authority is not clear. Nor is it clear whether the board of directors,
which also has power to promulgate by-laws, can subsequently repeal a by-law approved
by the shareholders. The no-action letters play out these problems with conflicting results.
Compare Exxon Corp., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1992) (allowing
the shareholder proposal to establish a committee to oversee the board of directors to be
excluded) with Pennwil Company, 1993 WL 52187 (S.E.C.) at *52 (Feb. 24, 1993)
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4.13.2 Explanation of the System
The rule of absolute delegation came into corporate law with the turn-of-the-
century shift toward an entity conception of the corporation-a shift that had the
incidental effect of affording freedom of action to the managers of new, mass-
producing firms. 276
 Previously, an agency theory of board authority had
prevailed and access had been the rule. 277
 New Jersey, the early leader in
the chartering of large firms, 278
 conditioned amendment on board approval
before 1895 . 279 Delaware followed in its corporations code of 1899,280 a
(original proposal) and Pennzoil Company. 1993 WL 87871 (S.E.C.) at *4Ø 42 (Mar. 22,
1993) (revised proposal) (suggesting that the shareholder proposal that by-laws were to be
amended only by shareholders was not proper under state law). For a summary of the
Pennzoil correspondence, see Charles F. Richards & Anne C. Foster, Exxon Revisited: The
SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precatory Proposals Seeking to
Create a Shareholder Advisory Committee, 48 BUS. LAW. 1509, 1513-18 (1993). In the
former case, the SEC took a no-action position respecting a proposal for a by-law mandating
a permanent shareholder advisory committee, even though the proposal required funding
for the committee, arguably traversing the state law delegation of authority to management.
The SEC retreated from the position in the latter case, which also concerned a by-law
proposing a shareholder advisory committee. Upon resubmission of the proposal on a
precatory basis, the SEC still sanctioned the proposal's omission because it contained a
block against repeal by a subsequent board by-law. This, said the agency, created a question
as to state law validity.
The SEC's treatment of the Pennzoil no-action letter is somewhat counterintuitive as
a state law proposition. The state codes, read literally, imply that charter terms trump
bylaws, and that shareholder by-laws trump board by-laws, but the point is not clear. The
SEC's no-action letters thus have a perverse effect. They invite state courts to determine
the issue in management's favor should it come up at the state level. Given the charter
competition system, the states have every incentive to decide against the shareholders. For
further discussion, see Coffee, Half-Time Report, supra note 32, at 883-89.
276 See William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1989).
277 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 349 n.7 (citing Joseph K. Angell
& Samuel Ames, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, Aggregate § 297-99 (9th
ed. 1871); 1 Victor Morawetz, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations § 243-44 (2d
ed. 1886)).
278 New Jersey began to liberalize its code after 1890, with considerable financial success.
See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey and the Fiscal Origins of Modern American Cotpor-
ation Law 43A5 (1993).
279 JAMES B. DILL, The Statutory and Case Law applicable to Private Companies under
the General Corporation Act of New Jersey and Corporation Precedents 42-43 (1899)
(reproducing New Jersey General Corporation Act §27).
See Act of 1899, 21 Del. Laws ch. 273, § 135.
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piece of legislation that manifested its determination to enter into charter
competition with neighboring New Jersey. 28 ' Access limitation provisions
diffused into the codes of other states during the subsequent decades. By 1960,
twenty-five state codes conditioned charter amendment on board approval;282
by 1970, twenty-eight state codes did so;283 by 1993, forty state codes did
so. 284
 Today, only ten state codes leave a door open to shareholder access.
This historical sequence can be read as further confirmation of the capture
of state codes by the management interest: It is no accident that this component
of management agenda control dates to the first instances of the purchase and
sale of corporate codes. Another plausible story has been offered, however.
Jeffrey Gordon has set out a functional explanation for absolute delegation,
tied to his observations that an open agenda could lead to costly shareholder
voting cycles and self-dealing by proponents of initiatives directed to the firm's
business. 285 The tie led him to a three-part argument that explained the statu-
tory pattern as a result of evolutionary efficiency. 2 First, if the absolute
delegation rule had a significantly negative effect on value, some states would
offer an alternative. Second, although many states do permit corporations to
contract around the delegation of business decisionmaking power to the
board, 287 public corporations have not offered charter terms that take up this
option. Third, unlike antitakeover resolutions, which have a negative impact
on share prices, the absolute delegation rule has a long historical standing that
share prices already reflect. Citing Jensen and Meckling's famous article on
agency costs, 288 Gordon concluded that if the rule injures shareholders, man-
281 See Russell Carpenter Larcom, The Dell2ware Corporation 11-13 (1937).
283 See 2 Model Business Corp. Act. Ann. 23-3 1 (1960).
283 See 2 Model Business Corp. Act. Ann. (Second) 260-61(1971).
284 See 2 Model Business Corp. Act. Ann. (Third) 1172-73 (Supp. 1993). The MBCA
count is 38. We disagree as to two omissions: N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 803, 804
(McKinney 1986), and Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-1003 (Cumulative Supp. 1994). Of the
10 states that omit the board veto, four allow a stated percentage of shareholders to propose
amendments (Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania); five have no process
provisions respecting amendment proposals (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and
Wisconsin); California, somewhat ambiguously, requires a board resolution before or after
the shareholder vote. CAL. CORP. CODE § 902, 904 (West 1990).
285 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 35761. For our discussion of
the cycling problem, see infra notes 3 13-27 and accompanying text.
286 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-59.
287 See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
288 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 358 (citing Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
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agers bear the agency costs when they initially sell stock to the public.
In response to the first argument, we note that a number of alternative codes
do exist, but we think that inattention by local bar associations and other
management representatives is the best explanation for the isolated persistence
of shareholder access provisions. Given management agenda control over
reincorporation decisions, 289
 no actively competing jurisdiction would include
shareholder access in its product package, even if access were thought to have
a positive impact on shareholder value.
We also question the probative value of the second argument's point that
public corporations have not exploited opportunities to opt out of the absolute
delegation of ordinary business decisionmaking authority to the board. Agenda
control follows from process provisions that appear to be mandatory and is
analytically distinct from the statutory delegation of business decisionmaking
authority. 290
 Opting out of the board authority delegation came into the codes
to facilitate shareholder-level contracting as a means to police opportunism in
closely held firms. The charter amendment that makes use of this permission
removes decisionmaking authority from the board to the shareholder level.
Such a broad-brush removal is neither feasible nor desirable in a publicly held
firm. A public corporation conceivably could exploit the permission by expand-
ing the set of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval.
However, doing so would not open the agenda to shareholder charter amend-
ments; instead, the charter would set the agenda, and management would retain
a degree of control over the initiation and timing of the transaction eventually
submitted to the shareholders.29'
289 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Del Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991) (charter amendments to be
approved by the board). This doctrinal distinction is long standing. See Henry Winthrop
Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations § 97, at 320 (1927) (distinguishing between director
and stockholder powers).
291 We note the possibility that a charter could be amended to remove to the shareholder
level the determination of the charter amendment agenda. Certainly this is the inevitable
result in closely held firms that move all business decisionmaking to the shareholder level,
as the statute permits. However, again, any blanket removal makes little sense for publicly
held firms. In the alternative, the charter could provide that management's agenda power
over charter amendments is subject to pro tanto limitation in any case in which a shareholder
proposes an amendment at a meeting. On the theory that the greater includes the lesser, this
provision would be valid. On the other hand, if the agenda control provision were read as
strictly procedural and not one of the 'business' matters under the basic statutory delegation,
it would resist opting out and amount to a mandate. That reading follows from the structure
of the state code. Since shareholder approval is mandatory for charter amendments, they
are by hypothesis not within the 'business' in the exclusive delegation to management.
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Finally, we question the applicability of Jensen and Meckling's historical
ex ante pricing model to this case. That model presupposes a complete contract
as to which all risk is priced out when the firm initially goes public. We think
an incomplete contract model inclusive of ex post renegotiation of terms is
more appropriate here. In practice, firms go public at an early, entrepreneurial
stage of their life cycles. At that point, uncontrolled management influence
over decisions creates value, and no one worries about independent directors
and other process protections. 292
 The shareholder participation movement
deals with firms at a later stage of the life cycle-mature, solvent companies
able to pursue failed strategies because of weak capital market constraints.293
To have present contracting processes determined by a risk allocation implied
from a public offering of a quarter or half century earlier seems
counterproductive.
In sum, state law's evolution to block shareholder access to the corporate
contract may raise a presumption of efficiency, but a review of the history
rebuts the presumption. At the turn of the century, when the agenda control
provisions came into the corporate codes, corporate law was changing to
facilitate investments of unprecedented scope by entrepreneurial managers.
Today, the picture is more complicated. Some firms fit the paradigm of the
productive management firm, but many do not. Until the recent occurrence
of successful shareholder initiatives, the shareholder collective action problem
made it pointless to question access barriers. The question finally comes up
today in an economic environment in which we look to the legal framework
to facilitate disinvestment as well as investment. 294
 The implication for the
state code's access barriers is not efficiency, but obsolescence.295
292 Indeed, a charter loaded with such terms might send a negative signal in an initial
public offering.
See Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 832; Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 208, at 74-76.
294 See generally Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847 (1993) (arguing that firms able
to achieve disinvestment will be successful competitors in the coming era).
295 Gordon, Cumulative Voting. supra note 148, at 175-79, indirectly confirms this point.
Gordon sensibly suggests that cumulative voting could facilitate implementation of institu-
tional board membership. His proposal runs up against the access problem at the implemen-
tation stage: Since cumulative voting must be in the charter, and the proponent's only
vehicle is the precacory proposal, chances for success are speculative at best.
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4.14 Shareholder Access to the Charter for Process Amendments
4.14.1 Benefits
4.14.1.1 Shareholder Participation
We direct our access proposal to the pattern of discrete shareholder participa-
tion led by agents of public pension funds. We project beneficial consequences
on the following model of engagement, abstracted from the practice
pattern.296
Let us start with a proponent who publicly selects a corporate target and
either launches a negative voting campaign or makes a precatory proposal.
Public targeting indicates the proponent's judgment that the influence costs at
the firm are unnecessarily high. If the proponent's determination has credibil-
ity, the targeting injures the reputations of the firm's managers and makes it
more likely that the shareholders will obstruct future management proposals.
The managers have three choices as to their response. First, they can take
action amounting to a counter-signal showing that the proponent has selected
incorrectly and thereby rehabilitate their reputations2
Second, if no such response is available and they are sufficiently risk averse
with respect to reputation and shareholder relations, they can indicate respon-
siveness by starting a dialogue with the proponent. Third, they can do nothing
296 See supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text.
297 Recent events at Philip Morris show that this is possible. A board coalition (led by
the previous C.E.O., a tobacco division veteran) formed to fight a proposal of the incumbent
C.E.O. (a food division veteran backed by the institutions) to split the firm into its food
and tobacco segments. This led to the incumbent's resignation and the selection of a new
C.E.O. from the tobacco division. The new control group took its strategy to the market-
place, promising a more favorable dividend payout, and met a favorable response in the
stock price-a two percent increase against a market decline on the announcement day. See
Eben Schapiro, Philip Morris CEO Resigns Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994,
at A3; Eben Schapiro, Philip Morris Will Consider Stepping Up Buybacks or More
Aggressive Dividend, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at A3.
Thereafter, the institutions continued to pressure the firm, with mixed results. Philip
Morris withdrew its poison p111 in March 1995, responding to a 40% affirmative vote on
a 1994 shareholder proposal. At the April 1995 annual meeting, 25% of the shareholders
voted in favor of a proposal recommending limitations on benefits to outside directors. A
Just Vote No Campaign initiated by CaIPERS did less well, however-management's board
slate was elected with a 96% vote. The C.E.O., meanwhile, continued to play the dividend
card, promising a lower level of earnings retention. See Suein Hwang, At Philip Morris,
25% of Holders Vote to Slice Benefits of Outside Directors, WALL ST. J., April 28, 1995,
at B4.
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and let the campaign take its course.
Access to the charter gives the proponent more room to maneuver in the
second and third cases. In the second case, the proponent gets a significant
payoff only If the campaign's reputational effects are severe enough to cause
realignment of the firm's internal coalitions and termination of the chief
executive. Otherwise, dialogue leads to a payoff in the form of contract
concessions. At the negotiations, the proponent has cost and reputational
incentives to make a quick deal and take home some sort of contract modifica-
tion. Management presumably will Want to give up as little as possible in the
way of concrete terms, consistent with an appearance of responsiveness.
Management, in addition, at all times retains the option of noncooperation. The
proponent, armed only with a precatory proposal and reputational threats, is
not in a particularly strong position to extract meaningful concessions. 298
 If
management has a pending proposal of its own, a credible negative voting
campaign could mean a stronger bargaining position. Charter access lets the
proponent go past the negative, which depends on management's agenda, and
take its own mandatory agenda to the table. Armed with a mandate, the
proponent with credible vote-getting ability can close off management's option
of noncooperation. Furthermore, the mandatory stick can be wielded directly
against the managers' influence within the firm as well as against their reputa-
tions: The proponent, for example, could go to the table with a new incentive
compensation scheme that reduces the manager's rents 299 In the trade-off
298 Grundfest, supra note 32, at 932 n.354, noted that the importance of concessions
extracted to date can be easily exaggerated. Confidential voting, as conceded by managers,
tends not to apply in contested elections; decisions to redeem poison pills do not bar the
board from adopting a new pill if the occasion arises.
299 A negative voting campaign also could have this effect if a compensation package were
up for a vote.We note that the proposal in the example in the text is unlikely to be made
in practice. Information costs would deter investment in a full-blown compensation proposal.
Even if such an investment were made (or a simpler percentage cut in base salary were
proposed), probabilities for passage would appear to be low even with respect to a manifest-
ly underperforming company. Shareholder imposition of compensation terms that materially
reduce management rents is tantamount to a no confidence vote, and presumably would be
met in kind with reduced management efforts to reverse the fortunes of the firm. The
proponent's purposes would be better served in the ordinary case with a proposal for a
compensation committee, that is, a proposal packaged in pure process terms. On the other
hand, a shareholder privilege to make compensation proposals, even uninvoked, retains a
deterrent value. In addition, a substantive compensation proposal conceivably could be
useful to a proponent in a case in which management has been recalcitrant, the outside
directors have been passive, the shareholders have become noticeably dissatisfied, and no
potential challenger for board control has appeared. In such a situation, a proposal might
either promote management responsiveness, prompt a shakeup, or induce a control chal-
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surrounding the proposal's withdrawal, the proponent can select from the
whole agenda of process reforms.30°
Charter access also could be useful in the case of a completely unresponsive
firm. Precatory proposals have no governance consequences for managers
willing to suffer the reputational consequences of noncooperation and risk the
long-term consequences of poor shareholder relationships. Such a refusal to
cooperate puts the proponent in a repeat play situation. Charter access lets the
proponent raise the stakes in a second round, proposing an incentive compensa-
tion scheme, or an amendment that redeems a poison pill and calls for a
shareholder vote as a condition of replacement. Such a punishment campaign
would, we suspect, have to be carefully targeted, 30 ' with the proponents
concentrating resources on a selected firm for a demonstration of enforcement
power. A successful demonstration would reinforce the importance of share-
holder relations and enhance cooperative incentives among the group of targets
as a whole. 302
 Charter access also holds out the possibility of short-term
financial gain in some circumstances: Poison pill redemption can make the
stock price go up if a takeover is a likelihood. The chance of gain might
favorably alter the economics of subgroup formation, inducing private institu-
tional players into the game on occasion.303
The utility of a bigger stick that holds out an intermittent financial incentive
could increase over time. The current pattern of discrete intervention turns on
reputational incentives on both sides. Reputational incentives can change with
circumstances from period to period. Pension fund entrepreneurship could
diminish in intensity if' as the roster of players changes, the replacements
discover that most of the available reputational gain has attached to the
departed players of the first generation. Management reputational concerns also
could change over time. The activists already have targeted the largest, worst-
managed firms. New targets will represent less obvious cases of high influence
costs, making noncooperative responses a more likely possibility. Old targets,
meanwhile, become repeat play situations over time; as dialogue with institu-
lenge.
300 See supra note 208.
301 A problem of information flow should be noted. A negative voting campaign involves
minimal informational cost. Mandatory proposals lifted directly from the existing institu-
tional agenda and fitting standing voting policies raise no significant informational problems
for the proponent. A more complex proposal, such as a compensation scheme tailored to
a particular company, would create more of a problem. Presumably, such a target would
have to be selected with care, and the campaign well-publicized.
302 Cf Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 45 (suggesting that occasional firing of big
enforcement gun by a regulator might be more effective than frequent firing).
303 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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tions becomes an ongoing fact of life for these firms, reputational threats may
loom less large and management's long-term concern about shareholder
relations matter more. A power to expand the mandatory agenda allows the
proponent to be more proactive.
4.14.1.2 State Law
Federally mandated charter access would ride atop the state system, giving the
shareholders access to the corporate contract but not otherwise interfering with
the production of state law. Taken alone, it would not impair the responsive
benefits of the state system. Nor, taken alone, would it ameliorate the system's
management bias. Accordingly, our definition of appropriate shareholder
'process' amendments would include reincorporation proposals. We would set
up the following two-step process for shareholder-initiated reincorporation.
First, the proponent's resolution would mandate the convening of a committee
of independent directors that would, after consultation with an outside consul-
tant, 304
 recommend a best alternative domicile. Second, the following year,
the shareholders would vote on a resolution to approve or reject a move to the
new jurisdiction. We employ the independent director intermediary to solve
the problem of selection. Two proponents could suggest different states; a
given proponent's choice could be uninformed or, conceivably, could result
from a side-deal with actors in the jurisdiction chosen. In any event, public
pension fund agents, being state employees, do not seem well-suited to this
particular gatekeeper function. Of course, there remain possibilities for man-
agement influence over the independent directors. However, since we make
this proposal more with a view to deterrent effects in states sensitive to incor-
poration business than with expectations of frequent utilization, we think the
compromise workable.
The point of the shareholder reincorporation initiative, as stated above,305
is to provide state lawmakers with a long-term incentive to respond to share-
holder interests. We doubt that it would result in any short-term disruption of
today's charter market. 306
 No state presently stands out as a candidate for
the role of shareholder-sensitive charter monger. Indeed, Delaware's laggard
role as an antitakeover jurisdiction during the 1980s makes it a possible share-
Here we note possible income for legal academics.
See supra text accompanying notes 141A7.
306 Had a federal reincorporation mandate been on the books in 1980 along with a pattern
of active shareholder participation, antitakeover legislation might not have become so
widespread. A few well-timed reincorporations might have deterred management representa-
tives from lobbying state legislatures because the shareholder interest would have garnered
a more prominent profile in lawmaking processes.
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holder-directed destination for firms located elsewhere. As a practical matter,
then, the deterrent of shareholder-directed reincorporation would complement
the federal threat, 307
 reinforcing Delaware's moderate legislative pattern and
encouraging its judges in their attempts to mediate between the conflicting
interests.
The burden to make use of initiative to invigorate the charter market would
be on the shareholder proponents. To make active competition work here, they
would have to expand their entrepreneurship to locate a jurisdiction, persuade
it to go into competition and invest in an informed judiciary, draft an attractive
code for it, and bring it some business. If all of that happened, Delaware
would face a dual demand that could produce difficult choices. Moves in the
direction of the shareholder interest to counter the threat of exit by established
firms could cause the state to lose new business from entrepreneurial firms on
the move to maturity, but such conflicts are the ordinary incidents of active
competition.
4.14.2 Unintended Consequences
We have designed our proposal to avoid two possible unintended effects of
shareholder initiative-rent seeking and vote cycling. Jeffrey Gordon, warning
of both, has concluded that initiative is not cost beneficial. We argue that these
concerns can be met through a subject matter limitation and a few ancillary
process-rules.
4.14.2.1 Rent Seeking
On self-dealing, Gordon showed that, given concentrated shareholding and
unlimited access to the charter, there would arise a risk of logrolling effected
through shareholder side agreements that direct the firm to suboptimal projects
benefiting the shareholders' businesses. Given dispersed shareholdings, Gordon
projected that the problem might arise whenever a substantial proportion of
the group of holders represents a distinct unity of interest-as when union and
public pension funds, or members of some political or economic interest group,
hold a large proportion of the stock. 308
 This latter scenario would be unlikely
to arise in the present context, given prevailing institutional diversification
307 We would not expect this form of federal intervention to defuse the ongoing threat.
Any congressional move against the state system, however minimal, would break a concept-
ual federalism barrier and imply the possibility of further intervention in the event of
significani state developments attributable to management influence. The short-term effect,
then, probably would be one of reinforcement.
308 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 376-79.
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practices and rational apathy among small holders. However, Gordon also
noted that the advent of a regime of unlimited access could cause holding
patterns to change. At present, American firms having large block holders tend
to have only one such holder. That holder gains influence over management
and deters others from accumulating large blocks. 309 Unlimited access opens
up possibilities for hostile coalition-building by latecomer block holders,
inviting a change in the shareholding pattern.
We agree that the risks Gordon described are cognizable and have little
confidence that present fiduciary law could effectively limit them. Accordingly,
we leave matters of investment and disinvestment out of our access proposal
to delimit its utility to actors engaging in governance activity in pursuit of
short-term financial gain. The practical cost to the shareholder participation
movement, as presently directed, is the foreclosure of direct action respecting
disinvestment and corporate unbundling. Here, again with Gordon, we think
that dialogue and process reform work better.31°
It must be noted that the process and structure limitation diminishes incen-
tives for side deals without ensuring their absence. Return to the above
example of a proponent who threatens management with a new, rent-reducing,
incentive compensation scheme. Although defined as process and structure,
the proposal remains susceptible to withdrawal in exchange for a side-pay-
ment. 3 " The guarantee against such a transaction lies not in the subject mat-
ter limitation but in the proponent's projected incentive profile. So long as the
proponent comes to the role seeking reputational rather than financial capital,
trade-offs will be structured with a view to reputational gain. Thus, a pension
fund entrepreneur concerned with vote-getting credibility can be expected to
structure trades that entail a concrete shareholder-beneficial component.312
See id at 374 (citing Harold Demsetz& Kenneth M. Lehn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership: Causes and Consequences. 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985)).
310 Interplay between unbundling and process reform can be hypothesized. The proponent
wants the firm to divide itself in two or spin off a substantial subsidiary. The proponent is
motivated by current conventional wisdom and is ill-informed. Management resists. The
proponent threatens management with poison pill redemption or incentive compensation.
If management concedes, the firm is unbundled. If management resists, the proposal goes
to a shareholder vote.
We do not view this possibility as problematic. In the latter case, the proponent still
has the substantial task of persuading the shareholders of the merits of the process proposal.
The proponent's inadequate information about unbundling does not bear directly on that
matter. In the former case, management will have had an opportunity to inform the financial
community of its case. If the case resonates, management has no reason to concede.
" We thank Jeffrey Gordon for noting this point.
312 Certainly, a secret financial component could be a part of such a trade. But the
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Any additional consideration sought by this actor will more likely take the
form of influence within the firm than the form of rent. Influence within the
firm, unlike money, gives this actor opportunities for further reputational
enhancement and at least holds out a prospect of shareholder benefit. At the
same time, even an undisclosed rent deal creates a risk of reputational injury
for the proponent.3t3
4.14.2.2 Cycling
On the problem of voting cycles, 314
 Gordon hypothesized corporate versions
inclusion of such a component would not necessarily mean that the overall trading process
was detrimental to shareholder interests.
313 And for the target making the offer: Third parties report that managers at Philip
Morris, a leading institutional target, recently offered a job to Richard Koppes, the Deputy
Executive Director of CaIPERS. Koppes turned down the offer. See Glenn Collins, Philip
Morris Meeting Subdues Tobacco Protest, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1995, at D3.
This calculus might change during an end period, but the reputational deterrent should
still exercise influence. An actor might leave state service for the private money manage-
ment sector, or leave one state office to assume or run for another. In either case, later
exposure of a questionable trade could prove injurious. On the other hand, a pension fund
agent looking to a career in state politics might have a reputational incentive to trade for
a geographically specific benefit, such as the location of a plant in his home state. But the
conflict of interest still bespeaks a need for secrecy, limiting the potential for political
reputational enhancement at home. Only an actor building a personal account for a projected
retirement seems to present a strong risk.
It also must be noted that a process and structure access privilege could provide the
medium for a threat by a financially-motivated actor. For example, a hostile large block-
holder could use a management compensation proposal (whatever the identity of the
proponent) as the occasion for negotiations keyed to rent extraction. But this possible abuse,
like that of rent extraction by a political entrepreneur, exists in the present legal structure.
Indeed, the blockholder's opportunities to extract rents follow from the very existence of
the shareholder vote. An access proposal limited to process and structure does create
additional occasions for rent demands, but we doubt that it would so alter the underlying
economics as to induce blockholding in the first instance or provide a blockholder with a
rent extraction opportunity that could not arise otherwise. Thus, at the bottom line, our
proposal's incremental aspect comes into the appraisal of the self-dealing risk that attends
it. Limited shareholder access serves mainly to strengthen the bargaining position of one
party in an established bargaining situation. The side deal possibility exists already and is,
indeed, intrinsic to any shareholder empowerment strategy.
Social choice theory, which began with Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individ-
ual Values (2d ed. 1963), asserts that 'majority rule can lead to any economically and
technically feasible outcome. Even if voters are other-regarding, so long as their preferences
differ, voting results will be unstable. Furthermore, there will be no basis for assuming that
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of a standard Arrovian voting cycle 315
 under unlimited shareholder access.
In his base case, we have three shareholders, each of whom owns twenty-six
percent. The issue is unbundling. One wants to sell a division; the second
wants the status quo; and the third wants a spin off, The preferences are
ordered, and a majority voting cycle results. The same, of course, could follow
with dispersed shareholdings.
However, voting cycles can be contained by process institutions. Critics of
social choice theory point out that its models suffer from significant limitations;
cycling becomes a problem only in the simplest of majority rule institutions-
without agenda controls, without strategic voting, and with an agenda con-
structed on an ongoing basis; in practice, agenda-setting institutions and agent
sophistication constrain majority outcomes. 316 So long as actors in voting
voting results are connected with the preferences of the electorate. Id at 22-33, 7-120; see
also Richard D. McKelvey, Intransativities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 480 (1976) (discussing
global cycling theorem which shows that when majority rule breaks down, any two points
in space will belong in a cycle).
315 Given majority rule, it is possible to cycle through different preferences. Assume that
there are three players, A, B, and C, and three alternative outcomes, a, b, and c, and the
following preference rankings:
A:abc
B:bca
C:cba
The result is a classic voting paradox, that is, a lack of transitive social ordering.
Cycling occurs by virtue of the actors' preferences remaining fixed over time. With
multiple issues to be resolved simultaneously by a large number of decisionmakers, social
choice models show that cyclical majorities will occur in two-thirds of the decision contexts,
so long as logically ordered preferences are likely to emerge.
316 See Shepsie & Weingast, supra note 258, at 69; see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying
Institutions, Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, ii. THEORETICALPOL.
131, 135 (1989) (arguing that cycling majorities are not a major problem).
For a survey of the anticycling literature containing a useful taxonomy of explanations
for stability or induced equilibrium, see Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of
Rational Choice Theory: a Critique ofApplications in Political Science 11-20 (1994). Green
and Shapiro divide the existing accounts into three groups. The first contends that equilib-
rium results from information costs and legislative specialization caused by the existence
of a system of permanent committees. The second school of thought holds that induced
stability results from a range of special preference formation-for example, a quasiconcave
preference distribution in connection with a supermajority voting requirement. The third
group, which includes Shepsle and Weingast, asserts that stability stems from institutional
arrangements. Green and Shapiro add a few additional factors to the catalog drawn from
outside the confines of rational choice theory computational difficulty, political infeasibility,
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institutions take full advantage of strategic opportunities available to them
under those institutional rules, majority-rule voting cycles are unlikely.317
Gordon, heeding this literature, acknowledged that the cycling problem attend-
ing charter access could be ameliorated with a process device that orders the
agenda. He considered the possibility of a rule that lets management set the
agenda, as between the three shareholder proposals. He rejected that device
on the ground that management ends up controlling the result, effectively
returning us to absolute delegation. 318 We note in response that the device
of the independent director committee could be drawn on instead. The pro-
cedure would be the same one we propose for reincorporation. The shareholder
proposes the formation of a committee to consider the best means of
unbundling the firm; the committee reports back with its best proposal; the
shareholders vote yes or no, with no being a vote for the status quo. Since a
choice must be presented, management's agenda control is broken. The special
committee serves the same cycle-breaking function here as does the legislative
committee. Of course, it would not guarantee the result of effective shareholder
choice. The committee could resort to subterfuge to get the result management
wants, reporting a manifestly unpalatable alternative to the status quo. How-
ever, the initiative is destabilizing nonetheless. The initial shareholder vote to
convene the committee signals that divisions of the firm may be up for sale.
If the signal were to attract a third-party offer, suppression by the special
committee would be substantially constrained.319
Given the availability of a process rule that restricts shareholder choice, we
are not at all sure that cycling need be a problem with respect to initiatives on
investment and disinvestment. As Gordon also noted, 32° however, consistency
over time might be such a problem: Shareholders could decide to invest in one
period and disinvest in the next period, with costly results Given the problem
of asymmetric information, and the possibility of rent-seeking on the side, we
conclude that the risks attending initiative on matters of investment and
disinvestment are prohibitive.
Cycling could in theory occur with process and structure matters, even
though the immediate financial incentives that motivate the shareholders in
and a regime of metapreferences that works to avoid conflict.
317 Ole-Jorgen Skog, 'Volonte Generale' and the Instability of Spatial Voting Games, 6
Rationality & Soc. 271, 282-84 (1994), argue that McKelvey's theory of global cycling
depends on the assumption that individuals are able to discriminate between alternatives that
are very close. In Skog's view, this assumption is unrealistic; if it is relaxed the general
instability of two-dimensional spatial voting games disappears.
318 See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 363-64.
319 See cases cited supra note 117.
320 Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 364-65.
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Gordon's examples would be absent. Conceivably, one proponent could
propose a compensation committee, a second could propose a specific, self-
executing investment compensation scheme requiring no committee, and a third
could propose a compensation scheme resembling the status quo. However,
no cycling would occur here under our proposal, even though it would open
the door to any proponent or group of proponents meeting a threshold percen-
tage ownership requirement. We have included a process rule that prevents
cycling: 32 ' Proposals only may be considered at the annual meeting, and
under the proxy voting system, proposals are submitted for a one-round
majority vote. The problem stemming from unlimited access would not be
cycling but inconsistency of result-for example, both the status quo based and
the new compensation scheme could be approved. A breaker rule could be
included to deal with this problem. If management deems two proposals to be
inconsistent, it refers the matter to a third-party adjudicator. If the proposals
are then found to be inconsistent, the first in time reaches the agenda. 322
 Two
candidates are available for this adjudicatory role-the SEC staff and the inde-
pendent directors' committee. We prefer-the latter in theory, but since any
disputed matter would find its way to the SEC staff in any event, the former
amounts to the practical choice. In either case, a result is reached and there
is no cycling. One problem remains: the possibility of inconsistency over
time323 and attendant costs.324
321 Steven J. Brams, Theory of Moves 187-93 (1994) (showing that there are very simple
ways to employ process rules to break voting cycles).
322 Here, a possibility for management manipulation opens up. If management hears of
a proposal, it arranges with a friendly shareholder to propose an inconsistent proposal first.
Assume that management wants to block a proposal for a compensation committee. The
management nominee would propose that the charter, which says nothing about compensa-
tion committees, be amended to say the corporation shall not have a compensation commit-
tee. The result is the status quo on either a yes or a no vote. To avoid this problem,
proposals that have a status quo effect would have to be excepted from the first-in-time rule.
323 This problem easily could be treated with a provision that bars, for a period of years,
any subsequent shareholder initiative on the subject matter covered by a successful initiative.
324 An extension of our proposal toward the territory of investment and disinvestment
should now be suggested. Access could be granted to amend the charter to broaden the
statutory list of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval. Under such
an access permission, shareholders could require voting for acquisitions effected under
triangular mergers, large asset purchases, and other significant transactions that presently
can be effected in the boardroom in many states. Such an expanded voting regime is
extensively discussed as a mandatory proposition in Lynn L. Dallas, The Control and
Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47-71(1992); see also Rock, Dark
Side, supra note 161, at 1023 (noting shareholder approval of special issue of preferred
stock).
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We think the consistency problem is minimal, even absent a breaker rule.
We envision a percentage ownership requirement keyed to institutional holding
patterns and set high enough so that two or three institutions must coordinate
their efforts in support of the proposal. The idea is to rely on the practice
pattern to ensure process coherence. The leading players in the shareholder
participation movement have been motivated by reputational gain. 3
 Process
and structure initiatives that lead to conflicts with other institutional players
hold out little prospect of reputational enhancement.326
Furthermore, in a case in which a proposal responds to a bargaining
impasse with a long-term target or complete noncooperation from a new target,
one would anticipate coordination and information sharing among the institu-
tions involved in the campaign. 327
 Finally, since reputational gain here ulti-
mately depends on vote-getting ability, we would expect proponents to select
their proposals and targets with care.328
Under a more aggressive form of this extension, the shareholders would have a
privilege to legislate not only a veto but a right of initiative. For example, a charter
provision might permit initiation of a merger or asset sale. At this point the line between
process and Structure and substance is breached very clearly.
ns See supra text accompanying notes 200-08.
326 Cf Brams, supra note 320, at 118-19. Brams notes that reputation and moving power
are best understood in the same light: Where a player establishes a reputation and the
reputation is acknowledged by an opponent, 'it may no longer be necessary for players
physically to cycle to 'prove' themselves. Mental moves will then suffice, and a player with
recognized moving power may then get its way without suffering the costs of actually
cycling.' Id.
327 Here we draw by analogy on Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 258, at 64-69. Shepsle
and Weingast argued that legislative outcomes are not in flux, but display systematic
regularities, due in part to the disproportionate influence on outcomes of members of
powerful committees. Certain members, by virtue of the control over process derived from
their committee positions, are able to translate their preferences into legislative action.
Shepsle and Weingast call this 'structure-induced equilibrium', which means that an institu-
tion can be modelled as an extensive form game due to the combination of process sequence
and the identity of the individual players. At the bottom line, the structure-induced equilib-
rium is an alternative that is invulnerable. The earlier social choice models, in contrast,
relied on an atomistic structure lacking the features essential to understanding the nature
and distribution of the actors' preferences.
328 We make this proposal for limited federal intervention without an expectation of a
favorable political climate. In fact, the proposal contains a takeover-friendly aspect that
would make it politically controversial. Shareholders could use it to force poison pill
redemption or to opt out of state antitakeover statues containing open-ended opt-out
provisions. See Del. Code Ann. tiE. 8, § 203(b)(3) (1991).
Since access would facilitate shareholder defection in the event of a takeover, it also
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4.15 Conclusion
This Article began by comparing the regulatory strategy of enforced self-
regulation with the historic alternatives of market and fiduciary deterrence,
commending self-regulation as a means to cooperative solutions to corporate
agency problems. Having surveyed the emerging self-regulatory field, and after
making a proposal for its expansion, we close by noting the modesty of the
benefits we project. An experiment with process and structure access very well
might result in no significant changes, either due to sporadic utilization of the
access privilege, or a cooperatively based response by the larger group of
shareholders against the forcing of governance terms on managers, except in
extreme, end-period situations. In the alternative, extensive and underinformed
utilization could conceivably cause incentive or other contractual problems in
given firms. However, We think management has sufficient resources and
enough of an informational advantage to protect firms from this problem. On
our most sanguine projection, charter access, used responsibly and occasional-
ly, would bring process rules that lower management influence costs to a small
group of mature firms. Our hope is that competitive evolution would then take
its course, so that other firms voluntarily adopt the rules that work best. From
there, we would hope that responsible and occasional use of charter access
encourages ongoing contractual innovation, with all players contributing:
institutional agents, managers, and lawyers.
Some years ago, a corporate law debate over the desirability of mandatory
and enabling rules came down to simple difference of opinion. The enabling
side emphasized the importance of innovation and flexibility; the defenders of
mandates emphasized process infirmities. The discussion here goes back to that
point of difference. State law has done an excellent job of assuring that firms
can draft contracts that accord managers freedom of action to invest and
disinvest, but it has not evolved to open up all possibilities for productive firm
contracting. State law remains the best vehicle for realizing those possibilities,
but a demand-side barrier prevents state law experimentation. An incidental
federal intervention taken to facilitate the experiment will not hurt the state
system, and it might do the system some good.
would do nothing to ameliorate the problem that takeovers present for relational shareholder
participation strategies.
CHAPTER 5
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF JURISDICTIONAL
COMPETITION: DEVOLUTIONARY FEDERALISM IN A
SECOND-BEST WORLD
5.1 Introduction
Our federalism has entered a devolutionary phase. 2
 We see this in the political
rhetoric of federal deregulation, 3
 in new legislation like the 1996 welfare
reform act, 4
 and in academic discussions.5
 Under the emerging majority view,
relative regulatory advantage within the federal system lies with state and local
government. This reverses a conventional wisdom favoring federal solutions
that dates back to the New Deal. The shift results from the confluence of many
patterns of thought and action, political, social, legal, and economic. This
Article takes a new look at the last two factors, law and economics, at the
point where they come together to articulate a theory of federalism known as
jurisdictional competition.
Legal federalism looks to the economic theory of jurisdictional competition to
provide decisive support for devolutionary initiatives. Under the prevailing
story, the economic theory makes two general assertions, which in turn give
rise to three powerful normative implications for federalism. The two asser-
tions are said to be these: (a) Competitive forces shape a wide range of
outcomes at state and local levels because public goods and regulations figure
significantly in the locational decisions of citizens, factors of production, and
This chapter appeared (with William W. Bratton) in Georgetown Law Review 1997.
2 See Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, YALE
L. & POLICY REV./YALE J. REG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 1, 5-9 (1996).
See,. e,g., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gilliespie & Bob Schellhas, eds. 1994).
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193 (replacing Aid to Families With Dependent Children with block grants to the
states).
See, e.g., YALE L. & POL'Y REv./YAI..E J. REG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE (1996).
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capital; 6
 and (b) The competition results in a market that brings regulatory
outcomes and citizen preferences into a first-best equilibrium 7
 and thereby
provides an 'empirical answer' to important policy questions, 8
 since only
public goods and regulations for which citizens are willing to pay will survive
in the long run. 9
 The normative implications for legal and political theory are
said to be these: (a) Just as price competition disciplines producers of private
goods for the benefit of consumers, so competition will discipline government
producers for the benefit of taxpaying citizens; (b) Central govermnent should
be seen as a cartel: Just as collaboration among competing producers of
products reduces price competition and incentives to innovate, so the removal
of regulatory subject matter to a central government reduces the number
potential competitors and dilutes entrepreneurial incentives; and (c) Since
federal intervention, whether by congressional legislation'° or judicial
decree," thus inhibits the operation of the market, it is at best unnecessary
o See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5 (1996).
Two conditions must obtain, however - the junior level regulation must not generate
significant externalities and borders must remain open for the free movement of capital and
labor. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 Ir'L
REV. L. & EcoN. 125, 127, 129 (1994); cf Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rhenquist,
Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERs L. J. 621, 640 (1994)
(interjurisdictional spillovers and consequent races to the bottom limit the beneficial effects
of regulatory competition).
8 See Steven G. Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers': in
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 752, 776 (1995). And, even where
the conditions for a first best equilibrium outcome do not obtain, the possibility of competi-
tion will lead to beneficial experimentation and regulatory differentiation. Id. at 777.
Cf.George Wyeth, Regulatory Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
87, 88, 91, 92-94 (1996) (employing the 'hypothetical' competitive outcome as the basis
for determining the existence of a regulatory taking).
See Weingast, supra note 6, at 5. A jurisdiction, accordingly, will regulate only if the
political benefits of the regulation are worth the costs imposed by exiting actors. Id. at 6.
0 See, e.g., Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the
Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1994) (exercise of the federal
commerce power appropriate only where state regulation of commerce causes inefficient
externalities); Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-
to-the-Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1244-45, 1253 (1992) (presumption favoring environmental regulation at the state level).
See y icki Been, 'Exit'as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconsti-
tutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 C0LUM. L. REV. 473, 511(1991) (arguing against federal
constitutional scrutiny of municipal land use decisions and concluding that, given regulatory
competition, those who would constrain municipal power have the 'burden to explain' why
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and at worst results in deadweight anti-competitive costs. At the bottom line
there arises a strong presumption in favor of locating regulatory authority with
junior levels of government.
This Article shows this story to be false in crucial respects, and, in some
tellings, even a little silly. The weakness lies in the source. The story relies
on a model of jurisdictional competition whose robustness long has been
questioned by advanced opinion in its own field. In response to these questions
economists have modified their approach to the analysis of competitive
behavior among governments. They still emphasize the advantages of state and
local regulation. But the new economics of federalism they articulate operates
on a level of complexity that precludes global pronouncements about the
location of relative regulatory advantages within the federal system. In an all-
or-nothing debate between centralization and devolution, it supports neither
side.
The new economics thus withdraws support from legal federalism's general
assertion that devolution of regulatory authority to the state and local level
leads to competitive efficiency. It instead assists us in addressing the strengths
and weaknesses of particular regulatory initiatives, centralizing or
devolutionary as the case may be. It does not preclude reference to the benefits
of jurisdictional competition in policy debates. But it does reallocate the burden
of showing these benefits to the proponent of a novel junior level, competitive
solution. Two showings must be made to import plausibility to such a claim:
(a) Since devolution does not by itself assure that competition will determine
the terms of regulation, the presence of conditions conducive to competition
must be shown affirmatively; and (b) Since regulatory competition, if and when
it occurs, does not by itself assure identity between lawmaking and citizen
preferences, proponents should describe (or project) a chain of causation. This
should begin with a statement of particular competitive pressures. The propon -
ent should go on to show how the pressures impact on the alignment of interest
group politics and other factors that influence regulatory outcomes in the
competing jurisdictions. The proponent then should show the path from the
politics thus described to a regulatory outcome.
These economic lessons have not yet been assimilated into legal federalism
discussions. It is important that this deficient understanding of the
interconnection between economic theory and state and local regulation be
remedied, especially at a time of new devolutionary initiatives. This Article
market forces do not provide adequate discipline).
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begins the job.'2
Part I situates jurisdictional competition theory in the larger contexts of legal
federalism and public choice theory. This discussion begins with the classic
Tiebout model of public goods provision' 3
 and goes on to describe its expan-
sion into a model of regulatory competition in legal contexts. The discussion
then fixes the Tiebout model's place in public choice theory. This analysis
shows that jurisdictional competition theory's special attractions are its claims
to yield a first-best equilibrium outcome and to provide a mechanism that cures
state and local regulatory capture problems. These claims outstrip those of
concomitant devolutionary theories articulated elsewhere in public choice and
public economics. Finally, Part I describes the structure and posture of legal
federalism's debate between race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom views of
jurisdictional competition, commenting that neither side offers a useful
approach for projecting the economic results of devolution.
Part II is a sustained examination of the economics of the Tiebout model's
shortcomings. This discussion shows first, that public economics has never
managed to derive a stable equilibrium model of competing jurisdictions that
meaningfully describes the real world (or any reasonably approximate hypo-
thetical substitute). Theoretically speaking, this is a devastating development
for the economics of devolution. The absence of a base in a stable equilibrium
model leaves the theory to commend a bizarre sort of federalism in which
central government must intervene to stabilize a dysfunctional, unpredictable
market. The discussion goes on to show that such a central authority would
have its hands full devising mechanisms to ameliorate frictions that inhibit the
Tiebout model's operation - limited information, externalities, and the costs
of mobility. Finally, Part II highlights the hollowness of the model's assump-
tion that government actors have incentives to act entrepreneurially. This turns
out to be the biggest sticking point on the list. Without a credible description
' Two recent articles also draw on the new economics of regulatory competition,
avoiding the practice of viewing regulatory competition as an all-or-nothing proposition.
See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under
the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REv. 413, 420 (1996) (reserving decision on the
question of the efficiency consequences of deductibility of state and local taxes for federal
income tax purposes); Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade
Debate: Trade, Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EC0N. 61(1996) (taking
a complex approach to analysis of trade-offs between free trade and environmental and labor
standards). This Article is the first to discuss the implications of the new economics of
regulatory competition for the broader legal theory of federalism.
' Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EC0N. 416 (1956).
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of lawmaker incentives, the model cannot make on good on its claim provide
a mechanism that beneficially disciplines government and eliminates public
choice problems.
Part III introduces the new generation of formal models of jurisdictional
competition to the legal literature. These models redeploy the theory in a
second-best world. In so doing they sap the strength from the efficiency claims
made in legal federalism heretofore. Externalities, universally understood to
be a legitimate ground for federal intervention under the model, turn out to
be implicated in most state and local decisions to tax and provide public goods.
The job of qualifying a devolutionary initiative on productive grounds becomes
much harder as a result. The new economics also includes a search for new
mechanisms that shore up the old model's deficiencies. These models address
problems of information asymmetry and regulatory capture at the state and
local level that the old model assumes away. Ironically, politics and voting,
purportedly irrelevant under the old model, come back into the picture as a
more plausible model is cobbled together, piece by piece.
Part IV articulates the economics' implications for legal federalism. This
discussion recommends, first, a five-step suitability standard for legal applica-
tions of the theory, and, second, that the shopworn and misleading concepts
of a race-to-the-top and a race-to-the-bottom be retired. Part IV goes on to
extend the lessons of the economic models, which for the most part concern
local public goods production, to a range of regulatory competition situations.
This discussion offers a typology showing that the model applies with greater
robustness than is the case with local public goods in some regulatory competi-
tion situations, but applies in others with its problematics unabated.
THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION PARADIGM
A. The Tiebout Model and Its Reception to Legal Federalism
1. The Tiebout Model
- The economic theory of jurisdictional competition addresses the production
of public goods' 4 - the actual goods and services produced by government
' Technically, a pure public good is a good as to which consuming individuals cannot
be excluded in the event they fail to provide their pro rata share of the rent required for
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for which citizens willingly pay rents, such as national defense, police and fire
protection, roads and sewers, and public education. Under the 'Samuelson
condition' for public goods allocation, efficient public goods production occurs
when the sum of a citizen's marginal rate of substitution of income for the
good is equal to the marginal cost of an additional unit of the good. The
Samuelson condition is not easily met. With private goods, market competition
forces producers to keep down their marginal costs and market prices provide
concrete information about consumers' rates of substitution. With public goods,
in contrast, there is no obvious market that constrains government producers
to keep marginal costs down. Nor is there an obvious mechanism that forces
taxpaying citizen-consumers to tell the truth about their rate of substitution)5
Charles Tiebout's model of regulatory competition purports to identify a
mechanism that satisfies the Samuelson condition, importing discipline to
government producers and matching citizen preferences to levels of public
goods provision and taxation) 6
 The mechanism is a market - a market for
public goods in which competing local governments seek to attract a customer
base of mobile taxpaying citizens.' 7
 Tiebout's model depicts citizen-voter
production. The provision of public goods, thus defined, economically justifies the
existence of government: Given free rider problems, their producers are unable to capture
some or all of their production cost, and they will be undersupplied absent a taxation
mandate. Assessment of a good's status as a public good entails examination of a range of
factors, such as the feasibility of exclusion, the properties of demand, and the costs and
distributional implications of individually-based supply. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON AND
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 486 (1980). See also Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 1954 REv. EC0N. & STAT. 387. In
this Article, the term 'public goods' includes (a) goods conventionally provided by local
government in addition to pure public goods, and (b) public services.
The free rider problem that comes up in the arena of collective political action mak
es it rational for citizens to misstate the level of their demand. See Paul Samuelson, The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 34 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). Demands will
be overstated or understated depending on the individual's projection of required payments.
For example, an actor will overstate his or her demand if the actor believes that the demand
leaves his or her level of payment unaffected, and the additional cost of providing the good
will fall on others. See Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 ECONOMETRICA 617
(1973).
6 Tiebout, supra note 13.
'' The model has been subsequently developed and refined. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan
& C.J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model,
J. PUB. ECON., Apr. 1972, at 25; WALLACE E. OATEs, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972);
William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in
Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLs 119 (Mills et al. eds,
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choices respecting local public goods in the context of a city resident contem-
plating a move to the suburbs and choosing among a number of towns.
The model's results depend on a series of assumptions:' 8 (a) there exists a
large number of communities, and the public goods offerings of each reflect
the full range of public goods available; (b) mobility is costless for all relocat-
ing actors, who choose a jurisdiction based on taxes and available public
goods; (c) perfect information is available respecting the public goods on offer
in all jurisdictions; (d) every jurisdiction has an optimal size, defined as the
number of residents for which the bundle of services can be produced at the
lowest average cost, (e) communities below the optimal size will seek to attract
new residents in order to reduce the average cost of providing services; and
(j there are no externalities, monopolies or spillover effects across jurisdic-
tions. We will see in Part II that the problems with the model's robustness
stem from the difficulty of relaxing these assumptions.
With the assumptions in place, the Tiebout model makes two assertions. First,
it claims a tie between citizen mobility and preference revelation and predicts
that locational decisions will reveal individual preferences for public goods and
levels of taxation. Rational forward-looking individuals, after surveying the
range of available choices, will act in accordance with their preferences for
location-specific bundles of public goods. Second, the model claims that this
preference revelation process leads to a market equilibrium. This local public
goods equilibrium will be established since, like producers of private goods
and services, local government units will compete with their public goods
offerings to attract in-migration. Competition between local governments thus
should be promoted because it will lead to an optimal balance between the
level of taxation and the provision of public goods.
2. Extension to Regulation
- The Tiebout model influenced its own field profoundly.' 9
 Public econom-
1975).
8 Among others. The model also assumes that the preferences of relocating actors are
not influenced by the presence or absence of employment opportunities.
' Somewhat contradictorily, it also supports a set of autonomy oriented policy prescri
ptions designed to enhance the chance that local level competition respecting public goods
production actually occurs. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 C0LUM. L. REV. 346, 403 (1990). Related arguments have been made
in legal discussions of local government and land use. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities
and HomeownersAssociations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1543-44(1982) (ownerassociati-
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ists have been producing formal models ofjurisdictional competition ever since
it appeared in 1956. But, as Part II of this Article will show, strategies for
dealing with the model's lack of robustness have been the primary concern
during the latter part of this period.
The original model has fared better in recent years on the interdisciplinary
playing field of law and economics, where the rigors of formalization are
relaxed and normative concerns predominate. In further contrast to model's
development in its home field, where it has remained closely tied to the study
of the production of local public goods, it has been applied in legal contexts
it to a broad range of subject matter. These extensions take the public goods
concept to govermnent's output of regulation in addition to its output of actual
goods and services. Under the expanded view, the public consumes and pays
for regulatory outcomes such as contract enforcement, clean air, safe products,
and stable labor relations. Government is just another producer in the overall
economy, and law is product.
The Tiebout model came to legal federalism early in the history of law and
economics. Local government law and associated real property topics were the
first applications. 20
 The extension to regulation then enabled the model's
application to corporate, 2 ' banking, 22
 and environmental law, 23
 with
ons); Been, supra note 11, at 543-44 (arguing against judicial scrutiny of land use
exactions). But see Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 844-45, 850, 857-58 (1992) (arguing that
municipalities have rent-extraction capacity despite competition).
20 See Note, Frederick T. Goldberg, Equalization of Municipal Services, The Economics
of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89, 89-105 (1972) (applying the Tiebout model to argue
against judicially imposed per capita equality in respect of public goods provision by local
government); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
247-65 (1975); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 506 & n. 404 (1977) (citing Tiebout as supporting ideal of
a variety of public goods).
21 See Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpor-
ation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977).
22 See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 1213 (1977).
23 See Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act,
62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 714-22 (1977) (hereinafter Stewart 1) (race-to-the-bottom view of
regulatory competition); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism
in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196,
1212 (1977) (same).
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antitrust24
 and product safety following soon thereafterY- The cumulated
applications26
 transformed federalism theory. 27 Jurisdictional competition
came to be acknowledged as a basic federalism value, 28
 joining the list of
more traditional concerns.29
24 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 23, 23-25 (1985).
See David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B. U.
L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1985).
26 The law as product field is still 'booming'. Carol M. Rose, Book Review, Takings,
Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE. L. J. 1121, 1133 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORYTAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)). Applications of the basic
law as product model to wholly new domestic topics continue to appear. For a recent
example, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line between Corporate Law and Corpor-
ate Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REv. 471 (1994) (suggesting that a variant of state charter
competition would be preferable to a federal bankruptcy regime).
27 The volume of applications to general federalism theory has increased notably in the
past few years. See, e.g., Weingast, supra note 6, at 5-6; Calabresi, supra note 8, at 776;
LeBoeuf, supra note 10, at 556.
28 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 76-91 (1995).
29 Such as diversity and participation, checks on central concentrations of power, and
republican values. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917,
918 (1985) (hereinafter, Stewart II).
After thus becoming a fixture on the landscape of American federalism, regulatory
competition expanded to venues world-wide. It has been brought to bear within other federal
systems, see Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L. J. 130, 150-51 (1991) (Canadian corporate law),
and quasi-federal systems, most notably in discussions on strategies for integration within
the European Union. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 126-36; Garard Hertig,
imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 177,
178 (1994) (applying the Tiebout model to support the point that mutual recognition is
superior to national treatment).
It also figures into 'globalization' discussions. Regulatory competition assertions
strengthen the case for new supra-national legal regimes that promote free trade. Then they
enable a neat volte face, prompting caution with respect to all other initiatives for trans-
national regulatory cooperation or coordination, while simultaneously supporting arguments
for national-level deregulation in response to global competition for investment capital and
global product-market competition. See Joel P. Trachtman, international Regulatory
Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 47, 48-49 (1993).
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3. Restatement as Legal Federalism's Race-to-the-Top
- Legal federalism uses the Tiebout model to make a general prediction about
the evolution of state and local regulation - the 'race-to-the-top' view. Two
steps are taken. First, state and local governmental actors are assumed to be
in intense competition for citizens, factors of production, and capital. Second,
the resulting description is assumed to lead to an equilibrium and fitted into
a Darwinian evolutionary framework. 3° Thus restated, the model promises
diverse menus of public goods that meet differing citizen tastes, 3 ' and an
efficient allocation of industrial activity among junior-level jurisdictions.32
It is predicted that in a dynamic environment, competitive forces should assure
that only efficient regulation remains in effect. 33
 Over time, then, the standard
of all regulation should rise. 34
 In contrast, centralization and its secondary
counterpart of coordination across junior units become the regulatory equival-
ents of price-fixing35
 and presumptively retard the competitive evolution of
first-best law. 36
 The proponent of central government intervention as the
solution to a problem must bear the burden of showing why the problem will
not be eliminated in due course by market forces.37
30 The race-to-the-top, as a legal paradigm, originated in commentary on US corporate
chartering system. Thus viewed, the market for corporate charters assures that efficient legal
structures evolve as the states respond to the demands of reincorporating corporate actors.
No intervention of the national government is called for. Winter, supra note 21, at 290.
' See Weingast, supra note 6, at 5.
32 Revesz, supra note 10, at 1221-22.
See Trachtman, supra note 29, at 65-66. See also Weingast, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing
that only those regulations for which citizens are willing to pay will survive). Cf. Richard
B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J.
2039, 2050 (1993) (hereinafter Stewart Ill) (arguing that trade policy should not be modified
for environmental concerns, and that present environmental regulation does not achieve its
purposes in a cost-beneficial manner).
Although presumably, a jurisdiction will proceed to add to the net regulatory burden
of its factors if the political benefits exceed the competitive costs. See Weingast, supra
note 6, at 6; Maura B. Perry, A Challenge Postponed: Market 2000 Complacency in
Response to Regulatory Competition for International Equity Markets, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
701, 706 (1994).
Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 127.
Or at least disrupts it. Revesz, echoing the insights of the tax competition literature,
see infra text accompanying notes 16 1-203, points out that preemptive central intervention
as to one subject matter need only cause competition to shift to another. Revesz, supra
note 10, at 1245-47.
See, e.g., Been, supra note 11, at 511 (local government law); Roberta Romano, The
Genius of American Corporate Law 19 (1993) (corporate law).
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Two universally recognized exceptions to this presumption favoring decen-
tralization should be noted. First, borders must be kept open if factor and
citizen mobility is bring competitive discipline to regulation. 38
 Authority to
suppress anticompetitive lawmaking must be vested at higher levels of govern-
ment, whether through a centralizing device such as the commerce clause of
the constitution or a coordinating institution such as the GATT or the NAFTA.
Second, externalities must be policed pursuant to economic theory's command
that the scope of regulation match the domain of its costs and benefits.39
Competing governments have an incentive to regulate so as to facilitate cross-
border cost externalization by their citizens. 4° The classic example occurs
when a jurisdiction makes an exception in its environmental law for a given
type of pollution knowing that prevailing winds will blow the permitted
particles across the border. Here, not only does the producer externalize a
cost, but those affected by the externality have no voice as to its regulation and
have not traded its sufferance for higher incomes. With externalities, multiple
jurisdictions can even race-to-the-bottom, and either of intervention by a higher
level unit or intergovernmental cooperation is justified to remedy the situ-
ation.4'
Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 129.
Id. at 127.
40 If a law is not cost beneficial but involves no externalities there is at least some local
incentive to change it; if the costs are externalized, there is no local incentive to make a
change. Product liability laws that favor locals are another example of this. Michael Schill,
Unformizy or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implica-
tions of Changing Financial Markets, 64 So. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1288 (1991).
' Stewart III, supra note 33, at 2098. The justification for federal intervention does
preclude criticism of the regulatory strategy actually implemented. See Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996)
(arguing that the Clean Air Act does not successfully force internalization of interstate
pollution externalities).
In recent years, choice of law behavior in products liability litigation has been argued
to present such a case. See Michael E. Solmine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of
Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 54 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law
Approach to Products Liability Reform, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (W. Olson
ed., 1988). McConnell recommends a mandatory federal conflicts rule keyed to the law of
the place of the sale. Id. Hay argues that the incentive picture is more complicated and
counsels caution respecting federalization. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State
Competition in the ProductLiability System, 80 GE0. L. J. 617-18, 651-52 (1992). See also
Gary T. Schwartz, Assessing the Adequacy of State Product Liability Lawmaking, YALE
L. & P0L'Y REv./YALE J. REG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 359, 365 (1996) (arguing that any
problem of state-level structural bias is not as serious as has been suggested); Thomas A.
Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two Assumptions About Federalism and Tort Reform,
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A third exception, for welfare and other redistributive policies, 42
 is widely
(if not universally)43
 acknowledged. Competing local governments have incen-
tives to encourage new investment and immigration by rich citizens and to
discourage immigration by poor citizens. It follows that a decentralized system
is likely to lead to a lower level of government-mandated wealth redistribution
than its citizens otherwise would prefer. Centralized welfare provision (or
central intervention to impose minimum welfare standards) thus is indicated.44
4. Ties to Related Devolutionary Theories - Social Choice and Public
Choice
- One sometimes hears jurisdictional competition theory referred to as a
branch of public choice theory. This reflects their common rational expecta-
tions methodology, common devolutionary recommendations, and common
opponents and proponents. But important analytical distinctions between the
two need to be recognized. As the discussion that follows shows, jurisdictional
competition theory makes a more heroic claim for devolutionary benefits than
does public choice theory. The discussion in Parts II and III will go on to show
that problems in making good on this claim leave jurisdictional competition
in a situation of tension with public choice theory.
YALE L. & P0L'Y REV./YALE J. RUG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 371, 373, 378 (showing that there
is no state-level bias). More generally, conflicts rules have been characterized as a part of
the juridical fabric of a competitive regime. Trachtman, supra note 29.
42 See OATES, supra note 17, at 6-8.
See LeBoeuf, supra note 10, at 579, which argues that, given limitations on mobility,
local governments will have room to redistribute (even as it argues that regulatory competi-
tion otherwise is a useful tool, without any apparent concern for the problem of limitations
on mobility).
See Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1499-1500 (1987); Stewart II, supra note 29, at 919-920, 925-26. See also Clayton P.
Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARv. L. REV.
946, 959-61 (1987), reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR AND DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG
SIDE OF THE TRACKS: REvOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY (1986) (pointing out that a disadvan-
taged class of poor people can be cut out of local interest group politics and arguing that
inequality of municipal services favoring the rich may be necessary as a bribe to keep them
from moving the suburbs).
An additional point is made. Since here regulation and the attendant politics come
down to a determination of cash amount, localized preference diversity presents a less
important value. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 965 (1992).
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The two theories' common opponent is the public interest theory of govern-
ment that prevailed in the early post-war era. Public interest theory emphasized
government's role as a benevolent maximizer of social welfare both in the
provision of traditional public goods and as an economic regulator. 45
 The
approach tended to signal centralization as the strategy that best realized the
public interest, particularly in the wake of a finding of a market failure. Given
a democratic political framework, centralization was not of itself deemed to
have dangerous properties. Any expansionary tendencies would be checked as
citizens expressed their preferences in the context of interest group competition
in the political process.46
Public choice proponents countered that the 'public interest' cannot be mean-
ingfully articulated in the first place, much less utilized as a template for
regulation. One support for this view came from the theory of social choice,
which asserts that the public interest does not emerge in political practice
because voting paradoxes prevent the emergence of a preference ordering for
public goods, and predicts that no technical adjustment of democratic processes
can solve the problem. 47
 Regulation, accordingly, does not embody a 'public
interest' in the sense of an aggregation of the preferences of the electorate.
Public choice theory goes on to account for the content of regulation as a
reflection of private interests. It asserts that actors rationally employ the
government and form groups to influence it. As risk averse lawmakers respond
to the dominant voices, lawmaking comes to follow the demand patterns of the
JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT AND JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCURE-
MENT AND REGULATION 476 (1993).
The introduction of public choice theory indirectly strengthened this association between
the public interest and centralized regulation. Olson's model of government capture
stipulates that smaller, better financed interest groups have an advantage when it comes to
influencing regulators because they can more easily surmount collective action problems.
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). This means that producer
interests have a structural advantage over interests and policy causes with more diffused
bases of support, such as labor, the environment, and, for that matter, free trade. The
movement of regulation to higher levels helps to redress the balance, by making possible
cost economies in the lobbying efforts of the dispersed interests.
Voting procedures in theory should aggregate individual preferences into a single
consistent preference. Arrow, following earlier theorists, identified a paradox which stated
that there is no single, transitive social preference. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); see also DONALD P. GREEN AND IAN SCHAPIRO,
FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE 7-8 (1994). See generally PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 55-56 (1986).
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interest groups. 48 This private rent-seeking activity prompts competition
among government actors (who occupy a monopolists' position respecting
scarce public goods)49
 to become rent distributors and receive interest group
favors. 50
 Deadweight social losses result.5'
At this point, the Tiebout model, with its competition-based local public goods
equilibrium, appears in the picture to offer a theoretical cure: 52 Since market
transactions are the most accurate allocators of resources, government should
be structured so that regulation arises not from discussion of the public interest
but from the responses of at-the-margin producers. Such a market-driven
lawmaking equilibrium also will solve the problem of preference aggregation
identified in social choice theory. To achieve it, regulatory authority must be
vested in junior level units. Increasing their jurisdiction expands opportunities
for competitive lawmaking.53
The Tiebout model's prescription of devolution of regulatory authority to
junior levels of government tracks a conclusion reached independently in
another line of public choice theory. Under this 'Leviathan' theory of govern-
ment, government actors, particularly those in central government, use their
monopolists' positions to pursue the objective of governmental revenue maxi-
Producers, in particular, are likely to seek to register demands on lawmakers, looking
for subsidies, import quotas, tariffs, price regulation, or government-created barriers to
entry, such as licensing requirements. George Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation,
2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 13-17 (1971).
Gillette, supra note 44, at 958-59.
5° James M. Buchanan, Rent-Seeking under External Diseconomies, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); R. D.
Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 579 (1982).
SI Under this social choice/public choice diagnosis of the infirmities of democratic
government, regulatory capture and excess government growth flourish when discourse
about the public interest prevails in lawmaking contexts. The rhetorical equilibrium conceals
the determinant rent-seeking. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 128.
More specifically, Tiebout's analysis was framed as a direct response to Samuelson's
conclusion, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, that individuals would not reveal their
preferences for public goods. The Tiebout model follows from the same behavioral assump-
tions as does public choice theory and shares its methodological preferences. See WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 288 (2d
ed. 1988) (commenting that race-to-the-bottom arguments tend to be informal and yield
indeterminate results concerning the effects of competition).
The revenue enhancement constraints that prompt competitive responses to citizen (and
customer) preferences are likely to be felt with more intensity at junior levels. ROMANO,
supra note 37, at 48.
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mization. 54 A positive relation obtains between the degree of centralization
and the size of government, measured in terms of the budget. Given the uncer-
tainties of majority rule cycling, the rational ignorance of voters, and confusion
amongst politicians, 55
 political controls will not be equal to the task of con-
taining government growth. Thus, the provision of public goods will reflect
not the utility level of the average taxpayer, but that of the expanding state.
Meanwhile, regulatory capture leads to bigger deadweight costs when authority
is exercised at higher levels of government. 56
 Decentralization thus is intrinsi-
cally beneficial because it reduces the scope of the central government monop-
oly and ameliorates the negative effects of regulatory capture.
An independent line of public economics also yields a devolutionary pre-
sumption, once again repeating the Tiebout model's bottom line. Under this
'decentralization theorem', given a public good consumed by geographical
subsets of the population (the production costs of which are equal as between
central or local provision), it is always at least as efficient and frequently more
efficient for local government to provide a locally determined output level than
for central government to provide a uniform level across all jurisdictions.57
More generally, decentralization narrows the variance in the distribution of
preferences, reduces the likelihood that preferences will be bundled, and
ameliorates some problems of asymmetric information. Regulation, thus
adapted to local conditions, is more likely to approach the ideal of consonance
with citizen preferences. 58
 At the same time, the reduction of the size of the
' GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 17-24 (1980).
Id.; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE
268 (1989).
56 Local authorities have less capacity to damage the economy. They cannot impose tariffs
and quotas on imports; their licensing arrangements have a limited reach; their limited
resources limit subsidies. Incentives to interest groups, accordingly, decrease as authority
vests in junior levels. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 127.
OATES, supra note 17, at 35 (1972). Although the point of origin is public economics,
the proposition has not been modelled. See ALBERT BRETON, CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRA-
LIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION 185 (1996).
The larger the number of jurisdictions, the larger the number of winners over the
number of losers. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 640.
An incidental cost-benefit also is suggested in the literature: Reconciliation of prefer-
ences through the political channels of dialogue and voting is costly, and these costs tend
to go up with the size of the polity. The larger the group the more heterogenous and the
larger the number of interactions. See ROBERT BISH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF METRO-
POLITAN AREAS 35-37 (1971); Briffault, supra note 19, at 402-3.
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regulating unit and resulting increase of the number of jurisdictional alterna-
tives59
 increases the chance that a diverse range of preferences will come to
be manifested in regulation promulgated by one or another jurisdiction. The
localized experimentation thus fostered6° makes possible the appearance of
a range of regulatory strategies, while simultaneously limiting the negative
impact of unsuccessful experiments.6'
In these combined public choice/public economics stories, then, decentraliz-
ation leads to two benefits - responsiveness to citizen preferences and product
innovation - whether or not it also precipitates an outbreak of competition.
The addition of jurisdictional competition theory materially strengthens the case
in two ways. First, it predicts a first-best equilibrium given junior-level regula-
tion. This means that not only are preferences statistically more likely to be
satisfied at the junior level, as the decentralization theorem asserts, but that
they will be satisfied on an ongoing basis even given changing conditions. This
prediction gives regulatory competition claims a potent role in policy debates.
Given a complex cost-benefit comparison of central and junior-level regulatory
alternatives, it amounts to a trump card for decentralization. Indeed, it purports
to rpeempt the whole cost-benefit discussion.
Jurisdictional competition theory makes its second contribution as a rebuttal
to the argument that devolution simply turns regulatory subject matter over to
the distortive manipulations of state and local interest groups. The disciplinary
effect of competition across localities and states minimizes losses stemming
from these local capture arrangements. Given mobility of people, factors of
production, and capital, the imposition of costly and restrictive interest group
legislation in one jurisdiction benefits a neighboring jurisdiction with a less
costly regime. As the factors vote with their feet, they affect the incentives of
lawmakers - inefficient wealth transfers to favored groups become less attract-
ive than regulations that enhance the wealth of the larger population.
BRETON, supra note 57, at 8. Social tastes and preferences differ, and the differences
tend to correlate with geography. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 775. Smaller units also are
more likely to contain populations with majority preferences that depart from majority
preference of the population of the larger unit. McConnell, supra note 41, at 1498.
60 ROMANO, supra note 37, at 4-5. See also McConnell, supra note 44, at 1498.
61 For a larger governmental unit, small-scale experimentation of this sort is a difficult
undertaking. Even the choice of a venue presents a problem. LeBoeuf, supra note 10, at
555, 562.
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B. The Debate in Legal Federalism: The Race-to-the-Top Versus the
Race-to-the-Bottom
The jurisdictional competition paradigm crosses the barrier that separates the
public and private spheres to recast the public side in private sector terms. The
legal federalism debate over the paradigm focuses on the legitimacy of this
move. Opponents answer that competitive government actors will lose sight
of their public mission and thereby 'race-to-the-bottom' •62
To see this race-to-the-bottom perspective, consider how a proponent of a
public interest approach to regulation would respond to the race-to-the-top
story. From a public interest perspective, dismantling federal regulations to
encourage junior-level competition amounts to a betrayal of the public trust.
With competition, the content of regulation and the level of public goods and
taxation are dictated by the private preferences of a narrow, arbitrarily ident-
ified class of itinerant at-the-margin consumers, instead of following from a
dispassionate and responsible calculation of the public welfare. The individual
jurisdiction, forced to cater to their preferences, loses its ability to pursue its
notion of the best interests of the citizens committed to remain within it for
the long term. At the same time, the disaggregated groups of states and
localities lose the technical ability to regulate multistate businesses, with the
mere threat of disinvestment sufficing to get firms what they want.63
This race-to-the-bottom picture shares an important point with its race-to-the-
top opposite - both assume that government actors are in intense competition
for citizens, factors, and capital. But here the race goes downwards because
competition forces the pursuit of policies farther and farther removed from the
public interest. The characterization invites the remedy of preemptive central-
ization. If a race must go to the bottom, then the regulatory subject matter
should be removed to a higher level of government whether or not competition
presently determines the content of regulation at junior levels. This argument
is best known as a justification for the federalization of environmental law.
62 See generally Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in the Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, YALE
L. & P0L' y
 REv./YALE J. REG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 67, 74-75 (1996) (providing a useful
typology of race-to-the-top and race-top-the-bottom argumentation).
See Stewart II, supra note 29, at 919. Stewart also notes that even assuming that state
and local taxes are not the primarily factor in firms' locational decisions, states reasonably
might worry that taxes might matter at the margin. Id. at 949.
Stewart I, supra note 23.
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The environmental law literature also contributes a restatement of the race-to-
the-bottom position in economic terms. It is said that, without centralization
competition for production factors and capital would leave the states in a
prisoners' dilemma respecting environmental standards. 65
 Each state would
be deterred from promulgating standards at its preferred level of strictness by
the threat of a loss of production factors to a defecting competing state. The
more intense the competition for factors, the greater the disparity between the
level of environmental protection in the public interest and that evolving in
practice. 66
This prisoners' dilemma analysis recently has been rebutted by proponents of
jurisdictional competition. The prisoners' dilemma set up, they say, operates
on a set of heroic assumptions. It depends on the presence of fixed preferences
for strict regulation across many jurisdictions, with each believing that the
subject matter should not be one for cost-benefit tradeoffs. Competition for
factors and capital and collective action problems then undermine the juris-
dictions' ability to adhere to the stated policy, and we end up with a sub-
optimal result. 67
 A more realistic set up, say the critics, would depict the
situation differently: In a world of scarce resources, cost-benefit tradeoffs
between levels of regulation and income are inevitable; no a priori fixed
preference for a given level of regulation should be assumed. Without fixed
preferences across jurisdictions, higher payoffs through cooperation cannot be
assumed and a prisoners' dilemma is not inevitable. 68
 While it is in theory
Id.
Furthermore, given a large number of states, the transaction costs of collective action
prevent coordination. The prisoners' dilemma accordingly ripens into a commons dilemma.
For additional applications of this line of thinking, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Adminis-
trative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Adminis-
trative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1194 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 505 (1985). Revesz restates
the prisoners' dilemma account in a two-party framework, showing that where a player has
two strategies, lax and strict, a suboptimal lax strategy will strongly dominate the optimal
stringent strategy. Revesz, supra note 10, at 1216-17, 1229-32. The suboptimal lax strategy
is a unique equilibrium and will always be selected. See generally FUDENBERG AND TIROLE,
supra note 45, at 9-10. In the absence of cooperation or centralization, then, the outcome
is Pareto-inferior.
Note also, that given 50 states, co-operation through mutual forbearance is unlikely
to evolve even given infinite repetition of the game. Hay, supra note 41, at 625-26.
67 Revesz, supra note 10, at 1219-24.
LeBoeuf offers a different formulation of the point. He notes that a state that imposes
anti-pollution legislation transfers wealth away from industry to those who value a clean
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possible that absolute, normatively-based preferences, whether for stricter
environmental rules or some other form of regulation, could exist across
jurisdictions, this is asserted to be very unlikely as a practical matter.69
The race-to-the-top side now has the better of the discussion. The result is that
where the race-to-the-top and the race-to-the-bottom once competed for atten-
tion as paradigmatic opposites of apparently equal strength, we now tend to
see a general presumption in competition's favor. 70
 This result is said to
follow from economic theory: Regulatory competition pursuant to the Tiebout
environment. If the redistributive move embodied in the legislation is Kaldor-Hicks superior,
then the state can make a second redistributive move (a tax break, for example) that
compensates industry for the cost of compliance, and still be ahead on a net basis in the
end. If the state does not make the second redistributive move, it presumably prefers the
redistributive result of the anti-pollution legislation. If the state enacts no anti-pollution
legislation, its residents presumably do not wish to pay the price in terms of lost capital
investment. Federal intervention is, accordingly, redistributive. LeBoeuf, supra note 10,
at 578, 589-90.
Stewart III, supra note 33, at 2058-59. See also Howse & Trebilcock, supra note, at
77; Giandomenico Majone, Market Integration and Regulation: Europe After 1992, EUR.
U. INST. WORKING PAPER 91/10, 23 (1991); Konstantine Gatsios & Paul Seabright,
Regulation in the European Community, 5 OxioRD REV. ECON. P0L. 37, 42-43 (1989).
Majone and Gastios and Seabright both assert that the fact that there could be a prisoners'
dilemma at the international level does not of itself provide a sufficient justification for a
delegation of regulatory authority to a supra-national level. Meanwhile, a prisoners'
dilemma characterization remains structurally appropriate where the motivation for the
dominant strategy entails a negative externality. See Hay, supra note 41, at 625-26.
70 A recent competition-favorable statement from a once-prominent voice on the race-to-
the-bottom side, signals the shift. See Stewart Ill, supra note 33, 2079-82. See also Revesz,
supra note 10. A similar movement can be seen in European commentary. See Majone,
supra note 69, at 23; Gastios & Seabright, supra note 69, at 37, 42-43.
The degree of acceptance of competition as a regulatory tool can be indirectly
confirmed by reference to commentaries that avoid denunciations of competition even as
they postulate gains from centralization or coordination. Here centralized regulation instead
is advocated as the means to the end of harmonized regulatory standards that bring cost
efficiencies. See Stewart III, supra note 33, at 2043-44; David Charny, Competition Among
Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the 'Race
to the Bottom' in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 426 (1991).
National governments even have been seen racing against one another to provide regulation
that benefits consumers. Joel R. Paul, Competitive and Non-Competitive Regulatory Markets.'
The Regulation of Packaging in the EU, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION
AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 353 (William W. Bratton, et al., eds. 1996) (hereinafter INT'L REGULA-
TORY COMPETITION).
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framework has survived critical theoretical inspection, while the race-to-the-
bottom counter has not.7'
The Figure summarizes the components of the race-to-the-bottom and the race-
to-the-top views. It does so for the record only. Succeeding Parts of this
Article will show that the new economics of jurisdictional competition super-
sedes this framework of discussion.
Revesz, supra note 10, at 1212.
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
	
189
FIGURE
REGULATORY COMPETITION - THE BINARY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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II. THE TIEBOUT MODEL'S EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS
The Tiebout model's shortcomings are well known to economists. This point
has been acknowledged many times in legal scholarship, 72 sometimes along
with a bill of particular theoretical and practical problems. 73 Even so, in this
72 See e.g., Shaviro, supra note 44, at 964 (costly exit); Briffault, supra note 19, at 427
(externalities and jurisdictional size); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the
Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory,
74 VA. L. REV. 471, 506 (1988) (mobility and information costs); Stewart II, supra note
29, at 923, 927 (limited mobility); Rice, supra note 25, at 54-55 (mobility and number of
jurisdictions); Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1552 (mobility); Goldberg, supra note 20, at 98-
108 (optimal size, mobility, externalities).
Most of the serious arbitrage exercises occur in this areas of local government and real
property law - the subject matter closest to that of public economics. See Been, supra note
11; Briffault, supra note 19, at 399-403; Gillette, supra note 44, at 955-62; Ellickson, supra
note 19, at 1547-49, 1552; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 98-108. The exception is Revesz,
supra note 10 (environmental law).
These discussions acknowledge that the Tiebout model has encountered difficulties in
its home field. But they address themselves in terms only to narrow questions. They thereby
avoid confronting the negative implications of the model's sticking points and ultimately
they reinforce its robust appearance in legal contexts. Been, passim, at 511-39, writes in
terms only of land use. But she does a thorough review of the public economics. In
endorsing the Tiebout model, she relies on the conclusions of the body of empirical studies.
Id., at 5 1-6-17 & nn. 203-204. We draw a different conclusion. See infra notes 147-159
and accompanying text.
Revesz, passim, reevaluates the robustness of the Tiebout model in the context of
environmental law, making extensive references to public economics literature in so doing.
He endorses the Tiebout model, id. at 1242-44, but only for the limited purpose of refuting
the race-to-the-bottom assertion and asserting that regulatory competition is theoretically
consistent with the maximization of social welfare. His evaluation, accordingly, does not
address the parallel questions about the race-to-the-top that we ask here: (a) Whether
decentralized organization presumptively imports regulation shaped by the operation of
competitive forces, and (b) whether competition, once operative, presumptively takes us
to a first-best regulatory equilibrium. Oddly, Revesz draws extensively, id. at 1238-1246,
on a tax competition model that shows that Tiebout-type regulatory competition respecting
environmental regulation cannot be expected to result in a first-best equilibrium. See
Wallace E. Oates & Robert Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. POL. EC0N. 333 (1988). For our discussion of
the implications of this model, see infra notes 258-271 and accompanying text.
We also note that interdisciplinary scholars have made cutting-edge contributions to
the economics of regulatory competition. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of
Local Government: Exit, Voting, and the Land Market, 6 J. URBAN ECON. 319, 333 (1979);
see also Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.
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case the process of intellectual arbitrage from economics to law has been
sticky. 74
 Mention of the model's infirmities rarely ripens into acknowledg-
ment of their negative implications for legal federalism's economic presump-
tion in favor of decentralization. 75
 The assumption appears to be that the
L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 233-65 (1985) (empirical study on charter competition). Two
outstanding category-specific refutations of regulatory competition arguments also should
be mentioned. Hay, supra note 41 (refuting in detail claim of race-to-the-bottom in common
law of product liability); Sterk, supra note 19 (questioning the existence of competitive
constraints on land use exactions).
' There has been a failure to retrieve and assimilate past analysis of Tiebout problematics
even from within the law reviews. Cautions and caveats, once entered, see, e.g., Ellickson,
supra note 19, 1553, 1554 (commenting that the model 'drastically oversimplifies' the
'elusive reality' of metropolitan organization), are promptly forgotten. As already noted
it is well-known within the legal literature, for example, that the Tiebout model cannot be
directly applied to the real world because its assumptions never have been successfully
relaxed in the subsequent economic literature. It is less well-known that one commentator,
Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook, paused to note that the bundle of Tiebout model
assumptions can be redeployed as a tool for sorting out legal subject matter ill-suited to
application of the model. See Easterbrook, supra note 24 at 34-35 (fact sensitive standard
for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate subject matter). See also Rice, supra note
25 at 54-55 (same). The commentary in question has only rarely been cited for that
cautionary point, and it has not become the custom to conduct a preliminary suitability
evaluation of each topic. Nor does one find suitability standards set out in the existing
typologies of regulatory competition situations. See Revesz, supra note 10, at 1247-53;
Trachtman, supra note 29, at 59-60. We think that even minimal fidelity to the economics
requires that Easterbrook's suitability standard not only re-enter the discourse, but be
considerably tightened up in the process.
Given a literature thus constituted, it is unsurprising that clearly erroneous applications
of the theory show up. For a definitive rebuttal of one such suggestion, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in
Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447 (1995) (considering and rejecting
regulatory competition as a justification for a proposal circulated in securities law that
consolidation of overlapping regulation of derivative and other products by federal banking,
commodities, and securities agencies would be a bad idea because the prevailing system
implicates beneficial interagency regulatory competition). Cf Henry N. Butler and Jonathan
R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 C0RNELLL. REV. 677,
707-12 (1988) (drawing on public choice theory to refute argument that federal banking
agency competes with state agencies for bank incorporations).
It is not uncommon to mention that serious difficulties attend the model and then
proceed immediately to apply it. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10, at 561; Schill, supra note
40, at 1294-96; Easterbrook, supra note 24 at 34-35 (arguing that application of the model
is appropriate given mobility, a large number of jurisdictions, and no externalities). It also
has been reasoned that the existence of a market can be inferred despite imperfections from
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model, although problematic as to particulars, retains robustness in its broader
outline. This assumption is not safe. The model's robustness has been sharply
and successfully contested within its own field, causing it to emerge in a
narrower, more tentative form. The terms and implications of this discourse
have not been appreciated in the legal literature. We seek to complete this
stalled arbitrage exercise in this and the following Part of this Article.
Recall that the Tiebout model depends on a long list of assumptions when it
asserts that competitive forces determine the shape of regulation at junior levels
of government and sets regulation on an evolutionary path to a first-best
equilibrium. 76
 This Part shows what happens to the model when these
assumptions undergo relaxation in the ordinary course of testing for robustness.
Scrutiny begins with the most important assumption on the Tiebout list - that
there exists a large number of communities each of which actively seeks an
optimal population - and shows that this assumption conceals an insuperable
practical problem and a devasting theoretical problem. The practical problem
is that the model envisions a dynamically changing population of political
subdivisions that bears not the slightest resemblance to the jurisdictions of the
real world. The theoretical problem is that the model yields one of two results
when stated formally77
 - nonequilibrium or unstable equilibrium. It as a
result lacks real world predictive value. Additional frictions envelop the model
upon relaxation of its assumptions respecting externalities, mobility, informa-
tion, and entrepreneurial incentives. As these points of friction are acknowl-
edged, the list of exceptions to legal federalism's devolutionary presumption
gets so long as to be fatally destabilizing.
The process of scrutiny supports two conclusions. First, the economic theory
of federalism should be uncoupled from a general presumption in favor of
devolution. This is because junior-level regulation does not necessarily lead
to competitively-driven lawmaking, and, even when it does, the competition
does not necessarily produce regulation that meets consumer preferences.
Second, inspection of the economic model's infirmities highlights opportunities
for gain through centralization or coordination. The complexity of the resulting
picture implies that a positive theory of jurisdictional competition should even-
handedly address the desirability of both vesting and divesting central or
coordinating authority.
the 'possibility of relocation'. Wyeth, supra note 8, at 92 n. 10. One exception to all of
this is Macey, supra note 72 at 507 ('the traditional argument that jurisdictional competition
leads to the production of public goods appears to be overstated').
76 See supra text accompanying note 18.
" Tiebout, supra note 13, in fact does not state a formal model.
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A. Bundling, Pricing and Optimal Numbers
The Tiebout model's problems begin with the Samuelson condition for efficient
of supply of local public goods. 78
 Carried out to its logical conclusion, it
requires that individuals sort themselves among different jurisdictions so that
homogeneity of demand results in each. 79
 Such individual sorting turns out
to be hard to effect. Where private goods tend to be produced and sold separ-
ately, public goods tend to be jointly produced and made available on a
bundled basis. They are not individually priced. Similarly, regulation tends
to apply across the board. Public goods and regulations, then, typically come
in complex packages. Furthermore, the complex packages influence the choices
of consumers who display greater heterogeneity than those in standard product
markets.80
See supra text accompanying note 15.
Assuming that all residents pay equal taxes. A mixed community is said to be per se
inefficient because public goods provision therein responds to an average of at least two
types of demand. See Daniel Rub infeld, The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 582 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein, eds., 1987).
Rubinfeld asks whether the heterogeneity results change if we introduce a Lindahl
taxation scheme (defined below) where the tax paid per unit is equal to the marginal benefit
from the public good at a given level of provision. But the Tiebout mechanism fails to
achieve efficiency here: Even though each type of individual, by moving to a jurisdiction
with equal tax, increases her welfare, it makes more sense to redistribute income and not
force overconsumption of public goods. Id. at 582-83.
Rubinfeld also suggests that this argument can be extended to instances where there
are large numbers of individuals who differ in terms of income and tastes. He asserts that
given optimal numbers of communities and costless mobility, the tax system will be
nondistorting; hence there would be an equilibrium which might be efficient. The difficulties
with this scenario lie with the standard list of Tiebout mechanism problematics.
Lindahl was concerned with how to set public spending such that all consumers agree
unanimously. He defined government in terms of an auction. When setting tax levels for
public goods, the government would offer a tax rate to the consumers who would correspon-
dingly respond with a different shares reflecting their level of spending. New shares are
again issued by government (reflecting the preferences of different consumers). The Lindahl
process continues until unanimity is reached (a Lindahl price is one which everyone has
agreed to). This mechanism has been formalized. See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note
14, at 509-512.
° Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Local Government, I PERsP. ON LOC. PUB. FIN. & PUB. POL'Y 23
(1983). Heterogeneity of preferences occurs not only across populations but within given
individuals over time. The citizen who prioritizes school expenditures at one stage of her
life later on may prefer expenditures for senior citizens. For this citizen the Tiebout model
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The Tiebout model's analytical solution to this problem of complex supply and
demand lies in the dissatisfied citizen's move to a community that meets her
preferences. So long as the number of jurisdictions is large enough to meet
every set of preferences, bundling will not prevent preference satisfaction
(given costless mobility and complete information). 8 ' The problem is that the
model achieves this analytical solution by assuming it with its stipulations that
each jurisdiction has an optimal size and that a large number of jurisdictions
offer a large range of public goods and services.
These two assumptions have a notable interplay. Competition for a large
number of public goods presupposes a large number of jurisdictions. Each
additional public good raises the number of jurisdictions required. In dynamic
conditions, new jurisdictions will have to be frictionlessly formed to meet new
demand for particular public goods packages. How many jurisdictions would
it take to bring about this first-best result? As the number of public goods
becomes very large, the number of jurisdictions must equal the population of
individuals. 82
 The analytical result, then, is that optimal competitive govern-
mental structure can be achieved only in an atomistic universe in which the
number of jurisdictions matches the number of individuals and firms. Such a
universe is a theoretical spontaneous order in which trading markets effect all
regulatory adjustments. The advantages of regulatory competition are maxi-
mized in this environment: Individual preferences and governmental actions
are in identity; diversity is complete; interest group capture of government
cannot occur. 83
 Last, but not least, the bundling problem is solved: In this
implies a move to another community (or requires that the preferences of eveiy member
of the citizen's community change simultaneously). [Public Finance and Public Choice} 303.
' Note that as the venue moves from the local level to the state and national level, the
application of the model becomes less and less plausible. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 25 at
54-55.
82 See MUELLER, supra note 55, at 157; see also ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14,
at 528-29.
Interestingly, if a sufficient number of such jurisdictions were formed to bring us to
a first-best world of matched preferences, the idea of interjurisdictional competition would
lose much of its force. BRETON, supra note 57, at 230. In this world all incoming residents
share the preferences of the incumbents; all outgoing residents by definition have non-
matching preferences and target a preexisting matching jurisdiction. Although the sorting
process may be incomplete, there remains no need for new competitive initiatives from
government. Competition need not be involved even in the case of movement into a
jurisdiction with a suboptimally low population. That jurisdiction may indeed have an
incentive to compete. But, given a reservoir of jurisdictions containing too many residents,
it may not need to do so in order to reach optimal size, given complete information and
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one-on-one world, public goods in effect are private goods.84
Such a spontaneous order, while theoretically attractive to many, is not feas-
ible. 85
 Given different scale economies for different public goods, some
minimum jurisdictional size will be implicated in the production of each.
Beyond the problem of minimum size86
 lies the problem of optimal size.87
costless mobility. Even if inducements to move have to be offered to residents of the
overcrowded jurisdictions, no competitive response by those jurisdictions will follow. Id.
at 231.
See Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures,
49 ECONOMETRICA 713, 713 (1981).
Other, less thorough-going cases of spontaneous order can be mentioned. See, e.g.,
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law And Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1391-95 (1996) (suggesting leaving the development of regulation
in cyberspace to spontaneous order by analogy to the medieval law merchant). See also
Edmund Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Market and Public Choice, 6 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1982).
This point has been expressed formally. Stiglitz offers the example of two communities
which could be formed with equal number of two types of person except for their prefer-
ences. In this model, there are three public goods and two utility functions. If two separate
communities are formed, each will produce the preferred public good; however, if the
community is merged, the third public good could be produced and as a result individuals
will enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. There are, of course, potentially diminishing
returns to scale, but Stiglitz argues that in most circumstances people will be better off.
Joesph Stiglitz, Theory of Local Public Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SERVICES
(Martin Feldstein & Robert Inman, eds., 1977). See also Bewley, supra note 84, at 717-18.
87 This condition has been described in economic theory: Under the 'theory of clubs'
optimal size is a function of the marginal gains that population increases bring to existing
residents. See James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 12
(1965). But, significantly, practical application of this theory brings a confrontation with
sticking points that parallel those impairing the Tiebout model - each of externalities and
spillovers, heterogenous citizen preferences, heterogenous public goods, income discre-
pancies, and citizen mobility cause problems. Id. at 300. Club models and local public
goods models should be distinguished. Although club models are concerned with the
provision of local public goods, they focus on the pricing of externalities arising from
production within a group. Theoretical and empirical work on clubs concentrates on the
conditions under which a competitive equilibrium emerges in a club economy. In a club
economy it is possible, given a broad assumptions, to generate a competitive (or price-
taking) equilibrium. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Public Goods and the Invisible Hand, in
MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 94 (John Quibley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994). In club
models the consumer pays a fixed entry cost. In contrast, in local public goods models,
assuming taxation of real estate, the entry cost can be adjusted by consuming less land or
housing, making it much more difficult to structure a competitive equilibrium. See infra
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Even if an optimal size could be ascertained as a practical matter, it will be
a size so large as to undercut the provision of the large number of jurisdictions
Tiebout model requires. 88
 Finally, if we put optimal numbers to one side and
look at the real world, we see that both the size and number of jurisdictions
will be determined by a path-dependent process of geographical and political
evolution. Any jurisdictional competition by means of the Tiebout mechanism,
accordingly, can support only second-best efficiency claims.89
B. Nonequilibrium and Unstable Equilibrium
1. The Problem
- The problem presented by the Tiebout model's assumed optimal numbers
can be stated in formal economic terms. These presentations show that from
the point of view of economic theory, the Tiebout model's principal short-
coming is its failure to display the properties of a general competitive equilib-
rium except under an even more restrictive set of assumptions. This short-
coming denudes the model of predictive capacity.
a. None quilibrium
- Let us relax the Tiebout model's assumption of an infinite number of
jurisdictions. That is, the number of types of citizens is greater than the
number of available jurisdictions - there are, say, two jurisdictions and three
evenly-distributed types of resident. On these numbers, no matter how keenly
the two governments compete, it is easy to see that someone always will be
dissatisfied and have an incentive to form a new jurisdiction in order to be
better off. The result is no equilibrium.90
A Tiebout equilibrium has been demonstrated in a model assuming a finite
number of jurisdictions, but only given some additional assumptions. This
model assumes that there are multiple localities in a finite number, that resident
votes determine government policy, and that there are two goods, one public,
one private. 9 ' In addition, there is a continuum of individual types, each of
which is ranked according to their marginal rates of substitution between the
text accompanying notes 90-111.
88 Id. at 302.
89 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Comment on Suzanne Scotchrner, in MODERN PUBLIc
FINANCE 121 (John Quibley & Eugene Smolensky, eds., 1994).
9° See Bewley, supra note 84, at 721.
91 This assures that the residents choice is between more or less public goods, avoiding
social problems.
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public good and the private good. 92
 The model shows that for any exogenous
positive integer M there exists a Nash equilibrium 93
 with M jurisdictions.94
The trick lies in the way the model sets up consumer preferences - they are
single-peaked, a very strong assumption. The equilibrium is lost if this assump-
tion is relaxed.95
This analysis leaves us with the first of two strenuous requirements for an
optimal public goods outcome under jurisdictional competition - consumers
must be presented with a range of choices large enough to include the optimal
package for each type of consumer.96
Frank Westhoff, Existence of Equilibria in Economies With a Local Public Good, 14
J.ECON. THEORY 84 (1977).
A Tiebout equilibrium conceivably can be formulated in two different ways: It could
be either a Nash equilibrium in which no single individual wishes to join an already existing
jurisdiction, or a more demanding equilibrium in which there exists no group of individuals
that can make each of its members better off by forming a new jurisdiction. Joseph Green-
berg & Shlomo Weber, Strong Tiebout Equilibrium under Restricted Preferences Domain,
38 J. ECON. THEORY 101, (1986). Westhoff shows the first, less demanding equilibrium
on the assumption of a continuum of individuals. However, the second, more demanding
notion of equilibrium presents more difficulties. Id.
See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 544-46.
See Bewley, supra note 84, at 727. Nonequilibrium may be the result in cases of
myopic majority voting. See Westhoff, supra note 92, at 85-90; ATKINSON AND STIGLITZ,
supra note 14, at 544-46. See also James Buchanan & Charles Goetz, Efficiency Limits of
Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PuB. ECON. 25, 28-29 (1972).
Epple, Filimon, and Romer add that Westhoff, investigating the model's properties,
was pessimistic about the prospects for developing a model in which a unique stable
equilibrium exists - the model derives a stable equilibrium only when there are multiple
equilibria, and a unique equilibrium always will be unstable. Dennis Epple, Radu Filimon,
and Thomas Romer, Equilibrium Among Local Jurisdictions: Towards an Integrated
Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 281(1984). Epple, Filimon
and Romer themselves take the position that while the difficulty of relaxing the mobility
assumption is fatal to most theorizing about local public goods, a unique public goods
equilibrium can exist in limited situations. Id. at 283. More specifically, they argue that
an equilibrium level of housing can result where consumers select the amount of housing
and vote for the level of public goods provision, where there are restrictions on preferences
and the technology of the public goods supplied. Id. at 307.
Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 121. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of
Local Government: Exit, Voting and the Land Market, 6 J. URBAN ECON. 319 (1979); Frank
Westhoff, Policy lnferencesfrom Community Choice Models:A Caution, 6 J. URBAN ECON.
535 (1979). It could be added that within each homogenous community, the cost per resident
of each public good must be the minimum. See Susan Schotchmer & Myrna Holtz Wooders,
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b. Unstable equilibrium
- Tiebout's depiction of optimization through the attraction of new residents
implies a normative assertion that migration should be encouraged. And, in
theory, increases in mobility increase economic welfare by increasing allocative
income. 97 But mobility also entails spillovers with negative implications for
economic welfare.
To see this, assume that a number of jurisdictions provide the same public
good for two types of resident, one type high income and the other low
income. Assume also that demand for the good is income elastic and positively
correlated with demand for real property, and that jurisdictions finance produc-
tion of the good with a flat-rate property tax. The high and low income types
thus consume the public good at different marginal rates of substitution. Here
is the question: If we proceed to make the assumptions of the Tiebout model,
will high and low income types sort themselves into homogenous jurisdictions,
yielding a first-best equilibrium?
The answer is no. To see this, assume that such sorting does occur between
t=O and t=1 so that at t=1 all low income types reside in low income juris-
dictions and high income types in high income jurisdictions. This equilibrium
will be unstable. Between t=1 and t=2 low incomes types will have an
incentive to migrate to the high income jurisdictions. There they can consume
smaller properties, paying lower taxes than the high income types and nonethe-
less enjoy the same, higher level of public goods. Yet high income types will
have no incentive to migrate to low income jurisdictions since they will obtain
less public goods with little tax savings. 98 More generally, given egalitarian
access to public goods in each locality and the payment of different levels of
real estate tax based on income-based preferences for consumption of real
estate, the provision of the public goods will result in wealth redistribution,
Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies With Anonymous Crowding, 34
J. PUB. ECON. 159, 162 (1987).
Factor movements are normally a basis for efficiency gains. PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 20-27 (1990) (hereinafter KRUGMAN 1). Krugman,
writing in the context of international economics, has demonstrated that labor generally
increases its income by moving from one region to another. PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PEDDLING
PROSPERITY 184 (1994) (hereinafter Krugman H). The gains from this out-migration more
than compensate the labor that remains; but payment of such compensation to the labor that
remains does not always occur.
98 Even if an equilibrium existed, it is likely that there will be high levels of externalities.
See Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 123.
With an income tax, even one without progressive rates, a redistribution still benefits
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a result the high income types do not prefer)°° The built in inducement of
low income migration thus makes any equilibrium unstable)°'
This spillover problem can be solved if jurisdictions have the discretion to
select their residents. Any of number of policy devices can effect such a result.
The solution does of course sacrifice the Tiebout model's full mobility assump-
tion. But it does in theory make it possible to derive a stable equilibrium.
A model by Hamilton makes the formal showing.'° 2 The model assumes, (a)
that the housing supply is perfectly elastic; (b) that residents within each
jurisdiction have homogenous preferences for public goods; (c) that residents
are perfectly mobile; (d) that local governments offer a diverse range of tax
and expenditure measures to satisfy all preferences; and, critically, (e) that
each jurisdiction has a zoning ordinance requiring each resident to consume
a stated quantity of housing, with the stated quantity varying from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. The zoning ordinance builds in a price mechanism. This follows
because the ordinance keeps out poor residents who would consume smaller,
cheaper houses and thereby gain a surplus of public goods benefits over taxes
paid. At the same time, rich residents who desire to consume an amount of
housing larger than the jurisdictional minimum will move on to a jurisdiction
poorer residents. To see this, assume a flat income tax of 20 percent. Preferences for the
public goods exchanged for the tax will vary depending on the income level of the taxpayer.
Presumably, the redistributive effect is a benefit to poorer taxpayers. The opposite could
be the case if the jurisdiction imposed a poll tax. Whatever the tax system, open to access
to public goods will be redistributive.
Of course, some income redistribution does occur under the auspices of local govern-
ment. It is possible hypothesize how a modest amount of this could accord with the
preferences of high income types. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 472-79.
In addition, too much migration to a single target jurisdiction can entail externalities
and result in a suboptimal equilibrium characterized by crowding-out. The Tiebout model's
other assumptions - that movement by one individual has no effect on the welfare of other
individuals, and that, given the presence of public goods, an additional resident benefits the
target community - foreclose any possibility of this problem. MUELLER, supra note 55,
at 157. But neither assumption seems to be plausible as a general proposition.
A converse condition of suboptimality could arise where a locality directs itself to the
attraction of new residents through public goods competition. Governments seeking to attract
in-migration risk the progressive lowering of taxation to the point at which revenues are
unable to finance the public goods package. Stephen Woolcock, Competition Among Rules
in The Single European Market in INT'L REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 70.
Suboptimal allocations of public goods result.
102 Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System ofLocal Governments,
12 URBAN STUD. 205 (1975).
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with a minimum zoning requirement that equals their housing preference. This
way they avoid paying higher than average taxes that would confer a public
goods benefit on other residents. Thus does the ordinance force each resident
to pay an equal share for the jurisdiction's public goods, becoming the func-
tional equivalent of a nondistortionary head tax.'°3
The Hamilton model removes the instability caused by the free movement of
residents of different income levels across jurisdictions, and thereby yields an
equilibrium. Here citizen mobility leads to an efficient result, because citizens
are precluded from adjusting their property consumption level in response to
the property tax levels within a given jurisdiction. To adjust, they must move.
The problem with model lies in its long and unrealistic set of assumptions.'°4
It makes little sense to assume, as the model does, that communities are
homogenous both in terms of demand for local public goods and housing, or
that there is an exact correlation between housing tastes and income. The
model also joins the Tiebout model in demanding a number of communities
large enough to match the tastes of all individuals for both housing and public
goods consumption)°5
 Finally, and just as critically, the model tolerates no
political bias favoring old residents over newcomers. Such a bias, often present
in the real world, leads to strategic zoning and tax appraisal regimes designed
to force newcomers to pay a greater than pro rata share of public goods cost,
destroying the equilibrium)06
In sum, there emerges a second strenuous condition for a public goods equilib-
103 See also Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intra-JurisdictionalDW'erences in Local
Tax Prices, 66 AMER. EcoN. REv. 743 (1976) (showing that average costs will equal
marginal costs in this system).
104 This equilibrium result, moreover, clarifies the regressive implications of Tiebout
preference satisfaction for community life. If one tries to hypothesize a Tiebout-Hamilton
world, the first thing that comes to mind is the contemporary private, gated, and fenced
community.
105 The last requirement means that profit-maximizing entrepreneurs must be free to
produce new communities to satisfy the demands of the residents. In addition, the public
good must be produced at minimum average cost with respect to population. See Rubinfeld,
supra note 79, at 591.
06 SeeM. J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Areas, in FISCAL ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS 97 (E.S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, eds., 1975) (asserting
widespread strategic zoning disrupts the Hamilton equilibrium and leads to suboptimal public
goods provision). See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modelling the Political
Economy of Local Government in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERvIcES: THE TIEBOUT
MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (G.R. Zodrow, ed. 1983).
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rium. In addition to an optimal number of jurisdictions, the provision of public
goods in each must be tied to a strict membership criterion. If we now take
a look at the real world, we see that no equilibrium can be expected. The
numbers fall short of the optimum. And even if the numbers did not fall short,
any equilibrium would be unstable. The public sector (at least as we have
known it in American history) is institutionally unequipped to replicate the
gate-keeping of a private club. Unsurprisingly, many economists have con
-
cluded that the Tiebout mechanism succeeds in cases so stylized as to lack
realism. 107
2. Implications
- The Tiebout mechanism having failed to yield a stable equilibrium in
theory, a question arises as to its viability as a practical policy tool. The
question is serious as a matter of economic theory. In economics the study of
efficiency presupposes a stable institutional framework. As a result, questions
respecting stability take precedence over questions respecting efficiency.'°8
We will put it bluntly - the Tiebout model, viewed in isolation, provides no
basis for predicting that competitive behavior on the part of government leads
to preference matching. The prediction instead is this: Competition may make
residents better off or worse off depending on a dynamic and complex mix of
factors that competing governments cannot control. With this result, economic
theory literally withdraws its support from an unqualified presumption in favor
of devolution. This does not go to say that a powerful economic case cannot
be made for a devolutionary initiative. But such a case will require a much
more complex foundation than that offered by the Tiebout model.
Let us hypothesize what functions a minimalist central government would have
to perform in a competitive federal system, given the Tiebout model's short-
comings. Certainly, the central government must monitor junior level competi-
tion and be prepared to intervene to import stability. This regulatory function
107 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 57(1988). At best,
he says, Tiebout's approach would decrease the heterogeneity of populations living in the
same locality, but ultimately leave us to figure out how other motives - workplace, natural
advantages, exogeneity of sites - determine the location of agents. Id. See also Rubinfeld,
supra note 79, at 589, 591; Bewley, supra note 84, at 713-14; P. Pestieau, The Optitnalily
Limits of the Tiebout Model, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (Wallace
Oates, ed. 1977).
08 BRETON, supra note 57, at 240-41.
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in part would parallel that played in the private sector by an antitrust author-
ity.' 09
 But, as the wider literature of Tiebout imperfections is taken into
account, it becomes clear that additional stabilizing tasks would have to
undertaken. The central government would have to address tax and other fiscal
externalities, infrastructure development, research and development, wealth
redistribution, and local government
	
0
The last factor, local government structure, opens a Pandora's Box of junior
level public choice problems and associated failures in the market for regula-
tion. That list of failures can be expected to be lengthy. To see this, return
now to the problem with which this Part began - that of bundled public goods
and heterogenous consumer preferences. The model's failure to yield an
equilibrium except on stylized assumptions tells us that this problem cannot
be solved. The law as product analogy becomes attenuated as a result. Compe-
tition respecting public goods turns out to present a level of complexity
respecting supply and demand that far outstrips anything we see respecting
ordinary goods and services. This does not prevent such competition from
occurring; but it does make it less likely that consumer preferences will have
a disciplining effect on producers in any given case." As the expected disci-
plinary effect diminishes, the Tiebout model fails of its essential purpose as
a preference matching device and public choice problems return to center
stage.
'° That is, it would prevent predatory pricing, conspiracies and cartels, and trade
barriers. id. at 250-51.
"° Id. at 251-62.
Many public economists find Tiebout's location model to be an unsatisfactory solution
to the problem of ascertaining individuals' preferences respecting public goods. See Dieter
Helm & Stephen Smith, The Decentralized State: The Economic Borders of Local Govern-
ment, in ECONOMIC BORDERS OF THE STATE(Dieter Helm ed., 1989); G.A. Hughes, Rates,
Reform and the Housing Market, in THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOvERNMENT FINANCE IN
BRITAIN (5.1. Bailey & R. Paddison eds., 1987).
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C. Frictions Inhibiting the Tiebout Mechanism: Mobility,
Information, and Externalities
1. Externalities and Spillovers
- Legal federalism concedes the necessity of relaxing Tiebout's assumption
of an absence of externalities and accepts a limit on decentralization for the
policing of externalities)'2 The externalities mentioned most often in the
literature are the physical ones that give rise to tort liability. But the economic
concept of externality encompasses a much broader universe of behavioral
effects. In the theoretical first-best regime of public goods production, all costs
and benefits are be restricted to the providing jurisdiction." 3 Any departure
from this first-best implicates an externality. Real world practice at the state
and local level falls sort of the first-best in limitless ways. Taxes can fall
differentially on out of state owners."4 Alternatively, actions of one jurisdic-
tion can benefit other jurisdictions, requiring adjustment by a central author-
ity." 5 More broadly, where markets are incomplete and information is
12 The same relaxation ultimately must follows for spillovers, which are positive
externalities. Restating the point, in order to bring about internalization, larger and larger
jurisdictions are required, reducing the menu of choices. See Briffault, supra note 19, at
427.
" See infra text accompanying note 18. This point has been expanded into a simple
theory for locating the level of government appropriate for any particular regulatory problem
- the geographical area affected by the regulation should determine the level of govern-
ment. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOvERNMENT 113-16 (1962). For an application of
this point to environmental regulation, see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externa-
lities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, YALE L. & P0L'Y REv./YALE J. REG. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 23, 25 (1996).
" See notes 147-159 and accompanying text infra.
" In product markets, externalities can occur when the calculus of a given consumer has
an impact on the future choices of other consumers. Sometimes the value of a product is
tied to the number of purchasing consumers. The utility of telephones increases with the
number of users; with computers, increased use brings can increased selection of technically
compatible goods; with many other machines, increased use can mean scale economies in
spare parts manufacture and a larger supply of experienced repair personnel. Such products
exhibit 'network externalities': Existing users benefit from a positive externality when a
future consumer opts for the product and increases the size of the network; the externality
becomes negative when another consumer terminates use. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation,
76 AMER. ECON. REV. 940 (1986).
These spillover effects among consumers mean that one consumer's private calculus
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imperfect - as tends to occur in the world outside of the constrained models
of neoclassical welfare economics - actions by one individual often can have
externality-like effects on the interests of other individuals which the acting
individual fails to take into account." 6 Adverse selection and moral hazard
problems are well-known examples." 7
 In all such circumstances, free market
transactions will not be Pareto efficient and, in theory, intervention by a higher
authority can be unambiguously welfare improving."8
We have already seen that the costless mobility assumed in the Tiebout model
has the potential to cause externalities, thus broadly defined. If different levels
of income preponderate in different localities, a policy looking to competitive
matching of public goods packages and individual preferences can have
unintended effects of wealth redistribution, can result in overcrowding, or can
disrupt fiscal policy." 9
 We will see in Part III that public economics has
developed an extensive literature on fiscal externalities incident to state and
has no necessary relationship to an optimal result. When network externalities influence
supply and demand, decentralized, individually-maximizing decisions will be path depend-
ent. See, e.g., Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public
Goods, 20 J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1983); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition
and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994); Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, Techno-
logy Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. EC0N. 822 (1986).
Suboptimal equilibria may result - there may be excessive uniformity among products or
excessive diversity, or an inferior product may come to dominate the market. See Paul A.
David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AMER. ECON. REv. 332 (1985); for a
counterstory, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L.
& ECON. 1 (1990). The simple picture of product competition that informs the Tiebout
model, in contrast, assumes that value-behavior by consumers leads directly to optimality.
This assumption is not safe to the extent that the choices of consumers of law have signifi-
cant network effects. In the latter case, junior level diversity may be more of a cost than
a benefit. Michael Klausner makes a case for applying models of network externalities to
legal technologies. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts,81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). See also Charny, supra note 70. For a general
argument against employment of the network models in legal contexts, see Michael I.
Krauss, Regulation vs. Markets in the Development of Standards, 3 So. CAL. INTERDIS'Y
L.J. 781, 797-808 (1994).
116 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 28-29 (1994).
' Id. at 30-3 1. Margaret Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Marketfor Deadbeats, 25 J. LEG.
STUD. 201, 206, 224-27 (1996), shows empirically that some states have legal regimes that
attract migrant deadbeat debtors, assisting them in frustrating their out-of-state creditors.
IS STIGLITz, supra note 116, at 27-32.
' See supra notes 132-159 and accompanying text.
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local taxation.' 2° Significantly, this literature employs a modified version of
the Tiebout mechanism to show that downward competition to externalize
presents a significant problem at the state and local level.
The point for present purposes is this: Externalities hold open a larger door
for appropriate regulatory intervention by central government than the legal
federalism literature assumes. A question arises as to the plausibility of a
theory of government built on global devolutionary presumption ex ante subject
to adjustment for externalities by a central authority acting ex post, much like
a caretaker. If the property gets damaged, the ex post adjustment may be too
little, too late.
2. Mobility
- The Tiebout model's assumption of full mobility, like its assumption of no
externalities, is implausible. Movement, after all, is costly. But if jurisdictional
competition is to be widespread in practice this assumption can be relaxed only
slightly. Mobility breaks the monopoly on regulation held by the actor's
jurisdiction of origin and makes possible the choice of regulatory regimes.'2'
It therefore must be immediately feasible for jurisdictional competition to occur
in practice.'
In Tiebout' s model, individuals are the mobile factors of production. But
significant transaction costs attend individual changes of domicile, even where
abundant employment opportunities exist across jurisdictional lines. These costs
will vary from move to move depending on both the distance and the condition
of local housing markets. The cost thus relates directly to the geographical size
of the home and target jurisdictions. The larger the community,' 23
 the more
120 See infra notes 16 1-203 and accompanying text.
121 This assumes that significant choices are held out. The literature tends to ignore one
possible sticking point. Most models assume two-tier of government, central and local. In
our system, however, there tend to be three, federal, state, and local. The fact that a
particular county's public goods offerings are first-best to a particular consumer may not
induce a move if the resident dislikes the state in which the county is located. See BRETON,
supra note 57, 19 1-92.
22 Although Tieboutian sorting depends on actual movement, it should be noted that
governments can feel competitive pressure without actual movement occurring. By analogy
to the critical influence of the potential entrant on the behavior of the monopolist, threatened
exit can motivate reform with actual exit signalling unwillingness to compete. BRETON,
supra note 57, at 237.
23 The mobility assumption, accordingly, becomes more and more of a sticking point
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it costs to leave it, and the less the mobility possessed by its citizens.'24
With individual mobility, pecuniary barriers may not be the most significant
element in the larger cost picture. Family, community, and cultural ties also
can make movement an undesirable response to dissatisfaction with public
goods, taxes, or regulation. At some level, then, the localism that jurisdictional
competition theory seeks to promote retards the mobility that it presup-
Finally, even among localities, the potential scope of competitive
discipline always will be limited by the immobility of land - local govern-
ments remain free to some extent to usurp land rents.'26
3. Information
- The Tiebout model assumes perfect information about the characteristics
of all public goods in all jurisdictions. This assumption, like those of no
externalities and full mobility, must be relaxed. Unfortunately, relaxation
makes it technically impossible for the model to realize on its claims.
Like much of law and economics, jurisdictional competition theory asserts that,
assuming an appropriate initial allocation of wealth, every Pareto-efficient
allocation can be attained through the use of market mechanisms. The mathe-
matics that undergird this result stress the importance of convex indifference
curves. That is, market-driven Pareto efficiency depends on the assumption
that the law of diminishing returns and diminishing marginal rates of substitu-
tion ordinarily obtain. With sufficient nonconvexities, in contrast, markets will
not be competitive) 27
 It is now understood that wherever information is
imperfect, nonconvexities will be pervasive. Information is a fixed cost that
must be incurred regardless of the use eventually made of it. The return on
a little piece of information thus is always zero, and to the extent that invest-
ment in that little piece of information is costly, a net loss always results. Such
as the model's venue of application moves from the local level to the state and national
level. Rice, supra note 25, at 54-55.
124 MUELLER, supra note 14, at 155. Contrariwise, the smaller the community, the more
likely it is that benefits accruing from the provision of a specific public good will spill over
into other communities, causing externalities across communities and non-Pareto allocations.
' Contrariwise, large numbers of local governments and high mobility lessen both the
significance and likelihood of participation in local government processes. Briffault, supra
note 19, at 407.
26 See Sterk, supra note 19, at 844-45, 850, 857-58; Macey, supra note 72, at 506-7.
27 STIGLITZ, supra note 116, at 45, 55-56. It was thought that consumers and producers
normally would satisfy the assumption of convexity. Id. at 56.
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fixed costs in information give rise to nonconvexities, and, in theory, can
justify intervention by governmental authority)28
Economists assert that several conventional assumptions about the convexity
of private goods cannot be extended to markets for local public goods) 29
 To
restate this point, clearing prices for public goods usually cannot be shown.
It is, accordingly, unsafe to assume that public goods are competitively priced.
This implies, in tiirn, that markets for public goods (to the extent they exist)
will be sticky.'3°
This point can be restated less technically. If relocating persons have imperfect
information about the range of alternatives (and investment in the acquisition
of perfect information is not cost-beneficial), then they cannot match their
preferences with the best-suited locality, and a first-best equilibrium does not
emerge from the local government free market) 3 ' To the extent that actors
are aware of the bounds on their information sets, they will tend to assign their
preference orderings respecting jurisdictions in accordance with factors other
than public goods and regulation. Contrariwise, if citizens proceed to move
on a basis of limited information and uninformed regulatory competition
results, then the mismatch between preferences and public goods may be
greater in magnitude than that existing ex ante.
128 STIGLITZ, supra note 116, at 52-54.
129 LAFF0NT, supra note 107, at 60-76; ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 520.
130 Like the externality problem, the information problem could be ameliorated through
central government intervention. Here the device would be investment in a central informa-
tion-sorting repository (and mandatory disclosure of any nonpublic information). But, unlike
the case of externalities, controversy would follow the suggestion of central intervention.
Compare ROMANO, supra note 37, at 9 1-108 (suggesting that due to market incentives to
disclose participation in the securities mandatory disclosure system be optional), with FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAw 290-29 1 (1991) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure is justified because incidental
benefits to third parties stemming from disclosure create systematic incentive to under-
disclose).
A recent study shows that voters in a metropolitan area frequently lack information
about tax and service alternatives. See David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of
Jurisdictional Boundaries: An Individual Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. P0L. ECON.
73 (1989).
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D. The Problem of Entrepreneurial Incentives
1. The Entrepreneurial State and the Problems of Observation and
Verification
- The Tiebout model's prime mover is that cost-minimizing producer of
public goods, the local public goods entrepreneur. The model does not in terms
assume the existence of this key actor, and, analytically, it need not do so.
Entrepreneurship respecting public goods is instead the logical outcome of the
operation of the model's mechanism of consumer choice.' 32
 In the model's
vision of things, local government actors must act entrepreneurially or lose
their entire populations. Obviously, however, to the extent the model's assump-
tions cannot be relaxed, and this competition does not appear in practice, local
officials will not be forced to an entrepreneurial behavior pattern.
Might maverick entrepreneurs appear to jump-start the competitive process?
Consider the possibility of a local government takeover tycoon who shows up
to apply the model by turning real world frictions into an arbitrage profit. The
scenario is simple. First the actor identifies jurisdictions with high cost,
inefficiently produced public goods. Then the actor buys real estate in the most
inefficient such jurisdiction. Next the actor invests in getting elected to office,
and once in office cuts production costs drastically. Finally, the actor sells the
previously purchased real estate and collects an arbitrage profit. This actor has
a high powered incentive to invest in information acquisition, and, like a stock
market arbitrageur, ameliorates the real world problems of asymmetric infor-
mation. Given extreme levels of inefficient goods production, even product
bundling should present no problem. Efficient management, taken alone,
should cause taxes to come down and real estate prices to go up, securing the
arbitrage profit.
But a problem remains. A second assumption lies concealed within the Tiebout
model's complete information assumption - an assumption that the quantity
and quality of local public goods are both observable and verifiable by both
residents and potential residents. As to some local public goods this will be
the case - the public swimming pool, school buildings, streets, and fire trucks
are there for all to see. But concrete, asphalt, and steel are unlikely to influ-
132 When combined with the assumption that local public goods are verifiable information.
See Caroline M. Hoxby, Is There an Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off in School Finance? Tiebout
and A Theory of the Local Public Goods Producer, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 5265, September 1995 at 5.
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ence the marginal consumer of local public goods. School quality matters
more, but is much harder to specify. Consumer verification thus becomes a
serious problem. Here hard statistical evidences, such as student teacher ratios,
training records, even college board scores, are crude. Valuations, then, cannot
be extracted for the critical public goods. As a result, the conditions necessary
for an entrepreneurial arbitrage model do not emerge. Non-verifiability, then,
provides one explanation of why we do not see cost reductive entrepreneurship
respecting local public goods.'33
There result serious doubts about a core proposition of the Tiebout model
- that communities with populations below the optimal size will compete for
new residents. The model, deeming this proposition to be safe, depicts govern-
ment as a rent-seeking black box' 34 and side-steps the problematic exercise
of describing supply-side incentives in the public goods market.' 35 This
approach is implausible. The problem of verifiability, taken together with the
other frictions that retard the operation of the Tiebout mechanism, looms so
large as to make it unsafe to assume that interjurisdictional rivalry for citizens
is ever so intense as to obviate the need for a particular description of supply-
side incentives.
2. The Conventional State as Entrepreneur
- The Tiebout model's supply-side problem comes more sharply into view
upon an informal comparison of incentive profiles of private sector entrepre-
neurs and local government actors. Both actors produce for pecuniary and
other personal gain. The private sector actors must do so competitively due
to the presence of other private sector actors selling the same goods or services
and the diminished returns and risk of bankruptcy that come from excess
production costs and high prices or low sales. When government actors
produce public goods and regulation, in contrast, the consequences of manage-
ment failure are less catastrophic, diluting the incentive effect. These actors
produce for votes or other political capital. If they fail to compete their
jurisdiction does not disappear, unlike an economically uncompetitive the
u Hoxby, supra note 132, at 7.
Cf. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995) (criticizing 'black box' treatment of regulatory output
of private legislatures such as the American Law Institute).
Of Course, new residents can lead to scale economies. But that does not complete the
incentive story - the scale economies must be tied to the political or economic interests
of the lawmakers.
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firm.' 36 Fiscal improvidence can, of course, lead to bankruptcy for a govern-
ment unit. But, unlike the case of a firm, an absence of product
competitiveness would seem to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause.
Generally, then, with government, agency problems in the production of public
goods can be presumed to be more substantial than those within firms. Here
self-interested production does not necessarily imply product entrepreneurship.
Public economists have attempted to ameliorate this problem by restating the
assumption respecting supply-side motivations. For example, in some models
property value maximization replaces population maximization.' 37
 This
approach resonates better. But it solves the problem of supply-side incentives
only if we make the further, implausible assumption of identity between the
jurisdiction's govermnent actors and its real estate interests. Other models
analogize to private sector profits and assume that government desires to
maximize taxes collected.' 38
 Here again the change yields a more plausible
model, for government actors do need operating revenues.' 39
 But an entrepre-
neurial state still does not emerge. Questions come up about the intensity of
the revenue constraint, its connection to particular outcomes, and the role of
competition in shaping those outcomes.' 4° Indeed, given Epple and Zelenitz's
136 Revesz, supra note 10, at 1233-35.
' See, e.g., Jon Sonstelie & Paul Portnoy, Profit Maximizing Communities and the
Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 5 J. URBAN EC0N. 263 (1977).
138 See infra notes 147-154 and accompanying text.
" A conceptual antecedent is noted in Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications
of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 891. POL. EC0N. 1197-
1217 (1981). That model made one of the key contributions to the move away form the
Tiebout mechanism, arguing that long run individual sorting into communities will not
ameliorate the problem of fiscal rent extraction. They assume an exogenous number of
communities, inflexible community boundaries, and inactive landowners and developers.
The role of politics is introduced by virtue of the fact that local government, given passive
owners and residents, will attempt to maximize its tax revenues by usurping maximal land
rents. The Gordon models add interest group politics to the tax revenue maximization
assumption. But cf. J. Vernon Henderson, The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepre-
neurs, 93 J. POL. ECON. 248 (1985) (calling this Tiebout with bad politics).
A related line of literature should be distinguished. This is the line of public choice
theory that shows that bureaucrats are able, through agenda control, to expand public goods
output beyond the level preferred by the median voter. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). In those models tax revenue
maximization implies overproduction of public goods. In the tax competition models, it is
just as likely that underproduction of local public goods results.
° It also would seem safe to project a variable relationship between this revenue
incentive and the incentive to expand expected voter consent. See BRETON, supra note 57,
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famous formal showing that citizen mobility cannot completely eliminate
government monopoly power,' 4 ' a tax maximization incentive invites a per-
verse result.
In sum, an entrepreneurial state cannot be assumed) 42
 As a result, the
Tiebout model fails to achieve incentive compatibility.' 43
 Under what econ-
omists call the theory of the second-best, the Tiebout model's black box must
be opened so that the problem of motivating government actors to supply
public goods in accord with citizen interests can be addressed directly. Such
an exercise has two critical implications. First, it entails rejection of the claim
that the Tiebout mechanism solves the problem of regulatory capture. Second,
it invites the substitution of complex incentive picture in which market compe-
tition shares a place with the conventional political factors of interest group
influence and voter accountability.'
There results a very different, more complex working model of competitive
at 237.
'' Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 139, at 1199.
142 Perhaps it may be created in the future under a different set of institutional arrange-
ments. See infra text accompanying notes 204-225.
Even where incentives to compete clearly are present, additional incentive problems
may inhibit the evolution of first-best legal products. With the network models, described
above, we saw that a demand-side problem can cause suboptimal equilibria to evolve and
product innovation to be choked off in situations of intense product competition. Supply-side
problems also may come up. Product innovation presupposes an incentive to invest in
research and development. With industrial competitors, prospects of a patent monopoly
bolster the incentive. The patent deters entry by competitors, assuring a potential return on
investment in research and development. The basic patent model assumes that there is an
optimal way to stimulate firms to invest in research and development, which is deemed to
be necessary for product innovation. See Michael Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth
in a New Market, 10 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1979). Conversely, if an innovation easily can be
copied by a rival, then new technologies will not efficiently replace old technologies. Legal
innovation leads to the production of a public good, and carries no patent protection. Ian
Ayres, applying this point to corporate law, suggests that competing states will have
insufficient incentives to invest the resources in product innovation. Ian Ayres, Supply Side
In efficiencies and Competitive Federalism, in INT'L REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note
70, at 239.
Paul Seabright, Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete
Contracts Model, 40 EUR.EcON. REV. 61, 63 (1996).
' This has of course been suggested many times in the law review literature. For a
recent instances, see Swire, supra note 62, at 94; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environ-
mental Federalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 638-5 1.
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government. In this model government actors act entrepreneurially when the
tax revenues, export earnings, jobs, technology, or other positive externalities
yielded by the attraction of residents, factors of production, or capital also
happen to yield appropriate political benefits, either in the form of electoral
advantage or satisfaction of the demands of favored interest groups.' 45 Part
III of this Article shows that it is just these elements distinguish some new
formal models of jurisdictional competition.
E. Empirical Tests of the Tiebout Mechanism
How, given the Tiebout model's nonequilibrium and unstable equilibrium
results and its long list of disabling frictions, can we explain the legal
literature's ongoing endorsement of its predictive power? One explanation lies
in a thick stack of studies of its testable implications. These have been said to
provide strong support for the core proposition that jurisdictions use packages
of taxes and public goods to compete for residents,' 46
 apparently thereby
overcoming the model's sticking points.
We have two comments about this body of empirical work. First, the charac-
terization of its results as strong support is itself too strong. We show below
that the results at best are suggestive and make very little progress toward an
affirmative showing of a crucial missing element - entrepreneurial behavior
patterns on the part of government actors. Second, even if the studies did offer
strong support for the Tiebout model's assertion that jurisdictions compete with
public goods and tax packages, that support would not compensate for the
model's failure to yield stable equilibrium results. The model makes two
primary assertions, one descriptive and the other normative. The studies are
for the most part directed to the descriptive assertion that jurisdictions compete
for residents. The normative assertion, which the studies do not address, is that
' Or, in the alternative, the particular factor cuts an advantageous deal with the respon-
sible government actors directly. We would add a factor - the satisfaction incident to
enhancing public welfare.
It is less certain that an entrepreneurial incentive relationship can be assumed as a
systematic proposition. Indeed, where it does exist it can be ephemeral. Unlike firms, which
must hew to the profit incentive over time, the objectives of government suppliers change
over time with voter preferences. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 73, at 329. Of course,
under a loose Tieboutian view of the world, sorting through migration brings homogeneity
and thus political stability. But in Rose-Ackerman's formal attempt to model this, the
opposite result occurs: Migration causes the identity of the median voter to change, resulting
in an unstable equilibrium. Id.
'	 Been, supra note 11, at 517, 527-8.
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this rivairous behavior will lead to a first-best result of matching between
public goods packages and citizen preferences. It is this assertion that is
undercut by model's failure to yield a stable equilibrium.
1. Capitalization Studies
- On the surface, one line of empirical work on the Tiebout mechanism does
provide support for its normative assertion. This line began with Wallace
Oates' famous study showing that tax and public goods levels are capitalized
in property values. More particularly, property values are negatively related
to property tax levels and positively related to education expenditures This
result, which has been confirmed many times,' 48
 supports the model's
descriptive story by confirming demand-side awareness of the contents of tax
and public goods packages. And it appears to do even more. Oates suggested
that consumers can use real estate prices as guides to the jurisdictions with the
best public goods provision - high real estate values imply a surplus value
of public goods benefits over the tax cost.' 49
 In this view, house prices both
measure the amount which relocating citizens are willing to pay for public
goods and measure the differential attractiveness of communities.' 50
 Thus
conceived they seem to bear a familial resemblance to prices on the New York
Stock Exchange. Perhaps, then, the real estate market provides an empirical
equilibriating market for local public goods, along with a market discipline
mechanism for government actors.
Unfortunately, the analogy to the securities markets is infirm. To the extent
that house prices capitalize the public goods package and confirm consumer
awareness, they simultaneously negate the existence of a Tiebout equilibrium.
Since the consumers of real estate treat local taxes as the price they pay for
public goods, no capitalization could occur in a world with a Tiebout equilib-
' Wallace Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL.
EC0N. 957, 966-7 (1969).
The literature has been summarized. See Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen Biggs,
Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 31 URBAN STUD. 767, 775-779 (1994); see
also Been, supra note 11, at 521-23; According to Dowding, et al., passim, at 776, the
numbers yielded as to the quantum of capitalization vary widely across the literature.
Estimates vary between zero and 100 percent, with most results fixing capitalization at
between 30 and 70 percent. In addition, a several methodological shortcomings have been
uncovered and corrected as the literature has developed. Id. at 775-6.
Oates, supra note 147, at 968.
u BRETON, supra note 57, at 238-39.
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rium. This is because, in equilibrium, marginal demand equals marginal cost.
In a public goods equilibrium, then, the value of public goods benefits exactly
equals the taxes levied to produce them. Given that equality of benefit and
cost, there will be no excess value or dead weight cost to be capitalized in real
estate prices.' 5 ' Oates, then, inadvertently confirmed the absence rather than
the presence of a Tiebout equilibrium!'52
The real world's failure to deliver optimal numbers explains the result. Pre-
sumably, if there were a sufficiently large number of communities and public
goods packages from which to choose, no rational citizen would be willing to
pay a premium over the intrinsic value of the public goods on offer in any
particular jurisdiction. She would move instead to a jurisdiction that matched
her preferences. In contrast, the combination of a limited number of commun-
ities, a high demand for public goods, and taxes set at the cost of public goods
provision, implies that the aggregated jurisdictions fail to satisfy demand. As
a result, real estate prices go up as the value of the benefit is capitalized'53
'' Matthew Edel & Elliot Sclar, Taxes, Spending and Properly Values: Supply Adjustment
in a Tiebout-Oates Model, 82 J. P0L. Ec0N. 941, 946-47 (1974).
152 Dennis Epple, Allan Zelenitz & Michael Visscher, A Search for Testable implications
of the Tiebout Hypothesis, 86 J. POL. ECON. 405, 406 (1978).
The Hamilton modification of the Tiebout model, see supra text accompanying notes
102-106, also refutes the suggestion that real estate values serve as a price mechanism in
a local public goods market. Recall that the model reaches a stable equilibrium result by
stipulating a zoning regulation that functions as a nondistortionary head tax. In so doing
it concretely demonstrates that the Tiebout model's central problem is the lack of a price
mechanism. Dowding, et al., supra note 148, at 778.
Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 139, at 1212-13, revives the Oates claim, asserting that
statistically significant estimates of capitalization evidence the presence of a Tiebout
mechanism. BRETON, supra note 57, at 238, objects to this reading. Citing Dennis Epple,
Allan Zelenitz & Michael Visscher, passim, Breton notes that they assume an equilibrium
and that nothing can be surmised about an equilibrium's properties from an equilibrium
analysis of disequilibrium states. On the other hand, notes Breton, given a scarcity of
desirable locations, it hardly is surprising to see results indicating capitalization of higher
rental values.
Edel & Sciar, supra note 151, at 942. Edel and Sclar's study utilizes data on house
prices and finance in Boston over a period of two decades. They conclude that there was
movement towards equilibrium in respect of education provision over the period, but
constant capitalization of highway expenditures. George Richard Meadows, Taxes, Spending
and Properly Values: A Comment and Further Results, 84 J. P0L. EC0N. 869, 878, 879
(1976), criticizes Edel and Sclars methodology and reruns Oates' New Jersey numbers to
show some movement toward equilibrium during the period of the study.
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(or go down if the tax burden exceeds the value of the public goods
returned).'54
2. Other Studies
- An additional body of Tiebout studies focuses exclusively on demand-side
motivations, attempting to measure the extent to which tax and public goods
considerations influence migration. Here aggregate census data has provided
a basis for showings that fiscal factors are statistically significant influences
on population movement. To summarize the principal results, first, no groups
of migrants are attracted by high tax rates; second, migrants who are people
of color are sensitive to levels of welfare provision; and, third, results are
mixed on the question whether white migrants are sensitive to levels of welfare
provision. There is a methodological problem with these studies, however.
Since they use census data to measure individual motivations, they remain open
to the introduction of additional variables. Micro-level studies of relocation
motivations - conducted through questionnaires - solve this problem but
suffer from a cheap talk possibility.' 56 The micro-level studies reach sharply
conflicting conclusions in any event, with one side asserting that tax/public
goods packages are relatively uninfluential, and the other side asserting that
they matter.'57
The Tiebout equilibrium view showed up in the tax policy literature long after the
appearance of the refutation centered on capitalization. Given a Tiebout equilibrium and
benefits equalling public goods, there is no basis in tax policy for allowing a deduction for
local real estate taxes. See 1 U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 63 (1984); THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO
THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 63(1984); Charles R. Hulten &
Robert M. Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebout Comprehensive Income Tax, 44 NAT'L TAX
J. 67 (1991).
For an exposition of the tax policy implications and relative merits of the equilibrium
and capitalization views, see Louis Kaplow, supra note 12, at 420-57. Kaplow has some
skepticism respecting claims that perfect capitalization occurs in the real world, although
he does expect a long run capitalization effect. Id. at 447-8.
55 We rely here on the collection and recounting of the literature in Dowding, et a!.,
supra note 148, at 779-82.
° Id. at 784-5.
Compare David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact offurisdictionalBoundaries:
An Individual Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73 (1989) (studying Louisville
area and concluding that tax/service is unimportant), with Stephen L. Percy & Brett W.
Hawkins, Further Tests of Individual-Level Propositions from the Tiebout Model, 54 J. POL.
1149 (1992) (studying metropolitan Milwaukee and concluding that housing values matter
most and tax/service packages figure in as a secondary factor with crime and schools).
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Yet another body of studies shows that people tend to sort themselves out
by location, causing populations in particular jurisdictions to tend toward
homogeneity. This result is consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis and supports
an inference that the sorting occurs due to tax/public goods package prefer-
ences. The problem with these studies is that, statistically speaking, if there
is a large of number of jurisdictions and random (as opposed to intentional)
sorting, a relatively more homogeneous subset will emerge anyway.'58
These studies, taken together with the capitalization studies, do support the
idea that people pay attention to tax/public goods packages. But they thereby
only take us one step past the general assertion that citizens have preferences
respecting taxes and public goods. The assertion that sorely needs empirical
confirmation is the supply-side point that local government actors actively
compete for residents with tax/public goods packages. The assertion receives
only indirect support here. To the extent that mobile residents respond to fiscal
variables, it follows that governments will be sensitive to mobility. An infer-
ence of rivalrous behavior arises.' 59
 But the behavior pattern's strength and
character remains a matter of conjecture. As we have seen, a long list of real
world frictions stands between the behavior pattern and the projection of a
Other studies that go beyond aggregate data to micro-level data on household choices
open up a distinction between the fiscal influences on choice to move and on the choice of
a destination once the decision to move has been made. Results conflict. Compare William
F. Fox, Henry W. Herzog & Alan M. Schbottman, Metropolitan Fiscal Structure and
Migration, 29 J. REGIONAL Sd. 523 (1989) (finding that fiscal factors tend to influence the
decision to leave), with Brian J. Cushing, The Effect of the Social Welfare System on
Metropolitan Migration in the US by Income Group, Gender and Family Structure 30
URBAN STUD. 325 (1993) (finding that AFDC payment levels do influence departure
decisions of low-income persons, but do influence choice of destination with high AFDC
payments attracting low-income households and repelling non-poor female households). For
a summary of micro-level work, see Dowding, et al., passim, at 782-7.
158 Dowding, et al., supra note 148, at 774. There also are some equivocal results in the
stack of studies. See Robert M. Stein, Tiebout's Sorting Hypothesis, 23 URBAN AFFAIRS
Q . 140, 155 (1987) (testing Tiebout by regressing service/tax package differentiation against
mean municipal heterogeneity and finding no significant relationship other than racial
sorting).
A final body of studies, more directly connected to the Leviathan assertion of public
choice theory than to the regulatory competition literature, shows that big government tends
to cost more per capita, and smaller government tends to cost less. The problem with this
stack is that it measures expenditures but not efficiency. They can mean either that smaller
units provide the same public goods packages for less or that demand tends to drop where
jurisdictions are small. See Dowding, eta!., passim, at 769-71.
159 BRETON,SUpra note 57, at 239.
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concrete regulatory result. There remains every reason for skepticism about
policy presumptions that rely on competitive behavior.
III. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN A SECOND-BEST WORLD: THE NEW
APPROACH
The development of a robust version of the Tiebout model stood high on the
public economics agenda for more than a quarter century. But lately the field
has moved on to other topics, without ever having reached that goal. Although
continued pursuit a workable, self-standing Tiebout mechanism has fallen off
the agenda, jurisdictional competition still figures prominently in research in
the field. These work, which we term the 'new approach', models jurisdic-
tional competition in a second-best framework. It continues to employ the
Tiebout mechanism, but only for limited purposes or in substantially modified
form. It also pursues alternative conceptions of competitively disciplined local
public goods production. Meanwhile, it leaves the first-best Tiebout model on
the sidelines, there to stand as a compelling vision of an unattainable state of
the world)°
One line of research, the tax competition literature, employs a modified version
of the Tiebout mechanism to model the problem of externalities in a federal
system. These models employ a capacious concept of externality that includes,
first, all fiscal cost and benefit consequences of public goods production that
cross state lines, and, second, all intrastate economic and political distortions.
They tell a cautionary story about distortive effects that can be expected when
junior levels of government compete in a federal system. They insist that,
given competition, productive public goods provision must include the delinea-
tion and correction of these externalities. The problem cannot be assumed
away, as in the Tiebout model, or brushed off to one side as a limiting factor,
as in legal contexts. Confronting the problem, meanwhile, implies central
government intervention.
A second line of literature concentrates on local level information asymmetries
and pursues the same question formerly pursued through Tiebout modelling
- the design of local government mechanisms that cause preferences and
60 As we have seen, see supra notes 78-159 and accompanying text, given a fixed number
of geographically-definedjurisdictions, efficiency claims must take the status of second-best.
With fixed boundaries, a unique equilibrium respecting public goods production is unlikely
to emerge. Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 124.
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public goods production to be matched. Some of these models employ the
Tiebout mechanism, acknowledging its shortcomings and supplementing it with
additional preference matching mechanisms. Other models abandon the Tiebout
mechanism altogether. Instead of using competition as an outside force that
solves political problems by avoiding them, these models address the demo-
cratic process and look at ways to make it more competitive.
Taken as a whole, the new approach withdraws economic theory's support for
the legal literature's general presumption that competitive forces assure that
devolution enhances welfare. To survey this literature is learn that legal
federalism has yet learn how to ask the right questions about the economic
welfare effects of devolution.
A. Tax Competition Models
In a first-best economy, taxation and public goods provision meet the
Samuelson condition' 6 ' - that is, the sum of each person's willingness to
pay for another unit of a public good for her marginal benefit equals the cost
of producing that additional unit.' 62
 For that to be the case, all costs and
benefits must be restricted to the providing jurisdiction. As we have seen,
models in the Tiebout mold signal an easy route to that result by stipulating
exclusive use of a residential head tax.' 63 With a head tax, there can be no
interjurisdictional tax spillovers, and, given the further assumptions of perfect
mobility and an unlimited supply of states, no state can be positioned to export
its tax burden. ' Given all of this, it follows' 65 that interstate tax competi-
tion should be encouraged - it enhances welfare by forcing state governments
to lower tax rates, constrains the self-serving activities of politicians, and limits
efficiency losses they otherwise can cause. '
161 See supra text accompanying note 16.
162 John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: is There a
Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom? in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PRE-
REQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? VOLUME I: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393,397 (Jagdish Bhagwati
& Robert E. Hudec, eds. 1996).
63 See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
' Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Econ-
omies: An Overview, 60 J. PUB. EC0N. 307, 315 (1996). The formal showing is in the
Hamilton model, discussed supra text accompanying notes 102-106.
65 Reference to the Leviathan school of public choice theory provides affirmative support
for this assertion. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., CharlesE. McLure, Tax Competition: is What's Goodfor the Private Goose
Also Good for the Public Gander? 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1986) (arguing that rational
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The new generation of tax competition models no longer employs this first-best
template, however. Like the Tiebout model, they assume that state govern-
ments compete, although here tax dollars rather than citizens are the sought-
after commodity. These models also presuppose mobile citizens and capital and
mobile consumption across state borders. But they situate the Tiebout mechan-
ism in a world of myopic government actors and predict the results of govern
-
ment cost-benefit decisions respecting public goods provision that fail to
consider secondary effects, whether internal or external to the taxing state.'67
The prediction is economic distortion, a problem that can be aggregated when
governments compete for factors or capital. The models suggest a range of
policy remedies.
1. Basic Model
- The basic model comes from Gordon.' 68 It assumes a two-tier federal
structure in which residents reside in one state and sell their factor inputs and
purchase goods and services throughout the federation. State governments hire
factor inputs to produce goods and services and meet their revenue needs by
taxing factors and goods and services. Social welfare is defined as an aggregate
of (a) the social welfare function for all types of people across the states, (b)
after-tax prices for goods, services and factors, (c) public goods provision, and
(d) a state-by-state congestion factor tied to prevailing price levels. Taxes may
be residence-based or source-based - that is, they are either based on the resi-
dence of the taxpayer or based on the sources of transactions, whether the
place of employment or the point of purchase of goods and services. Each state
sets its own tax rate, constrained by a requirement that it balance its budget.
In addition, the state government must satisfy the reelection demands of local
citizens - the model specifies a political objective function sensitive to the
political power wielded by groups in state politics.' 69 The maximization of
the political objective function determines the state's tax rates, subject to the
jurisdictions should be prepared to reduce taxes on capital until the revenue yielded balances
the costs of public goods production).
167 Suzanne Scotchmer, Public Goods and the Invisible Hand, in MODERN PUBLIC
FINANCE, supra note 87, at 115.
' Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 95 Q
. 
J.
ECON. 567 (1983). See also John Douglas Wilson, Optimal Properly Taxation in the
Presence of Inter-Regional Capital Mobility, 18 J. REGIONAL ECON. 73 (1985).
' Gordon, supra note 168, at 577. Gordon models the simple case of median voter
politics across all states. See also Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, Economic and
Political Functions of Tax Structure, 78 AMER. EcON. REV. 701 (1988), expanding the
model to encompass coalition politics.
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budget constraint. As with the Tiebout model, households and factors are
mobile across jurisdictions. Finally, each state government is assumed to be
myopic' 7° respecting the allocative effects of its tax rates on tax rates in other
states and on relocation decisions of citizens)7'
The model shows that where an island jurisdiction could set an optimal tax
rate, interstate effects prevent a state in a federation from so doing, leading
to suboptimally low provision of public goods) 72
 Five types of distortive
effects are described - tax exportation, regressivity, 'not-in-my-backyard' (or
'NIMBY') tax devices, tax spillovers, and 'beggar-thy-neighbor' tax competi-
tion.
The first effect, tax exportation, occurs when tax burdens and resulting
public goods benefits are distributed unequally. In one case the effect is
interstate - taxes paid by out-of-state citizens and firms pay for public goods
consumed in-state. The other case is intrastate - the controlling voting
coalition within the state enjoys most of the public goods benefits while sharing
the taxation burden with disenfranchised local citizens (as well as non-resi-
dents). In either case, officials will have an incentive to overuse the exportative
tax.' 73
 The second distortion is the system's bias toward regressive results.
Given factor mobility, exit or threatened exit by upper income households will
tend to keep the tax burdens and public goods benefits evenly balanced.
Welfare provision for the poor thus is blocked.' 74
 The third problem con-
° Gordon, supra note 168, at 577.
7 Equilibria have been demonstratedfor competitive federalist economies thus modelled.
See Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax
Coordination When Countries Dffer in Size, 83 AMER. ECON. REv. 877 (1993); Jack Mintz
& Henry Tulkens, Commodity Tax Competition between Member States of a Federation:
Equilibrium and Efficiency, 29 J. PUB. EC0N. 133 (1986).
772 See also David Wildasin, Some Rudimentary 'Doupolizy' Theory, 21 REGIONAL Sd.
& URBAN EC0N. 393 (1991), showing the relationship between the ability ofajurisdiction
to export taxes and market constraints. This treatment assumes that a highly elastic supply
of capital makes it difficult for jurisdictions to export the costs of public goods to non-
resident owners, resulting in a distorting impact on the tax structure and underexpenditure
for local public goods.
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 316 argues that this effect is most likely to
be significant with taxes on consumption. Mobility will make the effect less substantial with
taxes on capital and labor. Id. See Leslie E. Papke, Interstate Business Tax DJferential and
New Firm Location: Evidence from Panel Data, 45 J. PUB. EC0N. 47, 67 (1991) (capital
taxation induces capital mobility).
For documentation of this effect, see Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal
Deductibility, and State Structure, 12 J. POLICY ANAL. & MGI. 109, 124 (1993).
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cerns congestion. Myopic states can raise tax rates to encourage exit by
unwanted businesses and residents, causing remaining residents to be better
off. This NIMBY phenomenon is particularly likely to show up respecting
noxious production processes that are in the aggregate socially beneficial.'75
The fourth distortion follows from indirect effects of increases or decreases
in tax rates. One variety of indirect effect concerns the taxing state's fiscal
policy and occurs on an intrastate basis. A change in tax rates will alter private
sector consumption levels, causing an indirect tax revenue effect; similarly,
tax rate changes will affect the prices of factors, and the cost of running state
government will rise or fall as an indirect result. The second category of
indirect effect is the cross-border spillover. Given mobility, consumption and
factors may migrate elsewhere when a state raises its tax rates. This can mean
positive effects in other states - tax revenues in the target states go up and
the cost of public sector inputs goes down.' 76
 The upshot for the home state
is a disincentive to use a tax applicable to a mobile tax base,' 77 even though
such a tax entails transaction cost efficiencies.' 78
 Fifth, and finally, come
effects on the terms of trade on offer in the home state. Price changes follow-
ing upon tax rate changes have an impact on the incomes of local
residents.' 79 As a result, there will be an incentive to provide for low taxes
on mobile inputs so as to increase income returns to the members of the state's
dominant coalition. When more than one state seeks to attract such mobile
inputs, there results the 'beggar-thy-neighbor' effect characteristic of the classic
race-to-the-bottom.' 8° As might be expected, subsequent models in the litera-
' Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 314 ,317.
176 An extensive literature on capital taxation explicates this effect. See Roger H. Gordon,
Can Capital In come Taxes Survive in Open Economies, 47 J. FIN. 1159, 1160 (1992); David
Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy,
25 J. URBAN ECON. 193 (1989).
' Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 315.
178 In models allowing for only one type of tax, these spillovers will cause an incentive
to underprovide local public goods. See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou,
Tiebout, Properly Taxation and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J. URBAN
ECON. 356 (1986).
179 Aggregate income changes to the income of private firms are assumed to be zero both
before and after any rate change. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 312.
'° See supra note 63. The Oates-Schwab model of an environmental race-to-the-bottom,
see Oates & Schwab, supra note 73, is the classic example.
According to Inman and Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 317, tax spillovers and terms
of trade effects are unlikely to be significant respecting consumption taxes. Factor taxes are
a different matter, however. Here there is significant empirical support for significant
effects. See R. Wassmer, The Use and Abuse of Economic Development Incentives in a
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ture focus in particular on interstate competition for scarce capital, and yield
similar results. 81
At the bottom line, these tax competition models signal that interjurisdictional
coordination must be employed to bring the states into a Pareto superior
equilibrium.' 82
 In the alternative, corrective central government intervention
Metropolitan Area; 46 PROC. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 146 (1993) (showing extensive use of tax
subsidies); John Mutti, William Morgan & Mark Partridge, The Incidence of Regional Taxes
in a General Equilibrium Framework, 39 J. PUB. ECON. 83 (1989) (computable general
equilibrium model showing that a 1 percent increase in a region's tax on business capital
leads to a significant out migration of regional capital and results in significant out of state
revenue effects); William Morgan, John Mutti & Mark Partridge, A Regional General
Equilibrium Model of the United States: Tax Effects on Factor Movements and regional
Production, 71 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 626, 631(1989) (computable general equilibrium
model showing that regions can increase residents' income by substituting a lump sum tax
for existing taxes on mobile labor).
181 Zodorow & Mieszkowski, supra note 178, develops a model in which jurisdictions
compete for capital investment by holding down a source based tax to finance local public
goods. See also Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy,
76 AMER. ECON. REV. 1086 (1986) (arguing that when other tax instruments are available,
a local government of the Zodorow-Mieszkowski type will make use of resident based
taxation in lieu of source based taxation). For a contrasting vision, see John Douglas
Wilson, A Theory of Inter-Regional Tax Competition, 19 J.URBAN EC0N. 296 (1986), in
which an individual jurisdiction relies on a property tax which is distortionary and may
restrict the public good level because of the perceived marginal excess of the local tax. In
Wilson's model, there are many small jurisdictions, each relying on a uniform tax rate and
facing an exogenously given net return to capital. A fixed supply of capital in the overall
economy is assumed. Given tax competition, there will be underprovision of local public
goods if all households would be better off by a simultaneous increase in the amount of
public goods in all jurisdictions. Wilson shows that tax competition will lead to a prisoners'
dilemma, as taxes are driven too low as the state tries to capture flows of mobile capital.
A PD obtains because each symmetric community understands an increase in local tax
spending to cause a loss of local capital. See also S. Bucovetsky & John Douglas Wilson,
Tax Competition with Two Tax instruments, 21 REGIONAL Sc!. & URBAN ECON. 333 (1991)
(arguing that when both residence and source based taxation are available, local govern-
ments provide efficient levels of local public goods).
182 See J. Edwards & Michael Keen, Tax Competition and Leviathan, 40 EUR. EC0N.
REV. 113 (1996) (arguing that international tax coordination is required when the tax on
mobile capital is the only revenue source available to policy makers; and suggesting that
when policy makers are neither wholly benevolent nor wholly unconcernedabout the welfare
of citizens, it is clear that, irrespective of whether the tax base is fully or partially mobile,
a small multilateral increase in the tax on mobile capital from the non-cooperative equilib-
rium will increase the welfare of the representative citizens). See also Guy Gilberd & Pierre
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may be justified. Significantly, the literature tends avoid suggesting broad-
brush centralization and looks instead to discrete interventions. The central
government might, for example, lay down the rules of the game, requiring that
all state taxes be resident-based, as opposed to source-based, with a consequent
diminution in incentives to externalize.' 83 In the alternative, state-level distor-
tions might be corrected with strategically directed central taxes that would be
tied to corrective grant-in-aid reallocations.' 14 Finally, given source-based
Picard, Incentives and Optimal Size of Local Jurisdictions, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 19 (1996)
(showing that optimal size of a jurisdiction in respect of public good production relates to
the magnitude of uncertainty on cost and spillover effects).
Coordination tends to be viewed as a superior alternative to centralization because it
keeps authority at junior levels. But coordination is not easily sustained on a spontaneous
basis - a central authority will have to design a reward and punishment system in order
to induce cooperation. Peter Klibanoff& Jonathan Morduch,Decentralization, Externalities,
and Efficiency, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 223 (1995), show formally that the cost of induce-
ment may exceed the benefit of coordination. In this model, 'coordination will be worth-
while only if external effects are at least as large as the largest possible private net benefit'.
Id. at 234.
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 318-19. Administration would present a
problem, however, since each jurisdiction would have to keep track of its residents' out-of-
state transactions. In addition, local tax regressivity would remain unconstrained. Wage and
income taxes piggy-backed on a centrally administered tax regime are suggested. Consump-
tion taxes would present more of a problem due the possibilities for unobservable out-of-
state activity. Id. at 319.
A restriction to residence-based taxation would reduce interstate tax exportation but
leave in place the possibility of intrastate exportation across political coalitions. Inman and
Rubinfeld argue that it also would deter NIMBY competition on the theory that the activity
to be discouraged through a tax disincentive now by definition is owned by a resident; to
the extent nonresidents conduct such activity they could not be taxed. Other competition
would be discouraged 'since mobile capital ... is uniformly taxed across locations under
the residency principle'. Id. at 319.
'' Id. at 320-21. For example, in order to combat beggar-thy-neighbor tax breaks on
investment capital, the central government could tax the benetitted factor or good at its
source and redistribute the proceeds in a 'locationally neutral' fashion. Id. at 321. See also
David Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and A Corrective
Subsidy, 25 J. URBAN ECON. 193 (1989) (employing a Nash equilibrium approach with
immobile agents, viewing tax competition as an externality, and constructing a corrective
subsidy).
Inman and Rubinfeld acknowledge a substantial feasibility problem: The economic
incentives that lead to inefficiency at the state level may lead toward inefficient central
government correctives. They look to strong national political parties and executive power
as counterweights to the inefficient tendencies of legislative logrolling, and as a final
backstop, they suggest that a restriction to resident-based taxation be embedded in the
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taxation across jurisdictions of unequal size, a minimum tax rate may have a
beneficial effect. It has been shown that the asymmetrically sized states will
find their way to a noncooperative equilibrium in which the small state sets
a lower tax rate than the large state, resulting in a higher level of tax revenue
and spending in the smaller state.185
2. Evaluation
- This theoretical case for interstate coordination or central intervention
becomes a practical case only to the extent that these models describe economic
distortions of significance in the real world.' 86 We think that a marginally
constitution. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 328-29.
185 Kanbur & Keen, supra note 182. The Kanbur-Keen model shows that the inefficiency
problem that would exist if the states were of equal size becomes aggravated in when the
sizes are unequal. The analysis is unusual in that it focuses on the role of size ofjurisdiction
as a source of inefficiency in itself and invites application to a range of issues, such as
location decisions of multinationals or transfer pricing policies among affiliates.
In the Kanbur and Keen analysis, the model consists of two states. Taxes are based
on source and enforcement is imperfect. Each citizen can either purchase a unit of commod-
ity in her own state where it is available for t or can travel to the bordering jurisdiction
where it can be purchased for T, incurring travel and other transaction costs. The consumer
will purchase the unit in the next jurisdiction only if the surplus she enjoys exceeds that
from buying the unit locally and the surplus is nonnegative. With the borders are open
between states, the question concerns how to choose the best tax rate to maximize revenue,
given that each country will taken into account the tax rate of the other. Id. at 879-80.
Asymmetry emerges between the responses of the small versus large state. We start
at t=O with low tax rates in both States and open the borders. Given the low rate, it is
optimal for the home state to set its tax above the outside rate, given that at the margin it
is not worth attempting to attract home certain citizens. As the rate increases, the optimal
response is for the home state to increase its rate. In terms of rate of increase, the best
response to increase the rate exactly half. But, this rate is subject to change when the
increase of tax is sufficiently high, that the best response is to increase the tax rate by a
discontinuous reduction. Id. at 881.
The model suggests two significant strategic responses. First, the increase in cross-
border shopping provides a basis for the large state to increase taxes without loss of revenue
to the small state. For this reason, the small state is able to increase its own tax rate without
fear of lost trade to the neighbor state. The upshot is that if strategic responses are taken
into account, it will be apparent that an increase in transport costs will have little impact
on the cross-border shopping. It follows that it is also not too risky for the lower tax state
to induce measures which makes it more costly to cross-border shop.
186 The view of those responsible for these models is that they are. See Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 3 16-18, 322 and sources cited in notes 168-171 supra.
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stronger claim for plausibility can be for this literature than can be made for
precedent applications of Tiebout mechanism. This conclusion follows from
consideration the tax models' success in confronting problems left unsolved
in the antecedent Tiebout literature the matters of unstable equilibrium, extern
alities, limited information and mobility, and entrepreneurial incentives.
a. Unstable equilibrium
- We begin with the unstable equilibrium problem. Here some progress can
be reported, if not a solution. A Nash equilibrium has been derived in the tax
competition context. It appears in Mintz and Tulkens' model of two jurisdic-
tions, each of which conditionalizes its optimal tax policy on the other's tax
policy. The problem is that the model derives discontinuous reaction functions
on the part of the two jurisdictions. That is, the a competing state's response
sometimes departs from the result expected by the acting state, with the result
that a Nash equilibrium does not emerge in some circumstances. When equilib-
ria do exist, they are not Pareto optimal.' 87
 In addition, this model's charac-
ter, if not its result, has been criticized. The charge is that the high degree of
generality in this and similar models carries a cost. The critics insist that even
if Mintz-Tulkens can show the emergence of a non-cooperative equilibrium
in pure strategies, their insight offers few general characterizations or con-
clusions. 188
The custom in the tax literature is to assume that a stable equilibrium exists
in a federalist economy' 89
 and go on from there to see the effects of different
fiscal policies. The assumption weakens the models' predictive power. They
in effect are better at pointing at possible distortions that can be expected to
occur in a competitive federal system than they are at convincing us that the
system is keenly competitive in the first place. Even so, they retain a powerful
critical function for legal federalism, where just such a competitive system now
routinely is assumed.
b. Externalities
- In the legal Tiebout world externalities tend to be put to one side as subject
matter inevitably left over for central government treatment. In the tax models
Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens, Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States
of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency, 29 J. PUB.. ECON. 133 (1986). Each jurisdic-
tion taxes a traded good and provides a local public good. The features of the model reveal
that tax changes in one jurisdiction will impact the tax and price level in other jurisdiction.
Because these effects are ignored by self-interested policy-makers, inefficiency emerges.
188 Kanbur & Keen, supra note 182, at 878-79.
189 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, 313.
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externalities take center stage as the subject to be modelled. The process of
inquiry shows that the list of problems requiring central government treatment
is longer than the legal Tiebout literature would lead one to expect.
c. Information
- Information presents less of a problem for the tax models than it does for
the original Tiebout device. The reason is that when the tax models stipulate
myopic government actors they imply a limited information world. In addition,
the most important piece of information in a model of competitive tax-setting
the tax rate of the competing state - is observable. Questions still can be
asked in a particular case about how much information real world government
actors have about the fiscal effects of their tax policies, the probable actions
of other states, and the preferences of their dominant coalition. But this
questioning process need not be debilitating.
d. Mobility
- Mobility again is the mainspring with the tax models, with emphasis
shifting to capital and transactions rather than citizen residency. There also is
a twist. With pure Tiebout models, less mobility and less competition imply
more distortion respecting public goods production. With the tax competition
models, less mobility and competition means fewer externalities and less
distortion. Either way, these mobility assumptions have to be backed up
empirically if these models are to have policy import.' 9° With the tax models,
as with pure Tieb out models, it comes down to a matter of degree. A minimum
degree of mobility-induced fiscal distortion is likely to be conceded by all
observers - the connection between consumption taxes and the phenomenon
of cross-border shopping is well-known. Studies offer additional support.
Labor has been found to move across state lines in response to tax-related
changes in the prices of goods and services. ' Results respecting tax-induced
capital movement are less decisive,' 92
 but some support is available)93
'° There also may be an analytical problem. See S. Bucovetsky, Rent Seeking and Tax
Competition, 58 J. PUB. Ec0N. 337, 337 (1995) (arguing that an optimal equilibrium can
emerge only if there is no migration (of capital or labor) needed to achieve efficiency;
otherwise tax competition leads to too little migration).
'' Gregory I. Treyz, Don S. Rickman, Gary L. Hunt & Michael J. Greenwood, The
Dynamics of U.S. Internal Migration, 75 REv. EC0N. & STATIsTIcs 209, 213-14 (1993);
Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, The Importance of Local Fiscal Conditions in Analyzing
Local Labor Markets, 97 J. P0L. EC0N. 1208, 1227-28 (1989).
92 According to Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 316.
"p-' Leslie E. Papke, Interstate Business Tax Differential and New Firm Location: Evidence
from Panel Data, 45 J. PUB. EC0N. 47, 48-49 (1991).
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e. Entrepreneurial incentives
- The tax models, like the Tiebout precedents, assume entrepreneurial incen-
tives on the part of governmental actors. But the change of context makes the
assumption more plausible. Here the payoff is not additional residents but
additional tax dollars. As noted above,' 94
 although the need for these is
indeed universal on the part of government actors, questions still can be asked
about the degree of need, its connection to particular outcomes, and the role
of competition in shaping those outcomes. But the problem materially lessens
when the tax models admit interest group influence as an objective function.
The stipulation that the dominant coalition prefers a given tax result technically
solves the incentive problem because it ties the result pursued by government
actors to the ballot box and, hence, to their interest in their own careers.
3. Neo-Tieboutian Tax Models
- A minority view in the tax competition literature argues to the contrary of
the models just described. More particularly, the Krelove-Myers models'95
purport to show that state govermnent activity does not imply fiscal distortions
due to externalities and spillovers and that tax efficiency does not require
central intervention. These models assume, (a) that local taxes are limited to
head taxes and taxes on rents; (b) that all households have identical preferences
and endowments; and, (c) that all governments set rates to maximize residents'
welfare and recognize that resident welfare must equal that offered to residents
in competing neighboring regions.
Here is the insight captured in the Krelove-Myers models. When, in the
Krelove model,' 96
 the burden of a local tax on rents falls disproportionately
on out-of-state property owners, there results a compensating in-migration of
new workers. These new resident workers bid down wages. Wages fall in the
amount of the tax subsidy provided by the out of state owners. Alternatively,
in the Myers model,' 97
 the taxing government realizes in advance that the
tax subsidy will attract new migrants and, to prevent the depression of wages,
voluntarily transfers cash to out-of-staters. At the bottom line, no state has an
incentive to export its tax burden because countervailing movement of factors
or capital into the state over time will have an equilibriating effect that elimin-
See supra text accompanying note 195.
' See Russell Krelove, Efficient Tax Exporting, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 145 (1992), and
Gordon M. Myers, Optimality, Free Mobility, and the Regional Authority in a Federation,
43 J. PUB. ECON. 107 (1990).
'	 Krelove, supra note 195, at 153.
97 Myers, supra note 199, at 108-109.
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ales the advantage of subsidized public goods production.
This a powerful insight. But, in our view, it is not powerful enough to erode
the position of the mainstream models. Although the other models continue
to draw to some extent on Tieboutian assumptions, with Krelove-Myers as with
the Hamilton equilibrium model, additional assumptions must be added. Inman
and Rubinfeld criticize Krelove-Myers on this ground without denying that
household relocation could have an equilibriating effect that neutralizes tax
exportation. They wonder whether the correction would occur speedily. If it
occurred slowly, there would remain room for fiscal myopia on the part of
local politicians.' 98
 They note in addition that the mainstream models allow
for a greater range of local tax devices and heterogenous citizen preferences,
or, in other words, for politics as we commonly experience it. Given multiple
types, the Krelove-Myers equilibrium would not generally be efficient)99
Finally, they note the awkwardness of an assumption that local governments
explicitly consider the effects of their fiscal decisions on relative household
welfare across localities. Local government actors performing in accordance
with this assumption are hyper-rational beings who perceive all external effects
and subject them in advance to the equilibriating analysis of the Krelove-Myers
model. 20° Inman and Rubinfeld think the Gordon models' myopia assumption
resonates better.
So do we. The Krelove-Myers models expunge the political factor that the
other tax competition models accept into their objective functions. The
expungement facilitates a solution to the problem of fiscal externalities and
allows the reinstatement of a first-best presumption respecting junior level
authority. But the models have to layer on the assumptions even then - the
mainstream tax competition models presuppose neither homogenous preferences
nor a universe limited to two tax devices. Krelove-Myers also aggravate the
old Tieboutian problems of information and entrepreneurial incentives. To see
this, contemplate the behavioral characteristics of the hyper-rational Krelove-
Myers politician. Under the model's assumptions, this actor operates in a
world of homogenous preferences and makes sure that the tax regime gives
locals no welfare advantages over non-residents. Such behavioral characteris-
tics approach those of the benevolent politician of the public interest theory
of government of the 1950s and 1960s! The resemblance stands to reason.
Krelove-Myers, like the Tiebout model itself, purports to claim a complete and
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 164, at 324.
' Moreover, given elasticity of supply of all factors of production, there literally will
be no rents to tax, returning us to the efficient but infeasible world of the Tieboutian head
tax. Id. at 324.
200 Id. at 323.
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spontaneous solution to local level public choice problems. For that to occur,
a benevolent hand, whether visible or invisible, has to be at work somewhere.
It also should be mentioned that the interpolation into a tax model of a fully-
informed, public-spirited government actor does not by itself guarantee a first
best result. A recent model by Nechyba makes this assumption to show that
such actors' attempts to reform distortive local tax regimes can be frustrated
by citizen migration. 20 ' The model assumes that politicians are informed
about the interjurisdictional effects of the taxes they set, but that citizens, who
have immobile real estate holdings and mobile incomes, are myopic respecting
the effects of their locational decisions. The model also assumes that politi-
cians, subject to a budget balancing requirement, set taxes by choosing a
proportion of a flat real property tax and a flat rate income tax and that citizens
have heterogenous preferences. The model shows what happens when politi-
cians in one jurisdiction attempt to improve its tax system by increasing the
proportion of the less distortionary income tax. Unsurprisingly, types whose
income is high in proportion to real estate ownership react to the shift by
moving out; meanwhile, immigrants attracted to the reformed tax system have
low incomes in proportion to real estate owned and may include both high and
low income types. 202
 At the bottom line, the shift to the less distortionary
tax causes the overall income of the jurisdiction and its tax base to shrink.
Furthermore, an income tax, even if uniformly employed across the jurisdic-
tions, will not result in a stable situation - politicians in each jurisdiction will
have an incentive to lower the income tax and let the voters increase the
property tax in response. Local politicians in effect are locked into the property
tax despite its distortions.203
201 Thomas J. Nechyba, Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjuris-
dictional Competition and Coibision, Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper 5419,
Jan. 1996.
202 The opposite results if the proportion of property tax is increased. Id. at 9.
203 Id. at 24. Interestingly, if there existed opposition to the property tax, there might exist
a prisoners' dilemma in that politicians would be forced to introduce simultaneously an
income tax, but every party would have an incentive to breach the agreement. This type
of agreement is unlikely unless there is a third party which could monitor and police the
agreement (for example, the state government). Since the state government can legislate
a uniform tax and transfer the monies back to the local level, it is assumed that the state
behaves as a enforcement body for the politicians' collusive agreement. For the record,
Nechyba assumes that such a state grant system is an effective response to voter dissatisfac-
tion with the property tax regime, particularly since it represents a low cost method to
satisfy voter demands (and thus avoiding the migration effects) while satisfying their own
preferences.
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B. Asymmetric Information Models of Local Public Goods Production
Another, more tentative, line of public economics reconstructs the paradigm
of jurisdictional competition for a second-best world, transforming it into a
branch of the economics of asymmetric information and mechanism design.
These models focus on the problem of an absence of incentives to induce
government actors to produce local public goods at a marginal rate. To solve
the problem, they propose revelation mechanisms that cause politicians and
bureaucrats to tell the truth about their costs. The Tiebout mechanism is not
necessarily discarded. But, by supplementing it, the models concretely
acknowledge its inadequacy. Other models bypass it entirely on the ground that
fails to offer a viable profile of an efficient public goods producer. 204 These
models substitute a political jurisdictional competition story205
 in which cast-
ing a ballot replaces voting with the feet as the preference matching mechan-
ism. 206 Emphasis thereby devolves on information asymmetries that impair
the vote's disciplinary effect.
1. Information Revelation by Local Government Agents in a Tiebout
Context
- Can the interpolation of an additional preference matching device cure the
Tiebout model's infirmities and make it a robust public policy tool? A model
by Hoxby attempts to do this, claiming to enhance the responsiveness of local
government in a Tiebout world 207
 by adding a new mechanism drawn from
the theory of optimal regulation developed by Laffont and Tirole. 208
 We are
not convinced that this exercise taken alone imports real world robustness to
the Tiebout mechanism, but we agree that it takes the literature an important
204 See supra text accompanying note 132.
205 These models build on the political model introduced by Epple & Zelenitz, supra note
139. Epple and Zelenitz showed that sorting does not ameliorate the problem of fiscal rent
extraction. Unlike early Tiebout work, they assumed an exogenous number of communities,
inflexible community boundaries, and inactive landowners and developers. The role of
politics was introduced by virtue of the fact that local government, given passive owners
and residents, will attempt to maximize its tax revenues by usurping maximal land rents.
206 A simple experiential point further supports this switch - voting in elections offers
a less costly alternative to migration. See Tim Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior:
Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 25, 26 (1995).
207 Caroline Hoxby, Is There an Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off in School Finance? Tiebout
and the Theory of the Local Public Goods Producer, Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research Working
Paper 5265, Sept. 1995.
208 See LAFF0NT & TIROLE, supra note 45.
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step in this direction.
Hoxby presents us with a school board that actively pursues two goals: to
provide quality education but not to have the price exceed the marginal cost.
This entrepreneurial profile follows from two key Tieboutian assumptions
- first, that residents already have sorted themselves into different school
districts and that there is an equilibrium, 209
 and, second, that public goods
producers have an incentive to limit costs since in the long run high cost
providers will forced to exit the market.
An information problem hobbles the school board as it tries to achieve its goal
of quality production at the margin. Although school quality is observable by
the board and the residents of the school district, it is not verifiable. The
school board's agent, the administrator, reports actual costs, but the board does
not know the parameters of the cost function. Such incomplete information
makes rent extraction easy for the administrator and leads to diminished
effort.21°
The industrial organization model, developed by Laffont and Tirole, shows
that it is possible, via an information revelation mechanism, to obtain truthful
information about the cost parameters of a regulated firm. According to the
theory, the regulator's problem is that, due to hidden information, it must set
a price for the firm's output based on the probability distribution respecting
marginal costs, where the firm knows its actual marginal cost has no incentive
to report it truthfully. The theory shows us that the regulator can use the
probability distribution to design a price menu based on an optimal combina-
tion of rents allowed to the firm and surplus supplied to the consumer. The
menu facilitates the maximization of expected economic welfare under condi-
tions of information asymmetry.21'
Applying the theory in her school model, Hoxby assumes two types of school
administrator, efficient and inefficient, and then introduces two menus, incen-
209 Otherwise, there would be an incentive for resident groups to migrate to high quality
school districts.
210 Assuming that there are low and high cost school administrators, the informational
asymmetry allows low cost types who might be forced to invest in productivity gains to
capture rents. The social costs of these rents may prevent high cost types from making
productivity enhancing investments.
211 And under the incentive and individual rationality constraints of the regulated firm.
Under an incentive-compatible regime the regulator is positioned to offer an optimal tradeoff
between control of rents to the firm and the transfer of surplus to consumers.
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tive compatibility for the efficient type and inefficient rationality for the
inefficient type. Under the incentive compatibility constraint, the efficient
school - that is, the school with low cost or high demand parameters - can
mimic inefficient school. That is, the information asymmetry permits the
efficient school to decrease its effort level for each level of improvement in
its cost or demand parameters. The trick in the model comes when the regula-
tor offers a side payment to both types of school administrator. Given this
offer, the efficient school will provide truthful information concerning its cost
and demand parameters and the average cost to produce the good. More
particularly, the efficient, low cost school will have an incentive to select a
low subsidy and a high marginal side-payment. In contrast, a high cost school
will choose the converse combination. The upshot of the menu approach is that
it allows the regulator to take account of this observable but unverifiable
information about the schools' cost parameters in setting the price sched-
ule.212
Hoxby couples this Laffont-Tirole revelation mechanism to a short-run
Tiebout mechanism. She thereby offers a solution to one of the Tiebout
model's primary informationproblems, that of the unverifiable quality of many
public goods. If this information problem were the only friction impairing
Tiebout mechanism's viability as a basis for policymaking, this might be the
breakthrough showing. But information asymmetries are not the only signifi-
cant friction that must be confronted. This point emerges when we reexamine
the model's assumptions: The school board desires to produce at the margin
because otherwise population loss will put the jurisdiction out of business. For
such an incentive to obtain, every other assumption on the Tiebout list has to
be left in place. 213
 But, as we have seen, those assumptions do not describe
the real world. Hoxby, then, has not delivered an entrepreneurial public goods
producer and we have no basis to predict that the school board will design a
revelation mechanism in the first place. 214
 The model's accomplishment must
212 The importance of a revelation mechanism is that it effectively introduces a cost and
quality index to assist the board in its pursuit of reducing costs and increasing school
quality.
213 Indeed, if that were the case we would be in a first-best world and the school adminis-
trator would share the school board's incentive to produce at the margin for fear of losing
her job due to bankruptcy. On such a scenario, the administrator has every incentive to tell
the truth, eliminating the information asymmetry!
214 The device presumably would have to be imposed by a higher governmental authority
as a process and structure reform.
Some problematic preconditions to the operation of the Laffont-Tirole paradigm also
might be mentioned. The model assumes that the regulator has the first-mover advantage
by means of a take it or leave it offer. As this assumption is relaxed, a commitment problem
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be narrowly stated: Given a Tiebout mechanism on the demand-side there is
in theory a mechanism that can ameliorate supply-side information problems
and realign supply-side incentives in a productive direction.
2. Yardstick Competition
- Yardstick competition models seek to ameliorate the Tiebout model's short-
comings by abandoning mobility as the source of competitive incentives and
substituting the vote. More specifically, these models posit that a form of
jurisdictional competition obtains when voters demand that their governments
do as well as governments in other jurisdictions in providing low cost, high
quality public goods. In so doing, these models draw on a specific branch of
the agency literature - the theory of tournaments. 215
 Once again the focus
arises and it becomes impossible to predict that the bargaining process will always result
in an efficient outcome. In the alternative, the regulated firm may test the regulator's
commitment to a policy by refusing to participate, leading to a temporary breakdown of
negotiations. In this case, the regulator will find it difficult to make credible commitments
for the entire policy period, for example, by refusing ever to make another offer to the firm.
See David P. Baron, The Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agenda, and
Approaches, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY, OLD TOPICs, NEW DIRECTIONS 13 (Jeffrey
S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek, eds. 1995).
215 In contrast with standard incentive devices, tournaments look to the relative perform-
ance of each agent rather than individualistic compensation schemes. This literature was
developed originally to examine the conditions of labor market competition. See Edward
Lazaer & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 841 (1981); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL. J. ECON.
324 (1982). It has been extended to analyze the role of competitive compensation schemes
in economies with imperfect information. See Barry Nalebuff& Joseph Stiglitz, Prizes and
incentives: Towardsa General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELLJ. ECON.
21(1983).
The tournament models concern information problems in principal-agent relationships.
They assume that while the input of agents is not directly and costlessly observable, it is
possible to establish an incentive scheme or reward structure, tied to individual output. They
make a substantive advance in offering a lower cost method to capture information (and
reduce risk levels) while remaining sufficiently flexible to accommodate different environ-
ments. See Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 321,
323 (1985). The models also provide a means to screen agents.
Some shortcomings should be noted. While the models do capture the idea that
compensation schemes can lead to increased effort where there is sufficiently high motiv-
ation (as in the case of law firm rat races), they do not always guarantee a first best level
of effort. See Nalebuff & Stiglitz, passim, at 41. Moreover, experimental work suggests
that the theory is robust in predicting average behavior across tournaments but is less
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is on information asymmetries.
The leading treatment comes from Besley and Case. 216 This is a two-period,
multijurisdictional model of tax setting that, like the Hoxby model, follows the
pattern of the game theoretic models developed in the industrial organization
literature. The model assumes that voters' choices and incumbent behavior are
determined simultaneously and that incumbent politicians decide whether to
increase taxes based on the tax policies of other jurisdictions. Voters and
politicians are asymmetrically informed, with the politicians being better
informed2 ' 7
 about the cost of supplying public goods. Politicians, meanwhile,
come in two types - good types who are responsible to voters and do no rent-
seeking, and bad types who finance their career concerns at the expense of
voters' interests. 218
 The rent-seeking politician adds to the marginal cost of
public goods by adding costs, low or high. There also are three different
external shock values - low, medium, and high - to which politicians
respond in setting tax levels. The asymmetrically-informed voters must decide
successful in predicting behavior in a single tournament. See Clive Bull, Andrew Achotter
& Keith Weigelt, Tournament and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study, 95 J. POL. ECON.
1, 3 (1987).
When the discussions of the tournament literature involve political agents, the model
is adapted to focus on competition between governments. Pierre Salmon, Decentralization
as an Incentive Scheme, 3 OXFORD REv. EC0N. P0L. 55 (1987). This analysis is predicated
on the assumption that the essential problem is that voters are not fully informed concerning
the quality of the politicians' input and that voters use the performance of other politicians
as a benchmark regarding their own politicians' policies (taxation). BRETON, supra note 87,
at 234. See also Pierre Salmon, The Logic of Pressure Groups and the Structure of the
Public Sector, 3 EuR. J. POL. EC0N. 55 (1987).
216 The Besley and Case model addresses the literature on the 'flypaper effect' (money
sticks where it hits), which points to the possibility that bureaucrats, because of their control
of the agenda at the local and state level, can expand the level of public goods output
beyond the demand of the median voter. See, e.g., Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal,
Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct
Democracy, 93 Q. J. Ec0N. 563 (1984) (showing that bureaucrats can set higher budgets
because of their information advantage over voters and the fact that voters are hostile to
an alternative, reversion budget). This literature is deemed to be hostile to the Tiebout
literature because it suggests that jurisdictional competition is insufficient to provide needed
fiscal discipline. See Wallace E. Oates, Federalism and Government Finance, in Quigley
& Smolensky, supra note, at 135.
217 The model follows recent work on asymmetric information and the political agency
problem: See Ken Rogoff, Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 21
(1990).
218 It is assumed that the politicians know each other's type.
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as to their incumbent's type based on performance. 219 The model stipulates
that the voters have an indirect informational means to assess the incumbents'
performance. Specifically, they observe the tax policy and public goods
performance relative to that of other jurisdictions. That information is
employed to set a benchmark to measure the incumbent's performance,22°
thereby to determine the incumbent's type and suitability for reelection.
A range of both pure and mixed strategies emerges in Besley and Case's
formal analysis. 22 ' Here, by way of example, are a few results. Assume first
that voters do not have access to information about tax and public goods
production in other jurisdictions. These voters are likely to reelect an incum-
bent when the incumbent sets an intermediate level tax, assuming a stochastic
shock with a high enough value that insures that an incumbent who has
selected this level is indeed a good type. But, at the same time, a bad incum-
bent can gain reelection on this fact pattern by falsely signalling goodness
through a medium reduction in his rent. Now assume that these voters have
access to information about the tax level in another, identical jurisdiction.
Three possibilities emerge: (a) if both incumbents are good, then there obvi-
ously will be no added tax cost of public goods; (b) if both incumbents are
bad, then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the two incumbents
- both will reduce rents when the cost shock is medium; and (c) if one
incumbent is bad and the other is good, the bad incumbent will be found out
if she sets a higher tax than the good incumbent and is unable to follow the
neutral strategy of lowering her rent; in this case, by virtue of the yardstick
mechanism, taxes are lower in the second period.
Thus does the model show that a reelection mechanism can discipline incum-
bents by forcing them to increase their effort level. Besley and Case go on to
note that this approach is analytically inconsistent with the Tiebout approach
in a significant respect. In a Tiebout world, where citizens would migrate
according to their tax and public goods preferences, citizens dissatisfied with
219 The voters observe their elected politicians' tax-setting behavior in the game's first
period. It is assumed that voters prefer to minimize their expected second period taxes and
so base their beliefs about the politicians type on period one behavior.
Since the transmission of information is noisy, incomplete, and expensive, it is unlikely that
any citizens will invest in monitoring the performance of politicians. Opposition politicians
cannot be relied on because they are just as untrustworthy as the incumbents. The voters
accordingly need an alternative source of credible information.
220 There are, of course, other mechanisms to discipline politicians, such as party control.
221 The scenario leads to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (this generates an equilibrium
in which voters and politicians have rational expectations).
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the incumbent's first period tax level presumably move rather than stay around
to vote no. On the other hand, Besley and Case note the possibility of a hybrid
model in which higher taxes lead to capital flight, with the capital flight
depressing property values and prompting general voter dissatisfaction.
This model, then, breaks with the Tiebout approach at a technical level. But
significant commonalities persist at an aspirational level. The yardstick compe-
tition approach shares the Tieboutian preference for decentralized government
and the view that competition between govermnents can lead to superior
outcomes. Indeed, the stress on information asymmetries comes coupled with
an assertion that better information gives state and local government an effi-
ciency advantage. As between an aggregated national information base and a
local information base, the latter is said to provide better guidance for the
design of regulatory policies and incentive structures. Due to the small num-
bers the politicians know more about the voters and vice versa.
Besley and Case conclude that their tax-setting/vote-seeking story embodies
an insight superior to that of the Tiebout mobility story. They have a point.
Projected election results certainly matter more to politicians in the ordinary
course than do comings and goings of residents and capital, and politicians
certainly do set taxes strategically with voting results in mind. But acknowl-
edgment of the approach's relative superiority does not by itself signal robust-
ness for policy purposes. Here is the question: Given present institutional
arrangements, to what extent do voter performance comparisons determine
state and local election outcomes? Besley and Case address this question with
an empirical study of tax setting and gubernatorial election results. 222 The
results show that tax changes in a neighbor state have a positive and direct
effect on a state's tax equation223 and that a tax increase increases the prob-
ability of incumbent defeat. These are interesting results. But they do not
support the conclusion that vote causes state and local spending levels meet
222 They examined tax changes observed in neighboring jurisdictions and incumbent
governor defeats using tax data for two income classes - joint-filers earning $40,000 and
$100,000 respectively in 1977 without dependents. See also Anne Case, et al., Budget
Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence: Evidence from the States, 52 J. PUB. EC0N.
285 (showing that expenditure changes respond to spending decisions made in other
jurisdictions).
223 For example, a one-dollar increase in neighbors' taxes results in roughly a 20-cent
increase. Id. at 38. These results reflect the assumption that given the different measures
of state taxes, they are likely to respond differently to changes in economic and demographic
factors.
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citizen preferences in any absolute sense. 224
 Nor do they tell us that state and
local regulation is otherwise unimpaired by interest group rent-seeking. Under
this model, after all, if bad types predominate in the population of government
actors, then bad outcomes follow whatever the level of voter information. On
that scenario, state and local government have no apparent advantage over
central government other than the fact that the local information base may
prove better outfitted for interest group rent-seeking!
C. Summary
The new approaches to jurisdictional competition send a complex signal. The
tax competition models make modified Tieboutian assumptions to give us a
detailed picture of market failure at the state and local level. To the extent that
a legal observer deems the assumptions to weaken the results, this literature
has little import for legal federalism. Contrariwise, to the extent a legal
observer accepts the Tiebout model despite its infirmities, these models indicate
that the mode of application of jurisdictional competition in legal context needs
root-and-branch revision. These models tell us that productivity gains through
devolution cannot be assumed, even given Tieboutian assumptions. A plausible
showing must include an exhaustive review of possibilities for distortive fiscal
effects.
The asymmetric information models show us that jurisdictional competition
models may look quite different in the future. The interpolation of the Laffont-
Tirole model of incentive-compatible regulation solves one of the many
information problems assumed away in the Tiebout model. But it does not
import a synergy that clears away all the other sticking points, transforming
the school board into the functional equivalent of an at-the-margin private
producer. The yardstick competition approach takes us one step farther toward
that goal by switching our attention to the vote as the disciplinary mechanism.
But we still do not realize the ideal of responsive local government. This model
makes some troublesome assumptions - first, that voters evaluate their
government by comparing it to similarly situated governments, and, second,
that common voter preferences prevail across jurisdictions. Clearly both
Also, the model must be contextualized in order to account for the range of demo-
graphic and economic conditions which impact on the tax increases in certain states. The
existence of both anticipated and unanticipated shocks means that, unless voters are capable
of making the correlation between the two forms of shock, it is assumed that they respond
to change whether it is anticipated or not.
BRETON, supra note 57, at 189, 233-34. The models also assume that any mobility
based competition between jurisdictions is not for the movement of people but resources.
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conditions exist to some extent in the real world. But it stretches credulity to
suggest that they prevail so powerfully as to solve the incentive problem in
respect of public goods. It may be that junior level democratic political institu-
tions can be designed so as to induce beneficial rivairous behavior. But such
designs have yet to be specified.
The models' focus on information asymmetries suggests a route to the ultimate
test of the robustness of the law as product analogy. If the analogy is robust,
then the remedy of regulatory and political information asymmetries should,
by itself, solve junior level public choice problems. If law is not product, then
transparency by itself will not assure its efficient production.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL FEDERALISM
The first part below sets out recommendations for legal federalism that follow
from our analysis of the economics. The second part below makes some
observations respecting the economics' application in regulatory competition
situations. Recall that the formal models for the most part concern local public
goods and that regulatory competition theory informally extends them to
outputs of regulation. The shift of context can affect the model's application.
In some regulatory competition situations, the model applies with greater
robustness than is the case with local public goods, as we show with respect
to corporate law and analogous situations. In other cases, the models'
problematics carry over unabated, as we show to be the case with environ-
mental law.
A. A Suitability Standard for Claims of Competitive Benefit
1. Implications for Legal Federalism's Devolutionary Presumption
- 
The economics of jurisdictional competition suggest that legal federalism
makes two unjustified predictive leaps. The first is the view, shared by both
race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom proponents, that decentralization by itself
means that competition will be formative influence on terms of regulation. The
economics identify significant frictions - product bundling, mobility costs,
spillovers, information asymmetries, and the lack of a public goods entrepre-
neur - that inhibit appearances of competitive lawmaking in practice. This
implies that regulatory subject matter needs categorization. Some will be
Besley & Case, supra note 206, at 26;
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structurally suited to competitive influence and some will not. Accordingly,
legal regulatory competition theory needs to avoid making a general prediction
and instead should articulate a suitability test.
Legal federalism's second questionable prediction is that, assuming decentra-
lized regulation subject to significant competitive influence, competition will
lead to a first-best outcome. The economics provide no tractable basis for
predicting stable, long-term equilibria in competitive lawmaking situations.
This problem respecting outcomes is exacerbated by two factors. First, the
federal system holds out limitless possibilities for externalization of costs,
possibilities that are more likely to be realized given competitive behavior.
Second, given the Tiebout mechanism's failure to make good on its original
claim to import a discipline that solves public choice problems, any claim of
welfare enhancement through devolution must take account of the possibility
of junior level interest group rent-seeking.
As we have seen, public economists are working on all of these problems. But
they have not yet provided general solutions. The legal literature is left over-
stating the connection between decentralization, competitive behavior, and
efficient results.
This conclusion does not imply a counter-presumption favoring federalization.
Nor does it controvert other public economics observations respecting junior
level regulatory benefits. Recall that public economics articulates an indepen-
dent claim of junior level advantage with the decentralization theorem. This
stresses that preferences are more likely to be satisfied in small numbers
situations, an observation reinforced by the literature of asymmetric informa-
tion. 226 The theorem also asserts that regulatory experimentation is more
likely to occur when a large number of jurisdictions all confront the same
problem. 227 Nothing in our analysis detracts from the force of these
226 Assuming of course that provision at a senior level of government holds out no cost
advantages. See supra notes 52-6 1 and accompanying text.
227 Serious doubts have been raised about the robustness of this claim. One problem is
that it is advanced absent a profile of the levels of risk aversion of government actors at
various levels. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation? 11 J. LEGAL STUDIES 593 (1980) (arguing that local politicians are
more risk averse than are federal and that therefore innovation should be expected at the
federal level). In addition, just as law may be analogized to product, so law, once seen as
product, may be analogized to technology. Unlike many technological innovators,
'awmakers seeking returns on investment face a public goods problem. Moreover, once
technical complexity is present, product competition does not by itself assure innovation,
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points. 228 But, significantly, the decentralization theorem makes claims of
a much lesser magnitude than the does the Tiebout model. It speaks only in
terms of probabilities and makes no absolute claims about the quality of the
projected result. As such it folds easily into traditional federalism dialogues.
We suspect that many observers would comment that traditional federalism
already instantiates its points. All other things being equal the states have
always gotten the nod, and the line about product experimentation finds its
most famous articulation in Justice Brandeis' reference to the states as social
laboratories. 229 Jurisdictional competition theory, in contrast, purports to
preempt thorough-going discussion about appropriate level of regulation by
ascribing determinative benefits to the states.
We also note that our analysis neither denies that jurisdictional competition
occurs in the real world nor implies a presumption of negative effects.23°
as is shown by the application of the economics of network effects, see Klausner supra note
115, and patent races, see Ayres, supra note 70, in the law as product context.
228 We have more doubts about the robustness of the Leviathan theory of the public choice
literature, see supra notes 54-5 6 and accompanying text, which advances the idea decentra-
lization acts as a constraint on the budget-maximizing bureaucrats. Few of the empirical
studies are supportive of the thesis that size of government varies inversely with the extent
of fiscal decentralization. See Wallace E. Oates, Searching for a Leviathan: An Empirical
Study, 71 AMER. ECON. REv. 748 (1985); James Heil, SearchingforaLeviathan Revisited,
19 PUB. FIN. Q . 334 (1991). The discussion is by no means settled, however— there are
now two studies to the opposite effect. See Jeff Zax, Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighbor-
hood?, 79 AMER. ECON. REV. 560 (1989); Randall W. Eberts & Timothy J. Gronberg, Can
Competition Among Local Governments Constrain Government Spending?, 24 ECON. REV.
2 (Fed. Res. Bk. Cleveland, 1988). Oates replies in turn that 'there is not enough unambi-
guous support available to make a convincing case that decentralization in itself constrains
government size. If we want smaller government, then other measures are probably in
order'. Wallace E. Oates, Federalism and Government Finance, in Quigley & Smolensky,
supra note 87, at 148.
We also note the appearance of a counterstory reflecting political developments of the
past decade and a half, see Reiner Eichenberger, The Benefits of Federalism and the Risks
of Overcentralization, 47 KYKLO5 403, 407-409 (1994). Eichenberger contends that
centralization weakens the demand for public goods and as a result limits the size of the
budget. Id. Citizens (a) opt out of the system when government actors do not respect their
preferences, (b) react to government rent-seeking activities since they have to shoulder
resulting welfare and budgetary costs, and (c) respond to increasing centralization and
government exploitation by enacting legislation that limits taxation and electing politicians
who support such initiatives. Id.
229 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dis-
sent ing).
230 Nor does our analysis imply rejection of the body of legal scholarship on regulatory
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Instances of state and local government competition cannot be denied. States
and localities routinely make taxing and spending decisions under competitive
stress, stadium deals for professional sports teams and tax breaks for firms
locating new plants being obvious examples. 23 ' In addition, entire areas of
law manifestly have been shaped by competition, corporate law being the
prime example. The competitive corporate law system, although not first-best,
holds out significant benefits of responsiveness to business interests and
technical expertise in its regulators. 232
 We even agree that regulatory compe-
tition appropriately may be termed a federalism value, at least at a broad
structural level. We would not, for example, dispute a prediction that reloca-
tion by citizens, factors, and capital would frustrate the plans of a state that
attempted to cartelize an industry or confiscate the wealth of a class of
firms.233
2. Suitability Standard, the Race-to-the-Top, the Race-to-the-Bottom, and
the Prisoners' Dilemma
- Legal federalism needs to stay in closer touch with the terms of the public
economics if it is to plausibly to connect junior level competition and economic
welfare. Two structural adjustments should move the discourse in this direc-
tion. First, the list of barriers to first-best competitive results should be restated
as a suitability standard. Second, the race-to-the-top and race-the-bottom
concepts should be discarded as misleading.
A claim that competitive benefits redound, presently or prospectively, from
the vesting of regulatory authority at junior level will be more plausible where
(a) the regulation is unbundled, (b) the regulation implicates no substantial
interconnections with other jurisdictions or with later consumers, (c) all actors
affected by the regulation are highly mobile, (d) all actors are well-informed,
and (e) competitive pressures registered by all actors affected by the regulation
determine its content. To the extent that one or more these variables does not
competition. To the contrary, we think that situation-specific legal applications provide a
useful source of material for demonstrating the theory's shortcomings.
' Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1996), confirms this with
an excellent report on the landscape.
232 Our view is articulated in William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861
(1995).
233 See Weingast, supra note 6, at 5.
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obtain, the case for competitive benefits weakens. 234 Meanwhile, a proponent
with a strong claim should be able to describe a causal connection between the
mechanism of competition and the claimed beneficial outcome, showing the
impact on the alignment of interest group politics and other factors that influ-
ence regulatory outcomes in the competing jurisdictions.
Claims of competitive detriment may be slightly easier to sustain under this
standard. Unbundled regulation and mobility still will have to be shown. But
this proponent can omit positive showings respecting information, input by all
affected parties, and an absence of externalities. Instead, a negative showing
respecting these factors advances the claim. We also note that there is a strong
case for relaxing the requirements of showing state level mobility and well-
informed actors where jurisdictional competition theory is drawn on to support
centralized wealth redistribution policies. The point that negative competitive
effects at junior levels require redistribution policy to be centrally managed
has been central to jurisdictional competition theory from the very beginning.
Nothing in the literature of Tiebout problematics disturbs this application.235
There also is backing from a highly suggestive body of empirical studies.236
234 Compare Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 34-35, which also sets out a suitability test
based on the Tiebout model's assumptions. According to Easterbrook, exit will cause a
'powerful tendency toward optimal legislation' to the extent four conditions are satisfied:
(a) mobile people and resources, (b) a large number of jurisdictions, (c)jurisdictions free
to enact any law they desire, and (d) all consequences felt within the jurisdiction. See also
Rice, supra note 25 at 54-55. In our view this test is incomplete, because it omits product
bundling, limited information, and interest group politics.
235 Wilson, supra note 157, carries this point to its logical conclusion and argues if the
power to set and implement redistributive policies is vested at multiple levels of government,
then it is always open to one level of government to undermine income policies promulgated
at another level. Junior level policy coordination remains a possibility, but might increase
the overall costs of achieving an optimum level of income distribution. Viewed through the
lens of regulatory competition theory, strongly stated, such coordination would in any event
be a diluted form of centralization. Thus the problems of taxation and distribution can be
solved only through coordination by the central government.
See supra note 157. This point has been made powerfully in connection with recent
welfare legislation, although not so powerfully as to have had an impact in Washington.
See Paul E. Peterson, Devolution 's Price, YALE L. & POL'Y REv./YALE J. REG. SYMPO-
SIUM ISSUE 111, 112-19 (1996) (citing additional empirical literature); Note, Devolving
Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1984,
1987-89 (1996).
Obviously, redistributive programs are implemented at the state and local level;
interjurisdictional pressures simply contain their magnitude. For discussion see Kaplow,
supra note 12, at 472-79.
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The retirement of the race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom concepts makes
sense for a number of reasons. The frictions that inhibit the Tiebout mechanism
may prevent a race from breaking out in the first place. Even given a race,
the equilibrium discussion teaches us that is unlikely ever to reach the top, or
even if it does reach the top it is unlikely to remain there for very long. In
addition, the capacious concept of externalities applied in the tax competition
literature teaches us that, even given the most promising-looking subject matter
for competitive lawmaking, there remain possibilities for distortive external-
ities. As a result, even with keen competition, central authority will have to
stand by to make adjustments. Race-to-the-top rhetoric obscures all of these
points.
The race-to-the-bottom concept, in its turn, is not an effective vehicle for
challenging weak claims for competitive benefits. The concept makes an
unnecessary concession when it assumes intense junior level competition. And
its all-purpose prisoners' dilemma story has been rebutted persuasively.237
Meanwhile, the tax competition literature shows that an important point about
distortive competition has been overlooked in legal discussions: A showing of
downward directed competition - whether at a race or a walk and whether
or not reaching the bottom - does not presuppose a prisoners' dilemma. An
assumption of government myopia and an open economic concept of an
externality provide a capacious framework. 238
 Of course, as noted above,
the myopia assumption has been controverted within public economics. But,
as a particularized instantiation of the familiar concept of bounded rationality,
it should resonate quite well in legal contexts. Finally, nothing in the econ-
omics per se delegitimates political and public interest justifications for central-
ization in legal contexts.
3. Scare Talk
- One likely objection to our analysis of the economics needs to be discussed.
It is sometimes said that actual mobility is not necessary for operation of the
Tiebout mechanism. Exit need not occur, it need only be threatened. To see
this, hypothesize a decentralized regime in which (a) citizens, factors, and
capital are very mobile, (b) the content of regulation figures into locational
237 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. Although we note the formal economics
does confirm that prisoners' dilemmas can be made out in jurisdictional competition
situations. See supra note 162.
Cf. Richard Briffault, TheLocal GovernmentBoundar-y Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1147 (1996) (localities acting in own interest will not decide
optimally because they will not take regional interests into account).
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decisions, (c) interest group deals determine the content of regulation in each
jurisdiction, and (d) the attraction of new citizens, factors, and capital does not
affect the content of the interest group deals. Competition does not shape the
law in this system in a purposive sense. Yet, so long as mobility obtains and
regulation affects locational decisions, the regulatory status quo affects the
movement of citizens, factors, and capital. A prediction that movement could
become a lawmaking influence as conditions change over time is justified. The
potential for future competitive influence can be seen as a benefit intrinsic to
any decentralizing initiative. On this picture, regulatory competition
legitimately can figure into policymaking calculations whether or not it present-
ly influences regulation or is likely to do so in the immediate future. It need
only be a possibility. 239
 The argument finds additional support in the
contestable markets approach to antitrust, under which the possibility of
attracting new entrants into a monopolized market served as an adequate
market discipline on the monopolist.240
The argument is a good one. But the question is whether, taken alone, it
displaces the economics of Tiebout problematics to support devolutionary
initiatives on an 'as if' basis. We would answer no, and these preemptive
competition arguments to one side for situation-specific application. We note
first that the contestable markets view is rejected under a succeeding economics
of monopoly. Given a long list of imperfections - including downward
sloping demand, nonconvexities, and imperfect information - potential
competition is now thought to have limited effects and not to provide a basis
for a regulatory presumption. 24 ' The analysis of the infirmities of regulatory
competition works similarly. Given the sticking points, there is a good possibil-
ity that preemptive competition arguments become 'cries of wolf' over time.
They will sound plausible for a while, but in the event competition does not
in fact break out they will not remain credible over time. 242
 Indeed, even the
first-time call for a preemptive response need not be determinative. The issue
is joined when the opponent suggests that the jurisdiction wait and see if the
239 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 34, at 738-46 (arguing that the SEC should amend its
regulations to facilitate competition with foreign markets for equities even though domestic
companies still issue equity at home, because competition will come in the future).
240 See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. L. & EC0N. 55 (1966); supra note
35.
241 See STIGLITZ, supra note 116, at 119-125.
242 An exception for wealth redistribution policy again may be appropriate. Here the cry
of wolf is made when a local welfare regime threatens to draw poor people to the jurisdic-
tion. Given the prejudice against the poor in American society, the cry may prompt action
on the thinnest of empirical bases.
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predicted competitive situation actually occurs. On this analysis, the preemptive
call carries the most weight in a situation where the proponent can show a first
mover advantage in a potential competitor state. 243 Delay has a cost in that
case. Otherwise, the jurisdiction that sees a countervailing policy reason not
to try to compete might as well wait and see, standing ready to copy the first
mover in the event a competitive outbreak causes injury.2
B. Implications for Regulatory Competition
The economics of jurisdictional competition focus primarily on local public
goods production, and do not tend in terms to address regulatory competition
situations. The transition of context to regulatory competition can cause the
precepts of the theory to apply differently than in public goods situations.
Much of the differential can be accessed by grouping regulatory competition
situations into two categories. In the first, conflict of laws rules apply so as
to put firms or individuals in a position to select among a number of jurisdic-
tions for the situs of a legal relationship, and the jurisdictions compete for their
business. In the second, product competition across jurisdictional lines prompts
competitive lawmaking by governments either pursuing new citizens, factors,
and capital or attempting to confer competitive advantages on existing resi-
dents. Both categories overlap at points with local public goods production and
related tax policy.
1. Competition to Confer Legal Status
- The clearest cases of regulatory competition arise when a conflict of laws
regime makes it possible for actors to choose a nominal jurisdictional situs for
a firm, transaction, or other legal relationship. If this choice produces rents
for the jurisdiction selected in the form of taxes, fees, transactional expenses,
or enforcement expenses, then there arises an incentive to shape the applicable
law to suit the selecting actors' preferences. Corporate law is the classic case.
Corporate actors may choose their state of incorporation without regard to the
location of the firm's physical assets. The states have been competing for
chartering business for a century, offering reincorporating firms attractive
codes and ancillary services in exchange for franchise tax revenues.
243 See Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 So. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1995) (discussing economics of
first mover advantage).
244 See Ayres, supra note 70 (discussing the ease of copy cat responses on the part of
follower states).
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Competition for incorporations also has emerged internationally, if on a lesser
scale. National tax systems vary in the bases on which they prescribe jurisdic-
tion; firms (and individuals) can exploit the systems' limitations by situating
themselves and their transactions in offshore tax havens. 245 What has gone
for the chartering of firms also has gone for the registration of ships - a
handful of leading jurisdictions offer regulatory havens to ship owners
worldwide. 246 This pattern of competitive lawmaking is not limited to the
siting of commercial relationships. Liberal marriage and divorce rules can
produce tourist revenues for jurisdictions accessible to population centers with
more restrictive family law regimes.247
The literature of Tiebout problematics shows us why the sale of status shows
up in practice as the clearest case of regulatory competition. Simply, here the
problem of the entrepreneurial government actor is solved. Nominally sited
legal relationships such as incorporation and marriage are unbundled legal
products that can be sold separately to foreign consumers. Their provision
leads to a two-party transaction resembling a conventional sale of goods. With
customers of means, such as wealthy individuals or large firms, mobility
presents a cost but not a barrier. Verifiability either presents no problem, as
with marriage and divorce, or readily may be delegated to the judgment of a
legal professional. The intermediary role of lawyers is especially prominent
with corporate law. Reincorporating firms can choose among 50 state codes.
They base their decisions on information channelled through their lawyers (and
their investment bankers). 248 Lawyers, in turn, draft the state codes from
which the reincorporating firms select. Their participation has contributed to
245 A 1985 Senate Committee Report identifies 29 tax haven jurisdictions worldwide. S.
COM . ON Gov'TAL AFF., Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies,
S. REP. No. 130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-31, 33-34 (1985). The largest of the states on
the list are Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. id. The report lists three distinguish-
ing characteristics: Low or nonexistent taxes on foreign source income; bank secrecy; and
banks and financial institutions with a dominant role in trade and commerce. Id.
246 The leading open registry states are Liberia, Panama, Singapore, Cyprus, and Vanuatu.
J. Wells, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR. L. REv. 221, 22 1-223
(1981). They offer easy registration procedures and free transferability, no income taxes,
no restrictions on manning by foreign nationals, and no other significant domestic regula-
tions. Id. Registration in an open registry jurisdiction increases the market value of the ship.
Id.
247 At one time Nevada divorces were the primary example. Today the question is whether
the point might obtain for same sex marriages. Brown, supra note 243.
248 ROMAN0, supra note 37, at 43-44; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
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an evolutionary of convergence on the basic terms of the 50 state codes and
the appearance of a focal point model code. As a result, despite 50 alterna-
tives, reincorporation presents a manageable informational problem.
As to these relationships, then, law may indeed approximate product. But,
significantly, status entrepreneurship is not a game any status-providing
jurisdiction can play. Particular conditions tend to obtain in jurisdictions in
which product sales become wrought into the lawmaking structure. Sufficient
competitive incentives do not show up throughout the class of potential supp-
liers. Small jurisdictions tend to take leading competitive roles: Delaware is
the jurisdiction of incorporation of about half of the corporations listed on the
New York Stock Exchange; small island states tend to offer themselves as tax
havens; Liberia, Panama, and Greece lead in the registration of ships. The
explanation prevailing for Delaware probably applies across the board. Corpor-
ate franchise fees amount to 15 percent of Delaware's tax base; the same cash
flow would be a trivial percentage of the tax base of a large state. Given a
limited market, competitive success has a larger percentage impact on the
smaller government budget of a small jurisdiction. Political and financial
incentives to create (or enter) a legal product market arise when this significant
payoff is held out. The incentive relationship lends plausibility in the product
market in turn. The small jurisdiction's propensity to fiscal dependence on its
legal business provides a structural assurance that customer interests will take
precedence over all competing interests in local political deliberations.249
Finally, even though the status sale category shows us that entrepreneurial
government actors can exist in practice, there arises no concomitant assurance
that incentives respecting status sales will be aligned so as to assure first-best
lawmaking. Note first that minimal contacts between the granting state and the
customer show up again and again across the examples. Externalization thus
emerges as a fundamental supply side motive, which in turn invites interest
group manipulation on the demand side. Corporate law shows how such a
distortive incentive structure can operate. The locational decision is remitted
to one interested group, corporate management, while the statutory structure
249 ROMANO, supra note 37, at 6-12. But even given such a clear-cut incentive in favor
the interests of a given customer, integration with the rest of the federal system can create
complications. For instance, where enforcement is through private lawsuits, states do not
fully control their product because parties are free to sue elsewhere. See Hay, supra note -
41, at 652. In the corporate law context, this incident of federalism has complicated
Delaware's incentive picture. It must offer the plaintiff's bar sufficient returns to induce
litigation in the state while simultaneously maintaining a reputation for privileging the
interests of management. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 232, at 1898-1900.
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excludes from the political decisionmaking process another group with a
conflicting interest, corporate shareholders. 25° As a result, rent incentives
on the supply side are tied to management's interest on the demand side.
Juridical path dependencies and collective action problems prevent the share-
holders from exploiting any opportunities to register their influence on the law
of any of the fifty available jurisdictions so as to make the competitive system
work for their benefit. The result is regulatory capture constituted by a com-
petitively-driven lawmaking system.' Since management's preferences vast-
ly outweigh those of the shareholders in the resulting legal regime, it is
suboptimal in the evaluations of most observers.2
2. Competition for Citizens, Factors of Production, and Capital
- Competitive regulation also can result from interactions between regulators
and actors in product markets. The clearest case occurs when rent-seeking
government actors (or private actors in a position to influence those in govern -
ment) seek to attract mobile factors of production or capital, offering invest-
ment-specific tax breaks or subsidies. 3
 A more subtle case occurs when the
regulatory profiles of alternative jurisdictions figure into the locational dcci-
° The first public choice analysis of charter competition is Macey & Miller, supra note
248. See also Butler & Macey, supra note 74 at 679 (arguing that what appears to be
federal-state competition for bank charters is rent-seeking).
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 232. See also James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition
in Securities Markets: An App roach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure
Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 164-66 (1993) (warning that
international competition respecting securities registration could follow only from the utility
functions of managers, and will be desirable only if it operates so as to benefit the interests
of the issuer as a whole).
252 For the proposition that the state's responsiveness to the management interest refutes
any race-to-the-top claim for the system, see, e.g., Ralph Winter, The Race for the Top
Revisited:A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM L. REv. 1526, 1528 (1989); EASTERBROOK
AND FISCHEL, supra note 130, at 222.
It should not be assumed that such competition is upward directed. Leon Taylor,
Infrastructural Competition among Jurisdictions, 49 J. PUB. ECON. 241 (1992), presents
a model in which jurisdictions compete to attract a big-ticket plant project by investing in
new infrastructure. Under the assumptions of Taylor's model, the contest involves net waste
that might be mitigated by central planning. Id. at 25 1-52. Taylor stresses limitations on
the result - waste should be expected where the contest is long, involves a lot of contes-
tants, and the infrastructure has limited alternative uses. Id. Taylor also points out that
existing literature on regulatory competition for industry assumes that the contest itself
consumes no resources. Id. at 242. See also Enrich, supra note 231.
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sions of mobile actors. 254
 Jurisdictional differentials in environmental regula-
tion give rise to a case often discussed. Today large firms can choose among
not only states but nation states when they invest in new plants. As between
two potential venues, the one with less restrictive environmental regulation
may present a more desirable location from a cost point of view. It follows
that capital mobility can put a jurisdiction to a choice between absorbing the
environmental costs of production and attracting investment and the alternative
of satisfying a preference for a clean environment by charging environmental
costs to producers and sacrificing capital investment. As a result, competition
for capital much influences the shape of discussions about environmental law,
and has influenced the shape of environmental regulation.
Capital mobility also is said to influence other regulatory choices. 5 Secur-
254 In core cases of regulatory competition, competition for individuals, factors, or capital
either determines the shape of a legal regime or prompts pressure for its reform. A concept-
ually related class of legal conflicts arises when a legal regime that is not determined by
regulatory competition has consequences for producers or consumers in a competitive
product market that operates across jurisdictional lines. For example, differentials in
environmental regulation that impact on the competitiveness of local businesses have led
to disputes in international trade law. Producers in states with less restrictive environmental
regulation get a cost advantage over producers in a more restrictive state; the disadvantaged
producers, if they cannot secure a relaxation of local regulation, seek retaliatory sanctions
against imports from the less restrictive states. Viewed from the perspective of the more
restrictive state's lawmakers and producers, such a sanction is a competitive lawmaking
response. But it is anticompetitive when viewed from the perspective of the goods market
and its consumers, and may run afoul of an international trade law regime. More generally,
differentials in environmental regulation have been stumbling blocks in the negotiation and
ratification of liberalizing international trade regimes.
Trade law seeks to reduce distortions that result from regulatory competition. Tariffs,
quotas and direct subsidies to export industries all seek to enhance the competitiveness of
local producers, but nevertheless prohibited under the Treaty of Rome, 2 B.D.L.E.L. 45,
GAIT, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, and NAFTA, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). There is a trade law
argument that defends retaliatory sanctions that make up for differentials in environmental
regulation that significantly lower the costs of producers in a less strict regime: The less
strict state's regulatory laxity amounts to a production subsidy. This 'indirect subsidization'
idea has been the justificatory basis for retaliatory sanctions, by the US, but has not
succeeded. See United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, (1991);
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29R, June 1994. For discussion of
these matters, see Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 12.
255 International tax competition presents the case of maximum mobility. Multinational
corporations have proved adept at using internal transfer pricing to shift income to lower
tax venues, avoiding the cost of physically shifting operations. After Britain and the United
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ities regulation is one area of discussion. Capital for a given financing may
be on offer in a number of competing centers worldwide. If investment institu-
tions sited in one of these centers find their freedom of action limited by local
securities or investment laws and lose business to foreign firms and capital
markets, they will, in turn, argue that this international competition justifies
relaxation of the local constraint. Some of these deregulatory initiatives have
prompted changes in domestic securities regulation; others have notY6
All of the frictions that inhibit the appearance and impact of competition in
local public goods situations potentially can come to bear on cases in this
broad, open category of regulatory competition. Competition, accordingly,
cannot be assumed. Even the presence of policy discussions about competition
does not assure its actual presence. For example, it is not clear that the oft-
discussed tie between competition for capital and environmental regulation
actually influences real world locational choices. It recently has been shown
that environmental regulations do not have a statistically significant effect on
plant location decisions.7
The degree to which frictions come to bear will vary with the particular subject
matter. The following discussion makes some observations about structural
tendencies. It begins with externalities, showing how the framework of analysis
of the tax competition models has been applied to competition for environ-
mental regulation to show a theoretical possibility of distortive results. The
discussion goes on to the problems of optimal numbers, mobility, information,
and entrepreneurial incentives.
a. Externalities and Competitive Environmental Policy
- The tax competition literature's influence in legal contexts should not be
cabined to tax policy discussions. Interconnections among all aspects of state
States cut corporate rates during the 1980s, Canada felt impelled to follow suit lest its
corporate taxpayers use paper ruses to shift income out of the country. See Robert A.
Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 62 (1993).
256 In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken limited steps
to facilitate cross-border financing and securities transactions. See Regulation S, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6863 (Apr. 24, 1990); Rule l5a-6 under the Securities Exchange Act,
17 C.F.R. §240.15a-6 (1989); Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1992). But, with the
exception of Canadian firms, see Securities Act Release No. 33-6902 (June 21, 1991), the
SEC has refused to accord mutual recognition home country auditing standards and account-
ing principles of foreign issuers.
257 See Adam B. Jaffe, et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. EC0N. LIT. 132 (1995).
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fiscal policy make these models' learning pertinent across the regulatory
competition debates. Tax policy, for example, can be influenced by policies
respecting investment and employment, and those policies in turn can influence
levels of regulation. A model that shows tax rates being set suboptimally in
a myopic attempt to attract capital thus can be extended to include tradeoffs
made respecting labor and environmental standards and capital investment. It
thus comes as no surprise that a tax competition model already has taken a lead
role in the federalism debate in the environmental law field.
The model is the Oates-Schwab model of environmental law competition. As
is well known, this model has been commended as a theoretical base point for
a devolutionary legal policy. 8
 It is less well known that the model's out-
comes depend entirely on assumptions it makes respecting tax policy. Indeed,
with the help of a recent of a recent extension by Wilson, 259
 the Oates-
Schwab model shows us that fiscal effects of state-based environmental regula-
tion create a structural possibility of inefficiency whenever the regulating state
comes to the table with a suboptimally constructed tax regime. The model
thereby teaches us an important lesson about the appropriate concept of
environmental externalities. Although all legal discussants concede that inter-
state environmental externalities justify federal regulation, they tend to think
in strictly physical terms in so doing, with cross-border pollution emerging as
the primary policy problem. The Oates-Schwab model shows this conception
to be unduly restrictive - fiscal externalities also need to be considered. There
follows a more particular description of the connection.26°
Economic theory tells us that firms should pay taxes equal to the costs of the
public goods they consume plus the external costs imposed by their activities.
Thus do tax levels become connected to environmental regulation: In theory,
a polluting firm can be taxed in the amount of the cost of its pollution, with
the public goods thereby financed being returned to the citizenry as compensa-
tion for the pollution. Predictably, the Tiebout literature asserts that competi -
tion will force this tax to be set at the right level - firm mobility will prevent
competing states from imposing a pollution tax greater than pollution cost;
258 See supra note 162.
259 Wilson, supra note 162, at 393-427. Wilson is a principal contributor to the tax
competition literature. See John Douglas Wilson, A Theory of Interregional Tax Competi-
tion, 19 J. URBAN ECON. 356 (1986).
260 See A.L. Bovenberg & F. van der Ploeg, Environmental Policy, Public Finance and
tile Labour Market in a Second-Best World, 55 J. PUB. EC0N. 349 (1994) (modelling
environmental and tax policy tradeoffs on realistic tax assumptions and getting second-best
results).
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local zoning regulation will assure that firms do not underpay. 26 ' The Oates-
Schwab model takes this a step farther, showing that a regime of environmental
controls can provide a functional substitute for such a regime of pollution and
taxation. Taking a cue from the tax models, Oates-Schwab has the cost-benefit
tradeoff occur with the capitalization of the cost of the regulations. More
particularly, instead of paying tax in exchange for the right to pollute, firms
operate under environmental controls that tie the right to pollute to the hiring
of additional units of labor. The model assumes that the supply of labor is
fixed, 262 and that the states tax labor but not capital. Given these assump-
tions, payment for the emissions comes not in the form of public goods
financed by taxes but in the form of higher wages for factors supplied by
residents. At the bottom line, then, each jurisdiction's residents have an
incentive to cause emissions to be reduced to the point where the marginal
value they place on a cleaner environment equals the marginal loss in output
and employment. 263 The states sort themselves out in accord with their rela-
tive preferences for pollution and wages.2
Wilson shows that land may be substituted for labor as the fixed factor in
Oates-Schwab. Given land use controls, a higher permitted level of emissions
results in higher land rents. This switch to a land-based model makes it easier
to imagine a tax externality. The neat trade off between emissions and rents
works only to the extent that all rent recipients live in the jurisdiction. With
significant absentee land ownership this will not be the case. The absentees will
favor inefficiently lax standards, while the residents will prefer inefficiently
strict standards, exporting the cost to the absentees. The actual result will
depend on the jurisdiction's political equilibrium.265
The Oates-Schwab model similarly incorporates the possibility of a sub-
optimally lax environmental regime when it introduces a tax on capital while
261 Wilson, supra note 162, at 394, 400. The leading models are Fischel, supra note 17,
and Hamilton, supra note 102.
262 Cf. Wilson, supra note 162 (fixed supply of capital in model of tax competition).
263 Oates & Schwab, supra note 73, at 335; Wilson, supra note 162, at 403-405.
264 Wilson points out that this best result depends on the assumption of a fixed labor
supply. A different result obtains if an upward-slope in the labor supply curve is assumed.
Now the regulatory link between emissions levels and employment amounts to a distortion-
ary subsidy to labor. To reduce the subsidy, the permitted amount of emissions has to be
decreased to an inefficiently low amount. The result is a NIIMBY situation— a suboptimally
strict environmental regime. Id. at 405.
265 Id. at 406-7. Here Wilson parallels the Oates-Schwab discussion of political conflict
between blue collar and white collar residents. Oates & Schwab, supra note 73, at 338.
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leaving environmental regulation tied to inputs of a fixed supply of labor.
Unlike the supply of labor, the supply of capital is not fixed in the model. The
result is that stricter emission standards cause a reduction in capital supply,
which has the indirect effect of reducing tax revenues. The cost of stricter
emissions controls now exceeds the jurisdiction's willingness to pay. Given
interstate competition for capital, the result is a race to relax enviromnental
standards in order to attract capital. 2 But, adds Wilson, that result is
avoided if we adjust the model so as to tie permissible emissions to capital
supply rather than labor supply. If capital is taxed at a rate equal to the
environmental cost of an additional unit of capital, efficient emissions regula-
tion reemerges. On the other hand, if the capital tax rate is set higher than the
environmental (and other) costs to the jurisdiction of the investment, then we
are thrown back into a suboptimal competitive situation. Capital outflows
occur, and governments wishing to make up the loss in the tax base lower
environmental standards as they attempt to increase the capital supply. Con-
trariwise, if capital is taxed at an inefficiently low rate - that is, the tax yields
less than the environmental and other costs incurred in the jurisdiction - there
results a propensity toward inefficiently high standards, the NIMBY effect.267
Expanding further, Wilson asserts that, as a general proposition, environmental
regulation should not be used as an instrument for attracting capital into the
jurisdiction. Subsidies and tax reductions present lower cost means to this end
than do environmental standards that fall below those for which citizens
otherwise are willing to pay. But, to the extent that jurisdictions adopt sub-
optimal capital taxation regimes, they are likely to turn to environmental policy
as a way to influence investment levels. 268 And, unfortunately, jurisdictions
have many incentives to tax capital suboptimally. Capital tax levels may be
skewed due to their relation to employment levels. 269 In the alternative, high
transaction costs related to the collection of a capital tax may cause the substi-
tution of environmental policy as a mechanism for influencing investment.270
Significantly, at no point does this discussion make a general prediction of a
downward directed results. Nor, for that matter, does it generally predict
upward directed results. The point instead is that we possess neither a theoreti-
cal nor empirical basis for either prediction. What is needed, says Wilson, is
Oates & Schwab, supra note -, at 	 Wilson, supra note -, at 407.
267 Id. at 408.
268 Id. at 409.
269 Id. at 413-15.
270 Id. at 41 1-13.
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research that enhances our understanding of the incentives that cause govern-
ments to substitute environmental policy for more effective fiscal tools. And,
he says, the key lies in better understanding of 'political market failures' 27I
b. Optimal numbers
- 
On the surface, optimal numbers are less of a concern with regulation than
with public goods, since words on a page do not present the same scale
economy problems as do the production of goods and services such as streets
and education. But, on reflection, concerns respecting scale economies are not
absent. The most prominent line of questions respecting competitive decentra-
lization concern regulatory conventions - expected regularities of behavior
such as the rules of the road. 272 These perform a coordinating function anal-
ogous to that performed by the taxing sovereign who provides traditional
public goods. Any one of a range of behaviors may be equally rational, but
costs will be saved if a means can be found to select one behavior pattern in
the range. With the rules of the road, uniformity saves accident costs. With
standardized default rules for contracting parties, uniformity economizes on
the transaction costs of search, verification, and coordination. 273 The same
thing can be true for regulation. With product specifications, diversity across
jurisdictions can increase transaction costs of compliance by foreign producers
or, worse, amount to a form of protectionism; harmonization can bring scale
economies and increased competition. 274 Thus, given trade and mobile factors
and capital, cost minimization requires horizontal units to operate together as
a juridical system to some extent. Decentralization looking to the benefits of
competition will become suboptimal at the point where the number of resulting
jurisdictions is so large that diversity begins to entail net costs.
Advocates of maximal decentralization have a standard response to this line
of analysis. With regulation (unlike public goods production in geographically
bounded political subdivisions) a plausible spontaneous order story can be told.
Efficient local legal regimes can evolve on a trial and error basis at a local
level without the necessity of central adjustments for the purpose of harmoniz-
271 Id. at 396, 408. It should be noted that Wilson suggests several models and avenues
of inquiry in addition to those mentioned here. In any event, this the theoretical result tracks
the detailed responses to Revesz, supra note 10, in the environmental law literature. See
Esty, supra note 144, at 638-5 1; Swire, supra note 62, at 94.
272 DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION (1969).
273 Charny, supra note 70, at 443-44.
274 Stewart III, supra note 33, at 2043-44. See also Esty, supra note 144, at 613-23
(showing how technical complexities implicated in environmental regulation make state
regulation unfeasible).
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ation. The market can set the balance between regulatory diversity and har-
monization. Mobile capital and factors of production will gravitate to the
jurisdictions with the best rules; those rules, having thus risen to the top, then
will serve as focal points for other jurisdictions, which will imitate them.275
Harmonization results on a bottom-up rather than a top down basis.276
Given complete capital and factor mobility, intense competitive pressures, and
stable equilibria, evolutionary processes very well might produce the cost-
beneficial regime envisaged. But suppose these assumptions are not safe. If,
in practice, citizen, factor, and capital mobility and competitive pressures on
regulators are sporadic and vary in intensity with different subject matter, then
costly diversity can persist over time. Given this deadweight cost, centralized
coordination to provide a uniform set of standards - default rules or man-
dates, depending on the subject matter - would economize on transaction
costs 277 In sum, any guarantee that junior level regulation assures an optimal
degree of uniformity respecting regulation, depends on the safety of the other
assumptions the Tiebout model makes.
c. Mobility
- Once again the question goes to the particular mobile actor or factor sought
by jurisdiction and the cost involved. Competition for residents, for example,
is more likely to show up among localities within a state or states within a
federation than among nation states. There is a trend towards greater interna-
tional labor mobility, but its level is often overstated. 278 Movement of labor
between countries remains too small to have much economic significance.279
The upshot of this discussion is a notion of differential mobility: In advanced
275 Cf. Krauss, supra note 115, at 786-96 (describing emergence of spontaneous order
emerges as dominant strategy in repeated 'crossroads' game); Klausner, supra note 115,
at 848 (firms have incentives to produce products compatible with a dominant product and
will imitate).
276 The corporate law system provides an example of this process. See William W.
Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1994);
William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the Results
of Competition, in INT'L REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 153.
277 Charny, supra note 70, at 436-37. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An
Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 131, 132 (1996), which studies
adoption patterns of uniform state laws and concludes, based on an exogenous and informal
concept of efficiency, that a combination of jurisdictional competition and interest group
politics causes higher adoption rates of efficient statutes.
278 Woolcock, supra note 101, at 301.
279 KRUGMAN II, supra note 97, at 181.
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economies, capital's mobility will exceed that of labor, particularly across
national borders, and the mobility of financial capital and capital for new
producing investments will exceed that of capital already invested in hard
assets or locationally situated through ties of goodwill. 280 Incidences of regu-
latory competition will reflect the differentials. We are unlikely to see competi-
tion for residents across national borders along the lines predicted by Tiebout's
model of government. Instead, as we apparently have begun to see in the area
of securities regulation, national regulators will be forced to compete to offer
low-cost regulatory products to highly mobile factors. 28 ' In effect, immobile
factors of production - individuals in different countries or locations - will
be competing for the only really mobile factors, capital and technology.282
At the state and local level, higher relative mobility for capital and technology
may skew the appearance of jurisdictional competition in a direction quite
different from that predicted by the Tiebout model. Given a weak mobility
constraint on government actors, local public goods production may proceed
relatively uninfluenced by market constraints. Simultaneously, tax policy and
industrial regulation could be heavily influenced as government actors chase
capital investment.283
d. Information
- The problem of asymmetric information will be ameliorated on the demand
side in some regulatory competition situations by the appearance of intermedi-
aries who, given demand for information, will appear to collect and channel
it to consumers for a fee. One suspects that for Tiebout's relocating individuals
the information asymmetry problem is ameliorated only in a small degree by
networks of real estate agents. But, with a shift of the subject matter to compe-
tition for regulatory goods across states and nations, the profiles of
informational intermediaries become more pronounced. We have seen that
lawyers and investment bankers disseminate information about corporate law
across the 50 states. Similarly, large law firms provide the comparative
expertise necessary for consumer choice among regulatory regimes within the
° See Shaviro, supra note 44 at 964; Green, supra note 255 at 57-58.
281 See Cox, supra note 251. But even here in this most fluid of international situations,
a number of factors seem to be keeping capital tied to home markets. See Perry, supra note
34, at 708 (citing tax policy, the issuer's desire for a public profile, administrative costs,
and domestic market efficiency in accounting for fact that American companies still tend
to raise equity capital at home).
282 Woolcock, supra note 101, at 306.
283 BRETON, supra note 57, at 192.
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50 states and internationally. 284 Since these lawyers will be consulted by both
sellers and buyers of regulation and will themselves move in and out of
government, their intermediary role will be far from passive. But they may
very well solve any serious problems of information availability respecting
regulation (if not of information cost). Generally, then, as the scale of regula-
tory consumer choice expands from the local and mundane to the far ranging
and grand - from the choices to individuals to the choices of those who
manage capital - information asymmetries become less of a problem.
One other information problem should be mentioned, this one on the supply
side. Law production results from deliberative, political processes. As we saw
with the tax competition models, if asymmetrical information exists
amongst competing lawmakers, or one set of regulators fails properly to
account for the choices of another, 286
 no equilibrium matching of regulation
and preferences will result. Alternatively, one jurisdiction may inaccurately
predict the tradeoff calculus prevailing in another, setting its regulatory
standard lower (or higher) than necessary. 287 Later development of a full set
of information will at least create an opportunity for a cure, provided that other
factors remain relatively stable. Given keen competitive forces, neither interest
group deals nor political stasis should get in the way of an adjustment. Relative
stakes should be pertinent once again: The greater the capital investment riding
on a particular regulation, the less of a problem information asymmetries
should present.
e. Entrepreneurial Incentives and Regulatory Capture
- 
As with local public goods, credible predictions of beneficial regulatory
competition require sustained attention to supply and demand side
incentives. 288 Compare once again the situation of a conventional producer
284 Yves Dezalay, Between the State, Law and the Market: The Social and Professional
Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena, in INT'L REGULATORY
COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 59.
285 See supra text accompanying note 162.
286 Majone I, supra note 69, at 24. See also Bewley, supra note 84, at 720. International
tax competition has been described as an area of perverse effects resulting from failings of
technical understanding on the part of taxing authorities. According to Green, supra note
255, at 59-60, manipulation of source-based corporate tax systems leads to competition,
but not a competition related to levels of public goods production.
287 Stewart III, supra note 33, at 2059.
288 Indeed, even though the Tiebout model does not make this demand, such attention has
been the practice of many legal scholars. Discussions of regulatory competition respecting
product standards and product liability are distinguished for the care they take to include
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of private goods to that of a regulator. In conventional product markets, cost-
benefit calculations on both the supply and demand side focus on the price and
quality of a single product and result in the consummation or rejection of a
two-party transaction. With regulation, in contrast, the product's welfare
effects often present complex conflicts of interest. If, for example, the regula-
tion is a new environmental control, government actors must consider welfare
effects on all constituents of polluting firms resident in the jurisdiction, in
addition to effects on the firms themselves and on the residents who do (and
do not) bear the cost of the pollution. Differential effects present problems of
preference aggregation and difficult political calculations. The rent-incentives,
electoral interests, and welfare concepts of multiple actors are implicated. In
addition, bundles of issues may become tied together in the decisionmaking
process.289
There results a problem of winners and losers. The lawmaker's preference
aggregation problem will not necessarily admit of a neat solution. Some
affected actors may be dissatisfied with the regulatory result, whether or not
competitively determined. The theory remits the losers to self-protection
through relocation to a more satisfactory jurisdiction. In the environmental law
example, where regulation is enacted, polluting firms must disinvest and
reinvest elsewhere; where regulation is not enacted pollution sensitive individ-
uals must move somewhere with a stricter code. The problem is that the
technical possibility of ex post exit does not solve the lawmaker's ex ante
preference aggregation problem. Given bundled regulatory products, informa-
tion asymmetries, associational ties, cultural preferences, and the costs of
consideration of probable lawmaker incentives. The earliest such model is Rice, supra note
25, at 56-60, which projects a race by the states toward stricter product standards than they
otherwise would prefer. The ultimate cause is the product manufacturers' inability to design
and price to reflect differentials between the laws of more and less strict states. In Rice's
model, legislative movement toward stricter standards is sparked by a class of disadvantaged
merchants. Solmine, supra note 41, at 72-73, backs up McConnell, supra note 41, on
suboptimal product liability litigation, with an interest group story. State supreme court
judges, says Solmine, are not fully insulated from interest group pressure. Finally, Hay,
supra note 41, at 617-18, 651-52, rebuts McConnell by arguing that the states' pro-plaintiff
conflicts rules give them room to make their own liability rules less stringent, thus favoring
their own manufacturers.
The credibility of any of these projections can be questioned. The point is that when
they are included the black box is opened and chances for evolution of an accurate descrip-
tion are enhanced.
289 Information problems also may inhibit preference sorting in the environmental area.
See Esty, supra note 144, at 631.
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movement, exit will not be a viable option for all dissatisfied parties.
There also remains a possibility of regulatory capture. Given the frictions, the
presence of junior-level competition does not guarantee that the political
process of trading off preferences and policies operates as a Pareto superior
preference matching mechanism. To see this, return to the environmental law
example and draw an analogy to the result with competitive corporate law.29°
By analogy to the case of corporate law, interest groups favoring pollution
could effectively organize themselves so as to capture regulators throughout
the class of jurisdictional alternatives so that the list of clean air alternatives
dwindles to the point at which the regulatory decision might as well have been
made by the central government. On this scenario, the dissatisfied parties do
not even have exit available as a possibility. Given differential mobility,
nothing in the competition model prevents this result.
More generally, if a complex of variables connects competition and product
quality, then the outcomes predicted in regulatory competition models will have
to be stated in relative terms. Given qualified predictions, the evaluation of
present or projected regimes of competitive lawmaking may come to turn on
descriptions of the institutional contexts in which competition influences
lawmaking, 29 ' and closer attention to distortions stemming from interest
group politics.
V. CoNcLusIoN
The economics of jurisdictional competition have followed a standard social
science pattern during their four decade history. After a confident start,
ordinary testing and criticism has led to retrenchment. A tentative theory
emerges today. It is still heavily couched in enervating assumptions, while
empirical confirmations remain suggestive only. Actors in the field, dissatisfied
with the construct, experiment with improvements and alternative means to the
same end. Legal federalism should take the economics on its own terms. This
means a plausible case for a competitive solution to a regulatory problem
requires a situation-specific demonstration both of projected beneficial effects
and the absence of perverse effects identified in the economic literature.
Lawyerly presumptions have no place.
290 See supra text accompanying note 250.
291 Cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 61(1992).
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Our claim that legal federalism does not reflect the terms, implications, and
problematics of the formal economics on which it draws gives rise to an
institutional question. Given the competitive and critical nature of academic
discourse, why such a long wait for an arbitrage corrective to this situation
of interdisciplinary information asymmetry? We answer by analogy to the
literature on efficient markets, which teaches that informationally efficient
results depend on the presence of an appropriate incentive structure. 292 Sim-
ply, law and economics are not incentive compatible, at least in this case.
Several factors explain the absence of incentives favoring thorough arbitrage
from public economics. 293 Some of these are particular to the context. For
example, legal jurisdictional competition is a disaggregated discussion. Appli-
cations and critical responses occur in separate, well-defined subject matter
categories - local government and land use, corporate, environmental,
products liability, trade, and so forth. The subject matter divisions amount to
natural barriers to the circulation of information. Local government and
property law are the only applications with strong subject matter affinities to
public economics. Unsurprisingly, these discussions tend to be better informed.
In addition, the sharpest criticisms of the theory have followed from a race-to-
the-bottom perspective. This means that they pursue the position that competi-
tion is an intrinsically illegitimate influence on regulation, even as they share
a number of assumptions respecting the presence and effects of competition
with the theory's proponents. A race-to-the-bottom proponent has little incen-
tive to look to the parent economics for useful ideas.
Broader structural disincentives also should be mentioned. Interdisciplinary
legal discourses do not necessarily replicate the critical incentive structures of
the natural and social sciences. We suspect, for example, that because legal
scholarship is normative - that is, it tends to be directed more to the support
of policy positions than to accurate description - it favors simpler (and often
older) economic models that signal clear bottom-line results. We also suspect
that reputational payoffs tend to favor an initial arbitrage of a particular
292 Few any longer contend that securities markets are strong form efficient - if all
relevant information already is incorporated into market prices, then no one has a financial
incentive to invest in acquisition of new information. If, however, prices only partially
reflect the information level of the best-informed trader, the requisite incentives find a place
in the description. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AMER. EC0N. REV. 393 (1980).
293 The problem also may be derivative. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 73, at 333,
commenting that 'the lessons of theoretical economics have not been well assimilated by
urban economists' in the Tiebout mold.
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economic theory over a maintenance exercise that marginally enriches a well-
established interdisciplinary discourse. Indeed, to the extent that a maintenance
exercise casts doubt on an established policy position supported by an outdated
economics, reputational disincentives may outweigh incentives. There also may
be a numbers problem. The number of legal scholars applying economics is
much larger than the number of trained economists producing legal scholar-
ship. As an economics becomes more complex, the number of potential
observers with an incentive to maintain the information level of the legal
literature becomes smaller. But, as this Article shows, corrective incentives
are not wholly absent in the legal context.
CHAPTER 6
AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: OF THEORY
OF THE FmM AND REGULATORY COMPETITION*
6.1 Introduction
In an ideal world, inquiry into the efficiency of a legal regime would mean the
collection and analysis of empirical information concerning costs and benefits.
But, due to cost constraints and limits on available means of measurement,1
fact studies are the ewception rather than the rule in law and economics.
Instead, legal policy debates respecting efficiency usually deploy economic
theories in the absence of determinative empirical evidence. Efficiency emerges
not as fact but as presumption. For, absent data on costs and benefits, these
debates must be resolved through the allocation of an empirical burden of
proof, with the party ending up bearing the burden losing the debate. Partici-
pants draw on the behavioral predictions of economic theory as they search
for ways to assure the burden's placement on their opponents' shoulders.
Economic models, however, do not come ready-made with burden of proof
recommendations keyed to legal policy debates. They must be. translated and
adjusted for legal contexts. Historically, these arbitrage exercises have sim-
plified the economics, so as to cause it to yield clear policy signals, regulatory
or deregulatory as the case may be. But with some heavily traversed subject
matter, the passage of time has brought such an accumulation of economic
assertions as to cause the presumptive regulatory signal to lose its clarity. Such
a mature literature, by virtue of its very complexity, is less well-suited to the
sustenance of strong policy positions. Policy debates still go forward, of
course. But clarity of position follows less from the terms of economic theory
itself than from the employment of the ordinary tools of normative Iawyerly
This chapter appeared (with William Bratton) in Washington and Lee Law Preview
(Spring) 1997.
And limitations of training.
264	 OF THEORY OF THE FIRM AND REGULATORY COMPETITION
debate.
The law and economics of limited liability, with its succession of back-and-
forth arguments about the location of an efficiency presumption for and
against, 2
 presents a literature of this sort. So when Allan Vestal asked us to
inquire into the efficiency implications of the recent proliferation of limited
liabilty company (LLC) statutes for this symposium, we accepted the invitation
without making any projection as to the exercise's probable result. But we did
harbor a hope that the economic literature, upon de novo review, would yield
some new theoretical spin on limited liability, a spin that would provide new
advice as to the appropriate location of the legal presumption and redirect the
back-and-forth legal debate. Unfortunately, that hope was not fulfilled. The
economics we reviewed does indeed offer new theoretical perspectives on
limited liability. But, instead of sending a new efficiency signal, these only
further complicate the existing picture. We emerge to find ourselves in a
position to recommend only that the best presumption is that the present
economics supports no presumption at all.
This article reports on our encounter with the economics of limited liability.
It begins, in part I, with a review of the back-and-forth debate on limited
liability in law and economics and of applications of positions in that debate
to the LLC. Here we observe that the proponents of the LLC have grounded
their claims for productivity-enhancement on an extremely thin theoretical
base. Their claims follow the view, first articulated more than a decade ago,
that limited liability fosters efficiency because it lowers the cost of shareholder
monitoring, reduces the risk of investment, and creates conditions for the free
transferability of shares. This is said to permit shareholder portfolio diversifica-
tion which in turn is said to prompt more productive investment policies within
firms. The thinness of the view becomes apparent when reference is made to
a contrasting law and economics theory, the pro rata hypothesis. This asserts
that the problems of unlimited liability can be solved if a pro rata liability
regime is employed in place of the joint and several regime manifested in
current partnership law. It projects that, given that pro rata regime, efficiency
gains will follow from stepped up equityholder incentives to limit firms'
suboptimal risky investments. This pro rata view directly and strongly chal-
lenges all standing justifications for limited liability for small firms. It is,
accordingly, somewhat surprising that LLC proponents thus far have failed to
address it.
2 See infra notes 3-34 and accompanying text.
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Part I goes on to report on our encounter with the economic literature. Here
we claim that the story about capital and ownership structure drawn on hereto-
fore to claim efficiency effects for limited liability no longer safely can be
relied on as a matter of economic theory. We show that the most basic notion
behind that efficiency case - that there is an interesting connection between
a single firm ownership structure and the maximization of firm value - has
become highly contestible. It may be unsafe, in the absence of empirical
verification, to assume that there is any direct relationship at all between a
particular ownership structure and firm performance. More specifically, some
models show that an incentive device (such as collateral) can provide a suffi-
cient economic basis to align management incentives and limit the effects of
risky decisions. Other models show that under certain conditions concentrated
shareholding may have productivity advantages. Cumulated, these presentations
sharply controvert the assertion that limited liability enhances productivity by
discouraging concentration and encouraging diversification. Part I, in its fmal
segment, considers the implications of the assumption, made by both the
efficiency and pro rata approaches, that insurance is readily availabile cover
the risks taken by firms. Here we ask some questions about this assumption's
safety, making reference to some recent literature on insurance's availability
and effect.
In part II we take up the second component of the LLC proponents' efficiency
case - the assertion that the economic theory of regulatory competition comes
to bear to justify the states' seriatim adoption of LLC statutes. Here, in
contrast to part I, we emerge from our encounter the economics with a definite
result. We assert as a general proposition that regulatory competition analysis
cannot plausibly be conducted on a black box basis that avoids inquiry into the
incentives of government actors. We use this perspective to show that,
although LLCs do present a law as product situation, the classic race-to-the-top
story in which fifty states compete to supply cost-saving business forms to an
undifferentiated class of choosey consumers does not fit the facts of the case.
A more plausible economic account of the enactment of LLC statutes centers
on a locally-based supply and demand description and an interest group
causation story. Given such an account, regulatory competition theory provides
no basis for an efficiency pronouncement in favor of the LLC. But we also
show that it does not thereby imply an affirmative inefficiency story either.
We consider and reject the suggestion that the LLC amounts to a race-to-the-
bottom, finding the application of the downward model of regulatory competi-
tion in this case to be just as implausible as the application of the upward,
race-to-the-top model.
Our regulatory competition analysis thus reaches definite conclusions only to
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offer no ultimate help on the question-in-chief - the appropriate location of
an efficiency presumption respecting the limited liability company. As to that
we make no recommendation.
LIMITED LIABILITY AND EcoNoMIc EFFICIENCY
We begin this part of this essay with a review of the law and economics of
limited liability and its application to the LLC. We go on to situate some of
the economic concepts operative in this literature in the larger context of the
economic theory of the firm. We pursue a modest objective in so doing. We
do not, for example, purport to offer either a complete review of the latter
literature or a definitive statement of its bearing on the subject of limited
liability. We seek instead to show that the some of the economic assertions
figuring prominently in the legal policy discussion are highly contestable as
a matter of economic theory. To the extent that we succeed, we further
complicate an already complex discourse.
A. The Limited Liability Company and the Law and Economics of
Limited Liability
A limited liability company bandwagon has rolled across the country. Since
1988, when two states provided for this business form, 3 forty-six additional
states have enacted enabling statutes. Law practice in the field has matured
rapidly, aided by a prototype statute from the American Bar Association, 4
 a
model act from the Uniform Laws Commissioners, 5 and a comprehensive
Revenue Procedure from the Internal Revenue Service. 6 All observers agree
on a simple explanation for this spontaneous expansion of the menu of business
forms: There is high demand for the LLC's combination of one-tier, partner-
ship tax treatment, 7
 limited liability, and flexibility respecting governance
We use the word 'new' guardedly. As William Carney has shown, the LLC is a first
cousin of the historical joint stock company. William J. Carney Limited Liability Companies:
Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 855, 868-77 (1995).
PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAR. Co. ACT (American Bar Association 1992).
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1995). For criticism of this statute, see Larry E. Ribstein
and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Mode! Laws and Limited Liability Companies, 66
U.COLO. L. REV. 947 (1995).
6 Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
' The Internal Revenue Service's 1988 determination to accord flow through tax treat -
ment, Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, is a sine qua non. See Larry E. Ribstein, The
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1995), hereafter cited
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terms. 8 The menu's antecedent means to the same end - the Subchapter S
Corporation and the limited partnership - now appear in comparison to impli-
cate excess complexity and, accordingly, excess cost.9
The LLC' s proliferation improves the menu of business forms in several ways.
It brings us to the final stage in the evolutionary abandonment of the historical
association of, on the one hand, limited liability, corporate governance norms,
and two-tier tax treatment, and, on the other hand, unlimited liability, partner-
ship governance norms, and one-tier tax treatment. The substantive grounds
that justified the bundling of the former trio lost their force many years ago
when limited liability, quasi-partnership governance norms, and one-tier tax
treatment became available to actors who elected Subchapter S status and made
full use of close corporation provisions in state codes. By the logic of legal
coherence, that concession of half-a-loaf implies a further concession of the
whole. One-tier tax treatment with limited liability having been made available
to those willing to pay the freight of the extra layer of transaction costs
incurred in organizing a close corporation, it appears arbitrary, even undemo-
as Ribstein I.
LLC statutes tend to allow members to choose between centralized and direct member
management.
Limitation of liability through the limited partnership form presupposes barriers to the
exercise of control by those participants enjoying the benefit of limited liability. See REv.
UNIF. LTD. PART. ACT §303 (1976).
The corporate form does not require such an arrangement. As is well known, parties
may incorporate and adopt special provisions that approximate the terms of partnership
governance, such as management at the shareholder level, restrictions on transfer of stock,
and exit through buyout or dissolution. Single-tier tax treatment then can be achieved under
Subchapter S. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, § 1361 (1988). The popularity of the LLC
implies that the complexity of the planning required for employment of these provisions has
operated to limit the number of businesses that opt for limited liability. As Ribstein argues,
given the imperfections of planning by contract, the background of inappropriate corporate
governance norms never recedes from significance. Ribstein I, supra note 7, at 2-3. The
Subchapter S restrictions - as to the number of shareholders, capital structure and owner-
ship interest in subsidiaries, see INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, § 1361(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1988) -
also often are included on the list of deterrents. See, e.g., William L. Klein and Eric M.
Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent
Outcome? 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001 (1995).
Forced to choose between the two disabling factors - state corporate law and federal
tax restrictions - we would choose the former. The Subchapter S restrictions do not operate
as constraints on many small businesses; but, the smaller the business, the larger the barrier
presented by complex planning supervised by an outside legal professional.
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cratic,'° to withhold the benefit from those similarly situated but unwilling to
pay." Corporate law having abandoned mandatory imposition of its board-
level, collective decisioninaking norm without concern for the resulting expan-
sion in the number of firms enjoying limited liability,' 2 there appears no
compelling reason against an expansion of the menu of governance options
available to firms doing business under the shield of limited liability.' 3 The
list of factors that in an ideal world would determine, on the one hand, the
availability of limited liability and, on the other hand, the application of one-
and two-tier tax treatment is unlikely to include the actors' preference for
partnership as opposed to corporate governance norms.
Legal coherence, however, provides only a conditional basis for the validating
business law practices. Today, they must also be determined efficient.
Unsurprisingly, the literature leaves open the empirical question respecting the
LLC's costs and benefits, and addresses the matter at a theoretical level.
Unfortunately, the applicable theoretical literature takes a divided stance,
inviting replication of its back-and-forth arguments as discussion goes forward
respecting LLC' s presumptive efficiency.
10 See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 155-56 (1992); Klein and Zoldt,
supra note 9 at 1030-34.
" Here we echo the argument of Klein and Zoldt. For them the status quo makes no sense
as a tax policy proposition. They comment that it is surprising that investors are entitled
to elect between two significantly different tax regimes. They also find it peculiar that the
participants get to choose whether or not to enjoy limited liability. Klein and Zoldt, supra
note 9, at 1002. While the wisdom of the provision of limited liability may be debatable,
it is their view that there is no reason why the liability shield be connected to the choice
of business form or the tax shield. Id. at 1007. We agree. Klein and Zoldt provide an
excellent analysis of the tax policy issues implicated by LLCs. See id. at 1006-1007.
Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WAsH. U. L. Q. 365,
378-88 (1992), recounts this history.
See Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law,
73 WASH. U. L. Q
. 
433, 451-52 (1995) (noting that theoretical questions about tort extern-
alities have not entered in the political processes that have produced LLC statutes); cf. Larry
E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 92-93
(199 1),hereafter cited as Ribstein Ii (arguing that corporate law process mandates serve
a function similar to that of the control rule applying to limited partnerships in discouraging
use of the limited liability form of doing business).
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1. Efficiency Theory
One line of theory, referred to here as 'efficiency theory', enunciates a produc-
tivity argument strongly favorable to limited liability. Its leading proponents,
Easterbrook and Fischel, make this case by describing the situation of the
publicly-held firm in a hypothetical regime of joint and several unlimited
liability.' 4
 They focus on the firm's equity investors and project problems
they would encounter respecting monitoring, liquidity, and diversification
under this unlimited liability regime. They identify four critical differences
between limited and unlimited liability. First, with limited liability shareholders
have a reduced need to monitor managers. Contrariwise, with unlimited
liability, monitoring costs might be so high that much equity investment might
not get made in the first place.' 5
 Second, since a joint and several liability
regime makes each shareholder potentially liable for the entire amount of an
unsatisfied judgment, an unlimited liability regime would force shareholders
to incur costs of monitoring one another's levels of wealth.' 6
 Third, limited
liability enables the transfer of securities on a trading market, ensuring liquid-
ity. Absent limited liability, shares would be hard to value because they would
carry the potential of visiting excess liabilities the probable magnitude of which
would depend on the level of wealth of the holder and of the other holders in
the group; as a result, stock pricing would encompass intractable variables'7
and free transfer would be constrained.' 8
 Fourth, by thus reducing the moni-
toring costs and downside risks of shareholding, limited liability facilitates
diversification.' 9
 Since diversification of holdings reduces the equityholders'
risk, it lowers the firm's cost of capital. In addition, shareholder risk aversion
is eliminated from the agency relationship so that management is freer to make
riskier investments holding out greater returns. Thus is limited liability said
to facilitate a more productive investment policy for the firm.2°
Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge that moral hazard results when investors
and managers are protected against potential liabilities for the firm's investment
losses and costs suffered by third party tort claimants. But they do not deem
The leading article is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).
' Id. at 94-95.
16 Id. at 95-96.
' Paul Halpern, et al, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,
30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980).
' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 95-96.
' Id. at 97.
20 Id. at 97.
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that problem to be determinative. As to the firm's voluntary claimants, they
argue that there is no externality since the voluntary creditors receive compen-
sation in advance for the extra risk. As to involuntary claimants, they argue
that the expected magnitude of unsatisfied tort liability will be minimal. The
incentive to insure remains strong despite limited liability because tort liability
still presents a threat to the underdiversified, firm specific human capital
investments of the firm's managers. At the same time, they acknowledge that
voluntary insurance will not provide a complete solution, pointing out that it
is doubtful that firms can fully insure for all expected tort liability. But they
nonetheless conclude that the benefits of limited liability outweigh the costs.
2. Pro Rata Theory
A contrasting approach, referred to here as 'pro rata' theory, has been articu-
lated by Leebron and Hansman and Kraakman. This view follows from the
assertion that most of the problems of unlimited liability identified by effi-
ciency theory are solved if the regime of unlimited liability abandons the joint
and several rule of partnership law in favor of a rule of pro rata liability based
on and limited by the proportion of equity owned by each shareholder. 2 ' The
proponents assert that in a pro rata regime investors would not have to monitor
one anothers' levels of wealth, and would have every incentive to diversify
so as to reduce the proportionate size of their holdings. At the same time, the
present system's perverse incentives to invest in suboptimally risky production
functions would be eliminated. Negatives also are recognized - for example,
the cost of equity capital would increase. But, according to Hansman and
Kraakm an, more productive outcomes still could be expected because man-
agers and investors would emerge with high-powered incentives to limit the
firms' pattern of risky activities or, failing that, to increase the level of invest-
ment in corporate insurance. A financial system benefit also is projected -
busin ess risk would be reflected in the share price. In sum, under the pro
rata view unlimited liability does not adversely affect the role of shareholding
in the financial system and even will serve to enhance firm performance.
21 David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1565 (1991).
More specifically, the emergence of a single share price would eliminate certain
constraints on the movement of the share price. Hansmann and Kraakman explain that
unlimited liability, as applied to the publicly traded corporation, would cause the stock price
to 'incorporate available information about the full extent of ... possible losses'. Henry
Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiability for Corporate Torts,
100 YALE L. J. 1879, 1907 (1991).
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The pro rata model has been criticized at the level of feasibility. It is said to
suffer from two significant limitations. First, it is argued that contingent
liability (unlimited or otherwise) would have little impact on share prices and
liquidity. Given the fact that offshore investors are attachment proof and
modern financial instruments permit investors to arbitrage the increased level
of risk attached to the limited liability rule, little impact on the share price of
firms can be projected. 23 The second limitation follows from a legal process
perspective. Since a given forum may be blocked from obtaining jurisdiction
over foreign shareholders, the enforcement of an unlimited liability system
would carry significant administrative costs. As a result, it would be rational
for creditors to pursue only the wealthiest foreign shareholders. That, in turn,
would cause future investors to make decisions to purchase shares based on
the wealth of the shareholders' pooi. 24 On this analysis, the pro rata approach
returns us in the to the scenario described under the efficiency view.
3. Efficiency Theory, Pro Rata Theory, and the Limited Liability Company
Ironically, LLC statutes proliferated across the states just as pro rats theory
appeared to raise serious questions about the productivity effects of limited
liability. Given pro rata theory, an across-the-board inefficiency presumption
respecting limited liability became plausible for the first time. This has put
proponents of LLC efficiency in an awkward position. Efficiency theory no
longer supplies an unshakable basis for asserting that limited liability was a
first-best result for public corporations. Indeed, even proponents of large firm
limited liability now argue from the rearguard position of feasibility; their
claim now in effect is that a limited liability regime is the first-best choice in
a second-best world of practice due to technical problems and perverse incen-
tives. Furthermore, the feasibility objections to a pro rats regime at best
rehabilitate limited liability only for publicly-traded firms and provide no basis
for justifying limited liability for close corporations and LLCs.
LLC proponents have been forced to equivocate as a result. But, at least as
to contract creditors, their efficiency claims retain a vigorous appearance. They
make the familiar point that firms with limited liability have to pay more for
23 Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Feature of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L. J. 387 (1992).
24 Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited ShareholderLiabilizy Through a ProceduralLens,
106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992).
See-Grundfest, supra note 23; Alexander, supra note 24. For an able rebuttal to both,
see Mark. R. Patterson, Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable?: Of Long Arms and
Short Sales, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 815 (1995).
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their credit, aligning the social costs and benefits of their activities. 26 They
have more trouble with the irrelevance point - that is, that the shift of the risk
of failure to the firm's voluntary creditors is matched by an offsetting increase
in the cost of credit. They seek to refute it by repeating the basic points of
efficiency theory, stretching them to fit the small firm context. The increased
cost of credit, they say, is more than offset by (a) monitoring cost savings, for
delegation to specialized managers occurs in the small firm context as well,
and (b) diversification benefits, for sometimes venture capitalists collect
portfolios of investments. 27 In addition, they say, all parties save the cost of
negotiating into limited liability, 28 and small firm creditors are better posi-
tioned to diversify risk than are small firm equityholders. 29 As to involuntary
creditors, in contrast, the proponents have to concede that the economics gives
rise to a strong negative inference. They counter by pointing to the foregoing
benefits respecting relations with voluntary creditors, 3° pointing to the possi-
bility of veil-piercing, 3 ' making old-fashioned appeals to the need to encour-
age capital formation, 32 and repeating the point that the equity investments
and risk aversion of small firm investors will lead to considerable internaliza-
tion of tort risk. 33 At least one commentator boldly concludes that the benefits
outweigh the costs. 34 The pro rata theory, meanwhile, is not confronted
directly.
B. The Efficiency Theory of Limited Liability in a Larger Theoretical
Context
This subpart situates the efficiency theory of limited liability within the larger
framework of theories of agency and optimal capital and ownership structure.
It does so in order to show that efficiency theory follows from a number of
assertions prominent in the theory of the firm as postured ten or fifteen years
Macey, supra note 13 at 449.
21 Ribstein II, supra note 13, at 101-104. See also Macey, supra note 13, at 451.
28 Id. at 105.
29 Macey, supra note 13 at 450-5 1. One might ask whether in that case they should be
expected to contract into limited liability anyway. For a strong argument that such would
not be the case, see Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of
Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140, 157-58 (1994).
3° Macey, supra note 13, 449-50.
Id; Ribstein II, supra note 13, at 129.
32 Macey, supra note 13, at 451.
Ribstein II, supra note 13, at 127-28.
3° Id. at 127-28. The other is more cautious, leaving the bottom line question open.
Macey, supra note 13 at 449-50.
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ago. Efficiency theory remains rooted in these assertions today. Meanwhile,
the theory of the firm, like a caravan, has moved on.
More particularly, we focus on the implications of two assertions central to
the efficiency case for the LLC: (a) that limited liability promotes efficiency
by enabling diversified shareholding and liquidity, and (b) that diversified
shareholding leads to an efficient firm investment policy. The question is
whether these efficiency assertions are safe as a matter of economic theory.
Our response focuses first on the assertions' close ties to first-generation
agency theories of the firm and asks a question respecting those theories'
success at evading the irrelevance point and, further to that point, describes
a contrasting line of theory on management-investor incentive contracting. Our
response next surveys some subsequent economic literature on financial
contracting and optimal ownership structure that attempts to eliminate agency
costs under a limited liability regime. Finally, we turn to a recent financial
economic suggestion that, given the complexity of the agency problems of
ownership structure and financial contracting, there may not a single ownership
structure that deals with them optimally. An important contextual limitation
should be noted: Involuntary creditors make no appearance in the economic
theory of capital and ownership structure, and so we refer here only to models
of relationships among managers, creditors, and equityholders.
1. The Irrelevance Hypothesis and First-Generation Agency Theory
Economic theories of capital and ownership structure have evolved as an
extended response to the famous irrelevance hypothesis of Modigliani and
Miller. 35 Under the Modigliani-Miller model, firm value in a full information
and taxless world stems entirely from the production function and is indepen-
dent of capital structure. Furthermore, the cost of capital is constant across all
debt-equity ratios. Under the irrelevance hypothesis what goes for capital
structure also goes for business form - the choice of corporate or partnership
structure also makes no difference to the value of the firm, at least so far as
concerns voluntary creditors. As noted above, the irrelevance point continues
show up in legal discussions of limited liability when it is noted that the
interest rate fully reflects risk shifted in the creditors' direction.36
Agency theory rebuts the irrelevance hypothesis by showing that frictions that
Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 96.
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impact on the value of the firm's production function emerge from features
of standard debt and equity contracts. It holds that, as a result, an optimal
capital and ownership structure for the firm obtains as a theoretical proposi-
tion. The efficiency theory of limited liability employs this agency perspec-
tive37 when it asserts that the single limited liability ownership structure
reflects the optimal arrangement for productive investment.
Recall Jensen and Meckling's classic model of frictions attending standard debt
and equity contracts. 38 Here we see limited liability make a first appearance
in a model of optimal capital and ownership structure. The model asserts that
agency costs attach to both equity and debt. As to debt, conflicting interests
of debtholders and equityholders give equityholders an incentive to invest
suboptimally. Given the debt contract's provision for a fixed payment, equity-
holders receive a fairly large portion of the positive returns on investment.
Yet, given limited liability, debtholders can experience a greater impact on the
downside if the investment fails. The limited liability regime thus is not
irrelevant and indeed is suboptimal because its differential effect on downside
risk gives the equityholders an incentive to invest in highly (and suboptimally)
risky projects. As to equity, costly conflicts arise between managers and
outside equityholders because the managers are not the residual owners of the
firm. The managers do not gain pro rata from its profitmaking activities. Since
they are unable to diversify their risky human capital investments and at same
time remain exposed to the firm's downside risk, they will tend to pursue their
own interests at the expense of wealth-maximizing activities for the firm.
Jensen and Meckling looked to contractually grounded monitoring and incen-
tive schemes to offset these agency costs of capital and ownership structure.
By hypothesis, an optimal capital and ownership structure is the one that
minimizes these agency costs. The debtholders, for example, will anticipate
the asset substitution problem described above and will attempt to minimize
its effect (and the effects of other agency costs of debt) with covenants and by
increasing the cost of the debt. Furthermore, certain firms could commit
themselves to operate in the interests of their equityholders and restrict mana-
gerial shirking by increasing the amount of debt. 39 In this and related models,
' The fundamental articles are Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976); Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); and Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J. L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37.
The attempt to resolve the conflict between managers and shareholders by taking on
AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: 275
then, the central concern is to show how the capital structure can be employed
as an incentive instrument. The efficiency theory of limited liability follows
precisely this pattern when it asserts that limited liability is needed to facilitate
shareholder diversification because diversification permits managers to achieve
the productivity benefits of a risk neutral investment policy.
But a series of objections have been raised against this agency view of the
firm. Strictly speaking, when agency theory holds that capital structure
manipulation is the dominant strategy for influence management productivity,
it assumes that the terms of the managers' contract with the equityholders are
fixed. It thereby omits to consider the alternative option of offering the man-
agers incentives not to interfere with the firm's choice of financing. 40
 If we
can materially influence the managers' incentives by varying the terms their
contract, it is reasonable to assume that the same incentives can be offered
under different capital structures. In theory, then, unless agency theory can
explain why changes in capital structure cannot be undone by corresponding
changes in the contractual incentive scheme, agency analysis reemerges as
consistent with Modigliani and Miller hypothesis and we lapse back to irrel-
evance. The same result would follow for limited liability.
more debt can of course result in new conflicts between debtholders and equityholders, as
many learned to their regret during the 1980s and early 1990s.
In a related model, developed in Diamond, Financial Intermediaries and Delegated
Monitoring, 51 REv. ECON. STUDIES 393 (1984), the agency problem between manager
and outside investor is analyzed in terms of introducing an optimal penalty which operates
to maximize the manager's expected payoff. Viewing the basic framework in terms of
whether verification costs can be minimized, Diamond's model implies that in the case
where a manager can appropriate any income not paid out, a non-pecuniary penalty can be
imposed on the agent as a basis of what is paid out. The optimal penalty is a standard debt
contract which permits the investor to appropriate all the reserve. The problem with
Diamond's model is that is not consistent with ownership of equity claims made by outside
investors. That is, these debt-like contracts, which assume risk-neutrality, one period
contracting, a single investor and deterministic verification, are too simplistic and, as a
result, fail to inform about contract situations between investors and managers.
° See Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in R. Schmalensee and
R. Willig, (eds) I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 81 (Amsterdam: Elsevier,
1989).
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2. Limited Liability for Managers and Models of Investor-Manager
Incentive Contracts
Contracting between managers and equity investors having been asserted as
means of reasserting the theoretical irrelevance of capital and ownership
structure, we here pause to examine a few of these models. Unsurprisingly,
the managers' posture as to limited or unlimited liability for business failure
turns out to be a central variable. Also unsurprisingly, the question whether
capital structure is in fact a critical component in an optimal incentive structure
remains sharply contested. But today that contest proceeds in an assumptional
context quite different from that prevailing in the first-generation agency
models that inform the efficiency theory of limited liability.
The earliest manager-investor models followed an agency framework and
asserted that risk-sharing between manager and investor could lead to an
optimal outcome, given a situation of asymmetric information at the time of
contracting and risk neutrality on the part of the manager. In addition, these
simple models assumed that the output of the firm, although influenced by the
activities of the manager's effort, is nevertheless observable. For the most part,
these models' moral hazard approaches were based on the insight that the
manager, before contracting, can select a distribution over the output of the
firm which is influenced by his effort.4 ' Under these models, it was thought
optimal for the manager to rent the technology from the investor.
Harris and Raviv, employing these assumptions, moved this literature forward
a step to show that a self-interested principal can design an optimal contract
with a firm's manager. 42 This model asserts that in the absence of limited
liability or other risk constraints, the optimal contract mitigates the agency
problem by placing all the risk and upside returns for the project on the
manager. The investor, in contrast, receives under the contract a fixed amount
in exchange for his investment. Giving the manager all the returns from the
project is asserted to mitigate the agency problem. This is achieved, however,
only because the model assumes that there exist contractual institutions, for
example, the posting of a bond, which guarantee that the agent does not breach
the contract regardless how costly that course of action is for the agent. In
effect, the manager's position in this model corresponds to that of a holder of
unlimited liability equity, with the position of the investor corresponding to
' See Holmstrom and Tirole, supra note 40, at 80.
42 Milton Harris & Arthur Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts With Imperfect Information,
20 J. ECON. THEORY 23 1-59 (1979).
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that of a holder of riskless debt. Meanwhile, the fixed payment to the investor
limits the model's feasibility 43
 - we are not yet really modelling equity
investment.
Subsequent models are more robust. For one thing, they achieve limited
liability for the manager. In a model developed by Innes, 44
 the costly effort
of the manager (which the investor cannot observe) improves the expected
returns of the investor. Here the investor's compensation is constrained to be
nondecreasing in firm profit. 45 Under the model, if the investor's compensa-
tion is monotonic-increasing, the investor's first best choice will be a debt
contract. But without the monotonic constraint, the optimal contract will give
the manager all the profits in some high profit states and none of the profits
when the firm's losses are below a given level. But this more realistic model
still suffers from the monotonicity requirement. This constraint, Innes notes,
'can be motivated either by a requirement that investors never have an incen-
tive to sabotage the firm or by an ability of entrepreneurs to costlessly revise
their profit reports upward (with hidden borrowing for example)' •46 Neither
of these situations is likely enough so as to provide support for limes' debt-
contracting result.
Other recent models get a step closer to replicating the observed relationships
of managers and investors with ownership claims. Williams offers a multi-
period model of the firm which involves a risk-averse manager and investors
who are in effect risk-neutral. 47 Here the assumption is that the manager's
effort influences firm output which is unobservable by outside investors. The
investors commit at t = 0 in reliance on an & ante monitoring system that
functions to restrict the manager from appropriating the firm's returns, specifi-
cally, the provision of collateral for debt. The model provides that the value
of the collateral is uncertain at t = 1 and observed only by the manager. The
model stipulates that financial contracts must specify which fraction of the
collateral and what amount of cash should be transferred to the outside
investor. To be sure, this depends on the manager's report, which depends on
the unobserved value of the debt. When the manager reports the earnings of
See Robert Innes, Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante Action
Choices, 52 J. ECON. THEORY 45 (1990).
Id.
This is consistent with the view that all financial contracts are nondecreasing, for
example, the optimal debt contract.
Id. at 46.
Williams, Ex Ante Monitoring, Ex-Post Asymmetry and Optimal Securities (UBC
Working Paper 1989).
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the firm, the manager distributes the earnings as set forth in the contract.
While the optimal contract would have the manager allocating the entire
collateral to investors, this would lead to a control loss to the manager. Thus,
the optimal contract is incentive compatible - outside investors receive the
entire asset and no cash when the value of the asset and control value are low;
and, correspondingly, when the values are high, they receive a fraction of the
value. Interpreting the results of this model, the assertion is that optimal
contracts involve features of equity and debt.
The dynamic and result of this model contrast starkly with those of the earlier
agency cost exercises respecting manager-investor relations. Since those models
assume that the manager can affect the distribution of returns, they have to rely
heavily on techniques like monitoring and verification devices and deadweight
penalities in order to get optimal results. Here, in contrast, a contractual
priority does the job. Note also that the Williams model, with its emphasis on
the problematics of verifying firm results over time, highlights the excess
simplicity of the agency model of Jensen and Meckling, which focused on a
financial contract over a single period only. In order to achieve the result that
changes in the capital structure can be used as an incentive device to align the
interests of managers, that and similar first-generation agency models had to
assume that firm profitability and cash flows are fully contractible. The
Williams model, like other recent work in financial economics, alters these
basic assumptions considerably. Here, more in line with the experience of
actual firms, contracting for optimal investment incentives must cover contin-
gencies that unfold over time. In addition, these models look past the debt
equity-ratio to changes in the institutional features of the firm for effective
means to limit the ability of manager to appropriate the firm's returns.
But, significantly, the contractual priority in the Williams model gets its
incentive power from its debt-like characteristic. Therein lies its contestibility.
A contrasting line of multi-period asymmetric information models asks sharp
questions about the relative effectiveness of management-investor contracts and
control transfer structures bound up in capital structure as means to channel
management incentives in productive directions. The economists responsible
for these models assert that to the extent that crucial management choices are
noncontractible due to problems of observability and verifiability, monetary
incentive schemes based on firm profitability (or stock market performance)
cannot be expected to import adequate discipline. Control structures allowing
outsiders to take actions that managers dislike in the event of poor firm
performance, although a second-best solution, can be expected to do a more
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effective job of manipulating management incentives in productive
directions.48
Hart offers a more formal expression of this point. He notes that given man-
agers who derive no private benefits from control of assets, first-best results
easily can be achieved (in a taxless world) with an all equity capital structure
and a simple incentive compensation system. In a two-period situation he
would simply make the managers' compensation depend entirely on the
dividend. That is, assuming investment at t = 0, and cash flows to be realized
at t = 1 and t = 2, incentive compensation I should = p(dt=1 + dt=2),
where p is a small positive number. If the payment also covers liquidation
proceeds L at t = 2, then I = p[dt=1 + (dt=2, L)], and the manager can be
expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation at t = 1. If at t
=1, the expected L is greater than the cash flow expected at t = 2, the firm
is liquidated at t = 1 and no indebtedness is needed in order to align manage-
ment incentives .'
But managers do derive private benefits from asset management, and in Hart's
conception, the bribe p required align their incentives with those of the outside
security holders is unfeasibly large. Accordingly, a complex capital structure
that includes control mandates must be interpolated. And, in a dynamic
environment, a range of possibly optimal contractual formulas for setting the
terms of that control transfer can be suggested; uncertainty makes it impossible
to deem any one ex ante optimal. 5° Restating this point, it now is the under-
Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of
Shareholders and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q. J. EC0N. 1027, 1028 (1994).
Similar observations have been made respecting the agency dynamics of investment
within a firm. Arjit Mukherji and Nandu Nagarjan, Moral Hazard and Contractibility in
In vestment Decisions, 26 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 413 (1995), models the situation of a
principal investing in research and development projects. They show that if the principal
receives verifiable 'hard' signals concerning the quality of the projects during the develop-
ment period, the principal will be able to make a full ex ante commitment to a project but
that problems of opportunism and monitoring costs still will make for a second best result
- the principal rationally will overinvest relative to the first best. In contrast, in a world
holding out only 'soft' noncontractible information prior to the last period, underinvestment
is predicted.
" OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 198 (1995). Note
an interesting real world implication of these observations— incentive compensation should
not come in the form of stock options but in the form of illiquid long positions in the stock.
5° See William W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, -
CARDOZO L. REv. , (forthcoming 1997).
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standing that a simple one-period incentive contract that sets the firm's capital
structure based upon a particular projection of the appropriate direction for the
agents' activities will not be optimal for all future scenarios. A significant
question arises for the efficiency theory of limited liability as a result
- whether it follows that, in a dynamic and uncertain environment, more than
one liability structure for the firm's owners might have to be suggested as
possibly optimal, rather than the single structure, as assumed in first-generation
agency theory.
3. Optimal Ownership Structures, Agency Theozy, and Limited Liability
The efficiency theory of limited liability relies heavily on a second line of first-
generation agency theory when it suggests that a single ownership structure
maximizes the value of the firm. More particularly, its operative notions are
(a) that diversified, that is, dispersed shareholding leads to efficient investment
policies, (b) that limited liability, by promoting diversification, provides high-
powered incentives for firm managers to invest the firms' resources in assets
whose value is higher than under the next available alternative, and (c) that
limited liability creates value by assuring easy transferability of shares, pre-
sumably due to an assumption that optimal incentives obtain inside the firm
when its equity interests are traded in an outside market with maximal liquid-
ity.
The line of agency theory that supports these notions looks to the structure of
ownership to ameliorate moral hazard problems on the part of those performing
the production function. This connection between ownership structure and
production can be traced back to the classic analysis of Aichian and
Demsetz. 5 ' Their model looks into the incentive problems of team production
and asks how the owners of the asset can induce the manager of the asset to
cooperate. The model introduces two mechanisms to overcome the control
problem - monetary incentives and a third party monitor - and assumes that
the monitor can measure the agents' performance. Fama and Jensen later
sharpened this story by centering on how the structure of ownership can be
altered to limit the externalities tied up with the incentive problems of joint
production. More specifically, they argued that an ownership structure, such
as a partnership, can be designed so as to produce an optimal outcome for the
firm. The equilibrium result is asserted to follow from the role played by
contractual constraints enforced by third parties.
51 Armin Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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This inquiry into the relationship between ownership structure, team produc-
tion, and firm value took a long step toward robustness when Holmstrom
identified concentration of equity ownership as a critical bottom line factor. 52
Holmstrom's model is concerned with techniques for disciplining production
team members. Holmstrom emphasizes that, given technological non-
separabilities and problems in monitoring individual contributions to firm
output, there is no sharing rule which can achieve an equilibrium outcome.
This is because the team members will always have an incentive to collude so
as to facilitate shirking and therefore cannot enforce a sharing agreement
among themselves. Hence, there must always exist a principal to enforce
penalties respecting shirking. More particularly, the moral hazard problem
respecting the agents calls for an incentive scheme which 'breaks the firm's
budget constraint'. In other words, given bad news about team performance
a budgeting authority must be in a position to cut off needed capital. 53 Holm-
strom suggests that shareholders with an ongoing contingent commitment to
provide capital could perform this incentive function; with the occurrence of
the contingency related to team performance they are released from their
funding commitment. Furthermore, in this model, the incentives are provided
by a marginal source - investors. In the face of contingencies they will have
cooperate in order to finance the marginal distribution of profits. As a result,
to the extent that investors are called on to make contributions to a fund it is
unlikely that free-rider problems will arise.
A final problem remains for solution in the Holmstrom model. With it we
reach the model's impact point for the present discussion. To the extent that
equity ownership requires monitoring, says Holmstrom, there will be an
incentive for some owners to free ride on other owners' efforts. From a
monitoring perspective, then, it might be optimal to have a single owner. Thus
do the costs of independently monitoring the firm and pledging capital for
financing give rise to a question respecting the optimal level of concentration
of ownership.
The problem that Holmstrom identifies - the relationship between ownership
concentration, liquidity, management agency costs, and investor incentives
respecting governance - is, of course, well-known to corporate lawyers as
the separation of ownership and control. Holmstrom's suggestion that concen-
tration might help solve the problem was novel. After all, when he wrote in
52 BengtHolmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).
At the margin, says Holmstrom, this is more likely to produce an equilibrium outcome.
Id. at 327.
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the early 1980s, takeovers and other market controls were thought to be
adequate to the task of overcoming shareholder collective action problems.
This line of agency theory, then, anticipated the turn taken by the 1990s
corporate law discussion of governance initiatives for institutional share-
holders. 54 It has disturbing implications for efficiency theory - because it
asserts without equivocation that limited liability enhances productivity by
discouraging concentration and encouraging diversification.55
This theoretical inquiry into optimal ownership structure remains at an early
stage of development, however. As it evolves it centers on the problems facing
increased levels of firm ownership in the presence of private information. As
is well known, if shares are highly diversified there are few high-powered
incentives for a single investor to invest in monitoring and control. Block-
holding is the obvious place to turn to solve the problem of low-powered
shareholder incentives to invest in monitoring and control that come with high
diversification. But blockholding itself is discouraged by the fact that the
blockholder incurs the significant cost of foregoing her chance to diversify her
portfolio to the maximum. Shleifer and Vishny 56 took a swipe at this problem
with a model of an equity financed firm in which there is one large shareholder
and a number of small shareholders who free-ride. In this model, firm value
increases with a larger shareholder's presence. Consequently, in the model,
the large shareholders are likely to have an incentive to retain their large
shareholdings. The problem comes if the large shareholders ever get into a
position to sell their shares anonymously in the trading market - they will
have every incentive so to do. A recent model from Bolton and von
Thadden57 takes a second look at this problem. They examine the properties
of a choice between concentrated, illiquid shareholding and a combination of
a control block and a publicly-traded, noncontrolling portion of the firm's
stock. The question is whether a closely held firm can go public with a big
block still in place under an arrangement where the small holders compensate
See, e.g., MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 3-49 (1994).
We note that pro rata theory asserts that pro rata unlimited liability encourages
diversification. But there is an important point of distinction from efficiency theory. With
pro rata theory diversification proceeds along with enhanced monitoring incentives.
Efficiency theory, in contrast, claims that decreased monitoring incentives are efficient.
Shleifer and Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON.
461 (1986).
Patrick Bolton and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity and Corporate Control
(paper presented at Journal of Finance Intermediation Symposium, Loosdrecht, Holland,
June 1996).
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the remaining blockholder for the cost of foregone diversification. In theory,
such a deal holds out advantages to the small holders since the monitoring
services of the control block will likely lead to greater returns than would be
received with fully dispersed shares. But the arrangement runs right into the
a problem identified by Shleifer and Vishny in the precedent model: 58
 Since
the trading market will be anonymous, the large shareholder will have an
incentive to take in the compensation through one door and unwind his position
through slow market sales out the other door. The result is that there will be
few incentives on the part of the small holders to commit to paying for the
monitoring ex ante. This in turn means that blockholding will be less attractive.
In addition, if it is the case that public trading aggravates information
asymmetries between the blockholder and the small holders, there will be an
additional negative impact on the feasibility of a financial arrangement between
the blockholder and the rest of the shareholder group. The small holders will
be willing to enter into the arrangement only in a very special case: They will
have to have reliable information about the future plans of the blockholder.
Unsurprisingly, Bolton and von Thadden conclude that there is no optimal
tradeoff between liquidity and concentration.
Thus does this line of inquiry prompt questions about efficiency theory's
association of diversification and productivity. Significantly, it in addition has
prompted a model that reconsiders of the whole place of limited liability in the
theory of the firm. 59 This model, put forward by Winton, suggests, first, that
contingent shareholder liability is feasible and holds potential productivity
benefits, and, second, that shareholder assumption of additional liability is
interconnected with the efficient choice of an ownership structure. Winton
notes that his model is motivated by the successful appearance in a number of
cases in practice of unlimited liability with respect to large firms. He cites a
range of cases, including Lloyds of London, unlimited liability for shareholders
in Britain, and double liability for chartered banks in the United States.6°
In the model, Winton stipulates that there are a number of large (symmetric)
shareholders who each may be responsible for additional financing for the
firm. The model also assumes that any investor can monitor the activities of
58 Shleifer and Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. P0L. ECON.
461 (1986).
Andrew Winton, Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm, 48
J. FIN. 487-5 12 (1992).
60 Id. at 489. For a fuller presentation of the history see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSISDIARY CORPORATIONS, § ( 1987).
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management and that the investors will always prefer to increase the amount
of wealth they invest in the firm. The model begins by showing that the wealth
effects of increasing shareholder concentration depend on the cost function of
monitoring - if the cost of monitoring is positive, an increase in the number
of shareholders causes the value of the firm to decrease. The model shows that,
given the adverse selection problem that thus arises when there is additional
liquidity, the investors have an incentive to conunit their external wealth to
bond management. The model assumes that most of the investors' external
wealth is illiquid. Given this, the model asserts that they will prefer to commit
their assets through a contingent guarantee, that is, collateralized debt, rather
than to make an actual investment in the firm. This is asserted to reduce the
probability of liquidation costs. The model's insight is that so long as the firm
is funded by a large number of shareholders via collateralized debt, wealth
illiquidity will impose a transaction cost that mitigates the adverse selection
problem on both sides of the market, causing the average price of a share to
reflect the residual wealth of the poorest outside shareholder. Thus does the
model challenge the position that unlimited liability causes the value of shares
to decrease because it causes the shares to gravitate to the hands of poorer
investors who have less to lose.
Some additional assumptions made by the model must be noted, however.
Specifically, Winton cannot get his result favoring a contingent liability regime
without trading restrictions on the equity and wealth verifications respecting
the shareholders. 6 ' At the bottom line, then, this model of contingent liability
asserts that, although increasing shareholder liability has benefits as well as
costs, there is a difficult cost-benefit tradeoff choice between adverse selection
and costly restraints on trading. Unsurprisingly, this tradeoff between liquidity
and monitoring requires empirical investigation.
All of the foregoing having been said, we note an absence of conclusive
empirical work on the connection between ownership structure and firm
performance. 62 The studies closest to point send conflicting signals. An early
study Demsetz and Lehn63 found no significant relationship between owner-
ship concentration and accounting profit rate. But, in a different context,
°' Winton notes that limiting sale of shares without approval or requiring residual liability
has been employed in many unlimited liability settings. Winton, supra note 59, at 500.
62 To our knowledge.
63 Demsetz and Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,
in 1 DEMSETz, OWNERSHIP CONTROL AND THE FIRM, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 202-222.
Thereby supporting Demsetz's earlier insights. Id. at 217-19.
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Wruck observes that private placements of equity produce higher shareholder
concentration and positive stock prices, 65 and concludes that the public,
perceiving that higher shareholding concentration involves better monitoring,
places a higher value on the firm. Cutting the other way is a study by Leach
and Leahy66 which reveals that in firms where the non-diversifiable risk is
high, there is likely to be more shirking. In this regard, the benefits to share-
holders from monitoring is higher. But this study also finds no evidence that
higher shareholder concentration produces a higher return on investment.
C. Some Questions About Insurance
Corporate law teachers like to rely on insurance as the solution to the problem
of limited liability. Both the efficiency and pro rata theories do likewise at
critical junctures, but with radically different treatments. Serious questions can
be asked about both.
1. Efficiency Theoiy
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that limited liability does not give rise to
significant externalities because corporations will contract for insurance in
respect of activities which implicate significant social costs. Given limited
liability, of course, corporations have an incentive to invest in risky activities
even when they cannot pass the extra costs along to consumers. One result is
that the firm, in order to capture the market rents it requires, will transfer
some of the costs to involuntary creditors. How then, given that the share-
holders have limited liability and incentives to diversify, could it be cost
effective for the firm to contract for insurance? Intuitively, when the firm
contracts for risk coverage of its socially costly business activities it pays extra
for protection its shareholders already have. Accordingly, the incentive to
insure must stem instead from limited possibilities to diversify the negative
spillovers of business risk on the part of managers, employees, and certain
investors. An additional cost incentive stems from risk sensitivity on the part
of voluntary creditors who adjust contract terms to reflect risk - that is, lower
interest rates on debt offset the cost of insurance to some extent. Once a
limited liability entity thus purchases tort liability insurance, say Easterbrook
and Fischel, it will have less of an incentive to transfer risk, and a diminished
Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private
Equity Finaneings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (1989).
Leach & Leahy, Ownership. Control Classtfications and the Performance of Large
British Companies, 101 ECON. J. 409 (1991).
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incentive to invest in risky activities. In addition, to the extent that the firm
insures, there will less probability of organizational collapse via bankruptcy.
At the bottom line, however, Easterbrook and Fischel caution that they do not
claim that the insurance incentive they describe completely eliminates the
incentive to engage in risky activities that follows from limited liability.
Ribstein extends this analysis to the LLC, arguing that LLC members will have
sufficient incentives to insure for their potential tort liability.
Hansmann and Kraakman object to the Easterbrook and Fischel analysis. In
their view, firms with limited liability will have an incentive to underprovide
for insurance. Why should managers invest in insurance, they ask, when it may
indicate to outside investors that they are shirking? Managers may want to
show investors that they are undertaking sufficiently risky investments without
drawing attention to their preference for their career concerns. In addition,
liability insurance contracts have ceilings on the upper limits of coverage,67
leading to decisions to insure at a low coverage limit. Firms also may either
mistake the frequency of claims or anticipate that a claimant will settle rather
than pursue the full claim. The fact that firms frequently pursue an
underinsurance strategy suggests that shareholders will have low-powered
incentives to protect potential tort victims. And even if a firm wanted to
purchase full insurance coverage, the existence of moral hazard and loading
costs, say Hansman and Kraakman, destroys any incentive to follow through.
Hillman, in turn, has countered Ribstein's extension of the Easterbrook and
Fischel analysis to the LLC. He observes that Ribstein fails to take into
account the differences between insurance incentives respecting public corpor-
ation ownership structures and small firm ownership structures. 68 He notes,
for example, that the incentive will not obtain when the firm's assets are worth
less than its potential liabilities. In the alternative, he suggests that risk averse
employees and managers of underinsured or undercapitalized firms could
instead bargain ex ante for additional compensation as a substitute for insur-
ance. We find these criticisms persuasive.
2. Pro Rata Theory
Insurance also figures importantly in the case for pro rata unlimited liability.
It is an essential support of the theory's predictions of a high-powered share-
67 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 1889. See also Gur Huberman, David
Mayers & Gifford Smith, Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules, 14 BELL J. EcoN.
415 (1982). -
Hiliman, Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on the Death of
Partners/up, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. 477, 480-1 (1992).
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holder monitoring incentive respecting suboptimal risky investment and of only
modest increases in the cost of liability to investors. The two predictions can
be made simultaneously only to the extent liability insurance actually would
be available to firms under an unlimited liability regime. If the insurance is
unavailable, unlimited liability will indeed mean stepped up costs to investors.
Given complete insurance, those costs could be contained with shareholders
still having a high-powered incentive to reduce risk-taking due a desire to keep
down the insurance's cost. Hansmann and Kraakman admit, however, that
insurance markets are essentially incomplete, 69 with their performance also
being hobbled by moral hazard, asymmetric information, and loading costs.
The viability of their theory accordingly depends on the robustness of their
back up assertion that the insurance market nevertheless substantially performs
its job. They argue that loading costs, while substantial, are unlikely to be
significantly greater than the costs, for example, of defending tort actions or
the transaction costs related to bankruptcy. They argue in addition that insur-
ance firms are generally able to control moral hazard through ratings and
monitoring of potential insureds. It follows, they say, that it can be assumed
that there would be no higher level of risk-bearing by investors under unlimited
liability.
We wonder whether pro rata theory here asks for more than the insurance
market can bear. The assertion that the insurance market works well enough
is based in the first instance on the assumption that insurers, through experi-
ence, ratings, and menus, are able to design contracts which effectively reduce
adverse selection and moral hazard. Early work in the economics of insurance
supports this conclusion, showing the existence of an equilibrium in which high
risk and low risk types separate themselves out by selecting different price-
quantity policies. 70 More recent work provides additional confirmation, show-
ing that in contracts where a menu is available to policyholders to select the
amount of coverage based on prince per unit, policy-holders tend to sort
themselves out based on their type. 7 ' But there is also some evidence to the
contrary. It has been suggested that experience-rated contracts can lead to first-
best outcomes only under limited conditions. 72 Indeed, these contracts are
They neglect to point out that in some cases insurance may not be available. Joseph
Stiglitz, SOCIALISM, 287-8 (citing to working paper).
70 Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of imperfect information, 90 Q.J. Ec0N. 629 (1976).
In practice, the insurance industry tends to rely on multi-period experience-related
contracts to select out high and low risk types.
72 Stephen D'Arcy & Neil Doherty, Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Low-
balling in Insurance Markets, 63 J.Bus. 145, 148 (1990), citing S. Gal & M. Landsberger,
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thought feasible where an insurer has comparative advantage over rivals in
monitoring the claims histories of policyholders. 73 Hence, if there, exists, for
example, an information asymmetry regarding valuable claim information, the
underwriting policies with respect to new policies could lead to a lowballing
price policy. And, the evidence of lowballing is consistent with the presence
of adverse selection in selected insurance markets, such as that for automobile
policies.
We also have questions about the assertion that the insurance market can
handle increased levels of risk and demand that would follow a shift to an
unlimited liability regime. The insurance industry, like other industries, may
be subject to underinvestment problems which lead to the reduction of the
value of its firm's equity and policies. To be sure the degree and location of
the problem will depend on the situation. The ability of insurers to insulate
themselves from exogenous shocks (due to interest rates and so forth) may be
related to their ownership structure, capital market access, and reinsurance
availability and ownership structure varies across the insurance industry.74
The literature on insurance, considering this industry capacity question from
another angle, asserts that firms operating in insurance markets have a basic
shortcoming - there is a limit on the amount of insurance that any one of
them can offer. 75 Moreover, capacity in insurance markets fluctates. Under
this constrained capacity view, unanticipated claims on insurance firms lead
to a loss in equity that can be replaced either internally or externally. Given
sudden and excessive losses, the insurance firms' short term supply curve will
shift. To the extent that they perfer internal capital, they will have to respond
by increasing premiums. As a result, capacity will be constrained. This con-
strained capacity model is thought fairly to explain the reasons for cyclical
changes in premiums for insurance contracts. 76 Given the existence of an
underwriting cycle, some have been led to suggest that there exists an imbal-
On 'Small Sample' Properties of Experience Rating Insurance Contracts, 103 Q
. 
J. EcoN.
233 (1988).
' Id., citing H. Kunreuther & M. Pauly, Market Equilibruim with Private Knowledge:
An Example, 26 J.PUB. EC0N. 269 (1985).
' See Neil Doherty & James Garven, Insurance Cycles: Interest Rates and the Capacity
Constraint, 68 J. BUS. 383-404 (1995).
R.A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 115, 126 (1991).
76 Of course much of the industry losses suffered during the 1980s could be linked to
adverse selection and other characteristics of the insurance market. In the 1 990s, in contrast,
the insurance and re-insurance industry in the 1990s faces a new capacity constraint which
is linked to more frequent and more costly natural disasters taking place.
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ance between supply and demand in the industry. 77 Insurance company earn-
ings lately have been substantially impacted by losses and the capital bases of
insurance companies are under review. As a response to this new capacity
constraint, the Chicago Board of Trade in 1995 introduced a new catastrophe
option to hedge against risk of loss due to unexpected events. 78 Although the
introduction of an option contract provides an important new asset to control
risk, it should be noted that this instrument offers only a small reduction in
an insurer's exposure to credit risk.79
This goes only to say that more empirical support may be needed to sustain
Hansmann and Kraakman's assertion that contracting institutions within the
insurance industry work reasonably well. It is an open question whether the
insurance market is sufficiently stable and predictable to provide the liability
insurance under an unlimited liability regime. It also should be noted the
complexity of this industry's problems may make the requisite supprot difficult
to marshall. The possibility of controlling moral hazard and other market
imperfections is difficult to measure unless the individual performance of each
firm in the industry is evaluated. What, for example, are the incentives to
monitor and supervise managers in an industry which may suffer financial
losses for idiosyncratic reasons rather than because of moral hazard?
II. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY:
LAW AS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Proponents of the LLC employ a regulatory competition story to counter
negative implications arising from the back-and-forth debate on limited liabil-
ity. This line of defense draws heavily on the literature that describes and
justifies state competition for public corporation charters. That precedent
regulatory competition story is retold in the first subpart below. The subparts
that follow confront and refute the story's extension to the LLC. This three-
part analysis first considers the prospects for adoption of an LLC statute in a
hypothetical island jurisdiction assumed to have an income tax system and
interest group alignment identical to those of a typical American state. This
discussion invokes public choice theory to project that special interests in the
Michael Canter, Joseph Cole & Richard Sandor, Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset
Class for Capital Markets and a New Hedging Toolfor the Insurance Industry, 4 J. DERIVA-
TIVES 89 (1996).
78 The contracts were introduced based on information that insurance losses could poten-
tially limit the overall effectiveness of the industry. Id. at 92.
Id. at 95.
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jurisdiction will procure an LLC statute. The second part extends this analysis
to a hypothetical federal system of four states in which charter competition is
precluded by a siege reel choice of law rule. Here the question is whether the
enactment of an LLC statute by a single state in the federation can lead to a
race-to-the-bottom. The discussion shows that possibilities for externalizing
the costs of torts make a race-to-the-bottom a structural possibility. But it also
projects that this race-to-the-bottom scenario is highly unlikely to occur in
practice. The third and final part carries the analysis to a hypothetical federal
system in which charter competition is a structural possibility. Here the
question is whether the enactment of LLC statutes can be characterized as a
competitive race-to-the-top. The discussion acknowledges the possible presence
of competitive influences. But it concludes that these do not provide a plausible
basis for explaining either the initial proliferation or ongoing evolution of LLC
statutes. Domestic rent-seeking by interest groups, the explanation offered for
the first part's island jurisdiction, provides a better explanation even in the
context of a federal system. Interstate competition emerges in a secondary
posture, taking its usual role as an inevitable limiting factor on state-level
economic regulation. Thus positioned, it cannot support an efficiency presump-
tion, and, accordingly, has no significant justificatory role to play for the LLC.
A. Corporate Charter Competition
Regulatory competition is an economic theory of governmental organization
that equates decentralization with first-best equilibrium results. The theory
analogizes law to product and then asserts that junior level governments
- local, state, or national, as opposed to federal or super-national - compete
for citizens and factors of production when they regulate. 8° It predicts that
such competitively-determined regulation will satisfy citizen preferences. The
prediction has a normative implication for legal and political theory: Just as
price competition disciplines producers of private goods for the benefit of
consumers, so regulatory competition promises to discipline government
producers for the benefit of taxpaying citizens. Two distinct benefits are said
to follow - the distortions that result as interest groups compete for, and win,
political favors are ameliorated, and incentives for innovative lawmaking are
enhanced.8'
80 Citizens signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when they migrate
from regime to regime. Their ability to exit disempowers government actors, whose welfare
diminishes as citizens depart, taking along votes and revenues. See Ronald Daniels, Should
Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J.
130, 142-43 (1991).
' See ROBERTA R0MAN0, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 4-5 (1993),
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Regulatory competition has been brought to bear on the entire range of federal-
ism discussions, usually to support a devolutionary initiative or to oppose a
proposal for federal intervention. This is because the law as product model
implies a preference for decentralized regulation. It depicts central government
as a cartel: Just as collaboration among competing producers of products
reduces price competition and incentives to innovate, so the removal of
regulatory subject matter to a central government reduces the number potential
competitors and dilutes entrepreneurial incentives. Furthermore, since the
revenue enhancement constraint on the national government is less intense,82
the national lawmaking process will be slower, less responsive to productive
concerns, and more susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups.83
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on the assumption that
state corporation codes are products for which reincorporating firms are the
marginal consumers. In the resulting description, competition for the legal
business of firms forces the states to adapt the law to the dynamic conditions
in which the firms operate. State lawmaking emerges as a trial and error
process suited to the accurate identification of optimal corporate arrangements.
More particularly, reincorporating firms seek a predictable legal regime that
reduces their costs. Delaware, leading provider of charters, provides this with
comprehensive case law, well-specified indemnification rules, and an expert
judiciary. The firms also seek a guaranty that the new state of domicile will
maintain the desirability of its code - the reincorporating firm and the target
jurisdiction enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of opportunistic
breach. Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target's favorable legal
regime, the target remains free to change its politics and transform itself into
an unresponsive jurisdiction. The competitive jurisdiction has to reduce this
possibility by offering a credible commitment. Delaware's commitment stems
from its fiscal dependence on franchise tax revenues. 86 These revenues are
an 'intangible asset' that emerges from the combination of a large number of
incorporations and a small population. Delaware also invests in real assets
specific to its incorporation business - its caselaw, and judicial and adminis-
trative expertise. These, together with Delaware's code, constitute reputational
capital. 87 To protect the capital, Delaware imposes internal process and struc-
hereafter cited as ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW.
Id. at 4-5, 48.
Id. at 5.
84 Id. at 6.
Id. at 32, 33-34, 39 n.20.
Id. at 36-37.
The store of capital bolsters the state's market position. Other states cannot credibly
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ture rules that deter political disruption.88
As originally articulated, this market-based race to the top validation of state
law bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack of influence over state
lawmaking with a reference to the control market deterrent. The assertion, in
effect, was that the managers' option of exit adequately disciplined the states,
while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile offeror adequate-
ly disciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasiveness when managers
and state politicians collaborated 89
 to hamper the market deterrent with the
antitakeover legislation of the 1980s. 9° This manifest case of charter market
failure9 ' reinforced the assertion of the system's opponents that, despite its
competitive elements, it still allows management to capture the states, with
suboptimal results. Following the lead of Roberta Romano, the members
of the market deterrent school moved to a middle ground position on charter
competition. 93
 There they defend the state system, except to the extent that
precommit to offer superior service, and thus are deterred from incurring the necessary
start-up costs. A first mover advantage in Delaware results. Id. at 40-41, 43-44.
9° These include its direction of corporate matters to a specialized chancery court, its
practice of appointing rather than electing its judges and limiting them to twelve year terms,
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities of both houses of its legislature for the approval
of corporation code amendments. Id. at 38-42.
89 Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a
centrally-organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state legislative
process here suggested that the statutes are initiated by threatened managers of local
corporations and their assistants in the local corporate bar rather than by broad coalitions
of business, labor and community leaders. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.h (1988).
9° For a summary see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 81, at 53-57,
74-75.
.j A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a harmful
effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture that
encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as poison
pills. For a summary, see id. at 60-67.
9° See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.
L. ECON. & ORG5. 225 (1985).
See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, The Race for the Top Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing more confidence in incorrectness of
the race-to-the-bottom view than in the view that State competition results in a race-to-the-
top); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (concluding that the race to the top stands as refuted, but the
proposition that competition creates a 'powerful tendency' to enact shareholder beneficial
laws remains vital).
AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: 293
it inhibits the control market. Other commentators, all of whom also occupy
middle ground views, have taken the occasion to attack the state system and
argue for federal intervention. 94 As usual, at the debate's bottom line lies the
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1458-75 (1992). Bebchuk
argues that the middle ground result stems from a structural defect in the competitive system
that disables the production of a maximizing legal regime. The market leads the competing
states to focus on the variables that influence reincorporation decisions. Id. at 1452, 1454.
From this there follows a concern for management preferences rather than shareholder value
itself. Accordingly, nothing deters the states from pursuing policies of management accom-
modation respecting the fiduciary and market deterrents. Id. at 1462-63, 1468, 1488.
Bebchuk concludes that much state takeover regulation should be preempted and federal
fiduciary standards should be imposed. Id. at 1495. See also David Charny, Competition
Among Jurisdiction in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the
'Race to the Bottom' in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 441-53
(1991); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BRoOKLYN L. REV. 1, 60-63 (1993);
Joel Seligman, The Case for Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947,
97 1-74 (1990); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It time for a Federal Corporation Law? 57 BROOKLYN
L.REV. 55, 91-96 (1991).
New allegations of interest group capture also have cropped up. See William W.
Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995), in which we argue that capture
of corporate law by the management interest operates across the 50 states and that regulatory
competition exacerbates the problem, producing corporate codes that block shareholder
access to the corporate contract and justifying limited federal intervention. Our interest
group capture story complements, and to some extent contrasts, with an antecedent descrip-
tion by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469
(1987). Macey and Miller offer a supply side account that highlights the impact of internal
interest group politics on the production of Delaware law. Id. at 471-72. In their account,
all groups within the state have a common interest in producing a marketable legal regime,
but the groups differ on the relative proportions of costs imposed and revenues earned. The
taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs (franchise tax revenues) and lower indirect
costs (legal fees). The lawyers' interest in fees would be served by lower direct costs
leading to a greater number of incorporations, and by higher indirect legal costs even at
the sacrifice of some incorporations to the extent that the legal fees paid exceed those lost.
Macey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as a pure profit maximizer
would limit indirect costs so as to maximize direct costs. Id. at 472-73, 498, 503-04.
Delaware fails to conform to the product model's predictions because the bar acts as a
small, cohesive interest group that extracts special concessions from the legislature at the
expense of the general public. Id. at 504-08. For an extension of this story to the broader
context of choice of law, see Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual
Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 (1994), hereafter cited as Ribstein Ill.
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allocation of the theoretical burden of proof for or against federal intervention.
Theoretical burdens of proof also show up at the bottom line when regulatory
competition theory is drawn on to explain the proliferation of LLC statutes.
The inclusion of regulatory competition in the account of events supports an
inference of productivity, countering the negative signal sent by the pro rata
theory of limited liability.
B. Domestic Incentives: LLCs in an Island Jurisdiction
Hypothesize an island jurisdiction that makes available the corporate, limited
partnership, and partnership business forms, and taxes income pursuant to a
system identical to our federal tax system. Assume that the taxing authority
issues a new ruling that makes one-tier taxation available to an incorporated
partnership. The question is whether the island state's legislature can be
expected to respond by enacting an LLC statute. Assume further that the
efficiency of the statute follows from a relatively simple cost-benefit compari-
son: The costs are the costs of externalized firm torts and the benefits stem
from cost savings accruing to firms organizing as LLCs and new capital
formation induced by the form's availability. Finally, make the public choice
assumption that the legislature is open to the influence of special interests and
routinely enacts suboptimal legislation in order to meet their demands and
preferences.
1. Beneficiary Firms
Legislative authorization of LLCs holds out potential cost-saving benefits for
several classes of firms. 95 The first class is made up of existing partnerships
for which incorporation is unduly costly due to the costs and uncertainties of
planning within the corporate form and Subchapter S. The second class of
firms contains existing Subchapter S corporations for which long term cost
savings accrue in the event of reorganization as LLCs, with the savings
We stress the word 'potential'. The pattern of LLC usage in practice appears to be
more complex than one would predict based on an encounter with the cost saving claims
of LLC enthusiasts. For example, startup firms in which venture capitalists invest continue
to choose the corporate form, despite the two-tier tax treatment thereby entailed. See Joseph
Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start Ups, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1737, 1747-50
(1994). For -a governance-based explanation, see Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the
Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Interest, - WASH. &
LEE L. REV. - (1997).
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exceeding the cost of reorganization. 96 The third class consists of future firms
which, but for the LLC statute, would fall into one of the first two classes.
Three additional classes of beneficiary firm can be suggested, but on a more
speculative basis. The first contains future firms that come into existence in
the LLC form that would never have come into existence had the form not
been available. The number of firms falling into this category is likely to be
quite small. To the extent that limited liability and one-tier tax treatment are
preconditions to these firms' existence, Subchapter S incorporation would be
available in any event at additional cost. The class thus contains only firms for
which the cost savings held out by the LLC has a magnitude sufficient to
induce new capital formation. We suspect that, given a project of a value so
marginal that the cost of Subchapter S organization presents an insuperable
barrier, the nontrivial costs of organizing as an LLC also will present a
significant deterrent. A second and related class of beneficiaries consists of
existing and future C corporations that prefer One-tier tax status obtainable only
through the LLC form. This class, by definition, falls outside of the
Subchapter S limitations, presumably due to a large number of equity partici-
pants. Such a large base of equity participants also would tend to preclude
selection of the partnership form. Presumably, the number of firms in this class
also is very small, since the defining characteristics make the firms likely
candidates for organization as limited partnerships. With that point we identify
a final class of beneficiary firms - present limited partnerships for which
long-term cost savings will accrue in the event of reorganization as LLCs, with
the savings exceeding the cost of reorganization. Future firms that, but for the
LLC statute, would have organized as limited partnerships also fall into this
class.
2. Costs and Benefits
The beneficiaries of the legislation having been identified, we can proceed to
consider the island jurisdiction's cost-benefit calculation. An LLC statute will
be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the externalities suffered and additional costs
incurred as the result of its employment are so trivial as to be outweighed by
the quantum of benefits from cost savings to firms and spillovers from
Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Formsfor Closely Held Firms. Theories and Evidencefrom
LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L. Q . 369, 428-30 (1995), hereafter cited as Ribstein IV, collects
numbers for organizations in the LLC, limited partnership, and corporate firms in five states
during the period 1988-1994. Ribstein interprets the numbers to support an inference that
actors have been switching from the corporate and limited partnership form to the LLC
form. Id. at 429.
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incremental capital formation accruing within the state. But, for the sake of
discussion, we will make a contrary cost-benefit assumption here - that is,
the costs externalized and incurred as the result of the increase in the number
of limited liability businesses are not trivial. From this point there ensues a
complex cost-benefit comparison. Clear benefits accrue, first, from the cost
savings yielded for existing Subchapter S firms and, second, from spillovers
from new businesses that otherwise would not be formed. Things become less
clear, however, when we turn our attention to the class of partnerships that
reorganize under the LLC statute. Here we have two additional categories of
social cost to consider. These businesses presumably will incur additional
transaction costs as they pursue limited liability as LLCs. Also, since these
firms are new to limited liability, it is possible that LLC status will alter their
incentives so that they now engage in suboptimally risky new lines of business.
By analogy, a technical innovation that lowers the cost of evading detection
for criminal conduct leads to no overall gain for society. Accordingly, as to
this class of firms, any benefits result only from the productive aspects of new
lines of business taken up after reorganization as LLCs that would not have
been taken up had LLC organization been unavailable.
So as to raise with clarity the political issue implicated by LLC legislation, we
will stipulate a cost-benefit result: The enactment of the LLC statute is ineffic-
ient. Accordingly, if the public interest is the state legislature's sole concern,
there will be no LLC statute. But since public choice assumptions are made
here, the question as to enactment remains open.
3. Interest Groups
Will the island state's legislature enact an LLC statute? Projection of an answer
to this question requires us to specify the interests pro and con and to project
their likely influence on legislative results.
First and foremost on the pro side come the business lawyers. They have a
high-powered incentive to persuade the legislature to enact the statute in order
to increase fee revenues. There appears to be one-period pent up demand that
they can satisfy 97 stemming from existing inventory of partnerships, limited
partnerships and corporations that will opt to transfer to LLC status. In subse-
quent periods, the lawyers presumably gain to the extent that new firms that
otherwise would organize as partnerships choose the more formal, and expens-
See Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism andLegislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 745, 747-69 (1995).
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ive, LLC form, and also to the extent of new capital formation. But the
lawyers will lose to the extent that firms that otherwise would organize as more
expensive corporations or limited partnerships choose the LLC form. 98 The
lawyers will have no problem in mobilizing to procure the legislation. Their
bar associations routinely step in to solve problems of collective action respect-
ing enactment of beneficial legislation, serving the drafting function as well
as the lobbying functionY Organized small business interests conceivably
could join the lawyers in the lobbying process. Both voices, thus organized,
would serve as a proxy for the voice of any present and potential outside
investors in small firms.
There are three possible voices that might be heard on the opposition side. The
first is the state treasurer, to the extent that LLC implies revenue losses. The
extent of any such loss would not to appear to be particularly significant,
however. Any income tax consequences would be trivial because most corpor-
ate candidates for LLC reorganization presumably already would be Subchapter
S taxpayers and one-tier treatment also will have been the rule for all partner-
ship and limited partnership candidates for LLC formation.'°° Nor should
the franchise tax draw present a problem: If franchise taxes for LLCs are set
at a level comparable to that already existing for close corporations, the
treasurer should experience a net gain as untaxed partnerships convert to LLC
form and become franchise taxpayers. The second candidate for the opposition
role is the banks. To the extent that limited liability presents a contracting
barrier, the statute will disable them from contracting back to their ex ante
position of security respecting small business lending. 101 But since they can
adjust the cost of credit to make up for this and diversify the additional risk,
one would not expect them to expend financial resources and political capital
on an opposition campaign)°2 The third potential class of objectors is the
98 We have heard informally from practitioners in two different states that the LLC form
is most widely employed for single-purpose real estate acquisition vehicles having a single
equityholder. With the LLC, counsel can just file a piece of paper, skipping the additional
step of producing a needless set of by-laws.
Cf. William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the
Results of Competition, in WILLIAM BRATFON, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIvES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 157-61 (1996).
'°° Moreover, if the Silicon Valley experience is any guide, some potential LLCs will
organize as C corporations despite the tax disadvantage. See supra note 95.
'°' Booth, supra note 29, at 157-61.
02 Contract creditors unaware that firms were shifting to limited liability status in quantity
might suffer surprise losses. See Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies,
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tort plaintiffs' bar. Here participation in the political process would depend on
a cognizable division of labor'° 3
 between business lawyers and plaintiffs'
litigators. Even given such a division of labor, the business lawyers would
appear to have the more high-powered incentive. They would be going after
the near-term reward of fees generated by pent-up demand. In contrast, income
reductions to the plaintiffs' lawyers stemming from the difficulty of collecting
judgments against LLCs amount to a distant period problem and, as a result,
may take on a speculative appearance in the present. Indeed, the likelihood of
loss might rationally be discounted on a number of grounds. Individual defend-
ants could be identified in many cases,'° 4
 and the remedy of veil-piercing
might provide some compensation)° 5
 In addition, to the extent that the
expansion of limited liability attracts assets to risky endeavors, the volume of
tort litigation will rise, with recoveries out of corporate assets in those cases
offsetting losses from unsatisfied judgments in others. Finally, since the
incentives of the tort plaintiffs' bar have themselves become a political issue,
a perceived need to husband political capital for opposition to more threatening
future legislative initiatives might counsel silence here, even given a perceived
impairment of interest. In all, then, the organized plaintiffs' bar serves as a
decidedly imperfect proxy for the interest of inchoate class of future tort
victims. It accordingly is plausible to project complete silence respecting the
tort victim interest in the political process respecting LLCs.
4. Predicted Result
Comparison and weighing of the competing interests, thus described, supports
a projection of prompt enactment of an LLC statute. Here we tell a 'just so'
story, of course. The historical proliferation of LLC legislation has been
attributed to the initiative of state bar committees rather than the initiative of
the legislators themselves) 06
 State treasurers, if they have objected behind
the scenes, have been overruled. The banks and the plaintiffs' bars appear to
and Taxes: A Comment on the Survival of Organizational Forms, 70 WASH. U. L. Q
.
 489,
49 1-92 (1992). Obviously creditors so positioned would not be players in a political process.
03 Note that a complete division of labor among individual business lawyers and tort
litigators need not result in a visible division of interest on the part of the bar if the two
types of lawyers practice together in firms.
04 See Booth, supra note 29, at 154-57.
' See Ribstein I, supra note 7, at 8-9 (suggesting that corporate veil piercing on general
equitable principles should apply equally to LLCs).
'° Id. at 4. See also Ribstein III, supra note 94, at 1008-12 (explaining that in 'non-
corporate' situations holding out no cognizable franchise tax yield for the state, its legisla-
tors will not have incentives to innovate).
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have taken no interest in the matter. Thus, in practice, the business lawyers'
high-powered incentives appear to have carried the day.
Note that in our hypothetical island state the law of business forms very much
is product - domestic product. The local bar procures the legislation in order
to access and satisfy an existing client demand. Yet, significantly, nothing in
this law as product description provides the slightest assurance that the legisla-
tion is efficient. Indeed, in the confines of the model here, the supply-side
interest procures the legislation in the usual manner of interest group capture
and the demand being satisfied stems in part from a perverse incentive to
externalize accident costs.
It also should be noted that the alignment of incentives in the island state make
it likely that innovation respecting the terms of the LLC form will continue
in the period following enactment. The legal practitioners can only learn the
particulars of the statute's effects on a trial and error basis over time. As they
do so, one would expect to see amendment of the legislation. This, presumably
suboptimal, incentive to innovate follows from the business lawyers' interest
in maximizing fee revenues. Recall that one of the main sources - perhaps
even the primary source - of fee revenues from LLC organization lies in
firms that, but for the LLC statute, would organize as partnerships due to the
prohibitive costs and uncertainties attending corporate organization under
Subchapter S. There arises an implication of extreme cost sensitivity on the
part of these firms: Limited liability has a value to them, but they opt in only
if the cost is minimal. Given such discriminating consumers, we can expect
the business bar to invest in close monitoring of the operation of the LLC
statute. Since complexity is involved, there is no reason to expect that the bar
association's (and legislature's) first round draft will best satisfy client demand.
Rounds of revision will be needed to achieve the maximum possible satisfac-
tion of client demand for lowest cost organizational terms. As the statute is
improved through amendment, the class of firms for which LLC organization
expands, with the bar experiencing the reward of higher revenues. Here again
we tell a 'just so' story: The prevailing forms of LLC statutes have evolved
dynamically in the course of their short history. 107
107 See Ribstein IV, supra note 96, at 412-28.
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C. Incentives to Race-to-the-Bottom: LLCs in a Federal System With
a Rule of Siege Reel
It has been suggested that the states' rapid movement to enact LLC statutes
cannot be described as a race-to-the-bottom for the reason that a downward
corporate race can only occur given a separation of ownership and control.'°8
Unfortunately, this suggestion misses the point. If a given legislative enactment
causes costs to incurred in other states, then a race-to-the-bottom always is a
structural possibility. Thus, to the extent that the costs of limited liability are
felt outside of the state providing the business fonn, a race-to-the-bottom could
occur when multiple states expand the availability of limited liability.
We model such a race to externalize below. The pattern of regulatory competi-
tion that informs the model follows from conditions quite distinct from those
that determine the familiar corporate law race of charter-mongering jurisdic-
tions. To underscore this difference, our model assumes a federal system in
which charter-mongering is precluded by a siege reel choice of law rule. In
other words, firms must be chartered in the state in which most of their assets
are situated. Although the exercise shows that a race-to-the-bottom is a struc-
tural possibility, we conclude that this theoretical race is very unlikely to have
figured into the proliferation of LLC statutes across the states.
1. Regulatory Races to the Bottom	 Externalities, Preferences, and
Prisoners' Dilemmas
Regulatory competition theory recognizes two exceptions to its presumption
favoring state-level lawmaking. First, the federal government has to keep state
borders open if factor and citizen mobility is bring competitive discipline to
regulation at the state level) 09 Second, pursuant to the command that the
scope of regulation should match the domain of its costs and benefits, the
federal government has to police interstate externalities)' 0 Competing gov-
erninents have an incentive to regulate so as to facilitate cross-border cost
externalization by their citizens. This occurs, for example, when a jurisdiction
makes an exception in its environmental law for a given type of pollution
knowing that prevailing winds blow the permitted particles across the border.
Here, not only does the producer externalize a cost, but those affected by the
08 See Macey, supra note 13, at 442-43.
08 Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 125, 129 (1994).
'° Id. at 127.
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externality have no voice as to its regulation and get no chance to trade
sufferance of the pollution for higher incomes.
Cross-border externalities, then, invite races-to-the-bottom across multiple
states, with either of federal intervention or interstate governmental cooperation
being justified as a remedy." Choice of law behavior in products liability
litigation has been argued to present such a case." 2
 The key to this argu-
ment, as articulated by Michael McConnell, lies in the problem of synchroniz-
ing local preferences respecting levels of product liability with supply and
demand conditions in a national product market. Since each state's manufac-
turers price and sell on a national basis, individual states have an incentive to
set a higher level of product liability protection than they would set as island
jurisdictions. The federal system thus allows them to satisfy local plaintiffs at
the expense of foreign manufacturers, free riding on states that legislate lower
levels of protection. Downward adjustment of the level of liability does local
manufacturers little good, and forces local plaintiffs to incur the cost of finding
alternative jurisdictions in which to sue. Says McConnell, we accordingly tend
to see downward adjustments of liability levels only where costs and benefits
both are felt locally - medical malpractice and municipal liability being
examples. With products liability, he argues, the downward race to set high
levels of liability requires federal level adjustment."3
Races to externalize, such as that hypothesized by McConnell, comprise a
subset in the range of race-to-the-bottom situations debated in the literature.
Some important points of distinction should be noted. Consider, by way of
contrast, the famous race-to-the-bottom argument advanced to justify the
federalization of environmental law."4
 That argument presupposes no cross-
Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentaiRegulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L. J. 2039, 2098 (1993).
" See Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-LawApproach to Products Liability Reform,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (W. Olson ed., 1988). See also Michael E. Solimne,
An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1989). But
cf. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System,
80 GE0. L. J. 617, 617-18, 651-52 (1992) (arguing the states have a dual incentive - to
attract investment with manufacturer-favorable liability rules and to skew their choice of
law rules in directions favorable to individual local plaintiffs suing foreign manufacturers -
and that therefore the incentive picture is more complicated than in McConnell's presenta-
tion and counseling caution respecting federalization of the product liability system).
" McConnell, supra note 112, at 91-92.
" See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-Constitu-
tional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean
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border pollution. It instead focuses on the internal state politics of environ-
mental regulation, asserting that local factors of production exercise a distortive
influence when they threaten to relocate in the wake of stepped up regulation.
The argument is that competition for new factors of production among the
states leaves them in a prisoners' dilemma respecting environmental standards.
Each state is deterred from promulgating standards at its preferred level of
strictness by the threat of a loss of production factors to a defecting competing
state. The more intense the competition for factors, the greater the disparity
between the level of environmental protection desired by the public and that
evolving in practice. Furthermore, given a large number of states, the transac-
tion costs of collective action will prevent coordination. The prisoners'
dilemma accordingly ripens into a commons dilemma calling for a federal level
solution."5
Regulatory competition proponents have mounted a strong attack on the
assumptions underlying this prisoners' dilemma story. The prisoners' dilemma
set up, they say, depends on the assumption that the multiple jurisdictions have
fixed preferences for strict regulation, each believing that the subject matter
should not be one for cost-benefit tradeoffs. Competition for factors and
collective action problems then undermine the jurisdictions' ability to adhere
to the stated policy, leading to a suboptimal result." 6
 A more realistic set
up, say the critics, would depict the situation differently: In a world of scarce
resources, cost-benefit tradeoffs between levels of regulation and income are
inevitable; no a priori fixed preference for a given level of regulation should
be assumed. Without fixed preferences across jurisdictions, higher payoffs
through federalization or interstate cooperation cannot be assumed and a
prisoners' dilemma is not inevitable. While it is in theory possible that abso-
lute, normatively-based preferences, whether for stricter environmental rules
or some other form of regulation, could exist across jurisdictions, this is
Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV. 713, 7 14-22 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of SacrWce?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1212 (1977).
Revesz restates the prisoners' dilemma account in a two-party framework, showing
that where a player has two strategies, lax and strict, a suboptimal lax strategy will strongly
dominate the optimal stringent strategy. Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Conpeti-
tion: Rethinking the Race-to-the-Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1216-17, 1229-32(1992). The suboptimal lax strategy is a unique
equilibrium and will always be selected. Note also, that given 50 states, co-operation
through mutual forbearance is unlikely to evolve even given infinite repetition of the game.
Hay, supra note 112, at 625-26.
116 Revesz, supra note 115, 1219-24.
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asserted to be very unlikely as a practical
	
'
A prisoners' dilemma characterization remains structurally appropriate, how-
ever, in cases where negative externalization drives the lawmaking
strategy." 8
 The model that follows falls into this category.
2. Racing to Externalize With Limited Liability
a. Low trade scenario
We begin with the island jurisdiction of the previous subpart. As before, larger
firms endure two-tier taxation but enjoy limited liability. For simplicity, we
assume that all smaller firms are organized as partnerships because of the high
expense of incorporation. We also drop our public choice assumption and
instead stipulate that the jurisdiction's government devotes itself to the maximi-
zation of the welfare of its citizens. The jurisdiction has altered its income tax
regime to extend the availability of one-tier taxation and now its legislature
has to decide whether to enact an LLC statute. The legislature correctly
ascertains that the value of the present system of small firm unlimited liability
to be 100 - the sum of the value of extra compensation to tort victims,
transaction cost savings, and foregone investment in unproductively risky
ventures. The cost of this unlimited liability system is 80 - the sum of the
negative value of foregone investment in productive ventures and the dead-
weight extra costs incurred by a firms that incorporate but would not do so
in a regime making limited liability more cheaply available. On these numbers,
the legislature, immune as it is to the ministrations of interest groups, will not
enact an LLC statute.
Now let us change the facts and place the island jurisdiction in a federation
of four identical states. As stated, the rule of siege reel prevails. But, as in our
interstate corporate system, each must recognize corporations formed in each
other state. Trade and interstate contact are spread evenly across the
jurisdictions' geographies and are enjoyed on apro rata basis by all firms. The
level of trade is such that some of the benefits of each state's unlimited liability
regime are felt in other three states. Specifically, 90 percent of the benefits
accrue to local residents and firms, while 10 percent of the benefits accrue to
out-of-state residents and firms. All of the costs of the regime are incurred by
" Stewart, supra note 114, at 2058-59. For a strong rebuttal, see Brian A. Langille,
Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and
Labour Standards, in BRATTON, ET AL, supra note 99, at 477-90.
t8 See Hay, supra note 112 at 625-26.
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local businesses and citizens. Since the legislature of each state cares only
about the welfare of its own citizens, the externalized benefits have no bearing
on the legislative cost-benefit calculation. Yet no shift in favor of LLCs results
on these numbers. Although the costs of an LLC statute now amount to only
90 of foregone benefits of unlimited liability, the LLC statute's benefits remain
fixed at 80. Since we are in a world of siege reel, no state's preference
calculation can be influenced by the possibility of setting up shop as a charter-
mongerer that draws benefits from pent up demand for LLC status across the
four states. If any one state enacts an LLC statute, foreign corporations
wishing to take advantage literally will have to pick up stakes and move their
assets. Such capital movement seems unlikely, since incorporation is available
in each of the four states for any firm willing to pay the incremental cost.
b. Signfl cant trade scenario
Now let us examine the incentives of each of the four states on a different
scenario. We go from a low trade scenario at t = 0 to a t = 1 at which
interstate trade has picked up substantially and makes up a more significant
proportion of the gross product of each state. The increased level of trade is
such that 70 percent of the benefits of unlimited liability are felt at home and
30 percent are felt outside, distributed as an even 10 to each other state. As
before, all costs of unlimited liability are felt at home by local businesses.
Assume further that State 1 fortuitously adjusts its corporate tax system at t
= 1 to make one-tier treatment available to all small firms whatever their form
and, as a result, rethinks its policy respecting limited liability. State 1 has a
short-term incentive to take the first mover role respecting an LLC statute. The
local benefits of unlimited liability are 70 and costs are 80. And, since the
benefits of unlimited liability are the costs of limited liability, the state can
export 30 percent of the costs of the shift, provided of course that none of the
other states make the same move.
State 1 thus enacts an LLC statute at t = 1. We now look at the situation from
the point of view of the legislature of State 2 at t = 2. State 2 is experiencing
70 of benefits from unlimited liability and bearing 80 of costs. In addition, it
bears 10 of additional costs of limited liability exported by State 1. Standing
pat thus leaves State 2 in loss situation. If it enacts an LLC statute it will
receive benefits of 80, incur local costs of 70 and export 30 of costs to the
other three states. Of those exported costs, 10 will go to State 1, offsetting the
10 of costs coming from State 1. Netting all of this out, an LLC statute will
be a wash for State 2, yielding 80 of benefits against 70 of local costs and 10
of costs coming from State 1 in any event. If States 3 and 4 do not act,
enactment of the LLC statute is the maximizing move for State 2.
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The problem, of course, is that States 3 and 4 are doing the same analysis at
t = 2. If all three states enact LLC statutes they will get the following result:
Each of the four states will gain 80 in benefits of limited liability, incur 70 of
local costs, export 30 of costs, and import 30 of costs, for a total cost of 100.
This situation clearly is suboptimal, since as island jurisdictions none would
prefer the limited liability regime. Absent an opportunity for coordination
across the states, this also would appear to be the equilibrium result, since each
of States 2, 3, and 4 has a sucker payoff to worry about. If, say, State 2 stands
pat and States 3 and 4 enact LLC statutes, it ends up in a worst case situation,
experiencing 70 in local benefits, 80 in local costs and an additional 30 in costs
exported from the other States for a total cost of 110. On the other hand, if
coordination among the states is feasible, States 2, 3 and 4 could mutually
agree to stand pat)' 9
 This leaves each with 80 of benefits and 90 of costs
for a deficit of 10 - a result superior to the deficit of 30 resulting from
uncoordinated enactment of LLC statutes. Of course, if the agreement to stand
pat cannot be enforced, there will remain an incentive to defect on the part of
each state so as to pick up 10 of benefits. The first-best result, however, comes
only as the result of intervention by the federal government to bar all four
states from extending the availability of limited liability.
A question arises about the incentives of the first mover, State 1. Given that
its initial adoption of an LLC creates the possibility of a suboptimal equilib-
rium at t = 2, why would it move in the first place? Two reasons can be
suggested. First, the time lapse between the first and second periods might be
long, given information asymmetries and the vagaries of political processes
- long enough to make first movement optimal given a high discount rate on
the part of State l's politicians and the possibility of interstate coordination
in a later period. Second, if State 1 is lucky, States 2, 3, and 4 will coordinate
themselves into standing pat, leaving State 1 on a first-best free ride.
c. Inthalanced trade scenarios
Let us try one further scenario to illustrate the possibility that State 1 can
succeed with a scheme to externalize. All we have to do is give State 1 a
special reason to take the first mover role. Specifically, State 1 contains the
federation's largest city and business center. As a result, the benefits of limited
liability to State 1 are 100 where the benefits remain at 80 in the other states.
On these numbers, there is no reason for State 1 either to refrain from enacting
an LLC statute or to cooperate with the other states.
119 The stand pat result also might emerge as a focal point equilibrium.
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We get a variation on this theme if we stipulate benefits of limited liability at
an even 80 across all four states, but then accord State 1 a 70-30 split between
internal and external benefits, and accord each of States 2, 3, and 4 a 90-10
split between internal and external benefits. That is, citizens from States 2, 3
and 4 go to the big city in State 1 to do business, but the volume both of
citizens going out of State 1 to do business and the volume of traffic between
the other three states inter se is much lower. On these numbers, State 1 has
every incentive to externalize. At t = 2, if each of the other states stands pat,
each will have an unlimited liability benefit of 90, a local unlimited liability
cost of 80, and an externalized cost of 10 that it cannot avert. If the states
enact LLC statutes, they will each have a limited liability cost of 90, a limited
liability benefit of 80 plus a burden of externalized costs in excess of 10,
assuming that each spreads some of its trade around the group of 3•120 Doing
nothing thus is the superior strategy, and State l's move does not prompt a
race-to-the-bottom.
3. Summary
Generally, then, the higher the level of interstate contacts and trade, (a) the
wider the spread between the benefits and costs of liability and unlimited
liability in each state, and (b) the more likely it is that a given state will have
an incentive to move to a limited liability regime from a first position of
unlimited liability in order to effect externalization of the costs of limited
liability. Given such a first move, a race-to-the-bottom among the remaining
states in the federation may or not ensue, depending the cost-benefit posture
of each state.
That all having been said, it appears very unlikely that desire to externalize
costs of limited liability on the part of individual states has played a causative
role in the proliferation of LLC statutes. Since we tend to deal with small firms
here, we also deal for the most part with local costs and benefits. The posture
might be different if the subject was an extension in of the availability of
limited liability for the benefit of large corporations doing business in the
national market.
20 And even if each of the three states does all of its trading with State 1, the enactment
of an LLC statute still leaves it in a negative situation with costs of 100 and benefits of 80.
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D. Incentives to Race-to-the-Top: LLCs in a Federal System
We begin with the hypothetical federal system of the previous subpart and
change a number of assumptions. First, we abandon the rule of siege reel,
making it possible for firms to incorporate in any state despite the location of
their assets elsewhere. Second, we revert to the public choice framework and
assume that there obtains in each state the interest group alignment described
above for an island jurisdiction. Third, we initially assume that there is no
uncertainty respecting recognition of foreign LLCs in any state in the feder-
ation (an assumption we later relax).' 2 ' And, fourth, we add a fifth state
modelled on Delaware: State 5 is smaller in area and population than the other
four and has made a successful business of attracting the chartering business
of large, publicly-held firms. We look at the five jurisdictions at three times.
First comes t = 0, when the federal government alters its tax system to allow
one-tier treatment for incorporated firms matching the description of LLCs;
second comes t = 1, some years later, when all five jurisdictions have LLC
statutes; third comes the period after t = 1 and before a t = 2 that occurs
several years later still. Here is the question for discussion: Whether there is
any basis to for concluding that regulatory competition plays a significant
causative role either in the first appearance of an LLC statute immediately after
t = 0, in the proliferation of LLC statutes between t = 0 and t = 1, or in the
ongoing maintenance and modification of the LLC regime between t = 1 and
= 2.
1. Corporate Charter Competition as a Model for the Period Between
t = 1 and t = 2
We will begin with the period between t = 1 and t = 2 and inquire as to the
likelihood that the pattern of corporate law charter competition will be repli-
cated with respect to LLCs. Historically speaking, charter competition began
after general incorporation statutes already had proliferated across the states
- in effect ex post t = 1. We accordingly begin with the end period as we
explore the possibility of direct application of the corporate charter competition
model to LLCs. Under the charter competition model, State 5 would take the
first mover role respecting improvements in the LLC form, amending its LLC
statute with a view to attracting registration fees and legal business from the
121 Here we assume away a possible barrier to regulatory competition respecting LLCs.
LLC proliferation in the federal system occurred despite a slight degree of uncertainty
respecting recognition of foreign firms. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract,
18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993).
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other four states.
The question as to whether we plausibly can project replication of this charter
competition pattern in the LLC context can be asked in two forms, one narrow
and the other broad. The narrow question is whether we can expect a literal
repetition. It admits of a clear answer: No. Two reasons can be cited, one
lying on the supply-side and other on the demand-side: State 5's government
has little financial incentive to compete for LLC business; at same time, costs
constrain the migratory options of small firms suited to organization as LLCs.
The broad question is whether, despite the absence of conditions supporting
literal repetition, some out-of-state LLC business may find its way to State 5,
with actors in the state having incentives to shape its legal environment so as
to attract that business. Here a more equivocal answer is yielded: Possibly.
a. The narrow question
We address the question about exact replication by looking first at the supply-
side incentive picture. Firms opting to become LLCs tend to be small firms,
and small firms have historically been excluded from descriptions of charter
competition. Close corporation charters, even when registered in quantity,
provide only insignificant revenues to the chartering state. Delaware keys its
franchise tax rates to the size of the chartered firm. The resulting revenue
figures for close corporations are so small as to contribute only a minor portion
of the state's revenue draw.' 22 The Delaware legislature, accordingly, has
only a weak financial incentive to compete for small firm business.
The charter competition analogy also fails to carry over to the demand side
of the incentive picture. As noted above, firms reincorporate to Delaware to
obtain comprehensive case law, well-specified indemnification rules, and an
expert judiciary. " Historically, these benefits have justified the costs of the
move in the case of larger firms, either because they plan merger and acquisi-
tion transactions or, more generally, have a concern about shareholder litiga-
tion.' 24 Since small firms have only a limited need for these services, they
historically have tended to find that the costs of foreign incorporation outweigh
the benefits. Nothing in the nature of the LLC provides a basis for a different
projection. One would expect a strong incentive for foreign organization to
arise only if a given home state provided a negative incentive, whether because
122 See Carney, supra note 99, at 156.
123 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124 See generally. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 81, at 37-48. See
also Macey, supra note 13, at 444-46 (arguing that LLCs do not replicate the corporate fact
pattern).
AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: 309
it enacted a statute that failed to meet the demand of local firms in some
material respect or failed to enact any statute at all. And even these cases, it
would not be immediately clear that the costs and benefits favored foreign
organization as an LLC. Recall, from the demand picture set out above for an
island jurisdiction, that we for the most part deal here with a class of small
firms as to which the costs of Subchapter S corporate organization loom so
large that unlimited liability in the partnership form is the preferred alternative.
The degree of transaction cost sensitivity thereby implicated makes foreign
organization an unlikely first choice even in the case of a suboptimal domestic
statutory provision. Incorporation in a foreign state costs the firm more
because it results in two franchise taxes and two sets of compliance costs
instead of one.' Whatever the benefits held out by a superior foreign codes
and dispute-resolution regimes, they have not historically outweighed the costs
with respect to close corporations. This demand side pattern should continue
to obtain with LLCs.
The failure of the strict charter competition analogy should come as no surprise
to anyone familiar with charter market's structure. Although it is fair to speak
in terms of a charter 'market', that market does not function as a sort of
Middle Eastern souk in which 50 states set up booths in a small space and
corporate consumers go from booth to booth comparing product quality and
haggling over price. Instead, only one state, Delaware, competes for charters
on a national basis. Its capture of about half of the available volume has
enabled it to develop an expertise in sophisticated corporate dispute resolution
that cannot easily be replicated by a competitor.' 26
 Given convergence among
the states as to the terms of corporate codes, the possibility of easy replication
of any statutory innovations by Delaware, and the difficulty and expense of
replicating Delaware's dispute resolution expertise,' 27
 no other state has had
an incentive to invest in entry into active competition. Thus, interest group
influence in the separate states, rather than regulatory competition, can be
drawn on to provide an explanation for the phenomenon of fast diffusion of
innovative code provisions across the states.'
25 The firm also opens itself to suit in two states instead of one. Ayres, supra note 99,
374-75.
126 See Bratton and McCahery, supra note 94, at 1893-95.
127 cf• Ian Ayres, Supply-Side In efficiencies and Competitive Federalism: Lessons from
Patents, Yachting, and Bluebooks, in BRArF0N, ET AL, supra note 99, at 241-46 (suggesting
that the absence of intellectual property protection for innovators will lead to suboptimal
charter competition).
128 Carney, supra note 99, at 172-82.
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b. The broad question
The absence of conditions necessary for replication of the corporate charter
market does not imply the complete absence of competitive behavior respecting
LLCs in the period after t = 1. To the extent that firms with substantial
capitalizations choose the LLC form, it is not implausible to project that
lawyers in State 5, the Delaware in our hypothetical federation, can succeed
in skimming a little cream from the other states.
In making this projection, we look to Delaware's bench and bar for supply side
incentives. The Delaware bench maintains a national reputation as a center for
resolution of complex business disputes, and the Delaware bar draws rents
from the resulting flow of litigation business) 29
 LLCs, taken by analogy to
close corporations, could provide some additional litigation volume. Some out-
of-state close corporations do organize in Delaware, despite the standard cost-
benefit recommendation against Delaware sites for small firms. ° And a
cognizable number of cases respecting Delaware close corporations have been
reported over the decades.' 3 ' These firms thus add value to the state even
though they do not contribute a substantial portion of its franchise lax draw,
and there is every reason to expect the Delaware bar to pay close auenion to
the shaping and reshaping of the state's LLC statute with a view to catching
any parallel LLC business. This is not a high-powered incentive - here any
present investment in legislative drafting looks toward a speculative and
129 State policy to expand the volume of this business is manifested in Delaware's
contractual choice of law statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708(a), (c) (1993). For
discussion, see Ribstein ill, supra note 94, at 1003-1007.
30 This point is strongly implied by raw numbers of Delaware incorporations. Lu 1994,
for example, there were 44,762 new incorporations in Delaware, Joe Fuighamand Kimberly
Quillen, Keeping Businesses in Delaware, DEL. Bus. REV., Dec. 4, 1995, at 1; in 1996
the total number of active Delaware incorporations was 270.000, Kimberly Quillen,
Entrepreneurial Woman of the Year: Carolyn E. McKown, DEL. Bus. REV., Oct. 28. 1996.
p. 2. No doubt a large number of these firms were not out-of-state close corporations. They
might, for example, be either of (a) publicly-traded firms organized in other states migrating
to Delaware, (b) subsidiaries of existing publicly-traded Delaware firms, (c) subsidiaries
of publicly-traded firms organized in other states, or (d) domestic close corporations. But
it nonetheless seems highly likely that these large numbers include a cognizable number of
out-of-state close corporations.
131 See, e.g., Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232 (Del. Supr. 1982); Oceanic
Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1 (Del. Supr. 1981); Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del.
Ch. 222,222 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1966); Ringling Bros.-Barnum& Bailey Combined Shows
v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. Supr. 1947). Interestingly, the Delaware courts have taken
a distinct antifiduciary posture in disposing of some issues presented in close corporation
cases. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. Supr. 1993).
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sporadic return on the litigation side. But a high-powered incentive may not
be needed. One suspects that the requisite investment of time carries a corre-
spondingly low cost, and the returns, although sporadic, would accrue across
a long-term.
Turning to the supply side, the class of potential customers for Delaware LLC
organization presumably would have attributes parallel to those of its close
corporation customers. Several readily suggest themselves. These must be
firms as to which transaction cost penny-pinching is not a primary concern,
so that the lawyer has discretion to pursue a first-best legal regime. One
suspects that such a firm would engage a large law firm. Lawyers at that large
law firm might opt for Delaware LLC situs out of dissatisfaction with the local
LLC statute.' 32 Alternatively, Delaware organization might be indicated
where litigation is foreseeable litigation, as might be the case where parties
in interest conduct complex negotiations over conflict of interest points, or
where, absent such negotiation, the lawyer nonetheless identifies nascent
conflicts. As already noted, the Delaware bar has every incentive to craft an
LLC statute that signals sensitivity to the interests such marginal firms.
Having thus hypothesized a national role for Delaware, and hence State 5, in
the organization of LLCs, the question arises whether this implies a law
development path paralleling that of corporate law, with Delaware taking the
role of prime mover respecting LLC statutory and case law. Such a scenario
is very unlikely because there is no apparent source of responsive competitive
pressure in the other states. Here any litigation business in effect is lost as a
result of Delaware's standing reputation as a dispute resolution center, an
attraction that cannot be copied, at least at low cost. And, since out-of-state
lawyers routinely join Delaware lawyers on Delaware-based litigation, the
litigation loss is far from total in the eyes of out-of-state lawyers. Organization
business, meanwhile, need not be lost at all so far as they are concerned. One
of the factors that has assured Delaware's success as a charter competitor has
been its laws' availability to lawyers nationwide - it is the custom for out-of-
state corporate lawyers to form Delaware corporations and give Delaware
opinions on due incorporation and corporate authority to enter into transac-
tions. The out-of-state organizing lawyer thereby views Delaware as a choice
rather than as a threat. For a source of continuing incentives to improve the
local LLC statute, we are better off looking to domestic concerns, as the
discussion that follows will show.
132 A California lawyer has described just such a dissatisfaction to us in conversation.
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2. Incentives for the First Mover State at t = 0
The incentive picture changes only slightly when we change our temporal
perspective and survey the five state federation at t = 0. Here the question is
whether it plausibly can be hypothesized that the first LLC statute will be
enacted by a state seeking to take a prime mover advantage and draw on all
five states for LLC business. Such a scenario is implausible, at least assuming
a modicum of rationality on the part of the each state's actors and an awareness
of the history respecting corporate charter competition. Since the other states
are free to copy the first mover's statute,' 33 the time window for a first
mover advantage must be short, too short to permit the first mover to develop
any less easily replicated expertise that might preserve its leading position over
time. First movement with a view to out-of-state business thus is plausible only
given a high projected flow of out-of-state fees during the period of time
advantage, or given some special (and enduring) advantage on the first mover's
part. Significantly, the latter situation of special advantage has figured into the
history of charter competition. Delaware's small population enabled its emerg-
ence as the chartering jurisdiction: It could credibly commit to serve the needs
of large corporations without a risk of local political interference because,
given its small size, chartering revenues can make up a substantial portion of
its total tax receipts. ' Something comparable might be present here if, for
example, the interest group alignment in the other four states disfavored LLC
legislation. But, as we saw when considering incentives in an island jurisdic-
tion, such an unfavorable political climate cannot plausibly be projected.
But if the first mover does not seek foreign business, how can we account for
the appearance of the first LLC statute? If the first mover state is not State 5,
then the above description of the incentives of an island jurisdiction provides
an answer. Domestic, as opposed to foreign demand, plus the local bar's
pecuniary interest in satisfying that demand, together completely explain first
movement. Foreign demand would figure in only as low probability upside
factor - an extra splash of gravy on loaded plate. Such a factor certainly
could come into the first mover's cost-benefit analysis. But no implication of
determinative influence arises thereby.
Further to this point, consider the possibility that State 5 could take the first
mover role as a means to the end of adding litigation business. Given our
assumption of certain recognition of foreign LLCs in states without an LLC
B Ayres, supra note 127, at 241-46.
' ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 86, at 6-12.
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statute, that possibility must at least be conceded. But if we relax the assunip-
lion and admit a small risk of nonrecognition between t = 0 and t = 1, the
State 5 incentive picture changes radically. Now State 5 lawmakers may project
that conservative counsel in States 1 to 4 would advise that any State 5 organ-
ization be in the corporate form pending termination of the risk of
nonrecognition by means of domestic enactment of LLC legislation. They
furthermore might ask themselves whether State 5's interests are served at all
by first movement respecting a novel business form. That very novelty,
coupled with the prospect of easy replication by the legislatures of other states,
creates a risk of dissipation of the value of its accumulated experience and
consequent business loss. On this scenario, then, State 5 is the least likely first
mover due to the combination of a vested interest in the status quo and a low
level of domestic demand.
3. Incentives to Copy Between t = 0 and t = 1
The same domestic demand factors that best account for the actions of the
prime mover also come to bear in explaining the actions of the other states
during the period of proliferation of LLC statutes. One can plausibly model
the statues' rapid diffusion as a sequence of domestic events, without any
reference to interstate competition. Simply, the organized bar of each state
invests in securing the legislation in pursuit of domestic revenues. Note that
nothing in this description denies the appropriateness of the of the law as
product analogy. Law is as much product here as it is in the charter competi-
tion model. Here, however, cost advantages enjoyed by the local producer
make it a domestic product.
But, given enactment by the first mover, might not competition figure into the
legislation's proliferation because bar associations of the follower states either
experience loss of business to the prime mover or fear a potential loss of
business? The first of these two suggestions presupposes first, no relaxation
of our assumption of certain recognition of foreign LLCs, and, second, a
somewhat stylized model of interest group activity. Recall the sensitive cost-
benefit profile of the bar's small business customers. Given this sensitivity,
any firms unlikely to be deterred by the additional costs of out-of-state-organiz-
ation presumably already will be organized domestically as Subchapter S
corporations.' 35 Accordingly, no massive, statewide loss of business plausibly
can be projected. A limited loss of business at the state's borders is a more
135 Out-of-state reorganization as an LLC is possible for such a firm, but such a step
would seem unlikely given any uncertainty as to domestic recognition.
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likely possibility.' 36 But such a projection literally depends on the customer
firm's geographical proximity to the border - the proximity minimizes the
firm's information costs and other transaction costs. For this competitive
causation story to work, information about such border-town lost business must
then diffuse to and motivate the actors in the state bar who procure the legisla-
tion. 137 Such a scenario is not implausible, although it works best where the
border-town is itself a place of influence in the state.'38
The story's plausibility does not, taken alone, propel it to the top of the list
of likely causative factors in the proliferation of LLCs. After all, the very fact
of loss of business to a neighbor reinforces a projection of untapped domestic
demand. In addition, the overall risk of business loss to the bar declines
sharply once State 5 enacts an LLC statute. Recall that State 5 stands in here
for Delaware and that it is the custom for out-of-state corporate lawyers to
form Delaware corporations and give Delaware opinions with the Delaware
bar taking its special rents from litigating. Thus, once State 5 has an LLC
statute, a lawyer in a State 2, still lacking an LLC statute, plausibly can
compete with a cross-border lawyer in State 1 by offering organization in State
5 to a firm client desiring LLC status. Of course, State 5 organization being
more costly than domestic organization, the State 5 alternative provides no
basis for the realization of maximal LLC fee revenues by the State 2 bar. On
this scenario, then, local lawyers never need lose business to out-of-state
lawyers. But they nevertheless retain a powerful incentive to secure the
enactment of domestic legislation. Finally, we note a close and enervating tie
between this scenario and the assumption of certain foreign LLC recognition
in non-LLC states. If we relax the assumption and introduce uncertainty
respecting recognition of a State 5 LLC in State 2, then, at least until t = 1,
the State 5 solution is doubly suboptimal for both the State 2 lawyer and the
client. The implication of domestic causation in State 2 is proportionately
strengthened.
' See Ribstein !V supra note 96, at 400 (hypothesizing that Kansas City, Missouri,
lawyers might lose LLC business to lawyers in Kansas City, Kansas); Ayres, supra note
127, at 375 (suggesting that Delaware might take close corporation business from Pennsyl-
vania).
David Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U.L.REv.
1, 52-60 (1985), articulates such a scenario in the context of product safety standards.
Thus does Ribstein place Kansas City in the story. Carney, supra note 99, at 859,
suggests that the cross border business loss might be an influential fact even absent a
business center with a border location. He recalls a mention in a Georgia bar association
committee of south Georgia businesses crossing to Florida to organize as LLCs, and
speculates that similar stories were told nationwide during the period of LLC proliferation.
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But this lost business story can be restated so that it survives despite the
foregoing analysis. We simply say that risk averse State 2 lawyers fear lost
business, even though on reflection they will see that no significant amount
of business actually need be lost. This less pointed version of the story is
notably easy to tell. So long as even one firm might find it cost beneficial to
organize out of state and accept the risk of nonrecognition, it will be plausible
to say that the actors moving the bar association 'fear' a loss of the business.
At this level of generality, a regulatory competition story can indeed be
included in the description of the proliferation of LLC statues.
The high level of generality denudes the story of most of its descriptive
authority, however. Loss of business to another state is a constant possibility
respecting business organizations in a federal system that does not follow a rule
of siege reel. In such a system, the presence of out-of-state alternatives acts
as an intrinsic limit on the zone of any given state's lawmaking discretion
respecting business associations. No state enjoys a natural monopoly)39
Furthermore, in the long run, a state refusing to follow the LLC trend hobbles
its small firms with an extra level of costs, and, given the long-term possibility
of relocation of assets, may even experience a loss of economic activity. But
the fact of the projection and the presence of out-of-state alternatives do not
by themselves dictate the conclusion that a particular body of law results from
the competitive disposition of the state's legislature. In a world of interest
group politics, competitive incentives on lawmakers' parts cannot be assumed.
In order credibly to draw on the background constant of interstate movement
of individuals and production factors in ascribing a competitive origin to
particular legislation, therefore, incentives must be described with particularity.
In the case of LLCs such a competitive description can be made with complete
plausibility on a domestic basis. The regulatory competition overlay amounts
to surplusage.
E. Summary - LLCs, Regulatory Competition and Evolutionary
Efficiency
We conclude that regulatory competition can be accorded no more than a
secondary place in a plausible account of the proliferation of LLC statutes. We
can account completely for the fact of enactment by reference to the financial
incentives of the pertinent domestic interest group, the bar. Between t = 0 and
t = 1, the second level causal contribution of regulatory competition at most
09 Ribstein IV, supra note 96, at 400. As Ribstein points out, no state has the discretion
to raise its franchise taxes above a minimal, competitively set level. Id. at 399.
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concerns not to the fact of adoption but the timing of adoption. Here the
particular point to be explained is the unusually rapid action taken by bars and
legislatures. As to this phenomenon, local scare stories about business lost to
lawyers in other states fits neatly into a plausible causation story. But, remem-
bering that money has a time value and that local lawyers have fixed costs of
operation to cover, local financial incentives also must figure importantly in
the explanation of the velocity of enactment. After t = 1, certainty of foreign
recognition triggers the special incentives of the bar of State 5 so that a
competitive posture respecting LLC legislation becomes an active possibility.
But no federation-wide implication of competitive responsiveness thereby
arises.
This account must be sharply distinguished from competing descriptions of the
LLC phenomenon that accord regulatory competition and interest group politics
co-equal status) 4° Those descriptions tend to be used to support of bottom-
line efficiency assertions,' 4 ' for in theory regulatory competition serves as
a means to efficient ends. Unfortunately, however, a pre-existing need to add
support to a problematic efficiency assertion imports no plausibility to a
descriptive finding, whether of regulatory competition or anything else.
Even if there were some specific empirical evidence or a structural factor that
justified according regulatory competition a coequal place in the description
of the proliferation of LLCs, support for an efficiency assertion would not
necessarily follow. Regulatory competition has a very precise efficiency
function: It promotes efficiency by causing citizen preferences to be matched
with legislative outcomes, and as a result is held out as a cure to the problem
of legislative capture described in public choice theory. Thus does the effi-
ciency case for the LLC run into a problem, since interest group influence
figures prominently in all accounts of the proliferation of LLC statutes. As a
result, the exercise of admitting regulatory competition to a coequal place in
the description literally says that competition here serves the perverse function
of hastening the rate of adoption of a piece of interest group legislation! If we
in addition make the above assumption that LLC legislation effects an ineffic-
ient balance between loss externalization and transaction cost reduction for
small businesses, the inclusion of actual or potential regulatory competition
in the description implies a possible lock-in of the inefficient result.' 42 To
140 See Ribstein IV, supra note 96, at 397 (asserting that LLCs emerge from a combina-
tion of political forces and jurisdictional competition'); Macey, supra note 13, at 446-47
(arguing that the states compete for chartering revenues respecting LLCs).
'" Ribstein IV supra note 96, at 412; Macey, supra note 13, at 442-43, 446-47.
142 We have made a parallel argument respecting public corporations. See Bratton and
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see this possibility, hypothesize that groups detrimented by the adoption of an
LLC statute organize politically in a single state to attempt to bring about a
roll back. Surely in the resulting political contest the benefitted groups, lawyers
and small business, would plausibly counter that a single state cannot effective-
ly take a unilateral position against the trend in a competitive federal system.
Regulatory competition also has a second efficiency function: It promotes
efficiency by providing an incentive for innovation by junior level govern -
ments. The LLC story strongly implies the presence of such an incentive to
innovate. First, the states have enacted these new statutes in a short period of
time, and, second, the terms of the statutes they enact (or amend) have
changed during that short period of time so as to favor enhanced flexibil-
ity. 143 But can we take the existence of innovation, by itself, as sufficient
proof of efficient results? No, for given a strong rent-seeking incentive on the
part of a dominant interest group, a burst of regulatory (or deregulatory)
innovation may signal a deadweight loss to society. Can we furthermore take
the existence of innovation, by itself, as sufficient proof of the presence of
interstate competition? No, for innovation may be prompted by domestic as
well as interstate competitive incentives. With LLCs, domestic rewards by
themselves suffice to explain the close attention paid by state lawmakers (and
bar associations) to the terms of LLC statutes. The lawyers seek a statute that
provides maximum access to the group of firms that otherwise would go into
or remain in business in the partnership form. Some trial and error in the
achievement of that end is only to be expected. Meanwhile, given that we are
talking about small business, it simply does not seem plausible to suggest that
nuances in the terms of LLC statutes cause a significant amount of LLC
business to flow across state lines. Although the possible appearance of a
Delaware LLC 'boutique' directed to a small class of firms does, literally,
modify the description, it has no bearing on the description's policy implica-
tions.
McCahery, supra note 94, at 1885-90.
143 Ribstein IV, supra note 96, at 412-28.
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F. Regulatory Competition and Producer Incentives
The foregoing discussion follows from the view that regulatory competition
stories cannot be told on a black box basis that avoids inquiry into the incen-
tives of government actors. With regulation, self-interested production does
not necessarily imply product entrepreneurship. Governments, unlike firms,
do not labor under an immediate threat that bankruptcy results from suboptimal
decisionmaking. As a result, agency problems in the production of public
goods tend to be more substantial than those within firms.
Certainly, government actors sometimes do act entrepreneurially. Presumably,
this occurs when the tax revenues, export earnings, jobs, technology, or other
positive externalities yielded by the attraction of factors of production also
happen to yield appropriate political benefits, either in the form of electoral
advantage, satisfaction of the demands of favored interest groups, or the
satisfaction incident to enhancing public welfare) It is less certain that this
incentive relationship can be assumed as a systematic proposition. Indeed,
where it does exist it can be ephemeral. Unlike firms, which must hew to the
profit incentive over time, the objectives of government suppliers change over
time with voter preferences.
The exercise of opening up regulatory competition's black box and inquiring
as to competitive incentives shows that special conditions tend to obtain in
those cases in which govermnent entrepreneurship becomes wrought into a
lawmaking structure. Consider corporate charter competition in this regard.
There we do see recognizable buyer-seller relationships, but it also turns out
that in practice competitive charter provision is not a game that every state can
play. Significant competitive incentives do not show up across the class of
potential suppliers. Small jurisdictions tend to take leading competitive roles:
Delaware is the jurisdiction of incorporation of about half of the corporations
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Similar conditions obtain in parallel
cases of sale of juridical status - small island states tend to offer themselves
as tax havens; Liberia, Panama, and Greece lead in the registration of ships.
The explanation prevailing for Delaware probably applies across the board.
Corporate franchise fees amount to 15 percent of Delaware's tax base; the
same cash flow would be a trivial percentage of the tax base of a large state.
Given a limited market, competitive success has a larger percentage impact
on the smaller government budget of a small jurisdiction. Political and financial
44 Or, in the alternative, the particular factor cuts an advantageous deal with the respon-
sible government actors directly.
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incentives to create (or enter) a legal product market arise when such a signifi-
cant payoff is held out. The incentive relationship lends plausibility in the
product market in turn. The small jurisdiction's propensity to fiscal dependence
on its legal business provides a structural assurance that customer interests will
take precedence over all competing interests in local political deliberations.'45
Even where incentives to compete clearly are present, additional incentive
problems may inhibit the evolution of first-best legal products. Network
externality models,' 46 for example, show that a demand-side problem can
cause suboptimal equilibria to evolve and product innovation to be choked off
in situations of intense product competition. Supply-side problems also may
come up. Product innovation presupposes an incentive to invest in research
and development. With industrial competitors, prospects of a patent monopoly
bolster the incentive. The patent deters entry by competitors, assuring a
potential return on investment in research and development.'47 Conversely,
if an innovation easily can be copied by a rival, then new technologies will not
efficiently replace old technologies. Legal innovation leads to the production
of a public good, and carries no patent protection. Ian Ayres, applying this
point to corporate law, suggests that competing states will have insufficient
incentives to invest the resources in product innovation.' 48 State legislatures
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 86, at 6-12. But even given such
a clear-cut incentive in favor the interests of a given customer, integration with the rest of
the federal system can create complications. For instance, where enforcement is through
private lawsuits, states do not fully control their product because parties are free to sue
elsewhere. See Hay, supra note 112, at 652. In the corporate law context, this incident of
federalism has complicated Delaware's incentive picture. It must offer the plaintiff's bar
sufficient returns to induce litigation in the state while simultaneously maintaining a
reputation for privileging the interests of management. See Bratton and McCahery, supra
note 94, at 1898-1900.
' For a survey of the literature, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
The basic patent model assumes that there is an optimal way to stimulate firms to
invest in research and development, which is deemed to be necessary for product innovation.
The patent prevents a rival from introducing a sufficiently close product, and thus makes
the rival's entrance into the market more costly. The patent will completely deter such
entrance under certain assumptions - for example, in a homogenous-goods industry in
which the monopolist is the only firm able to outbid the entrant to acquire the innovation
See John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1(1995); R. Gilbert
and D. Newberry, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. 74 AMER. ECON.
REv. 238 (1982). But patentability does not by itself foreclose entrance into the product
area.
48 Ayres, supra note 127, at 241-46.
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will see no point in entering a race to innovate if any resulting lead will be
exhausted in a very short period of time. Under this approach, the efficient
rate of legal innovation will depend on the probability of a state having the
optimal degree of patent protection.' 49 If the response to this suggestion is
that legal innovations intrinsically belong in the public domain, then law turns
out to be quite different from product.
III. CONCLUSION
Domestic incentives, taken alone, support a presumption that the LLC is
evolving so as to provide a cost-effective limited liability shell for small firms.
Any further conclusion respecting the development's overall efficiency obvi-
ously depends on an absent factor - a clear cut basis for assuming that limited
liability itself is efficient.
Ayres also suggests that an especially fast race between states wilt result in rent
dissipation. id. at 246-51. In this leader-follower model of entry deterrence, if only the
leader state adopts the new technology, it receives all the profits from the innovation. But
the rents decrease if imitators can free ride. The larger the spiltover to competitors, the
larger the incentive problem. JEAN TIROLE,THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGMnzKrtoN
400 (1988).
CHAPTER 7
LAWYERS AND LAWYERING,
FROM STRUCTURE TO PROCESS'
7.1 Introduction
The recent spate of work on the practice of business lawyering has begun
belatedly to make up for the surprising neglect of the topic by sociologists of
law, or social theorists generally. An important reason for the neglect of the
consideration of lawyering as a process has been the predominance of
structuralist perspectives in the sociological study of the legal profession.
Furthermore, both theoretical perspectives and practical factors have led those
sociologists who have attempted to analyse lawyer-client relations to concen-
trate on encounters with individual clients rather than the work of lawyers for
business. The image of the lawyer as dealing essentially with the private
problems of individual clients has become harder to maintain with the
increased prominence, first in the US and then in many other countries, of the
large, bureaucratized law firm specializing in commercial and business law
(Galanter 1983; Galanter and Palay 1991), and the sharpening of the division
between lawyers who serve corporate clients and those with a practice pre-
dominantly of individuals (Heinz and Laumann 1982).
7.2 Theories of the Professions
The predominance of structuralism is noticeable, despite the continual flux of
theoretical perspectives in this field over the past twenty years. The focus of
sociologists, stemming from the study of the social role of professions and
professionalism generally, has been on the control of specialized expertise.
Initially the dominant viewpoint was functionalist, assuming the utility of
specialized knowledge and of the 'bargain' by which society was said to grant
This chapter appeared (with Sot Picciouo) in Y. Dezalay and D. Sugarman (eds.)
Professional Competition and Professional Power (London: Routledge 1995).
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professional groups self-regulatory autonomy. From the 1 970s this came to
be criticized as ignoring questions of power and the role of the state (Larson
1977; P. Lewis, in Abel and Lewis 1989; Rueschemeyer 1983). Professionals
such as lawyers were seen as trying to achieve status, prestige or power, on
the basis of claims to specialized knowledge resulting from the mobilization
of resources. A more complex picture was then further developed, which
included the importance of other factors such as access to state power, and the
need to consider the historically specific conditions of development of particu-
lar societies (Luckham 1981). However, studies in the field became dominated
by discussion of the thesis originated by Magali Larson and most forcefully
put forward by Richard Abel which, in brief, argued that the legal profession
has generally aimed to secure monopolistic markets for its specialized services
by controlling the production both of and by the producers, or by seeking to
create demand for these services (Abel, in Abel and Lewis 1989: vol. 3, ch.
3). This argument was in turn criticized by studies showing that professionals
often have little control over their markets or their clients (e.g. Paterson, in
Abel 1989: vol. 1). While undoubtedly the profession tries to establish and
maintain market control, such measures are often reactive, and it is not clear
that market control is the source of the power or privilege of lawyers.
What is clear is that most of these discussions have tended to leave out any
examination of the nature and process of lawyering itself. 2
 This lack was
stressed in relation to the study of professions more generally by an important
new work by Andrew Abbott, who pointed out that existing studies had talked
'less about what professions do than about how they are organized to do it'
(Abbott 1988:1). For Abbott, the main difficulty with the prior concept of
professionalization was its 'focus on structure rather than work' (ibid: 19). He
defines professions loosely as 'exclusive occupational groups applying some-
what abstract knowledge to particular cases' (p. 8), and emphasizes that it is
the control of the abstractions whichaenerate the practical techniqstat
aTiTiiuishes as crafts, since
o y a owledge system governed by abstractions can redefine its problems
and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new problems' (p. 9).
Abbott provides an interesting analysis of professional work, organized around
'the sequence of diagnosis, inference, and treatment [which] embodies the
essential cultural logic of professional practice' (p. 40); and he explores the
relationship between professional practice and the academic knowledge which
This was belatedly recognized by the inclusion in the massive three-volume comparative
study edited by Abel and Lewis of a final chapter called 'Bringing the Law Back In', which
sketched some considerations for the study of lawyers work. However, this project did not
include any actual studies or analyses of lawyering.
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formalizes these skills and gives professionals cultural legitimacy by the
essentially symbolic power with which it links those professional skills to
major cultural values, usually of rationality, logic and science (pp. 52-4). By
starting from the characteristics of professional work, Abbott's approach
redirects attention from the structural concerns of organization to the interac-
tion between the competitive system of professions and their environment.
However, he himself perhaps over-emphasizes the structural character of the
'system of professions', which he sees as essentially reacting to external forces
which cause a competitive struggle over the reshaping of professional tasks
(ibid.: 33), leaving little space for the dynamic role of professionals in helping
to construct the social world.
7.3 Studies of Lawyering
Despite the limitations of the general theories of professionalization, a handful
of pioneering sociological studies have been made of the actual process of
lawyering. In addition, others have put forward various analyses of the pro-
cess, calling upon diverse types of evidence, 3 including contemporary accounts
both of the major exploits of big business lawyers and direct experience of its
more routine aspects, as well as historians' reports of the role of lawyers in
the creation of corporate capitalism based on studies of the archives of major
law finns and memoirs of leading practitioners.
The issue that is posed by shifting the concern from structure to process is
the nature of the 'transformation' that takes place in lawyer-client interaction
(Felstiner et al 1980-1). Studies of lawyering generally agree that the lawyer's
task is to convert the requirements of the client into legal solutions, and
The confidentiality of lawyer-client relations has been a serious barrier to access for
a researcher; since an observation study requires initial cooperation from the lawyer and
then permission from each client, entailing practical problems which may prevent a study
taking place (Danet 1979-90) as well as meaning that the interviews observed are likely to
be a highly selective sample. Nevertheless, some observation studies have been carried out
(Cain 1979; Sarat and Felstiner 1986). Research based on participant-observation has
focused less on the process of lawyer-client interactions and more generally on lawyers
strategies (Mann, 1985; Flood 1991). An interesting study by K. Mann concerned a
relatively small group of white-collar criminal defence attorneys in the Southern district of
New York, and began with in-depth, open-ended interviews, but was supplemented by
participant observation, the researcher taking employment as an associate with one of the
lawyers being studied (Mann 1985). Others have used their personal experience of law
practice, fOcusing on a specific type of transaction for which documentation is available,
e.g. Gilson's (1984) analysis of the role of lawyers in mergers and acquisitions focusing
on the drafting of a corporate acquisition agreement.
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emphasize that this is by no means limited to litigation or dispute-settlement.
But once the lawyer is recognized as 'gatekeeper to legal institutions and
facilitator of a wide range of personal and economic transactions' (ibid.: 645),
many issues arise as to the nature of the conversion or transformation that
takes place between the client's concerns and the lawyer's solutions.
Some studies still see the lawyer-client relationship simply as a structured
power relation, in which the extent to which the client can obtain the lawyer's
specialized knowledge or skills depends on the client's wealth and other related
factors, such as the likelihood of repeat business or other connections through
this client, perhaps weighed against the lawyer's loyalties and ties to other
actors (other clients, the opposing lawyer, and so on). In this perspectIve, the
lawyer as 'gatekeeper' to the legal realm is motivated mainly by financial
reasons, but also social and cultural ties such as loyalty, in deciding whether
and with what degree of assiduity to venture on behalf of the client into that
realm to bring back the desired legal outcomes. Thus, Abraham Bhimberg
argued that important procedural rules laid down by courts as a protection for
criminal defendants are in practice rendered nugatoly because defence lawyers
do not act as adversarial representatives on behalf of (mainly indigent) clients,
but are 'bound in an organized system of complicity in which covert, informal
breaches and evasions of due process are institutionalized, but denied to exist'
(Blumberg 1966-7: 22); the strong ties of criminal defence lawyers to court
personnel and their involvement in the unwritten rules and routines of the
system mean that what they do is not really private practice but bureaucratic
practice (ibid.: 31). Similarly, Stewart Macaulay argued that consumer pro-
creative lawyering and business regulation protection legislation was ineffec-
tive, because he found that lawyers were generally reluctant to utilize legal
provisions and procedures in a serious way, preferring conciliatory negotiation,
since they regard consumer cases as unimportant as well as unlikely to generate
lucrative repeat business (Macaulay 1979). Although these studies focused on
the characteristics of lawyering in practice, they adopted a rather simple model
of lawyer-client interaction, and reinforced the view of the lawyer as possessor
of privileged knowledge.
A radically new approach was put forward by Maureen Cain, who rejected
the perspective of social control by the lawyer of the client based on their
positions in the social structure, emphasizing instead the need to study
lawyering as a specific practice, centring on lawyers' role as 'conceptive
ideologists, who think, and therefore constitute the form of, the emergent
relations of capitalist society' (Cain 1979: 335). This was based on two central
points. First, that lawyers act typically as agents for the bourgeoisie (in its
various forms), and far from controlling their clients, they are often highly
dependent on them, or at least must compete to offer services for which clients
are willing to pay. Second, Cain focused on the specific practice of lawyering
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as translation:
Clients bring many issues to the solicitor, expressed and constituted in terms of a
variety of everyday discourses. The lawyer translates these, and reconstitutes the
issues in terms of a legal discourse which has transsituational applicability. In this
sense law is a meta-language. Its material significance, however, derives from the
fact that it is also the workaday language for certain state authorized adjudicators.
The combination of these two points provided an important new perspective,
supported by the detailed accounts resulting from her pilot observational
study. 4
 Cain's argument integrates some elements emphasized in previous
studies to help explain the relative dependencies in the lawyer-client relation,
such as whether a client represents an important source of repeat business.
However, an important new dimension was introduced by refocusing on the
specific practice of lawyering as an ideological mediation and translation
between the needs of the client, expressed in everyday discourse, and the
specialized discourse of the law, which the lawyer also helps to create.
This perspective introduces a more differentiated approach to the analysis
of lawyer-client interaction. First, it recognizes that the conversion of the
client's problem into legal terminology and the search for a legal solution
which can be reconverted into an acceptable one in the client's world, is a
common concern of both parties. Although the lawyer's professional expertise
may entail some socio-psychological advantages in the immediate relationship
(some lawyers may be able to browbeat some clients), this is not structurally
determinative, for the lawyer must compete with others in the provision of this
service. The question is, rather, the nature of the interaction between the realm
of the law and that of 'everyday' social relations in which it is primarily the
client who initially defines the problem.
Certainly, this entails a jgal construction of the client', and the lawyer
may take the lead in 'educating' the client as to the law' i requirements. Sarat
and Felstiner have provided a detailed micro-study illustrating how a client
conference involves the 'construction of a legal picture of the client, a picture
through which a self acceptable to the legal process is negotiated and validated'
(Sarat and Felstiner 1986: 116). They provide a valuable account of the way
legal professionals behave as if it were natural to separate out those aspects
of human behaviour with which the law is willing to deal, thus implicitly
legitimating parts of human experience and contributing to the 'reification'
characteristic of law (Gabel 1978). However, this begs the question of
Regrettably, the importance of this study was not recognized, and funding for a full-
length study was not forthcoming.
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legitimation of the law itself. 5
 If the client has a ready made, practical,
socially functioning self, whence comes the need for its legal reconstruction?
If this need is considered to be externally imposed, as part of a social power-
structure involving the state, how is it validated or legitimated, if it involves
distortion of a previously whole 'self'?
It seems necessary to accept that the client's social self is constructed by
intersecting social processes, of which legal discourse is one. After all, if a
person has become a client it is by some sort of prior recognition that there
is a legal dimension to the social circumstances in which the problem arises
to which a solution is sought. Further, and this involves the second important
aspect of Cain's argument, the lawyer carries out not only the translation of
the client's problem into legal terms, but also (once a legal solution has been
found) a retranslation back into the client's everyday discourse. Hence, the
solution found in the legal realm must in turn be validated by successful
interaction with the other social processes contributing to the social construc-
tion or reproduction of the client's self.
7.4 Business Larering
This point is more clearly brought out through consideration of business
lawyering, for several reasons. First, it focuses on the client as an organization
rather than an individual, thus de-emphasizing the socio-psychological aspects
of lawyer-client interaction. l'his brings more sharply into focus the point that
both the skill of the lawyer, and the legitimation of the legal process generally,
depend on the extent to which they make an effective contribution to the
ensemble of processes interacting on the business enterprise. This has been
very effectively analysed from an economic perspective, in particular by
Ronald Gilson (1984). From this point of view, it is clear that busiiiess enter-
prises will not resort to lawyers, nor request them to seek legal solutions,
unless lawyering 'adds value' to the business transaction in question. Gilson
iiiidail, through an analysis of the drafting of the complex acquisition
Robert Gordon, in his important essay on the effects of the turn to corporate law
practice on New York lawyers after 1870 argues that law itself entails a legitimizing
ideology, by offering 'an artificial utopia of social harmony (Gordon 1984: 53); he argues
that this universal vision was embodied in an ideal of law practice, rooted in liberal
individualism, which was undermined by the fragmentation of that order, a process to which
lawyers contributed considerably, especially through their service of corporate power. This
created a disjuncture between the old ideal of the law and the practical tasks lawyers were
called upon to perform on behalf of clients, which was only partly remedied by the attempt
to reconstitute a new progressive vision of the corporate lawyer, since the new synthesis
was too liberal-reformist to be acceptable to clients and the courts.
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agreements common in (US) corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
practice, that the lawyer acts as a 'transacti cost en ineer', as j th g the
parties in pricing the transtion attlie lowe cost. n ot er words, from the
internal perspective of economics, the lawyer adds value to t e transaction as
a whole if transaction costs fozxamp1e.by
maximizing the availabilitypf relevant information toJarties and guaranteeing
ftieracity, to assist the establishment of homogeneous exptatins-and-thus
ãcessThtoIexchan&e. However, other professions (notably account-
ants and investment bankers) also perform broadly similar functions, so an
economic analysis cannot explain the existence of a specifically legal function,
although it may provide criteria for testing its efficiency. Interestingly, Gilson
is driven to accept that the existence of such a specifically legal function in
economic transacting cannot be shown by economic analysis, but depends on
the existence and character of state regulation of such transactions (ibid: 296-
8).
Gilson characterizes the role of 'transaction cost engineer' as not a specifi-
cally or traditionally legal one, even when it entails the drafting of immensely
lengthy and complex contracts, since 'when lawyers play this role well, the
courts and formal law generally, shrink dramatically in importance' (p. 294).
However, one of the important points which results from the study of
lawyering is that lawyers in practice engage in a wide variety of activities
broadly concerned with the facilitation of transactions, and are not exclusively
or even primarily concerned with litigation. In the UK for example, the
bedrock of the market for solicitors' services, even for individual clients, has
long been, and despite many changes still remains, house conveyancing and
wills-and-probate; even the Bar, which defends its monopoly of rights of
audience in the higher courts, relies for most of its work on drafting documents
and opinions. Disputes and litigation are in any case better understood as the)) JI
pathology of a regulatory system. This makes it all the more important to try
to develop an analysis to help us understand whether there is any specifically
or inherently legal function in facilitating economic and social transactions.
Hence, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of the private ordering
which lawyers carry out for clients, and its relationship both to formal law and
to the economic or social aspects of the client's transactions. Returning to
Gilson' s analysis of a corporate acquisition agreement, it seems clear that the
need for a lengthy contract embodying a very detailed specification of the
business being acquired results from low-trust factors in the relationship of the
transacting parties: a corporate acquisition is usually a one-shot operation, and
the potential gains from opportunism or cheating outweigh any long-term
disadvantages, hence the need to juridify the relationships. 6
 Of course, in a
6 Gilson additionally points out that the major law and accountancy firms involved also
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different social setting there might be far less need for detailed contracting.
Indeed, the increased research into business lawyering in the US results partly
from concern about the loss of competitiveness of US business, especially in
relation to Japan, and the accusation that the US system over-invests in non-
productive professional activity (particularly lawyering) while Japan concen-
trates on professions such as engineering, which make a positive contribution
to production. 7
 Hence, it is said, not only does Japan have many fewer law-
yers, but a typical business contract will not be thick and detailed, but rely
essentially on a general good faith provision leaving any disagreements which
may subsequently arise to be worked out by the parties. 8
 This comparison
raises manifold considerations: perhaps Japan is a more homogeneous society
where even business relations are less prone to opportunism; or perhaps the
opportunism is constrained by other factors, notably a more stable (or even
rigid) managerial system together with other factors (such as the role of the
zaibatsu and keiretsu) which cement longer-term relationships between finns
and the senior managers representing them, but which may also carry their
own costs such as loss of entrepreneurial spirit (Gilson 1984: 307-12).
However, our concern in this chapter is rather with the relationship of
business lawyering to the forms and institutions of formal law. In particular,
we want to explore the interaction between lawyering and the development of
the regulatory forms in and through which corporate capitalism develops. This
entails consideration of the extent to and ways in which lawyers themselves
contribute to the creation and development of the legal forms regulating
business.
7.5 The Indeterminancy of Legal Rules and Lawyering as a Social
Practise
The lawyer's specialized knowledge is of the more or less abstract and formal-
ized rules which are the object and product of legal discourse; and it is the
practising lawyer who acts as the mediator between this field of formal rules
and the arena of economic and social relations inhabited by the client. The
characterization of the legal sphere or field and of its relation to economic
relations and social life more generally is a central concern of social theories
act as reputational intermediaries since, unlike the primary parties, they will expect future
mutual dealings.
This was forcefully expressed in the Report of Derek Bok (himself formerly a business
law teacher) as President to the Board of Harvard University, cited both in Gilson (1984)
and by several of the contributors to the symposium on corporate law firms pub shed in
Stanford Law Review, 34 (1984).
8 Gilson 1984: 308, citing Akio Morita, former chairman of Sony.
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of law. In this section we consider in what ways the study of lawyering as a
social process can illuminate this central question.
We focus on the characterizations of legal rules as unclear or indeterminate,
and the role of lawyering in relation to that indeterminacy. One result of the
increasing global competition in the field of professional legal services is a
concern that lawyers may excessively exploit the loopholes and ambiguities
of the law on behalf of clients, and that as a result 'creative compliance' with
regulatory requirements may undermine the efficacy of regulation. This has
been the subject of academic analysis (e.g. McBarnet 1988; McBarnet and
Whelan 1991; Power 1993), as well as broader political concern. Thus, in
1992 the Legal Risk Review Committee set up by the Bank of England pro-
posed a number of measures to deal with difficulties that may be caused for
London's financial markets by legal uncertainty. This was due to concern
caused by the losses to financial institutions following appeal court decisions
holding that local authorities were acting outside their powers in engaging in
'swap' transactions; although the Committee identified other problems of
uncertainty in the regulation of dynamic and constantly changing markets
(Bank of England 1992a; 1992b). More broadly, however, there is concern
that the globalization of financial markets means that traditional practices based
on understandings among closed City networks are inevitably being replaced
by a more juridified approach, and City of London regulators have shown
themselves to be, at the least, unaccustomed to dealing with this environment,
as evidenced by a string of 'regulatory failures', such as the Guinness, BCCI,
and Maxwell affairs.
However, the question of 'compliance' with rules and 'creativity' in relation
to them involves some fundamental philosophical concerns. Thus, we must first
consider the various ways in which this indeterminacy has been characterized
in jurisprudence and in social theories of law.
7.6 The Indeterminacy Critique
While there is considerable debate and controversy regarding the in-
determinancy thesis, even some positivist theories accept that rules are not
altogether certain. Indeed, it is central in the work of H. L. A. Hart that rules
have a core and a penumbra. 9
 However, for Hart this indeterminancy is
In his exchange with Fuller, Hart argue that words have a settled core meaning, but
that in cases where there is no core meaning the law is 'incurably incomplete' and inter-
preters by discretion decide penumbral cases. Thus, he states, 'If a penumbra of uncertainty
must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbra cannot
be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been
cherished as the perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges,
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merely linguistic: his theory is based on a distinction between the core and
penumbra meaning of words. There is a settled area, the core, in which the
meaning of words (and therefore of rules) is uncontroversial, and a realm of
uncertainty which is characterized as penumbra where there can be disagree-
ment due to the vagueness of terms and the open-textured quality of language.
In Hart's view, these disagreements can be resolved by reference to the settled
core of meaning which limits the boundaries of all disputes over the meaning
of a word or term.
The issue of the indeterminacy of law has been put most strongly by critical
(CLS) and post-modernist legal scholars, although the origins of this perspec-
tive lie in Realist legal theory.'° These theorists argue that legal doctrine is
internally contradictory, and as a result the legitimacy of legal decisions is
suspect and the rule of law undermined. The antinomies, inconsistencies or
contradictions of legal doctrine and legal reasoning mean, for some, that
judges, by engaging in legislative decision-making, impermissibly usurp the
role of the legislature and the efficacy of consent." For the most part, critical
legal theorists, in their analysis of the indeterminacy of legal doctrine, attempt
to demonstrate that the law is incoherent and contradictory and that there is
no mets-principle or norm which is capable of reconstructing the unstable and
highly contingent 'patchwork quilt' that comprises legal doctrine (Altman 1986;
for a critique of Altman, see Balkin 1991: 1145-53). As a result, liberal law
is contradictory and there are no foundations for legal determinancy.
Thus, for CLS scholars, the indeterminacy critique is central to their attack
on liberal legalism and formalism. Formalism is based on the idea that law is
a closed system which contains all the resources necessary to justify its
or indeed anyone, should do' (Hart 1958: 607-8). Thus, Hart's argument was that border-
lines must be drawn, whereas Fuller argued that meaning is always tightly connected to the
aim of the legal rule. Recently, Dennis Patterson has tried to reconcile the Hart-Fuller
divide, arguing that while Hart is correct to draw hard lines in the law, Fuller is also correct
in claiming that the line should be drawn based on the 'settled context of use.' Hence, for
Patterson, what counts is the formal element of the rule which makes the rule intelligible
to an interpreter (Patterson 1990: 961-3). However, Patterson's perspective remains within
linguistic philosophy, although emphasizing a Wittgensteinian view of context.
'° The Realists attempted to show that formalism is an impossible project. For the most
part, the Realists claimed that law is deeply subjective and contradictory and therefore a
purely formal system is implausible tojustil' since it is rooted in the values and assumptions
which it purports to exclude, viz., politics, morality, etc. Several authors have pointed to
the continuities between the Realists and CLS: see e.g. Brigham and Harrington 1989.
Ken Kress (1989) examines the work of Altman, Singer and Kennedy, to show that,
like liberals, CLS theorists think that legal determinacy is necessary to ground consent:
Kress argues there are other grounds to uphold just institutions.
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actions.' 2 It is predicated on the claim that there is an internal principle of
unity that structures and controls the legal system; thus, Kelsen (1967: 299)
considers that the law regulates its own creation. Formalism has tended to
support law's claims to objectivity, neutrality and consistency, because it
implies that the mechanical application of legal rules provides a basis for
constraining interpreters and justifying the values purportedly embodied in the
rules. The radical critique aimed, by exposing the indeterminacy of rules, to
show that the process of adjudication reflects and embodies deeper differences
at the level of society. Thus, Duncan Kennedy, in his celebrated analysis of
the difference between rules and standards in the context of contract and tort
law, aimed to deconstruct the form of law and to show that rules tend to serve
individualism while standards are consistent with altruist viewpoints (Kennedy,
1976).
By showing the struggle between two competing and opposed conceptions
of doctrine, Kennedy attempted to show that there are both individualist and
altruist arguments that might be employed by a judge in every legal decision.
Thus, for him, adjudication involves a choice between two competing political
visions: self-reliance, as reflected in rule-like forms, and altruism, reflected
in the resort to standard-like forms.' 3 The implication of Kennedy's analysis
in that deep structures of cultural meaning ensure that individualist or altruist
arguments will support their respective positions. Hence, his argument appears
to depend on the view that there is a deep system of structures, in which the
elements are defined in terms of difference, and that each vision is dependent
upon the other and, at the same time denies its existence. The thrust of the
indeterminancy critique is that it is impossible to generate principled, coherent
doctrine.
From a different perspective, Unger (1987) offers a sociologically informed
critique of liberal legalism which stresses the importance of the indeterminancy
of both legal doctrine and social context. Unlike the indeterminancy critique
advanced by Duncan Kennedy, which posits an irreducible conflict between
world-views, expressed in the divergence between rules and standards, Unger's
theory rejects structuralism; he opens up the possibility of social-structural
Recently, Richard Posner has stated that formalism has three features: (1) a scientistic
element which defines law in terms of a set of principles and a form of legal reasoning
which produces certain outcomes; (2) a formalist element which is static and treats legal
principles as if they were timeless and have no chronological ordering; and (3) a conceptual
vision which separates life from law. While there are both natural law and positivist versions
of formalism, Posner argues that the common thread is the view that one's conclusions
follow from one's premises (Posner 1990:15-16). For a critique, see Fish 1990:1458-9.
' Kelman (1987) offers a powerful critique of Kennedy's distinction; for a sustained
analysis of Kelman's own version of the indeterminacy thesis, see Kress 1989: 310-20.
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change, accepting that there is no constant human nature. For Unger the law
is contradictory and indeterminate because the liberal forms cannot be main-
tained as a result of the transformation of the state into a modern regulatory
state. Unger argues that the breakdown of the nineteenth-century liberal legal
order, and the transition to the regulatory law of the welfare state, leaves the
law caught in a contradictory logic: on the one hand, the political requirements
of the welfare state have been absorbed into the law in terms of goals and
purposes which are realized through administrative discretion; and, on the
other hand, the classical private rights complex functions with different tech-
niques to penetrate the community to accommodate the institutional framework
of society. The introduction of social welfare law subverts the formal qualities
of classical law (symmetry, certainty, generality, and so on). This combination
produces an inability to balance the political demands for results with the
classical formalist requirements of the rule of law model. For Unger, paradoxi-
cally, the private rights complex originally represented one side of an earlier
institutional compromise, one which involved the state granting the elite more
control over land, labour and wealth in exchange for allowing the state to
develop an administrative system based on taxation and war. Unger' s hypoth-
esis is that the origin of the private rights complex is based on a different
vision of society from the principles and aspirations embodied in the present
system.
The indeterminacy thesis advanced by Unger suggests that an alternative
vision of society can be worked out from the implications of indeterminacy,
which he defines in terms of conventions and context being indeterminate and
the dislocation of objectivity from representation in language. Locating the
transformative potential in the notion of 'negative capability', Unger maintains
that it is our capacity to break through a specific context of action which
presents the possibility for us to reappropriate the alienated political and
economic spheres and, at the same time, guarantees the possibility of personal
transformation and freedom. Unger insists that the formative institutional
context can be transformed through an exercise in deviationist doctrine which
involves drawing out the alternative legal vision of the private rights complex
in order to demonstrate that certain elements were embedded in deviant forms
in past legal arrangements and that these counter-forms avoided instability and,
as a result, form the basis of a transformed social institution. However,
Unger's deviationist doctrine, and the subversive potential in exploiting
contradictions that might shatter the liberal legal order, is limited by the fact
that it relies upon the existing norms and ideals in society as the basis for
social-structural change.'4
' For the most part, Unger's deviationist doctrine is perceived as the least threatening,
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The concern of all these theorists focuses on how indeterminacy affects the
authoritative decision-maker, usually the judge. There is little or no consider-
ation of the way in which the characteristics of legal rules affect the social
behaviour of legal subjects, nor for how this is mediated by lawyers, whose
prime role it is to adapt and develop the forms of legal rules and concepts to
the social transactions of their clients. We argue that it is important to integrate
some of these considerations regarding the indeterminacy of rules with the
recent sociological perspectives which emphasize the social structures and
function of competitive professions in exploiting paradoxes and inconsistencies
in law.
7.7 The Reality Paradox and Systems Theory
Indeed, this point has been advanced, albeit from a different perspective, by
Teubner, who argues that the problem with the radical critique offered by
critical legal studies scholars is that it 'is not radical enough' (Teubner 1990:
404). The general doctrine of indeterminism, as developed by critical legal
studies scholars, focuses only on superstructural phenomena, such as legal
norms, doctrine, institutions and decision-making, and, as a result, fails to
expose the deeper point that law itself is based on a fundamental paradox.'5
The paradox of legality is that, in order for law to be determinate, it must be
grounded in some super-norm.' 6 The problem for the rule of law is not to
locate a ground (or foundation) of law, since there is no grounding, but rather
to suppress the fact that we can generate paradoxical situations, and can accept
contradictory opinions as being both right and wrong, which umnasks the
disturbing reality that we must invent excuses in order to give authoritative
answers. For Teubner, the work of law is to accept paradox, and that reality
is paradoxical. The intuition here is that we are always already embedded in
a paradoxical world and it would be itself deeply paradoxical to attempt to
and hence most attractive, version of indeterminacy critique, since it provides a foundation
for the legitimacy of law within certain aspects of the present normative order (Collins
1987). For a view that Unger is actually a deconstructionist, see Jack Balkin (1990:1688
n. 55, 1689 & n. 57).
15 Teubner, following Luhmann, argues that the legal system has no foundation and that
paradox, self-reference, indeterminacy, etc., are part and parcel of the operation of the legal
system (Teubner 1990: 408-9). Hence, paradox can be grasped by a theory which contends
that reality has a circular structure and there is no insight gained from attempting to seek
solutions by avoiding paradox.
16 Interestingly, Luhmann and Derrida both refer to Walter Benjamin's classic essay, 'Zur
Kriiik der Gewalt' to support their claim that 'there is no such right above right and wrong,
no such superright' (Luhmann 1988b; 154; Derrida 1990).
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locate or construct a de-paradoxical reality. Thus, the best way to avoid the
perversion of paradox is to suppress the fact that law is founded on originary
violence or power.
For Teubner, legal decisions are not based on any super-norm of justice;
the system merely sorts claims on the basis of a simple binary code, legal-
illegal. The simple process of differentiating legal from illegal acts necessarily
involves the suppression of the paradox of self-reference. That is, the judge
must suppress the truth that there is no right or wrong, in order to follow the
dictate of the binary code that a wrong be constructed. The proper role for the
interpreter is to avoid the problem of locating a transcendental ground for law.
The fact that the legal system is able to process these demands routinely, and
without creating legitimation problems in every instance, is what makes it
function.
Teubner argues that the function of contemporary theory is not to offer a
general account of legal contradiction or paradox. No such theory is possible
since there are no practical solutions to the fundamental indeterminancy of law.
For Teubner, the proper task for the radical indeterminancy critique is to
extend it to understand that there are classes of legal indeterminancy which
arise from other sources than the paradox of the legal system. Teubner under-
stands the emergence of the new indeterminancy as being instantiated in
balancing tests, the increased propensity to employ general clauses in contracts,
and the emergence of sociological and economic-based jurisprudence (Teubner
1990: 410). For Teubner, the relevant theoretical perspective for extending
the indeterminacy critique is autopoietic theory, since the problem of in-
determinancy is important at the level of system's own conununicative con-
texts. In this regard, Teubner, unlike critical legal studies theorists, attempts
to ground the indeterminancy analysis at the level of real operations within
society. For Teubner, indeterminancy is created when a communication sub-
system adapts to another system's self-description. Indeterminancy is a function
of the interaction of autonomous but overlapping communicative contexts;
while the internal codes which ensure self-reproduction remain intact, the
interference that results creates conflict between the system and operation of
its environment, and the influence of the environment within the system.
Teubner views the legal system not as a coherent whole, but a series of self-
enclosed sub-systems reflecting the functional differentiation of society; thus,
conceptual and normative conflicts between the sub-systems are unavoidable.
It is the very indeterminacy of legal principles, such as general clauses in
contracts, that provides the mechanism for reconciling the conflictual logics
of sub-systems. The high degree of flexibility manifested in these clauses, for
example 'good faith' clauses, provides an efficient mechanism for reconciling
the legal disputes between the various sub-systems (Teubner 1990). Diverse
social demands and conflicts, resulting also in state intervention, produce the
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materialization in private law of general clauses, which provide the legal means
for co-ordinating contradictory social demands. Unlike critical legal scholars,
Teubner concludes that legal indeterminancy is a functional mechanism which
ameliorates the disabling effects of the paradox that there is no foundation for
law. That is, the legal system is capable of creating internal mechanisms which
stabilize the intersystemic conflicts, through the recursive self-generation of
'eigenvalues' which creates the potential of social regulation through law
(Teubner 1990: 408-9, 420-5; see also Teubner 1992).
However, the systems theory approach concerning indeterminacy is prob-
lematic in several respects. While indeterminacy is clearly a prominent feature
of regulatory systems, this does not mean that reality itself is inherently
paradoxical. Zolo argues that '[a]ttributing to "reality" a circular structure not
dependent on (the circularity of) knowledge amounts to violating the premise
of the circular and "closed" nature of the cognitive process' (Zolo 1991: 77).
As regards the claim that law is a closed system - closed off from external
sources and capable of reproducing its own operations through its own struc-
tures - the basic question is whether autopoietic systems are indeed self-
regulating.' 7 To suppose that reflexive autopoietic structuring can obtain
stability suggests, as Frankenberg has argued, the emergence of an invisible
hand which operates to produce stability and order from chaos (Frankenberg
1989: 382). According to Frankenberg, systems theory, by employing the
concepts of structural coupling and interference, creates the possibility of
reforming self-contained systems. The problem is that Luhmann and Teubner,
on the one hand, wish to enclose the legal system, but on the other hand, insist
that it be sufficiently open to different operating principles in order to create
the conditions for internal reconstruction. Nevertheless, despite the limitations
of systems theory, the attempt to locate indeterminacy within the material
realm constitutes in some ways an advance over critical legal studies' formula-
tions.
Teubner acknowledges that the recursivity of the legal system creates a problem for
societal regulation. Briefly, the problem is that external intervention within the legal system
creates a regulatory trileinma: i.e., regulation creates disintegration (institutional death);
is irrelevant; or corrodes the social sphere (see Teubner 1987: 21).
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7.8 Bourdieu: the Generation of Normativity through Social Practices
A sophisticated post-structuralist sociological approach is provided by the work
of Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu the autonomy of law results from the com-
petitive struggle of lawyers to assert their influence in the social system by
asserting the right to declare or state the law. Thus, lawyers generate the
abstract and formal principles characteristic of legal norms and doctrines, and
their special knowledge of these principles, and skill in operating the distinctive
linguistic processes of the law, guarantee both the autonomy of the legal field
and the monopoly of lawyers' access to it.
The body of legal doctrine is, for Bourdieu, a symbolic order which at any
particular moment delimits what is possible; although legal doctrine appears,
due to its autonomy and its abstract and formal nature, to be a closed and
coherent system which generates outcomes from its own internal logic, it does
not, according to him, possess the principles of its own dynamic. Both this
dynamic, and the conditions of existence of legal reasoning, derive from the
operation of the objective relations between agents and of the institutions of
the legal field. Thus, the legal test is the focus of struggles because its interpre-
tation is a means of appropriating and influencing the symbolic power which
it contains; however, this is not a closed hermeneutics, since the interpretation
of legal texts must have a practical effect. Although jurists can put forward
competing interpretations, they must operate within the hierarchy both of
institutions and norm-sources which defines the authority of legal decisions.'8
At the same time, the competition between interpreters in putting forward their
versions and developments of legal doctrine is limited by the necessity of
presenting them as rational interpretations of recognized texts. Bourdieu
describes the ways in which the two major effects of neutralization and univer-
salization are produced by the characteristic linguistic procedure of law, such
as the use of passive constructions and impersonal phrases; far from being a
simple ideological mask, this rhetoric is the result of the continual process of
rationalization which has over centuries constituted the universalizing posture
which is the spirit of law.
While Bourdieu provides a very strong explanation of how the legal sphere
is constructed, he is much less clear on why abstract formal rules play such
an important part in the reproduction of social relations. He presents a very
Weberian view that legal rationality offers predictability and calculability
" Also, the juridical field has its own rules and conventions which must be accepted by
all participants. Its fundamental principle is that all conflicts must be resolved juridically;
beyond this, the three main requirements, Bourdieu says (1) that decisions are binary (e.g.
guilty/not guilty), (2) claims must be couched in the procedural terms which have become
historically accepted, and (3) precedents are authoritative (Bourdieu 1987: 832).
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(Bourdieu 1987: 833). Yet Bourdieu himself accepts the Legal Realist critique
that rules can never be merely applied to new cases, and that texts 'can go so
far as complete indeterminacy or ambiguity' (ibid.: 827). For him, it is this
indeterminacy which gives not only judges, but more importantly the various
groups of competing legal professionals, the power to explore and exploit it
by using their resources and techniques to generate alternative rules which they
can wield as symbolic weapons. If the promise of consistency and predictability
offered by the formal-rational nature of the legal universe is illusory, whence
comes its legitimacy?
For Bourdieu the power of law seems to derive from the effectiveness of
legal symbols in giving the 'seal of universality' to social practices (ibid: 845).
Legitimacy is imposed in the social order through symbolic domination. In
explaining how the promise of predictability is fulfilled, Bourdieu again
emphasizes the social practices of professionals. Here he introduces his key
concept of the 'habitus':
the juridical field tends to operate like an 'apparatus' to the extent that the cohesion
of the freely orchestrated habitus of legal interpreters is strengthened by the discipline
of a hierarchized body of professionals who employ a set of established procedures.
(Bourdieu 1987:818-19)
The habitus is defined as 'the system of dispositions to a certain practice... an
objective basis for the regulation of behaviour, and thus for the regularity of
modes of practice, and if practices can be predicted... this is because the effect
of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain
way in certain circumstances' (Bourdieu 1990: 77). Note that the habitus,
which is constituted by second-order objective structures, is the repository for
the strategies of distinction which varies actors employ in their struggles with
and against other actors within the autonomous field.' 9 Serving as the media-
tion between external structures and action, the habitus 'est createur, inventif,
mais dans les limites de ses structures' (Wacquant, in Bourdieu 1992: 26).
Thus, the repertoire of behaviour is structured and limited by the habitus,
9 Bourdieu states: 'Between the system of objective regularities and the system of directly
observable conducts a mediation always intervenes which is nothing else but the habitus,
geometrical locus of determinism and of individual determinations, of calculable probabil-
ities and of lived-through hopes, of objective future and subjective plans. Thus, the habitus
of class as a system of organic and mental dispositions, of unconscious schemes of thought,
perception and action is what allows the generations, with the well-founded illusion of the
creation of unforeseeable novelty or of free improvization, of all thoughts, all perceptions
and actions in conformity with objective realities, because it has itself been generated within
and by conditions objectively defined by these regularities' (Bourdieu 1968: 706).
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although it permits a range of creative invention which obeys a practical logic.
Bourdieu argues that the notions of the field and of habitus must be understood
as interactive concepts in order to avoid the twin charges of determinism and
functionalism (e.g. Bourdieu 1992:102-15). Thus, he states that the habitus
becomes active only in relation to the field and that the habitus may generate
a different trajectory of strategies depending on the state of the field (Bourdieu
1990: 116-19). However, it has been argued that Bourdieu presents an 'unreal-
istically unified and totalized concept of habitus, which he conceptualizes as
a vast series of strictly homologous structures encompassing all of social
experience' (Sewell 1992: 16). The habitus, which is responsible for the social
dispositions of agents and for framing the range of possible actions has a strong
conservative bias. This rather static concept is unable to explain how change
occurs internally to itself. Thus, Sewell argues, 'Bourdieu's habitus retains
precisely the agent-proof quality that the concept of the duality of structure is
supposed to overcome' (ibid: 15). Bourdieu's requirement that these structures
are all homologous is far too demanding, because society is not so cohesive
and there is a range of competing and overlapping structures. Hence, a more
dynamic account of change would loosen the strict requirement for homology
between the symbolic struggles within the juricUcal field and the political and
economic transformations occurring outside it.2°
Within the juridical field, Bourdieu argues that it is the legal scholars and
theorists who generate the formal abstractions whose universalizing tendency
is the source of the symbolic power of law. Judicial interpretation adapts these
general rules to particular cases. 2' But above all, Bourdieu emphasizes the
role of competing groups of practising lawyers and other professionals, who
mediate the application and development of formal rules to social practices and
20 To take a comtemporary example, Dejalay argues that the internationalization f of
capital and the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s have stimulated a response
by the most powerful players in the legal field (Dezalay 1992). The new technological
developments, and the movement of firms across jurisdictions, is linked to the relative
position of each group of lawyers in the juridical field, and their ability to obtain sufficient
resources to create new devices for exploitation by their clients. This appears to function
as a structural explanation, without sufficient regard either for the improvizational activities
of lawyers, which help to mediate the social conflicts, or for the structurally complex role
of states.
21 In certain respects, Bourdieu is influenced by Wittgenstein's work on rules, although
he often says that the reality of practices is a richer source for understanding the social
fields (e.g. Bourdieu 1990: 59-75). We believe that Bourdieu's notion of indeterminacy is
broadly consistent with the community consensus reading of Wittgenstein since it looks to
the social-cultural features of rule-following over the internal, grammatical aspects
(Bourdieu 1986: 826).
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reality, by marshalling varying degrees of technical skill and social influence.
For Bourdieu the indeterminate nature of legal rules is central, since it is
the source of the power of professionals as mediators between the realm of
formal law and the economic and social practices of their clients. Bourdieu's
focus on the practices of competing professional groups, with varying degrees
of skill and symbolic capital, provides a very different perspective from that
of critical legal scholars. As Coombe has argued, Bourdieu's position avoids
the problem of essentialism which besets the structuralist theory offered by
Kennedy, and by interpreting the legal field in tenns of conflicting struggles
among competing legal actors, Bourdieu achieves a dynamic notion of legal
practice; one that is defined in terms of the social dispositions and norms of
the competitors which are shaped and structured by struggle (Coombe
1989:103-11). Bourdieu's theory of the juridical field constitutes an advance
on the views advanced by critical legal studies because he examines the
practices and dispositions of habitus and explains them in terms of the objective
elements of social life. Bourdieu clearly understands that the juridical field
shapes and structures the dispositions of legal actors and that legal rules are
predictable largely as a result of the homogeneity of the habitus. Thus, the law
is determinate to the extent that diverse groups within the juridical field accept
the legal conventions. In this respect, Bourdieu offers a theory of legal con-
straint based on the cultural practices that shape the legal habitus (cf. Balkin
1991: 1149-53).
Bourdieu acknowledges that Luhmann's notion of self-reproduction of a sub-
system is superficially similar to his own concept of the autonomy of fields
(Bourdieu 1992: 79), in that differentiation and autonomization are central to
the respective approaches. However, he parts company with systems theory
by rejecting its functionalism and organicism. Bourdieu considers that
Luhmann makes a simple category mistake by confusing the symbolic domain
with the social field in which it is reproduced. Bourdieu's claim is that the
juridical field is only potentially autonomous since, on the one hand, it is
structured and shaped by its own norms and practices, but on the other hand,
it is influenced by social, cultural and economic forces outside it. In this
regard, Bourdieu's account, unlike systems theory, is capable of explaining
how legal actors are affected by extra-legal forces and how struggles outside
the juridical field are refracted into the field. While we have seen that
Luhmann and Teubner see law as a closed system which is in contact with the
external environments, but only learns and re-structures from perturbations
produced within the system, Bourdieu's notion of the autonomous field requires
22 Elster has argued that Bourdieu's symbolic theory also has functional explanation at
its core (Blster 1983: 105-106); but see Bourdieu (1990: 106-19).
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a social process of intermediation in the confrontation of texts and procedures
with the social realities that they are supposed to express or regulate (Bourdieu
1987).
Bourdieu' s theory of the legal field offers an important approach for under-
standing indeterminacy since it accounts for regularity and predictability in
legal doctrine largely in relation to the social structures which constrain and
structure legal rules and their application. Bourdieu's approach avoids the
structuralism of certain critical legal studies approaches while at the same time
it does not reify the legal system or suppress the importance of possible
external sources of critique.
7.9 Beyond Bourdieu
Bourdieu provides a powerful account both of the characteristics of legal
reasoning and of the conditions and processes of its production, which goes
a long way towards an explanation avoiding the dilemma between idealism and
economism. However, we would like to indicate what we consider to be weak
points in the argument, and develop the analysis in the context of the study of
business lawyering. The central problem is with Bourdieu's account of
juridification and of the relation of the lay person and of social 'reality' to the
legal field. His claim is that this relationship is structural, in that the process
which he identifies as the main dynamic of autonomization of the legal sphere
is the 'spontaneous logic of competition' between agents asserting specific
competences. We argue that Bourdieu over-stresses the role of the professional
in the autonomization of the legal field, and under-emphasizes the social need
for law and the contribution that law makes in the reproduction of social
reality.
In Bourdieu's account, the world-view of order offered by law is powerful
yet illusory. The social power of legal professionals derives from their ability
to create a demand for their services by offering a world-view of an order
based on universal norms and the neutralization of particularisms, and in
transforming irreconcilable conflicts of interest into an appearance of
exchanges between equal subjects regulated by rational argument between
independent professionals before a neutral arbiter. But the offer is a spurious
one. First, the capacity to perceive an incident as an injustice, which is the
source of the demand for law, is not 'natural', but the result of a construction
of social reality mainly by professionals generating the feeling of entitlement,
the revelation of rights (Bourdieu 1987: 833). Second, the elasticity and
ambiguity of legal texts means that judicial decisions involve an element of
choice which is either arbitrary or derives its content externally, from the
social or economic preferences of the judge. The conformity of decisions with
the system of abstract rules is essentially an ideological matter, reinforcing the
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symbolic power of the legal sphere, which is exerted by the social acceptance
of the decision as legitimate despite its arbitrariness. The practical efficacy of
a legal decision, for Bourdieu, rests in its applicability in the everyday realm
where the matter originated. This double function of law produces two poles
around which the types of lawyer coalesce: on the one hand, the theoreticians,
whose role is the elaboration of pure doctrine, and on the other, the practi-
tioners, who take care of the necessary adjustment of pure principles to social
reality and for whom the interpretation of law must be evaluated by its applic-
ability to the particular case.
To begin with, an empirical objection can be made, that this distinction in
roles appears based on the continental European tradition, in which judges or
magistrates tend to decide on the basis of the practicalities of the situation,
while academic lawyers are the guardians of the purity of doctrine. In contrast,
in the common-law tradition, particularly in English law, it is the judiciaxy
which tends to emphasize legal autonomy, especially from poiitics, and the
importance of basing decisions on doctrinal exegesis, whereas academics often
criticize their judgements for failing to take into account social 'reality' or
practical implications. 23 However, the existence of two 'poles', of pure and
practical law, is a structural requirement according to this theory, hence it is
not of major concern which particular group carries out either funclion.
A more fundamental difficulty is that, in identifying power with the comnal
of access to legal resources, Bourdieu treats control as concerned exclusively
with the ability of certain social agents to appropriate conflict. In contrast, m
examination of situations in which social actors actually do invest iesttn
to improve their access to legal sphere shows that by doing so they do nct
challenge the autonomy of law, although they may increase their conliol o
lawyers. Though members of the dominated classes generally have low access
to law, they can in some circumstances become specialized in aspects of
concern to them: for example, in the case of 'jailhouse lawyers' who dcwlleç
specific skills in the filing of appeal petitions and other procedures (Mum-
23 These differences caused similar difficulties for Weber's theory of legal lunonnlimnni
the famous 'England problem'. Bourdieu himself argues that the French and Ginnna
Professorenrecht is based on the primacy of doctrine over procedure. whezeas the AstDm-
Saxon case-law system emphasizes procedural fairness and aims for a solution to Itilixe
particular case without much concern for its basis in a moral or scientific rationally; this
distinction he sees as rooted in the greater importance of practice both in legal raining andl
in the recruitment of judges (Bourdieu 1987: 822). The argument is further developed by
Dezalay, (1986) who argues that the theoreticians of pure law have a sti-anglehold over the
reproduction of law, which they codify and rationalize on the pretext of drawing out general
and abstract rules by purifying them of ordinary language, dispossessing and downgrading
practitioners, a picture which does not easily fit the common-law world.
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vanovic 1988). More central to our concern with business Iawyering is the
growth of in-house corporate law departments, which permit a large firm to
internalize routine legal aspects of its transactions and create a better basis for
it to evaluate and control its external legal contracts (Chayes and Chayes 1985.
To be sure, it can be said from a Bourdieuian perspective that this
'competition' from the periphery of the legal field merely pressurizes indepen-
dent lawyers to invest further in legal autonomy and rationality. Our point,
however, is that such investment must show an economic return and cannot
be based on a merely ideological power. Large corporations, especially when
they have their own in-house counsel and are dealing with others similarly
situated, do not resort to outside lawyers only due to acceptance of the ideol-
ogy of professional autonomy. The in-house counsel movement has certainly
had a strong disciplinary effect on the legal profession in the US, and probably
does so also in other countries, such as Germany where bank lawyers play an
important part in business lawyering (Hartmann 1991). In the US the evidence
is that internalization of legal services was part of the general trend of pres-
sures on corporate management from capital markets to reduce costs, with the
end of the era of uninterrupted corporate growth. Internalization reduced the
costs of much routine work and capped expenditure on some outside work,
notably litigation, but stimulated new areas of work for the independent firm,
in specialized transactions, regulatory work and the breakdown of business
relationships (Chayes and Chayes 1985). This has led to the emergence of new
'boutique' firms and undermined the old general-purpose commercial law
practice, creating new tensions between the professional ideal and the increas-
ingly bureaucratic organization of the elite law firm (Nelson 1988).
Both the example of the jailhouse lawyer and the corporate in-house counsel
show that the client is not structurally excluded from the legal field, but can
develop independent legal expertise, either where it is economic to do so, or
where there may be another gain, for example in social prestige (e.g. in the
jail). Bourdieu's account offers a distorted characterization of the power of the
juridical field to exclude lay persons. In our view it is necessary to accept that,
since social relations are reproduced partly through law, social actors are
always already (partly) within the juridical field; but they possess varying
degrees of skills, time, resources and inclination to monitor the legal pro-
fessional.
For Bourdieu, the main effect and purpose of creation of the legal space is
to secure a monopoly for lawyers, who have invested in the acquisition and
the generation of the specialized knowledge and techniques, and to exclude the
lay person, whose everyday, commonsense understanding is confronted by a
sharply different mental universe. Largely a by-product of this alchemy is the
neutralization effect, in which irreconcilable conflicts of interest are trans-
formed into regulated and rational arguments between equal subjects or parties.
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This embodies a vision of social order, backed by state powers and sanctions,
which by its symbolic force consecrates and helps to create the social world.
Its force is symbolic, in that it can only be effective if it is accepted even by
those whom it dispossesses. In Bourdieu's account there is a dual basis for this
effectiveness. On the one hand, it is essentially ideological, in that the vision
of order projected by law, which is a universalist one transcending particular-
isms, is merely a deception since its pure principles must be adjusted to reality
by arbitrary or political judgements. On the other hand, he accepts that there
is a social reality to the symbolic efficacy of 'formal rational' law, and that
it does provide predictability and calculability, as argued by Weber. However,
these features of the formal rigour of law are only available to those who can
gain access to the specialized realm of pure law.
Hence, the powerful reinforce their positions through law in two ways.
First, because the judges and others with legal competence come from the same
social stratum and share their ethical and political dispositions, their interests
are more likely to be reflected in the process of adjustment of pure law to
social reality. But second, to the extent that pure law can offer a realm of
formal rationality, access to these advantages is the privilege of those who can
purchase legal advice. Although a shift in the balance of social forces in favour
of dominated groups can produce a differentiation in the legal sphere, by the
introduction of consumer law, labour law and social law more generally (with
an emphasis on public as against private law and the creation of special
tribunals as against the general civil courts), this is essentially integrative. For
Bourdieu, law is essentially conservative; although he says law creates the
social world, it does so on the basis of existing structures, since its effective-
ness depends mainly on its being adjusted to those existing structures. A
creative or prophetic vision is possible, especially in periods of revolutionary
crisis, but generally even a creative vision of law can only consecrate a process
which is under way. Hence a critique of law, and the generation of a basis for
social change, must be sought outside it. So for Bourdieu, as for many other
sociologists of law, law is internally coherent and in its own terms rational;
the problem lies with restricted access. His position is on the radical wing, in
that the implications of his position are not that access should be improved but
that law should be abolished.
We argue that Bourdieu's picture of the realm of law can be brought into
a different focus, with different implications, by accepting that the legal sphere
plays its part in the reproduction of social reality by interactions with other
equally fetishized spheres, notably the economic realm, which is mediated by
money. To the extent that the legal sphere contributes to the reproduction of
social relations it has a functional and not merely illusory role; however, there
are deep structural contradictions in this role, a distorted reflection of the
broader social contradictions. The process of abstraction by which legal
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reasoning produces and elaborates formal legal rules results in norms which
purport to regulate social conduct; as Bourdieu correctly points out, their
abstract nature entails indeterminacy, since they can only receive substantive
content by interaction with other social spheres. Nevertheless, this indetermin-
acy is functional, in that it provides the flexibility and adaptability which
permits law to contribute to the dynamic of social change. We do not say that
this is necessarily a positive or ameliorative dynamic; simply that social change
is generated partly through law, and hence that lawyers can play a creative or
contributory role in such change.
7.10 The Regulatory Process and the Dynamic of Business Lawyering
In this section we pull together some of the points made until now, and sketch
out a framework for the analysis of business regulation and lawyering, which
will be applied in the final section to the specific example of the regulation of
financial market transactions and the prohibition of insider trading.
Markets cannot exist without rules, and the regulation of market transactions
takes place through layers of rules, formal and informal. Rules emerge through
the need to mediate economic transactions by reference to a framework of
generally understood and articulated expectations about behaviour and conduct.
Regulation is essential to the operation of any system of social organization;
but the generalization of social relations mediated by commodity circulation
resulted in the autonomization of the state, which legitimizes the definition and
allocation of property rights, and ultimately guarantees the enforcement of
those rights and their circulation. It is the combination of economic relations
mediated by markets, and political processes dominated by the state, through
which social relations are reproduced. That combination is mediated primarily
by money and by law.
This is not an automatic process, nor one that flows logically from the
development of economic and social relations. Hence, it is important to
understand the ways in which the forms taken by social and economic activities
have developed historically, and the role that regulation has played in that
development. There is no space here to give more than a brief indication of
the main phases of development of the regulatory frameworks which have
helped mould the institutional and transactional patterns of corporate capital-
ism. The key formative period of 1865-1914, between the American Civil War
and the First World War, was marked by the great depression of the late 1870s
and early 1 880s, which stimulated the concentration of capital and the estab-
lishment of the first large-scale major companies. During this period, the
leading capitalist countries established the basic legal framework for the
institutionalization of corporate capital, through the liberalization of the right
to incorporation and of the main institutions of property ownership and trans-
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fer, including industrial and intellectual property rights. Although there was
significant international discussion and debate, and cross-jurisdictional trans-
plantation and emulation, there were significant national divergences. Notably,
while the US, during the 'progressive era' evolved a liberal 'regulated
corporatism' (see, e.g., Sklar 1988), elsewhere the state played a more direct
role: in Germany, within a formalized framework, which included state-
supervised cartels, whereas in the UK the longer history of the centralized state
and greater homogeneity of its ruling groups permitted much more informal
supervision of business and industry. These patterns were generally further
consolidated during the 1930s, following the crash of 1929, notably with a
significant revamping of the US regulatory arrangements during successive
Roosevelt administrations, especially the establishment of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1933-4, and the revitalization of antitrust law
enforcement after 1937. After 1945, American influence led to some regulatory
transplantation, especially of antitrust laws (for example, to Japan and Ger-
many), but as the post-war boom gathered momentum after the end of the
Korean War, the regulation of the institutions, structures, practices and transac-
tions of business was of relatively small concern. The period since the mid-
1960s has seen a trend towards formalization or juridification of business
regulation in many fields. It has also been marked by international conflicts
of regulation, resulting from the application of national regulation to increas-
ingly internationalized business (Picciotto 1983). Finally, during the 1980s,
although there has been a significant process of national deregulation, it has
been accompanied by equally important patterns of and attempts at re-regula-
tion, to establish internationally co-ordinated controls over global business.
From this brief outline it should be clear that the development of regulation
takes place in response to both political and economic processes. While major
events, such as war or depression, have broad political repercussions and often
lead to radical changes in regulatory forms, the continual operation of econ-
omic and political processes also produces changes, generally at the micro
level. A key failure of legal regulation within capitalist market economies
generally is that they aim to produce and maintain equalization of the condi-
tions of competition: hence their basis ideal or feature is equal treatment or
rule-fairness in relation to similarly situated economic actors. However,
competition is not a static state but a process. Furthermore, economic actors
are quite different in their factor endowments, market power and sunk invest-
ments, so rules affect them differently. Moreover, the very operation of a
regulatory system produces inequalities resulting from competitive advantage.
Hence, an important function of the process of interpretation, application and
enforcement of rules is to resolve the persistent antinomies resulting from rule-
structured market transactions. For that reason, a regulatory system by nature
is not a static but a continually evolving and dynamic process. The interpreta-
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tion involved in the application of rules to specific transactions generates
modification, supplementation and amendment.
A key role in this process is played by the private lawyer whose job is to
structure a client's business strategies and transactions to optimal advantage
in relation to the regulatory framework. This often involves routine
'compliance' work, ensuring that transactions conform to the bureaucratic
formalities of the regulatory arrangements, or are kept within the accepted
understandings of the regular players. Not infrequently, however, often in
small and sometimes in major ways, the lawyer may play a 'creative' role.
This may entail, for example, achieving an economic objective desired by the
client, which is impeded by a regulatory obstacle, by devising a new legal
means; or the lawyer may find significant cost-savings for a client by new
ways of structuring a transaction, by creating new legal forms or adapting
existing ones to new ends. Such creativity can lead to the development of
major new legal and institutional forms (such as the holding company), as
devices become generalized through competitive legal practice. However, legal
'creativity' raises constant ethical, political and economic (as well as legal)
issues, as it probes the limits of the existing regulatory patterns.
The problem of regulatory compliance is the chief concern for state offi-
cials. As we have seen, legal theorists and economists have addressed the
problem of rule avoidance and compliance in terms of the conflict between
rules and their interpretation. Until recently, regulatory theorists assumed that
legal rules were common knowledge and that there were static incentives for
compliance. The static rule framework was based on the view that legal rules
were fixed and assertable and that parties self-select, given their preferences,
to follow the rule. As we have noted above, modern legal theory has pointed
out that legal rules are moderately indeterminate, and that the uncertainty in
legal rules results from the competitive struggle to define the rule and the fact
that interpreters can, within certain boundaries, select an interpretation. In this
perspective, legal rules are the result of interpretations of regulators and judges
who justify their decisions with the aid of rhetorical practices (Fish 1993). This
contingency of law leads some CLS theorists to infer that law must therefore
be politics and hence illegitimate; whereas it delights pragmatists, like Fish,
who argue that it reflects the inherently contingent and historical quality of
interpretation generally. The implication for regulatory theory is that indeter-
minacy permeates the regulatory domain and there is always movement in the
juridical field to assert new interpretations in order to modify the impact of
legal rules.24
24 Even law and economics scholars have tried to integrate some of the insights of the
post-realist jurisprudence; thus, Jason Scott Johnston has examined the problem of legal
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7.11 The Regulation of Insider Trading
Against this background, we now turn to discuss the role played by business
lawyers in mediating some of the changes in the financial services sector,
focusing especially on the major scandals in the US during the 1980s and the
debates about the interpretation and enforcement of the 'insider trading' rules.
7. 11.1 Risk, Trust and Property in Information
As in any area of economic regulation, the role of legal rules in mediating,
financial transactions is expected to be to ensure a 'level playing-field'. The
demands for fairness, in this context, result from expectations underpinning
the functioning of financial markets (Giddens 1990: 247) and their accompany-
ing regulatory institutions. Financial market transactions, like all exchanges,
require a basis of trust between the parties; this is especially important since
such trading is particularly impersonal, taking place between parties who may
not even know each other's identities, and particularly abstract, since it
concerns subject-matter with little content other than price. In such circum-
stances, trust is only possible if risk is kept within acceptable limits (Luhmann
1988a: 36-46).
Perhaps the most important force driving financial markets is information.
It is not surprising, therefore, that rules governing the disclosure of informa-
tion should be central to the stabilization of expectations about risk, and thus
to the maintenance of the basis of trust necessary for the functioning of such
markets. However, the issue of information disclosure involves a central
contradiction. Profitable trading results from capturing the value of private
information, which would be negated by disclosure; hence, an obligation to
disclose removes the economic incentive to acquire information, and would
impede the flow of active trading (Fischel and Ross 1991: 509) by participants
who believe they have advantageous knowledge or superior analysis. On the
other hand, many investors would be repelled from markets if they perceive
them to be 'rigged' by privileged knowledgeable insiders.
Hence, it is in the characteristics of financial market transactions themselves
that can be found both the need for rules, as a means of reconciling expecta-
tions and creating trust, as well as the reasons for their instability. The market
requires a regulatory framework, inter alia to define the legitimate limits of
property in knowledge. The abstract and formal nature of the rules helps to
legitimize the terms of trading, while their relative indeterminacy provides the
uncertainty, and argues that legal form oscillates 'from precision to generality, between rules
and balancing' (Johnston 1991: 365).
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flexibility which can accommodate divergent expectations between the parties.
The particular skills of legal professionals lies in acting as intermediaries
between the realm of abstract-formal legal rules, where the general interests
of market participants is debated and reconciled, and the practical realm of
specific transactions, where the professional can and must exercise the creativ-
ity permitted by the ambiguities and indeterminacy of the rules to facilitate a
deal or resolve a conflict caused by a failed transaction. As this creativity is
also used on behalf of clients in the competition between market participants
for competitive advantages, it can contribute to the destabilization of the
regulatory system which results from the dynamic of the markets.
7.11.2 The Origins and Basis of the Prohibition of Insider Trading
Historically, trading in financial securities was regulated only under the general
law of contract and fraud. The emergence of a more specific regulatory regime
took place in the US, following the general loss of confidence due to the
collapse of the stock market in 1929, and the resultant widespread lack of trust
and generalized belief that dishonesty permeated the financial markets. The
need for regulation to restore confidence was argued by eminent lawyers who
were also public figures, notably Brandeis, who published a critique of Wall
Street (Other People's Money) in 1933. Congress enacted legislation in 1933
and 1934 which regulates the issuing and registration of securities (Securities
Act of 1933), and the purchase and sale of securities (Securities Exchange Act
of 1934). The 1934 Act also established the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, a regulatory body of a fairly classical corporatist type: the Commissioners
are eminent professionals who direct the policy, while the official staff are
charged with its implementation.
The main target of the legislation was market 'manipulation'. However, this
is a far from precise concept, and defining its scope involves significant
economic and political issues, as well as affecting numerous vested interests.
The legislation of 1933-4 included several specific provisions outlawing
particular practices. Thus, s. 16(a) of the 1934 Act required corporate execu-
tives to register their holdings of the company's stock, while s. 16(b) introduced
the 'insider's short-swing profit rule' requiring such insiders to disgorge to the
company any profits from trading in its securities within a period of six
months. The 16(b) rule was very narrow and easily avoided, since it did not
cover trading in the shares of related companies, nor tipping, nor 'stringing
out' trades beyond the six-month limit. In addition to such relatively specific
rules, the 1934 Act also included a sweeping provision (s. 10(b)) making it
unlawful in connection with any sale or purchase of securities to 'use any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe'.
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Whether and to what extent trading with privileged or inside information
might amount to or should be treated as fraud was unclear, and had been the
subject of some academic and judicial debate. Common law fraud generally
required a deliberate and explicit misrepresentation. Hence, mere silence or
the failure to disclose was not actionable, unless there was a basis for an
obligation to speak, such as a confidential or a fiduciary relationship. Although
the Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide (1909) had found that the concealment
of his identity by a manager purchasing from a minority shareholder did
amount to fraud, this seemed based on the special circumstances of a close
relationship rather than the mere manager-shareholder link, which made the
concealment fraudulent. Some argued that company executives were in a
fiduciary position by virtue of which any trading by them in the firm's secur-
ities should be regarded as tainted; however, it seemed too extreme to prohibit
all trading by executives, and other theorists preferred to point to the need for
disclosure by any person (not only managers or employees) trading on privi-
leged information, which could also make avoidance more difficult by limiting
the passing on of the information (Manne 1966: ch. 1).
In the face of the inadequacies of narrow anti-fraud rules such as 16(b) and
17(a), the SEC in 1942 approved regulations under the broad powers of
s. 10(b), including Rule l0(b-5), which much later became a key and hotly
contested provision. Within the framework of a still very general rule against
fraud, ale 5 made it unlawful:
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading.
Initially, this provision was very little used. Overall, the rules and their
enforcement merely routinized and normalized the disclosure of holdings by
executives, as well as others purchasing large blocks of shares; this favoured
larger issues of securities (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991: 277-9). The 1 930s
New Deal reforms, which involved the delegation of regulation to self-regula-
tory bodies, including the stock exchanges and dealer organizations, served
to eliminate competition and restore political legitimacy to the markets (Moran
1991: 30-1).
It was only in the 1 960s, and based on private actions by shareholders and
purchasers, that the issue of concealment of privileged information was brought
to the fore. By 1965 there had been an appreciable increase in the number of
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230/2 1 May 1942), 7 Fed Reg. 3804
(1942) (17 CFR S240.lOb-5).
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private actions citing s. 10(b-5): in 1962-4 the number of cases citing lOb-5
were over 50 per cent more than those for the two prior decades, 1942-62
(Manne 1966). From the 1950s to the early 1970s the SEC contributed very
little in the way of control of insider trading, even though it was clear from
the empirical studies that there was significant non-disclosed trading on insider
information; particularly in the context of unannounced merger plans.
7.11.3 The Uncertainty of the Disclosure Rule and the Conflict over the
Misappropriation Theory
The activation of the obligation tO disclose by means of civil actions brought
by the SEC, as well as major criminal prosecutions by the Department of
Justice, began in the late 1970s, 27 resulting from major changes in financial
markets. In particular, the opening up of trading in share futures substantially
increased the potential value of privileged information, since very little capital
outlay was needed to take a position on the possibility of a price movement.
At the same time, the financial boom, creating much greater market competi-
tion, led to major institutional changes and the arrival of large numbers of
newcomers both as employees and major traders. These changes destabilized
the previous regulatory regime based on understandings among the WASP
leaders of the major financial institutions and professional firms.
While the vast bulk of cases initiated were resolved by out-of-court settle-
26 Early studies showed a strong relationship between insider trading and large price
movements (see e.g. Lone and Niederhofer 1968: 50-2; Pratt and De Vere 1972; Jaffe
1974a). For recent discussions of the statistical evidence see, e.g., King and Roell
(1988:173-7; Suter (1989: 912) Susan Shapiro's study of the SEC analysed data on securities
violation prosecuted by the agency from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, and showed that
the vast majority were apparently technical misrepresentation and registration violations;
however; while most of the common types of violation were remarkably stable, some
offences, such as professional technical violations and self-dealing, increased. Shapiro
concluded that [t}hese trends reflect some mixture of the effect of changing economic
conditions, growing sophistication among wayward capitalists, shifting SEC priorities, and
the ubiquity of certain generic modi operandi of securities fraud and cover-up' (Shapiro
1984: 27 & n 4).
27 The Commission brought fewer than fifty actions in the two decades 1949-1977, but
seventy-seven cases between 1982 and 1985, equivalent to all the cases brought in the
previous forty-seven years (information from the SEC: see also testimony of its Chair, John
Shad, to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance,
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, Hearings on
Insider Trading, June-July 274 1986; Naylor 1989). The first criminal prosecution was
brought in 1980, after which about 40 per cent of cases were criminal in nature (Naylor
1989: 88).
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ment (as is usual in white-collar infringement actions), 28 some key actions
were litigated to conclusion, exploring the ambiguities and limits of the legal
rules. The basis for more active enforcement had been laid in the early 1960s,
when William Cary, as Chairman of the SEC, supported the deployment of
the judiciary duty concept to establish an obligation on corporate insiders to
'disclose or abstain' from trading. 29 The SEC's reasoning was that there was
a duty to disclose material information obtained by company executives,
employees and others, since such information is obtained in the course of their
work which should be to the benefit of shareholders. This still left very open
the extent of the prohibition on the exploitation of such an informational
advantage. While the more specific rules governing disclosure of share owner-
ship and trading by executives might be too narrow and easily avoidable, a
broader rule dealing with privileged information could strike to the heart of
the quest for informational advantages which provides an important dynamic
for the markets.
Despite considerable doctrinal debate and some major litigation during the
1 980s, including several landmark Supreme Court cases, there remains a lack
of clarity both in the formulation of and in the rationale behind the insider
dealing rule. In Chiarella v. United States (1980), the Supreme Court accepted
that parity of information between trading parties could not be the aim, stating
that 'not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under S 10(b).' 30 The Court noted that the legislative intent of 310(b) did not
support the parity of information rule and that 'the problems caused by misuse
of market information had been addressed by detailed and sophisticated
regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm
operation of the securities market' (ibid.: 233). The SEC had secured convic-
tions against Chiarella, a 'markup man' employed by a well-known Wall Street
financial printer, who by virtue of handling confidential documents for a
takeover bid, was able to discern the names of the target companies from
information contained in the documents. Acting on these deductions, and
without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella immediately purchased shares in
the target companies and thereafter sold them after the takeover attempts were
Of the twenty-two Department of Justice prosecutions between 1981 and 1984, twenty-
one were guilty pleas; however; of the fifty-five cases brought in the Southern District of
New York up to 1987, sixteen defendants pleaded guilty (Naylor 1989: 88; see also Flynn
1992: 109 & n. 8.
The disclose or abstain rule developed in Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)
was later upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
401 2Ed 833 (2d Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
30 Chiarella v. United States, 63 L.Ed. 348, 359 (1980) (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977)).
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made public. The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decision, stating
that since he was not in a relationship of trust to the shareholders he was under
no duty to disclose.
The Chiarella decision sparked a heated theoretical debate, and obliged the
authorities to shift to a broader-based theory that the duty to disclose was based
on 'misappropriation' of information. Chief Justice Burger, in a strong dissent-
ing judgment in Chiarella, had argued that, in the context of rule 10(b)-5, what
matters is whether a party obtains information through air means or simply
misappropriates it unlawfully for personal gain, since such a party should not
profit from 'his ill-gotten informational advantage by purchasing securities in
the market' (1980 445 US at 245). This appeared to provide a better grounding
for a duty to disclose than the existence of a fiduciary relation, which covered
only a limited circle of direct employees.
The major test of the misappropriation theory occurred in the litigation
following the admission by a Wall Street Journal reporter, R. Foster Winans,
that he had shared pre-publication information of the details of his column
'Heard on the Street', with a broker m a major Wall Street firm, in exchange
for payments to himself and his room-mate, David Carpenter. Winans argued
that although he knew that his actions were a violation of journalistic ethics,
they were not illegal (Winans 1987: 260). The information essentially con-
cerned the contents of forthcoming columns, hence the decisive moment in the
pre-trial tactical manoeuvres was the production by the Journal's officers of
a 314 page document stating the paper's policy had ever been made known to
him, this was the basis on which he and all those who benefited from the
information he disclosed were convicted. Although the convictions were upheld
by the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the Journal had been defrauded of
confidential use of its business information, the Court was divided 4-4 on
whether the misappropriation theory was a valid approach (Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
7.11.4 The Enforcement Process and Restabilizing of the Regulatory
Regime
Within the framework of the loose and developing doctrinal rules, the regula-
tors conducted a process combining guerrilla war and strategic bargaining with
the major Wall Street houses, mediated by the various groups of lawyers
involved. By the mid-1980s Wall Street was m the middle of an unprecedented
merger wave and a raging bull market. The premium fees that investment
banking houses were charging for their services in control contests created
further competition and much public debate. There existed considerable public
pressure on SEC Commissioners to step up their enforcement against insider
trading, especially after the well-publicized Winans case and the persistent
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rumours circulating in the financial press that insiders were trading on confi-
dential information in most of the hostile takeovers, which were occurring in
greater frequency (Grunfest et al 1988: 311-32). Increasingly, critics of Wall
Street's freewheeling approach had begun to link insider trading with hostile
takeovers. Congressional democrats were making soundings to step up regula-
tion against takeovers.
A new consensus gradually emerged that financial institutions, in order to
promote further competitive gains, required an environment which was free
from scandal and based on investor trust. This change in attitude resulted from
the recomposition of the investment banking sector which occurred in the
1970s and early 1980s. Stimulated by the competition which resulted after the
1975 SEC decision to deregulate the fixed-rate commissions on stock transac-
tions, investment bankers, affected by the loss of secure profits, struggled to
create new markets (Moran 1991: 35-63). As a result, the established invest-
ment bankers joined in with the newer investment bankers, like Drexel
Burnham, to compete for other firms' clients and to move into the financing
of hostile takeovers. These changes upset many of the traditional social and
professional relations on Wall Street; but at the same time, the changed
commercial environment was threatened by allegations of unfairness which the
practice of insider trading promoted in the minds of the public and legislators.
The story of the chain of investigations leading from Dennis Levine through
Ivan Boesky to Michael Milken and others, involving a series of major pros-
ecutions, has been widely recounted (see notably Frantz 1988; Stewart 1991;
as well as Oliver Stone's film Wall Street). Although the underlying issue in
these cases concerned inside information, many of the prosecutions were on
other charges, such as stock parking or even registration failures. Virtually all
the cases were settled out of court on the basis of plea bargains, the negotiation
of which is the speciality of the white-collar defence attorneys, who are
generally former prosecutors. 3 ' The outcome of these, and many other less-
publicized cases, has generally been to punish prominent scapegoats, mostly
Wall Street newcomers. Nevertheless, this was clearly a traumatic process, not
only for the individuals who fell from positions of great financial power and
immense wealth to imprisonment and obloquy, but also for their firms, which
included some of the leading names of Wall Street.
That said, it is clear that the outcome has been the restabilization of a new
regulatory regime based on greater bureaucratization and juridification: the
Mann (1985). In these cases a key part was played by Harvey
Pitt, a former SEC attorney, who defended Bank Leu in the Levine investigation (in the
process helping to identi1' Levine as the scapegoat), and negotiated the plea-bargain for
Ivan Boesky which was denounced as a 'sweetheart deal' (Stewart 1991: 296).
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'increasing codification of rules, a more prominent role for formally consti-
tuted organizations, both public and private; and growing penetration of law
into the regulatory system' (Moran 1991: 13). Thus, into the gaps left by the
indeterminacy of the general legal rules have been inserted detailed codes of
practice, patrolled by corporate compliance officers, who cultivate a close
relationship with the official regulators. 32 Naturally, their prime task is to
ensure that no harm comes to the institutions, and to minimize the number of
individuals who may have to be sacrificed. The major financial institutions and
market professionals in general terms have an interest in safeguarding their
investments in more regularized processes of access to unique information, and
in discrediting the more unorthodox and informal channels used by the likes
of Levine and Milken.
It is important to stress, however, both that the transition has not been
smooth or predictable, and also that the new regulatory regime is far from a
being model of formal rationality. In both these respects, therefore, we con-
sider that it is necessary to go beyond a neo-corporatist theory such as that of
Michael Moran, who locates the cause of juridification in the institutional
structures of meso-corporations and argues that the regulatory struggles of the
1970s and 1980s reflects the response to the ascendancy of multinational
financial services firms, which operate increasingly in all major world markets.
In Moran's view, the regulatory changes, orchestrated by decisive state
interventions, is shaped by the alliance with large market players (Moran 1991:
124-35). While it is no doubt the case that the shifting alliance of private actors
and the state is responsible for the changes in regulatory form, we find that
Moran's thesis places undue emphasis on almost deterministic changes in state
structures, which fails to capture the dynamic and contingent nature of the
processes of change. We argue that a key focus must be the interactions of
government and private-sector lawyers. Hence, juridification is the result of
the strategic competition amongst different players within the juridical field.
On this account, the shape of the formal legal rules and the constitution of the
juridical field depends, in part, on the specific power of the legal professionals
to manipulate power for their interests. It is, however, the competitive interac-
tion between the state and the professionals around the definition of the legal
32 Prior to the massive publicity given to the high-profile insider trading prosecutions,
Congress had been satisfied with an enforcement consisting of obey the-law injunctions and
administrative remedies imposed by the SEC. However, the 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions
Act provided for fines up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided. Even more
significantly, the 1988 Insider Trading and Fraud Enforcement Act provided for civil
penalties for organizations which fall to take affirmative measures to prevent insider trading
by their employees. These powers have produced record sums in terms of disgorgements
obtained from defendants (see McLucas et al. 1992: 88-9).
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regime which creates juridification. The power of these professionals lies in
the specific skills which they control, of mediating the processes of
legitimization entailed in relating the realm of abstract rules of law to the
specific practices of economic actors. It is the indeterminacy of the abstract
rules that leaves the space for creativity, which enables the reshaping of the
regulatory regime.
CHAPTER 8
MARKET REGULATION AND PARTICULARISTIC
INTERESTS: THE DYNAMICS OF INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION IN THE US AND EUROPE'
8.1 Introduction
The central issue addressed in this chapter concerns transformation of the 'legal
field' 2 of insider trading against the background of the continuing interna-
tionalization of financial markets. While a number of factors are responsible
for the integration of financial markets in Europe and elsewhere, it is now
common to argue that an increase in competition between investment exchanges
is solely responsible for the need of national regulators to undertake regulatory
reform. Although this insight is important, it is only one factor which explains
the impact which changes in international capital markets have had on interest
groups and policy in nation states. This chapter aims to place the restructuring
process within the broader context of domestic political calculations and the
role of interest groups which are linked to, and influenced by, the logic of
restructuring in the international market. On balance, where opposing domestic
interests are strong, it has been difficult for national governments to pursue
a strategy of expending new resources for legislation and enforcement of
insider trading regulations.
The second question asked by this chapter is why did European financial
centres, which previously did not prohibit insider trading, choose to enact
securities legislation designed to restrict the incidence of insider abuses? First,
why did politicians promulgate this legislation, particularly since their capital
markets had long accepted insider trading practice? 3 Given the costs of these
This chapter appeared in Geoffrey Underhill (ed), New World Order in International
Finance (Londen: MacMillian, 1997).
2 On the constitution of a legal field, see ibid., p. 250-57.
Until 1986, only three Member States of the European Community prohibited insider
trading. See Raffaello Fornasier, 'The Directive on Insider Trading', in Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal, vol. 13, 1989-9, p. 149.
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changes to market 'insiders', why were politicians enthusiastically introducing
new obligations when the majority of insiders would, as a consequence, offer
them less political and bureaucratic support? Unlike the US, which has long
been committed to the regulation and enforcement of insider trading in its
capital markets, most European countries had waged a prolonged struggle to
maintain the status quo. 4 It comes as something of a surprise that these states
only recently recognized the shortcomings of their established practices and
developed specific legal procedures designed to strengthen the reputational
capital of their financial centres.
This chapter draws some lessons from the new research in economic theory
of inefficient markets and the public choice framework to retell the regulation
of insider trading story. Many discussions of the proliferation of insider trading
regulation attempt to explain it fully in terms of the need for worldwide
uniformity of regulation in order to support and sustain the globalization and
integration of capital markets. 5 The public choice approach adopted here, by
contrast, takes account of the features of interest groups, regulators, and
political decisionmakers when explaining the emergence of regulation, and
places them in a context of distributional conflict. There are two main theories
of the role of interest groups role in shaping regulatory outcomes. The simple
demand model of 'capture' asserts that lawmaking follows the lawmakers'
responses to demand patterns. An additional body of public choice theory
supplements this 'demand model' with a 'supply-side' explanation focusing on
legislators as 'suppliers' of regulation and regulatory agencies (such as the US
SEC in this chapter) as 'intermediaries' between demand and supply sides of
the equation. According to this view, the legislators create controls to limit the
discretion of agencies and also rely on interest groups, via 'fire alarms', to
monitor agency decisions. 6 Interest groups may 'signal' their preferences to
legislators, but since legislators (as the suppliers) have their own preferences,
interest groups cannot take for granted that legislators will act in their inter-
ests.7
' For a general overview of the developments in Europe, see Emmanuel Gaillard, (ed.),
Insider Trading: The Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan (Deventer: Kiuwer Law
and Taxation Publications 1992).
See e.g., Harvey Pitt and David Hardison, 'Games without Frontiers: Trends in the
International Response to Insider Trading,' in Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 55,
no. 4 (Autumn 1992) p. 199.
6 Matthew D. McCubbins et al. 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control,' Journal of Law, Economics & Organization vol. 3, 1987, p. 243-44.
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress,
Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy,' Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization vol. 11, no.
2, 1995, p.236-246.
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Any attempt to understand the regulatory process in financial markets must
therefore start by examining the role of financial intermediaries. The contention
is that the profits of market professionals are squeezed by the presence of
insiders trading in the market. It is argued that market professionals, at the
beginning of the 1980s, demanded from Congress new rules to restrict the
corporate insider trading. Congress saw potential benefits in supplying these
new rules, given constituent demands and the state of public opinion in the face
of market scandals. Supported by Congress, the SEC in turn proposed
increased enforcement in exchange for increased budgets and powers. But the
SEC was able to manipulate the situation by providing a framework of rules
and enforcement procedures which were sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy its
own heterogeneous constituents: market makers demanding change, corporate
insiders who were targeted by the new regime, and incumbent corporate
managers who wished to limit the power of market makers in takeover battles.
The existing literature has for the most part overlooked the subtleties of
these 'supply-side' effects of regulation. I will argue that, in the context of a
dynamic field of contemporary banking and financial intermediation, regard
for the way in which legislators and regulators combine to supply trading
regulation has become increasingly important for understanding the incentives
for greater efforts on the monitoring and control of insider trading. The aim
of this chapter then is not to propose a general theory of political economy of
insider trading regulation, but to suggest that a richer explanation for regula-
tory reform can only be explained with reference to the local history of the
institutional practices and their subsequent adoption.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section considers the
context in which there has been a sustained demand for the regulation of
insider trading. This section traces the origins and development of the US
system of enforcement, set up during the period when there was low public
confidence in the equity market. This section also analyzes the components of
the US approach to insider trading regulation, focusing on the problems of
employing Rule lOb-5 measure to control illegal trading. Section two deals
with the destablization of the legal regime and the emergence of demands for
tighter regulation of insider trading. It shows that the legislators and regulators
as suppliers were constrained by the domestic preferences of interest groups
which shape the demand for increased regulation, and that distributional
struggle among different types of market actors lay at the root of these prefer-
ences. Section three discusses the changes in the competitive environment of
international securities dealing. I argue that the erosion of rents through
deregulation and competition has led to a new environment in which banks and
financial firms operate. The growth of international debt and equity markets,
the development of new financial technologies, and financial integration has
brought important changes to the manner in which financial transactions are
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regulated. Tighter margins and competition have led market makers and
institutional investors to square off against corporate insiders, whose activities
were proving increasingly costly to the former. This section outlines the SEC's
attempt to develop cooperative regulatory strategies, based on reciprocity and
harmonization, with foreign securities regulators to achieve greater information
and supervision of international transactions. It is suggested that these strat-
egies are limited by national regulatory differences. The final section demon-
strates how the EU responded to the same pressures with regard to insider
trading in the context of the conflict between supranational authorities and the
pressures of interest groups at the national level. This is followed by a brief
conclusion.
8.2 Insider Trading Regulation in the US
8.2. 1 The Regulation of Information
In this section I survey some main legal and economic models dealing with the
regulation of insider trading. One of the most important variables distinguish-
ing the regulation of financial markets in Europe versus America is existence
in the US of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the very
different approach to basic notions of 'fairness' represented by its regulation
of insider trading. In the US, the demand for fairness originally emerged from
expectations underpinning the functioning of financial markets. 8 It was thought
that financial market transactions, like all market exchanges, required a basis
of trust between the parties. This is especially important since financial trading
is particularly impersonal, taking place between parties who may not even
know each other identities, and particularly abstract, since it concerns subject
matter with little content other than price. In such circumstances, it was
thought that trust is only possible if risk was kept within acceptable limits. The
SEC's early 'disclose-or-abstain' approach was constructed around such a
fairness ideal, based on an explicit concern for risk-averse individuals.
Perhaps the most important force driving financial markets is information.
The advocates of fairness argued that trading by those with privileged access
to inside information was unfair. Accordingly, it was argued that the access
to the private information involved a valuable price advantage which other
public investors were denied. Quite contrary to the free market paradigm, the
'equal access to information' view argued that the party with superior access
to private information should be restricted from trading. Certainly, the less
8 Harvey Pitt and David Hardison, op. cit., p. 200.
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informed will be at a disadvantage, but only where a market insider actually
trades on good/bad news and an uninformed investor has decided to sell/buy.9
While rules of disclosure became central to US markets, the issue of
information disclosure involves a central contradiction. Profitable trading
results from capturing the value of private information, which would be
negated by disclosure; hence, an obligation to disclose removes the economic
incentive to acquire information, and would impede the flow of active trad-
ing. 1° On the other hand, many investors would be repelled from markets if
they perceive them to be 'rigged' by privileged knowledgeable insiders. To
remedy this problem, it was thought that the mandatory disclosure of informa-
tion would create a more level playing field for investors and securities firms
alike, as the outside investor is unable to overcome lawfully the informational
advantage which the insiders possess 'no matter how great may be their
diligence or large their resources."
However, there are limitations to the fairness approach to the regulation of
insider trading. First, insider trading may not be unfair. If outsiders are aware
of insiders in the market they will change their expectations and pay a lower
price for the shares. There are other advantages which could explain the
disparities among traders.' 2 There are also a variety of reasons advanced to
support the claim that insider trading actually promotes market efficiency. The
efficiency theory suggests that if insiders are permitted to trade, they are prone
to release valuable information into the market and aid market efficiency by
producing more accurate securities prices.' 3 Beyond the relationship between
disclosure and performance, the efficiency theory argues that insider trading
is justified, given the importance of reducing transaction costs, because it
supplies strong incentives to firm managers to obtain information: if the firm
does well through lower costs, the managers can compensate themselves while
theoretically creating business opportunities for the firm.'4
Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993) p. 327.
10 Daniel Fischel and David Ross, 'Should the law prohibit "manipulation" of financial
markets,' Harvard Law Review vol. 105, 1991, p. 503.
' Victor Brudney, 'Insiders, outsiders, and informational advantages under the Federal
Securities Law,' Harvard Law Review vol. 93, 1979, p.354.
12 Jonathan R. Macey, 'From Fairness to Contract,' Hofstra Law Review vol. 13, 1984,
p. 15-16.
' Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York: The Free Press,
1966); Dennis Canton and Daniel Fischel, 'The Regulation of Insider Trading,' Stanford
LawReview vol 35, 1983, p.857-895. For a recent empirical study of the stock price effects
of insider trading analyzed by the SEC in the 1980s, see Lisa Muelbroek, 'An Empirical
Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading,' Journal of Finance vol. 47, 1992, p. 166 1-2070.
' See, e.g., Paul E. Fischer, 'Optimal Contracting and Insider Trading Restrictions,'
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Despite the efficiency argument, there are in fact reasons to suspect that
allowing corporate insiders to trade is problematic. First, permitting insider
trading may not be particularly efficient in getting information to the market.
The management of any enterprise have their own existing incentives to release
information and allowing insider trading may alter this incentive structure. In
short, permitting insider trading does not ensure efficiency. The efficiency
model is also blind with regard to the conflict among market participants over
the distribution of economic rents. I therefore turn to another school of thought
which focuses on the imperfections which arise out of financial markets. These
imperfections create additional transaction costs which in turn create disincen-
tives for large investors.' 5 Corporate insiders, taking advantage of their posi-
tion, in fact acquire trading information costlessly; it is generated by the firm's
activity. When corporate insiders use this informational advantage to make
gains in trades, this creates losses for market professionals, who must adjust
their bid-ask spreads to capture the rents which they are dependent upon. The
increased fixed costs which arise from insider trading are passed along to large
institutional investors. The distributional consequences of insider trading are
therefore: lower returns to outsider investors, reduced incentives for investors
to use market makers to access trading information, and potentially reduced
liquidity in the market. Although proponents of the efficient market hypothesis
argue that no one will be hurt so long as securities prices are efficient and the
aggregate levels of insider trading can be estimated by all investors, it is
intuitively obvious that lower returns on investment increases the costs to
firms. In this regard, the good excuse of lower prices cannot hide the fact that
insider trading raises firms' marginal costs and they and investors are made
worse off.
To conclude, I have suggested that the fairness argument does not support
a reason for insider trading regulation. I also maintain that the efficiency
argument cannot be used to support deregulatory policies: permitting insider
trading is not an effective means to disclose information to the market nor an
effective mechanism to compensate management. The theory of imperfect
capital markets, advanced by Glosten and Milgrom, amply supports the claim
that insider trading, with regard to market investors, has distributional effects
and increases the probability that a market will have less liquidity unless
regulators develop efficient means to implement insider trading laws.
Journal of Finance vol. 47, no. 2, 1992, p. 673, 681-4.
Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom, 'Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Special Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,' 14 J. Fin. Econ. 1985, p. 71.
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8.2.2 The US Statutory Framework
In light of the above section, several questions arise. First, what are the main
legal instruments employed to manage the problem of insider trading? Is there
any reason to believe that there is a determinate solution, given the complexity
of the problem and the political conflict among the groups competing for
political and regulatory influence? It is only possible to address these questions
if we examine the development of the process and structure built up to deal
with insider trading in the United States.
Prior to the Great Depression, trading in financial securities was regulated
only under the general law of contract and fraud. Congress enacted legislation
in 1933 and 1934 which regulates the issuing and registration of securities
(Securities Act of 1933) and the purchase and sale of securities (Securities Act
of 1934) following the loss of confidence in the stock market in 1929.16 The
1934 Act also established the Securities and Exchange Commission, a regula-
tory agency charged with legal enforcement of capital market regulation. The
SEC obtained regulatory control over the securities laws due to Roosevelt's
compromise with Wall Street. Macey argues that the removal of authority from
the Federal Trade Commission to the SEC overwhelmingly benefited Wall
Street interests in that the narrower objectives of the SEC made it more likely
that it could be 'captured' by its constituencies.'7
The main target of the legislation was market 'mpulation.' 18
 An impre-
cise concept, defining its scope involved significant economic and political
issues, and affected numerous vested interests.' 9
 The legislation of 1933-4
included several specific provisions outlawing particular practices. Thus,
section 16(a) of the 1934 Act required corporate executives to register their
holdings of the company's stock, while section 16(b) introduced the 'insider's
short-swing profit rule' requiring such insiders to disgorge to the company any
profits from trading in its securities within a period of six months. The section
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. sects. 8a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 11989).
Jonathan R. Macey, 'Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group For-
mation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty,' Cardozo Law Review vol. 15, no. 4, 1994, p.
909, 925.
18 5 U.S.C. sect. 78(b)4 (1988). Congressproscribed certain practices, such as the trade
in a security 'for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.'
15 U.S.C. sect. 78i(a)(2).
' See generally, Stephen Craig Pirrong, 'The Self-regulation of Commodity Exchanges:
The case of market manipulation,' Journal of Law and Economics vol. 38, 1995, pp. 144-8;
Daniel Fischel and David Ross, 'Should the law prohibit 'Manipulation" of financial
markets?,' Harvard Law Review vol. 105, 1991, pp. 504-5.
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16(b) rule was very narrow and easily avoided, since it did not cover trading
in shares of related companies, nor tipping, nor 'stringing out' trades beyond
the six month limit. 20 In addition to such relatively specific rules, the 1934
Act also included a sweeping antifraud provision. Section 10(b) made it
unlawful, in connection with any sale or purchase of securities, to 'use any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.'
In the face of the inadequacies of narrow anti-fraud rules such as section
16(b) and s. 17(a), the SEC in 1942 approved regulations under the broad
powers of section 10(b), including Rule 10(b)-5, which later became a key and
hotly contested provision. Within the framework of a still very general rule
against fraud, Rule 10(b)-5 made it unlawful, 'To make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.'
Initially, this provision was very little used. Overall, the rules and their
enforcement merely routinized and normalized the disclosure of holdings by
executives, as well as other purchasing of large blocks of shares 21 The 1 930s
New Deal reforms, which involved the delegation of regulation to self-regula-
tory bodies, including stock exchanges and dealer organizations, served to
restore political legitimacy to the markets.
It was only in the 1 960s, and based on private actions by shareholders and
purchasers, that the issue of concealment of privileged information was brought
to the fore. By 1965 there had been an appreciable increase in the number of
private actions citing section 10(b)-5: in 1962-4 the number of cases citing
Rule 10(b)-S were over 50 per cent more than those for the two prior decades,
194262 . 22
 From the 1950s to the early 1970s the SEC contributed very little
in the way of control of insider trading, even though it was clear from empiri-
cal studies that there was significant undisclosed trading on insider information,
particularly in the context of unannounced merger plans. It is clear that the
SEC played little more than a reactive role during this period. The agency had
20 The problem with section 16(b) is that it is a suboptimal regulatory mechanism. The
section only allows a shareholder or corporation to enforce the regulation in the form of
a derivative action. As a result, the SEC is unable to enforce section 16(b) violations.
2! Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 277-79.
22 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York: The Free Press,
1966).
23 Between 1966 and 1980, the SEC launched only thirty seven actions and, of that
number, twenty five were settled. See H. Nejat Seyhun, 'The Effectiveness of Insider
Trading Sanctions,' Journal of Law and Economics 35, 1992, p. 152.
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few incentives to disrupt the benefits to its favoured constituencies by imple-
menting a new set of policies which would upset the relationship among the
heterogeneous interests and the SEC. Thus, the SEC would not adjust its
policies unless there were political benefits to be captured by politicians in
Congress 24
8.3 The Uncertainty over the Disclosure Rule and the Problem of
Misappropriation
8.3.1 The Evolution of the Modern Legal Doctrine
Contemporary developments in insider trading law are set out in this section.
The US policy history can be divided into two periods: the 1960-1980 era
during which the SEC's policies were generally reactive, and the post 1980
policy era in which the Congress and SEC pursued a new regulatory strategy
designed to promote the long-term interests of market professionals. The
activation of the obligation to disclose by means of civil actions brought by
the SEC, as well as major criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice,
began in the late 1970s. This resulted from major changes in financial
markets. In particular, the opening up of trading in share futures substantially
increased the potential value of privileged information, since very little capital
outlay was needed to take a position on the possibility of a price movement.
Options markets are extremely sensitive to takeover rumours, making them
especially attractive to insider trading in the 1980s. 26 At the same time, the
financial boom, creating much greater competition, led to major institutional
changes and the arrival of large numbers of newcomers both as employees and
major traders.
These changes destabilized the previous regulatory regime which had been
based on understandings among the leaders of the major financial institutions
and professional firms. While the vast bulk of cases initiated were resolved
by out-of-court settlements, some key actions were litigated to conclusion,
exploring the ambiguities and limits of legal rules. The basis for more active
24 See, Barry Weingast, 'The Congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent
perspective (with application to the SEC),' Public Choice vol. 44, 1984, 147, 165-179.
The SEC brought fewer than fifty actions in the period between 1949-1977, but
seventy-seven cases between 1982 and 1985. The first criminal prosecution was brought
in 1980, after which about forty percent of cases were criminal in nature. John Naylor, 'The
Use of criminal sanctions by US and UK authorities for insider trading: how can the two
systems learn from each other?' Company Lawyer vol. 11, 1989, p.83.
26 See, Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A. Groskaufmanis, 'A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider
Trading in Non-Equity Securities,' Business Lawyer vol. 49, 1993, p. 187, 192-95.
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enforcement had been laid in the early 1960s, when William Cary, as Chair-
man of the SEC, supported the deployment of the 'fiduciary duty' concept to
establish an obligation on corporate insiders to 'disclose or abstain' from
trading. The SEC's reasoning was that there was a duty to disclose material
information obtained by company executives, employees and others, since
information is obtained in the course of their work which should be to the
benefit of the general public. 27 This still left very open the extent of the
prohibition on the exploitation of such an informational advantage. While the
more specific rules governing disclosure of share ownership and trading by
executives might be too narrow and easily avoidable, a broader rule dealing
with privileged information could strike at the heart of the quest for
informational advantages which provides an important dynamic for the mar-
kets.
Despite considerable doctrinal debate and some major litigation during the
1 980s, including several landmark Supreme Court cases, there remained a lack
of clarity both in the formulation of and in the rationale behind the insider
trading rule. 28 In Chiarella v. United States (1980), the Supreme Court intro-
duced a modern approach to the theory of insider trading. The Court accepted
that equal access of information between trading parties could not be the aim.
The majority in Chiarella determined that a degree of inequality in market
information did not constitute fraudulent activity under section 10(b).29
8.3.2 The SEC's 1980s National Enforcement Programme
The transformation of the 1930s regulatory framework had occurred slowly
at first but quickened as a result of financial market scandals in the 1960s and
the increased competition for rents among the diverse groups of interests within
the market. In the 1980s, within the framework of the loose and developing
doctrinal rules, the SEC conducted a process of stepped up criminal investiga-
tion, litigation, and strategic bargaining with the major Wall Street houses,
mediated by the various groups of lawyers involved. The Chiarella decision
had, however, scaled back the liability of those responsible for inside tip-offs,
undermining some of the SEC's regulatory instruments. The upshot of the
Supreme Court's decision was that, after Chiarella, the SEC's policy instru-
27 See Michael Dooley, 'Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions,' Virginia Law
Review vol. 66, 1980, pp.42-3; Jonathan Macey, 'From Fairness to Contract: The New
Direction of Rules Against Insider Trading,' Hofstra Law Review vol. 13, 1984, p.19.
28 Pitt and Hardison, 'Games without Frontiers: Trends in the International Response to
Insider Trading,' op. cit. p. 223.
29 Jonathan R. Macey, 'From Fairness to Contract: New Directions of Rules Against
Insider Trading.' Hofstra Law Review vol. 19, 1984, pp. 9, 37.
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ments were altered reasonably to protect the interests of market professionals
and expose insiders to greater monitoring and control. 3° However, while the
SEC cemented an alliance with market professionals and institutional investors
by hardening its line on insider trading, in line with prevailing Congressional
and public opinion, the SEC also found ways of satisfying other segments of
its heterodox constituency. In particular, the SEC extended its protection of
incumbent managers threatened by the 1980s takeover frenzy, which required
limiting the benefits that market makers in particular were deriving from the
takeover market in corporate equities. Let us look more closely at how this
complex situation emerged.
By the mid-i 980s, Wall Street was in the middle of an unprecedented
merger wave and a raging bull market. Corporate takeover specialists achieved
significant premiums by breaking-up the conglomerates formed during the
1 960s and 1970s. The crucial development, which transformed the market for
corporate control, was the introduction of the high yield ('junk') bonds in
1984. Junk bonds made it possible for smaller financial firms and raiders,
previously excluded from the corporate control market, to acquire large
corporations.
Distributional conflict in the markets intensified in a number of ways. First,
the premium fees that finance houses were charging for their services in
control contests created further competition between the traditional investment
banks and the new investment companies specializing in asset sales. At the
same time, the increased takeover activity led to intensified conflict between,
on the one hand, market professionals engaged in arbitrage and, on the other
hand, corporate insiders (e.g., incumbent managers of corporations) who were
the target of takeover and merger activity.
Under the growing influence of market professionals, Congress and the SEC
developed policies of increased monitoring and enforcement. The effects of
this institutional change yielded both symbolic and net regulatory benefits to
market professionals, securities analysts, and institutional investors. 3 ' The
SEC's successes in prosecuting insiders who violated the securities laws was
instrumental in establishing a new and stable regulatory regime based on
greater bureaucratization and juridification: the 'increasing codification of
rules, a more prominent role for formally constituted organizations, both public
and private; and growing penetration of law into the regulatory system' •32
3° David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey, 'Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model with Application to Insider Trading Regulation,' J. Law and Economics vol. 30,
1987, p. 311, 316-17.
' H. Seyhun, 'The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Sanctions,' Journal of Law and
Economics vol. 35, 1992, p. 149.
32 Michael Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Industry (London: MacMillan,
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Thus, in gaps left by the indeterminacy of the general rules against insider
trading were inserted detailed codes of practice, patrolled by corporate compli-
ance officers, who cultivated a close relationship with the official regulators.
Naturally, the prime task of compliance officers is to ensure that no harm
comes to the institutions, and to minimize the number of individuals who may
have to be sacrificed. The major financial institutions and market professionals
in general terms have an interest in safeguarding their investments in more
regularized processes of access to unique information, and in discrediting the
more unorthodox channels used by a certain group of 'insiders.' The regula-
tions now gave them an additional incentive for compliance officers to turn
in their own offenders.
However, the SEC was not only sensitive to the demands of market pro-
fessionals and institutional investors. The agency manipulated the new regime
to cater to a section of its corporate management constituency. These were all
potential 'insiders' targeted by the new regime, but their main worry had
become the takeover surge caused by corporate raiders (likewise 'insiders')
and the new Wall Street players. The SEC therefore also acted to increase the
cost of the takeover activities of these new maverick dealers, thus separating
the new firms from the Wall Street establishment and constraining a significant
element of the favoured market professionals constituency. Ostensibly in order
to overcome the enforcement problem exposed by Chiarella, the SEC adopted
Rule 14e-3, which imposes a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on any
person obtaining inside information about a corporate tender offer. This rule
was in fact designed to shield incumbent managers who were threatened by
takeover bids and subsequent job loss. It did this by creating a cost barrier for
corporate raiders and prevented their upstart financial intermediaries from
using inside information to encourage takeover activity. Rule 14e-3 was
therefore an effective tool in limiting the challenge to corporate insiders from
market professionals, particularly those of the latter involved in the heating
up the takeover market.
In this way the SEC, despite Congressional intent to support market pro-
fessionals, continued to respond to multi-interest group demands for regulation.
This suggests that there will be collusion between the national regulator and
its heterogeneous constituency, and the subtleties of the supply-side of regula-
tion are important for understanding the nature of the legal regime. Using its
informational advantage over Congress, the regulator pursued a course of
conduct which supported the diverse interest groups associated with the agency
in the sense that it succeeded in shielding select corporate insiders from further
challenges by market professionals, despite clearly revealed inefficiencies of
1991) p. 13.
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the new regime in controlling insider trading.33
8.4 The Internationalization of Financial Markets and the Emergence
of Co-operation in the Regulation of Insider Trading
8.4.1 The Internationalization of Capital Markets
So far we have discussed the legal regulation of insider trading in relation to
its purpose and to the distributional consequences of the regulatory process.
In the public choice model, we found that regulators were inclined to respond
to producer groups which have achieved a dominant position in the political
market for influence. In this section, we examine how the internationalization
of capital markets poses fundamental problems for national regulators like the
SEC. There are strong domestic pressures on them to pursue national regula-
tory policy preferences in an increasingly international market. The problem
regulators face is that unilateral policies, because of their distributional conse-
quences, will prove ineffectual in the context of the international market.
Market actors adversely affected by unilateral policies can alter the location
of their trades, all of which necessitates co-operation among regulators. The
main question is whether national governments can achieve their domestic aims
when the distributional benefits of international co-operation are unequally
spread. In this section, I shall examine the essential features of the recent
transformations of international capital markets, the relationship between
market changes and market participants, and how the existence of a partially
integrated international market alters the ability of governments to pursue
domestic policy goals concerning insider trading.
A review of market practices in the 1 980s shows that deregulation and the
increased competition of market participants for market share were the factors
primarily responsible for the changed institutional environment of national
capital markets. In my view, these factors were an incentive for firms to
introduce a range of new financial products, which created a new level of risk
in the market. These products depended on technical innovations which
actually avoided regulation and obtained greater cost savings for consumers.
To be sure, the rapid diffusion of these techniques was built on the successes
of the futures markets, which were established in the l970s.
A potential increase in market share stimulated Wall Street firms develop
Seyhun, op cit. at p. 149, notes that in the post-Chiarella period, the SEC increased
enforcement and increased sanctions. Ironically, this study goes on to demonstrate that
despite the increased enforcement and sanctions by the SEC, there was actually increased
volume in insider trading during the 1980s.
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these new 'derivative' products. Given the high volatility of exchange rates,
interest rates and commodity rates, corporations demanded new financial
contracts to manage the new level of risk in the firm. Short-term and long-term
instruments were used by management to attenuate independent shocks. In
turn, the new financial contracts were more sensitive to current cost conditions
and offered corporations and investors alike a low cost means to hedge against
increased volatility. Unlike conventional debt instruments, the new financial
products first made it possible to unbundle and reallocate the risk away from
investors to parties better able to bear the risk. Secondly, under certain condi-
tions, the new instruments also permitted managers to manipulate the firm's
income stream and the flow of the residual gains to investors. We can easily
distinguish these two forms of behaviour. What should be clear is that the new
pattern of market practice, reflected by the emergence of swaps, exchange
traded options, stock market futures and other hybrid debt instruments, stepped
up the competition among financial intermediaries, and eroded the traditional
role of banks as suppliers of finance for large corporations.34
The growth of the Eurobond transactions is yet another example of a
securities market eroding the position of banks as lenders to corporations.35
The international markets for debt and equity expanded several fold during the
1980s. Their importance can be measured in terms of the significant growth
of new issuances. 36 In addition to the emergence of international securities
markets, there has been a substantial increase in cross border trade in equities.
Since the beginning of the 1 990s, cross border trade has constituted ten percent
or more of all equity trading in Europe. 37 Most studies suggest that the inter-
national integration of markets is likely to continue apace well into the next
century. Already, many large exchanges have already entered into agreements
in which an overseas exchange is permitted to trade futures, options and other
securities within its borders. These inter-market linkages have introduced a
Despite loss in market share, banks have continued to play a significant role in the loan
market and have increasingly encroached on the domain of securities firms.
Cohn Mayer and Xavier Vives, 'Introduction,' in Mayer and Vives, (eds.), Capital
Markets and Financial Intermediation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 7.
For example, the global bond market, between 1980 and 1986, increased several fold,
from $38.3 billion to $225.4 billion. Charles Baltic, 'The Next Step in Insider Trading
Regulation: International Cooperative Efforts in the Global Securities Market,' Law and
Policy in International Business vol. 23, p. 167, 169-170 (1991-2). In terms of US securities
purchased and sold from abroad, the volume increased from $25.6 billion, in 1977, to
$481.9 billion in 1987. Harvey L. Pitt and David B. Hardison, 'Games without Frontiers:
Trends in the International Response to Insider Trading,' O Cit. at p. 202 n.14.
William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, 'Globalization and the regulation
of securities markets,' Journal of European Public Policy vol. 2, no. 3., 1995, p. 488,495.
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new level of competition among the exchanges which could result in further
restructuring of the industry.
Another indication of globalization can be found if we look at firm level
activity. Note that an increasing number of American, European and Japanese
investment firms now trade in both emerging and established international
markets. In order to produce higher returns to shareholders, American firms,
since the 1980s, have expanded into European and Asian markets in order to
service their clients and expand their market share. Such large firms as Merrill
Lynch and Goldman Sachs have participated in the waves of privatizations of
state companies in England, Eastern Europe, and South America which
stimulated the deepening of the globalization of securities markets.
Accompanying the internationalization of the world's capital markets has
been the increase in concentrated institutional ownership. Concentrated share-
holding by institutional investors is a significant factor in the transformation
of the large equity markets. 38 When institutional investors made significant
investments in financial information gathering and monitoring, combined with
the development of a network of monitoring by fund managers, the institutional
investor community obtained increased leverage against corporate managers
and boards. Institutions constitute the largest segment of share trading in
Europe and the United States. These shareholders are increasingly demanding
transparent markets and stricter enforcement of insider trading regulation. This
chapter will now argue that the persistence of an uneven international playing
field emphasizes most regulators' preference for domestic interests as opposed
to global need, and the ability of politicians to insulate themselves from global
influences.
8.4.2 The Regulation of International Securities Markets
The globalization of securities markets and economic interdependence has
therefore introduced a new level of complexity which has made it increasingly
difficult for national regulators to pursue traditional forms of regulation based
on unilateral policies. Governments have looked to a range of co-operative
alternatives to pursue their objectives. In this section, first I review the SEC's
movement away from a unilateral strategy to a co-operative approach based
on the bi-lateral treaty mechanism. Second, I argue that a networked system
of bi-lateral treaties gives us instructive example of institutional agenda-setting.
I question whether the bureaucratic-professional structure is adequate to
38 William W. Bratton and Joseph McCahery, 'Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation,' North Carolina Law Review vol 73, no. 5 (June
1995) p. 1903-25.
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articulate a new set of international regulatory standards on insider trading.
Until the mid-1980s, the SEC followed a unilateral strategy of pursuing its
domestic regulatory interests. Despite the considerable resources dedicated to
the enforcement of international insider trading cases, this strategy failed for
several reasons. First, very few countries had a history of regulating insider
trading violations and trading could migrate to those jurisdictions. Other things
being equal, the SEC found it difficult to rely on its national securities frame-
work to force other governments less dependent upon capital markets, to alter
their policy preferences. That fact is that these governments had very little to
gain by developing new institutional arrangements which might have a distribu-
tional impact on domestic interest groups. Thus, not only was the SEC in a
very weak bargaining position, it seems that the only thing left for it to do was
to attempt to influence those governments already committed to similar stan-
dards to sign treaties or pressurize smaller states into agreements. These
considerations, along with increased pressure from domestic groups to get
results, led the SEC to abandon its unilateral efforts to extend US jurisdiction
and securities laws to other national jurisdictions.
The next step involved an attempt by the SEC to build a broader policy
coalition by negotiating a wide range of bi-lateral treaties with national regula-
tory agencies. As with its earlier unilateral approach, the SEC formulated its
international strategy based on the constellation of domestic interest groups
(i.e., market professionals and institutional investors) concerned to ensure
fairness and accuracy in capital markets. The SEC followed a two-prong
strategy. First, it invested considerable agency resources in the monitoring,
investigation, and prosecution of insider trading cases perpetrated by off-shore
(particularly foreign) traders in US securities listed on American exchanges.
While the SEC achieved some gains, it continued to be frustrated in its
enforcement efforts. 39 Second, the agency sought information sharing and
regulatory co-operation through the use of Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) and other law enforcement treaties, e.g., mutual assistance treaties.4°
Extension of US jurisdiction and foreign discovery rules was unsuccessful, but notwith-
standing the problem of sovereignty there was further complexity. Regulatory co-operation
has its own distributional costs and benefits as foreign regulators have their own vested
interests and contrasting systems of control.
° Unsurprisingly, the attempts by national securities regulators to design a co-operative
policy-making mechanism have occurred only recently. Coleman and Underhill explain that
it was the combination of industry group pressures and the regulatory deficits of national
regulators which led to the formation of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) in 1984. See Coleman and Underhill, 'Globalization, Regionaliz-
ation, and the regulation of Securities Markets, op. cit. p. 504, and chapter one in this
volume. In regards to the insider trading issue, IOSCO's Technical Committee has endorsed
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The MOU is a bilateral treaty designed to provide extra-jurisdictional informa-
tion related to market oversight and prosecution (see also chapter one in this
volume, section on IOSCO). The bilateral treaty mechanism is a crucial
component in the SEC's strategy for limited harmonization of the regulation
of international securities markets. Policy pushed through treaties is attractive
to the SEC because it creates a reasonably effective structure of bureaucratic-
administrative bargaining and negotiation without requiring legislative changes
on the part of foreign agencies. While the bilateral treaty mechanism was slow
to gain influence, the SEC was later to achieve, in the late 1980s and early
1 990s, considerable success in developing a network of relationships among
national administrators. In fact the success of the MOU, along with other
interests, led the SEC in 1989 to propose a resolution encouraging the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions ('IOSCO') members to promote
information sharing through the negotiation of MOUs. The Technical Commit-
tee of IOSCO adopted the MOU process. 4 ' Porter has argued that the MOU
can be viewed as a success if we look to its importance in developing a set of
harmonized principles within IOSCO in modifying certain national govern-
ment's securities regulations.42
Much current public policy analysis understands bi-lateral bargaining (or
coordination) as the most basic alternative to a unilateral policy approach.
Coordination problems are seen as relatively easy to resolve. However, it is
difficult to understand the emergence of more thorough-going co-operation
without reference to the distributional considerations associated with a negoti-
ated agreement. Conflicts over the distribution of costs and benefits between
the parties themselves, as well as in relation to their constituencies, usually
determines whether an agreement will be reached. It should be clear from these
brief remarks that the main problem for the SEC was how to induce foreign
regulators to act in accordance with the US interest concerning fairness to
traders generally and price accuracy in capital markets. In order for a co-
operative agreement to be effective there must emerge a set of shared regula-
tory norms and standards which provide the basis for forming expectations in
the market. Norms are understood to be effective in that they limit self-inter-
ested behaviour.
It is not obvious that a system of bi-lateral agreements, even institutionalized
through IOSCO, could alone provide an adequate basis for producing binding
international norms, particularly where there are powerful groups with differ-
the SEC's strategy of LOSCO members executing information sharing arrangements.
' Tony Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1993) p. 114-5.
42 Ibid., p. 116.
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ent preferences. That is, it is not safe to assume co-operation will emerge
unless norms are agreed upon in advance. But, it is difficult for these norms
to emerge unless there exist high powered incentives or other commitment
mechanisms to deter the potential opportunist. A multilateral organization like
IOSCO could promote co-operation among its members. However we must
be realistic about the capacity of multilateral organizations to create public
goods for their members. This is not to deny the possibility that the organiz-
ation may help define policy-makers' preferences at the national level of
regulatory policy-making process. The communicative attributes of these
international organizations could hold some value, to the extent that they can
pool information which can be used to help open up the regulatory agenda.
There are other, more basic questions which arise regarding the limits of
the MOU approach. The SEC is limited in that its extra-jurisdictional investiga-
tions are structured and controlled by regulations which emerge out of the
contrasting legal and cultural context of the other signatory party. A second
problem concerns whether national governments which have only recently
passed insider trading legislation actually possess the legal and regulatory
machinery necessary to monitor and regulate complex international trading
violations. Thus, while the we should expect the SEC to continue to pursue
its MOU policy, one cannot expect this arrangement to offer an adequate basis
for establishing a set of coherent international securities standards unless the
constellation of industry interests are carefully balanced in the decision-making
process.
At any rate, this discussion illustrates that bi-lateral agreements constitute
but one limited form of policy coordination. Given that coordination can be
redistributional, it matters which mechanism of coordination is selected. This
suggests that any attempt to achieve coordination depends on a set of institu-
tional arrangements which enhances bargaining, and forces governments to
compromise and permits the settling of distributional conflicts amongst the
relevant interest groups in the market. We now turn to EU's recent attempt
to achieve coordination of policy in a multi-level system, simultaneously
explaining how the US concern with insider trading appears to have crossed
the Atlantic, facilitating international co-operation.
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8.5 The Harmonization of European Insider Trading Regulation and
International Co-operation
8.5.1 Recent Institutional Changes within European Financial Markets
In this section, I look at the impact of internationally-driven changes in the
capital markets on European financial markets, and at the distributional impact
of the policy changes emanating from the EU. I will also discuss the general
features of the new Directive on insider trading in the EU and the conse-
quences it is likely to have on market players. EU developments have facili-
tated co-operation with the US, but I conclude that the emerging set of appar-
ently harmonized international insider trading standards may not effectively
transform the different national regulatory arrangements unless there is effec-
tive enforcement of the EU minimum standards. Given the incomplete system
of national enforcement, there is a risk that certain national interest groups may
prefer and obtain a different level of regulatory control through lax enforce-
ment. It is not surprising that the effective harmonization of national standards,
as with other forms of international co-operation, requires a high degree of
collaboration among states in order to achieve equivalent regulatory outcomes.
We must remind ourselves that because successful policy harmonization limits
negative externalities, domestic interests must place pressure on their govern-
ments if they are to capture the benefit and avoid the regressive opportunism
of other governments.
European markets are not as competitive as US and UK stock markets. In
large part, European equity markets are undercapitalized compared with the
US market. What explains the difference between the US and other countries?
Some authors, such as Allen, have observed that companies raise a higher
proportion of funds in the debt and equity markets in the US 'D Another
reason for the difference is that European banks provide substantial direct
finance to corporations. In a bank-dominated system, intermediaries typically
develop long-term institutional lending strategies. In Germany, for example,
large banks have significant influence on the largest corporations. The
reason for this difference may be historical. That is, German banks in the 19th
century supplied the much-needed long term capital to German firms. The
relationship-oriented system leaves the monitoring and control functions to the
° See, Franklin Allen, 'Stock Markets and resource allocation,' in Cohn Mayer and
Xavier Vives, (eds.) Capital Markets and financial intermediation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) p. 83 (citing A. Frankel and J. Montgomery, 'Financial Structure:
an international perspective,' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1991) p. 257-3 10).
Theodor Baums, 'Banks and Corporate Control in Germany,' in J. McCahery et ah.
(eds.), Corporate Control andAccountability, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) pp. 267-87.
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banks and other large shareholders. It has been argued that German banks have
been instrumental in enhancing industry cartelization. 45 As a consequence,
northern European countries, committed to this approach to investment and
finance, do not rely on the equity market to raise capital or to discipline and
control managers. These factors, along with persistence of privately held firms,
has meant that European share dealing is less well-developed.
The most basic change brought about by the internationalization of capital
markets in Europe has been the entry of new competition into the market. In
certain countries, like France, Britain, and now Germany, the barriers to entry
have been removed through a series of large scale reforms both at the national
and EU level. The demand of corporate clients for greater sources of finance
caused European governments to modernize their public and professional
authorities and, most crucially, market organizations (i.e., listing procedures,
clearance and settlement, etc.). Another related reason which explains the
transformations taking place in the European markets concerns the implications
of increased competition between finance centres in Europe. National govern-
ments understand that there is a competitive imperative to develop their own
exchanges or group of exchanges. In a sense, European governments are
supporting the interests of those market players which can benefit from the
increased competition and the reduction in the level of regulatory costs associ-
ated with taxation, disclosure, and other transaction costs. Thus, the policy to
remove protectionist legislation, influenced by the changes in the international
setting, will continue to influence and structure the socio-economic conditions
which increasingly favour a stock market regime as the basis for raising
investment capital. Indeed, and crucially for this chapter, to the extent that
European companies have turned to the stock market for finance they have
been introduced to pressures from foreign investors to produce accurate and
timely information and to limit insider trading by corporate insiders.
What is clear is that these reforms have yielded a number of benefits for
investors. First, the private and public innovations have increased trading
efficiency. For example, the new level of transparency ensures that information
is effectively disclosed to investors. This means that the investor, when
considering whether to purchase shares, will be able to predict more accurately
the future value of the investment based on the information possessed and the
observation of share prices. The prospect of a flow of share price information
thus enhances the efficiency characteristics of the market for foreign investors.
Second, the deregulation of share listing requirements and the introduction of
share listings abroad, motivated by the need to obtain greater sources of
See Alexander Gerschenkron Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1962).
MARKET REGULATION AND PARTICULARISTIC INTERESTS 	 377
finance, has allowed institutional investors to take advantage of the differences
among markets. In contrast, the losers in the competitive struggle have
attempted to influence the distributional costs by pressuring national govern-
ments to adopt lax domestic standards in the case of insider trading, or to
undermine the policy goals of the EU through delays in implementation of the
policy changes. Changes in the EU insider trading regime have once again
highlighted the role of interest groups and distributional conflict.
8.5.2 The EU Measures against Insider Trading
I will now focus on the EU policy on insider trading. Like the US approach,
an important component of the EU reform process is concerned with the
protection of investor confidence. Until recently, European equity markets
were not been concerned with the principle of fairness between investors. At
most, governments considered the practice merely unethical behaviour. This
approach resulted in costs. It is thought that the presence of informed insiders
contributed to the thin capitalization of these markets and the absence of
outside investors from these markets.
Another reason for the underdevelopment of the European equity markets
was the strength of banks in supplying investment capital to firms. It is clear
that the European bank-oriented strategy of investment, unlike the stock market
system, permitted banks and corporate insiders an informational advantage over
outsiders when trading in company shares. The right to trade on inside infor-
mation tended to increase the banks' and corporate insiders' trading returns
and leads to opportunism with a negative impact on stock exchange business.
Hence, the introduction of insider trading reforms at the European level
challenged the broad coalition of interested parties which previously benefited
from the old system of regulatory standards. The question arises as to how any
insider trading prohibitions became accepted in the first place, let alone
rapprochement with the SEC in the US.
The EU's liberalization program is based on a pattern of policy-making with
an impact on both domestic and EU level interests. The EU is not a unitary
structure but must maintain a multi-level playing field in its single market.46
In this respect, the success of further integration depends upon the coordination
of policy for the reduction of negative externalities. Early EU efforts to
achieve coordination through the imposition of across-the-board harmonization
failed because they created unworkable complexities and did not focus on what
really mattered to further market integration. 47 In 1985, the EU recognized
Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Community and autonomy: multi-Level policy-making in the
European Union,' Journal of European Public Policy vol. 1, no. 2, Autumn 1994 p. 1350.
See William Bratton, Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto, Cohn Scott, 'Introduction:
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the need to adopt a more efficient process for the achievement of regulatory
goals. To this end, the Commission limited its harmonization efforts to the
essential minimum requirements, which allowed a high degree of diversity
among national rule. The new approach involved the introduction of the
principle of mutual recognition, developed by the European Court of Justice
in the Cassis de DUon (1979) case, a measure designed to allow member states
to maintain its own rules so long as they are substantially equivalent with
Community regulation.
It is argued that the EU regulatory process is different from other interna-
tional organizations in two important respects. The main reason for this claim
is the observation that member states effectively pooi their national sovereignty
through qualified majority voting and delegate their sovereign powers to EU
agencies. 48 The general conclusion is that this complex decision-making
process allows for effective (and less costly) decision-making in that introduces
a credible mechanism for states to establish institutional compromises. Let us
turn to the EU measures designed to regulate insider trading.
The EU enacted the Directive on Insider Trading on 13 November 1 989.
The Directive stated that the aim of the regulation was to guarantee investor
confidence by ensuring equal market opportunities for all investors. The
Council of Ministers passed a unified Directive on the grounds that the har-
monized provisions would eliminate conflict between certain countries and
provide the basis for co-operation and enhanced enforcement. Like US law,
the directive is concerned with the public disclosure of information that would
have a significant effect on market-sensitive information. 50 The Directive is
concerned with price accuracy and fairness among traders. The Directive was
welcomed by most member states although Germany, due to domestic pres-
sures from the large banks which stood to lose, delayed implementing the EU
Directive until mid- 1994.' Inside information was defined as information
Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution,' in William W. Bratton et al. (eds.),
International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Clarendon Press, 1996).
Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach,' Journal of Convnon Market Studies vol. 31, no. 4, 1993,
p. 473, 509.
Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider
trading, Official Journal of the European Communities (hereafter OJ), L334/30, 1989. For
an excellent analysis of the Directive see, Klaus J. Hopt, 'The Insider Dealing Directive,'
Common Market Law Review vol. 27, 1990, p.51.
5° OJ L 334/30 1989, Art 1 (1).
51 Daniel James Standen, 'Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for
Cold Winds of Change,' Harvard International Law Journal vol 36, no. 1, Winter 1995,
p. 177. Indeed it would appear that the passage of The Federal Securities Trading Act in
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which 'has not been made public.' This expression is designed to facilitate the
release of information to the public.
An important feature of the Directive is that it ignores the fiduciary relation-
ship between insider and firm and imposes liability on the traders who possess
inside information if they fall within one of the definitions provided in Article
2 of the directive. Article 2 distinguishes between primary and secondary
insiders. Under the Directive, a primary insider includes corporate insiders
who obtain information by virtue of their position in the firm, as shareholders
of the company, and as persons who obtain information 'by virtue of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties. ' Interestingly, based on
this clause, it would also appear that an employee could be treated as an
insider if he/she comes in contact with the information through the employment
relationship. This clause is interesting because it provides that nonconventional
insiders, such as the printer in Chiarella, would be liable by virtue of obtaining
inside information in the exercise of their employment.53
The Directive also provides that secondary insiders, i.e., those who receive
a tip-off, are prohibited from trading on inside information. Secondary insiders
obtain information from the primary insider ('tipper'). The Directive does not
require that the 'tippee' obtain the information through the course of employ-
ment. Despite the difference between primary and secondary insiders, it is
clear that both classes are restricted from the use of non-public information
in the purchase or sale of transferable securities. The Directive further provides
that the information must be specific (i.e., it must be price sensitive). Like US
law, insiders are liable only if they were aware of what they were doing at the
time.
Primary insiders are also subject to a 'tipping prohibition.' That is Article
3 states that insiders are prohibited from disclosing insider information to third
parties. It further provides that insiders shall not recommend stocks that could
make a profit or acquire shares for the benefit of third parties based on inside
information. However, it seems that the Directive permits the practical handl-
ing of inside information between market professionals and their clients. In
article 4 of the Directive, 'tippees' are not treated the same way as primary
insiders. That is, tippees are not permitted to trade based on inside information
but they are allowed to pass on information. 54 This section of the Directive
Germany, in 1994, has so far done little to alter the trading practices of insiders. Financial
Times, Financial Regulation Report December 1995, p. 22-3.
52 OJ, L 334/30 1989, Art 2(3).
Paul L. Davies, 'The European Community's Directive on Insider Dealing: From
Company Law to Securities Markets Regulation?' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies vol. 11,
no. 1, 1991, p. 92, 102.
See Klaus Hopt, 'The European Insider Dealing Directive, op. cit. p. 70-2.
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is thought to be incoherent.
While the EU monitors the implementation of Directives into national law,
Directives are primarily enforced by the member states. Member states make
regulatory decisions within their different institutional frameworks. 55 Article
8 of the Directive states that member states are required to identify the regula-
tory agency designed to perform the task of enforcement and provide this body
with the resources necessary to ensure the proper exercise of their functions.
This institutional design could lead to lax enforcement particularly where the
governments have an incentive to minimize the goals of the Directive. In order
for this kind of decentralized enforcement to be effective it depends on trans-
parency of other member states' regulations and the effects of those policies.
The lack of transparency and substantially equivalent sanctions could under-
mine the necessary level of trust required for the mutual recognition framework
to function effectively. I would argue that the mutual recognition approach to
co-operative regulatory control is unlikely to be effective unless member states
pursue similar policy interests.
If the approach is to be effective, then the respective domestic constellation
of interests in member states must develop shared norms and convergent policy
preferences. There is little evidence of such developments at present, as
illustrated by the slow pace of market reform in a number of EU countries.
Indeed, a large number of member states have so far failed to comply with
other securities directives, such as the Investment Services Directive, emanat-
ing from the EU, let alone establish the expertise in agencies capable of
monitoring and enforcing insider trading practices in complex securities and
securities-related markets. Very differential levels of enforcement are likely
to prevail, conveniently alleviating the distributional conflict among domestic
interest groups in their respective markets.56
Of course this makes it even less likely that there will be a successful
convergence of EU and US norms on insider trading. Domestic dynamics,
In view of the discretion left in Article 8 to member states in designating the admin-
istrative authority or authorities competent and determining the appropriate penalties (Article
10), these provisions are clearly not directly effective, hence ruling out the kind of decentra-
lized enforcement made possible by direct reliance on EU Directives in national legal pro-
ceedings. See Deidre Curtin, 'Directives-the Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individ-
ual Rights,' Common Market Law Review vol. 27, 1990, p. 708.
It should be noted, however, that the European Court of Justice, in Von Colson and
Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Wesfa1en [1984] ECR 1891, held that even in cases where
member states appeared to enjoy considerable discretion in the choice of sanctions in cases
of non-compliance, as a minimum standard the sanctions should be effective as a deterrent.
Nonetheless, it will take time before legal challenges bring about effective harmonisation
of enforcement standards.
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despite globalization, still have a prevailing impact on insider trading regimes.
Long run convergences cannot be ruled out, but that will require the effective
resolution of distributional conflict in national regulatory contexts. What is
likely in the medium term at least is the continuation of apparent convergence
around US style norms, but the prevalence of highly differentiated enforcement
standards among EU member states and between them and the US, reflecting
the contrasting nature of interest group competition among competing jurisdic-
tions.
8.6 Conclusion
The basic objective of this article has been to explore the role of domestic
pressure groups in the dynamic process of insider trading regulation in the
USA and Europe. I have attempted to integrate public choice theory with a
historically informed analysis of the social-institutional selling of insider
trading regulation. I have focused on the conflicts between market
professionals and corporate insiders and shown how regulators preferences will
be shaped by both supply side and demand side considerations of the regulatory
equation. This suggests that the dynamics of regulation depend on the strategic
relationship between regulated interest groups, the national regulator, and
political incumbents. Intensified competition for economic and regulatory rents
often leads to doctrinal indeterminacy in defining regulatory norms. In the
European context, which is underdeveloped, we noted that the potential
benefits from increasing insider trading regulation may be discounted through
lax enforcement. Given the intense and ongoing transformation in these
national markets, we can expect that the level of regulatory enforcement of
insider trading will be uneven. This will fuel ongoing conflict with US author-
ities despite the apparent convergence of legislation.
CHAPTER 9
MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTWES
ON PUBLIC LAW i BRITISH CRITICAL
LEGAL STUIIES
What does it mean to be 'critical' today? Inevitably the question of perspective
confronts every post-Enlightment legal theorist attempting to offer a critical
vision of the legal system and its operations. Indeed, this concern is reflected
in the attitudes and practices of virtually all theorists working in legal theory
for the past fifteen years. Not surprisingly the question of theory choice has
had significant implications for theorists working within the radical legal
tradition in the United Kingdom and the United States of American and is
responsible for the disagreement and differences in theory and the way it is
practiced. The discord and conflict over understanding and representing the
law is the result of real intellectual disagreement as well as a cognitive misun-
derstanding (Schlag 1989: 1208).'
This chapter appeared in 2 Social and Legal Studies (1993).
Pierre Schlag complains that legal theorists are constantly misunderstanding one another.
It happens all the time. Dworkin's attack on American critical legal studies is an example.
Schlag thinks there are all sorts of misunderstandings that occur from different perspectives.
What is so frustrating is that we live in many different cognitive frameworks and we move
between them all the time. Schlag's point is that there is no common ground of discourse.
I am in agreement with Schlag that 'our' discussion of different discourses should not rely
on the epistemic truth of each perspective. My disagreementwith Schlag, however, concerns
his claims of non-comparability of legal discourses. In the main, his argument depends on
positing the existence of distinct cognitive frameworks (a rationalist move) and then he
denies their unity and coherence (a modernist view) in order to sustain his claim that there
is both incommensurability of the cognitive frameworks and a progression among these
frameworks (a postmodern position). I find this argument clever and suggestive but not
convincing. To hold that cognitive frameworks are incommensurate and, at the same time,
argue that there is progression in understanding the incommensturability is a species of
rhetoric rather than logic. Schlag (1989: 1250) thinks that this sort of objection is only a
problem for rationalists. I find Schlag's argument uncompelling particularly since theories
are comparable if we employ referential semantics to determine the truth content of a state-
ment (Devitt 1991: 168-172). Finally, Schlag's argument that there is an understanding of
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Theorists working within the critical legal studies (cis) tradition in Britain
have looked to either a modernist and postmodernist vision in order to develop
a critical account of the juridical subject, the regulatory state, rights, and
democracy. The hallmark of a 'critical' perspective involves a challenge to the
philosophical tradition of the Enlightment, and the liberal legal order which
is supported and sustained by Enlightment convictions, particularly its view
of rationality and human nature. Critically-minded theorists are troubled by
the optimistic vision of the Enlightment. They show that its progressive
tendencies have been undercut by its underside which has left liberal society
without philosophical and cultural reserves and a culture characterized by self-
destructiveness. Unwilling to reconstruct the optimistic vision of Enlightment
reason, modernists and postmodernists alike have substituted the language of
Enlightment concepts with a new set of references and assumptions regarding
rationality and the social system. The importance of this shift can not be
underestimated since it is common to the aspirations of the legal theorists
working on both the modernist and postmodernist sides of the street.
The reaction to liberal society and its rationality has been the formative
influence in the production of legal theory in the 1980s in Britain. Most, if not
all, of the theory produced depended on the assimilation of vocabularies which
owned their self-descriptions to either a critical perspective which accepts the
importance of democratic deliberation in creating legitimate institutions or on
discourses which decenters ego-centered reason and demonstrates that demo-
cratic institutions are the products of power.
The modernist response to liberalism and the Enlightment tradition takes the
Frankfurt School and Habermas as their starting point. These scholars employ
the concept of immanent critique and attempt to offer an internal criticism of
law and the reified features of modern society. Immanent critique has ties to
Hegelian idealism (Habermas 1984: 366). The theory of society which employs
immanent critique looks to the normative conceptions of legitimation, law,
publicity, and rights as the resources for a critique of domination. In theory,
immanent critique operates to penetrate behind the appearances of a reified
social reality so as to reveal, within the existing forms, an emergent set of
alternative possibilities which are qualitatively superior to the existing arrange-
ments. On this view, immanent critiqueis the foundation for a view of law
defined as a self-justifying autonomous region of the social which influences
the progression among the cognitive frameworks is unsatisfactory due to its implicit reliance
on an epistemic claim which has nothing to do with his semantic claim regarding
incommensurability of meaning.
MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVES 	 385
the social, cultural, and political externalities but is uninfluenced by them in
the end (Hunt 1987: 12).
The second response takes Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida as its sources of
inspiration (Murphy 1987; Goodrich 1985). These scholars reject immanent
critique and other universalistic concepts of law and jurisprudence as dogmatic
and premised on an externalization of theory (Goodrich 1990: 1-2). The
postmodernist response announces that 'the Hegelian party is over' (Murphy
1989: 135) and attempts to show that a democratic vision of society, based on
the rational properties of the self and rational deliberation, may not be poss-
ible. These scholars deny the importance of public freedom insofar as it is
manifested within the democratic legitimacy of the state. By attempting to
supplement law with discourses that have been kept outside the law, post-
modernists are attempting to break apart the closed and formal system of law
and challenge the legal theory and practices which sustains it. Postmodernist
argue that the Enlightment's claim to objectivity and rationality masks an
authoritarian and totalizing logic. Theorists favoring postmodernism embrace
difference, displacement, and the disruption of discourse. Central to the
postmodern project is the attempt to deconstruct the democratic tradition of
the Enlightment, and its legal forms, and to show how these institutions
conceal domination while appearing to offer a discursive framework for
collective regulation of society. On this view, legal and political institutions
are bureaucratic structures in which agents have very little control of the
pattern, distribution and operation of the institutions. Indeed, it is argued that
normative legal discourse itself 'is coextensive with bureaucratic practice and
institutional inertia' (Schiag 1990: 186).
In this paper I will claim that the modernist and postmodernist visions are
partial and to my mind incapable of describing the complex structures of a
modern constitutional democracy. I shall try to show that the modernist
response, which challenges the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism, and
involves a search for different foundations which ultimately rely on a morality
and communication free from domination, is, at best, problematic. That is, I
find the modernist idea of convergence too unlikely a basis for founding
democratic legitimacy. I will consider the postmodernist claim that the legal
system is built on the expression of the democratic will but rather by an absent
Other, an absent unity which is a leftover from the Enlightment. I shall try to
show that the postmodernist strategy to decenter the law and eliminating the
social is, in my view, is based on an undifferentiated concept of power. The
genealogical account of modernity, read through the lens of Nietzsche, leads
an understanding of how modern institutions constitute the identities of subjects
and shows that norms, institutions and the like are controlled by power but
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masked by democratic and liberal claims to freedom and deliberation. I think
this view is unduly one-sided in that it while it challenges the democratic
institutions which emerged from the 18th century, it ignores the associations
and autonomous relations that emerge out of the differentiated sphere of
modern civil society.
The theme of this paper is that the content and direction of both modernist and
postmodernist critiques involve a theory of society which directly challenges
the normative foundations of English law and practice. Part I looks at the
Sheffield School's criticism of the traditional view of constitutional law and
representative democracy. This vision challenges Dicey's conception of
formalism based on precedent and the the broad discretionary power of parlia-
ment. I will argue that the recentering of constitutional discourse, which brings
in the state, is only partially successful in its challenge of the formalist vision
of English cons ititutionalism. It will be argued that the Sheffield school's
reliance on modernist reforms, like public dialogue and deliberation, may not
produce greater legitimacy or a more rational government. Part II considers
the modernist-inspired challenge to adjudication in the liberal welfare state.
The early modernist attacks were heavily influenced by grand critiques of the
liberal welfare state (i.e., Unger). These theorists concentrate on legal doctrine
and its indeterminacy in order to reveal the imperfect foundations of the
decision-making sphere of the welfare state and government's authority gen-
erally. This approach is subject to internal tensions and its failure as a fully-
explanatory theory has been widely acknowledged. In this section I will also
focus on the development of a late modernist critique of state and society
which reconstructs the Enlightment institutions in terms of modern systems
theory. Exploring the development of systems theory in English public law,
I consider the effectiveness of a theory of political society in which the major
institutions are stabilized by communications and the basic norms of authority
are irrelevant to its decisions and reproduction. The strength of systems theory
is that it may accurately describe some of the current changes in the social and
political structures and provide an internal critique of the legal system and its
formalist justifications. Part III focuses upon postmodern arguments against
the language of democratic participation and the normative foundations of the
liberal state. The discussion will include an analysis of the doctrinal and
poltical arguments against the liberal model. The analysis will be directed
towards an analysis of Goodrich's recent writings which advocate a non-ethical
critique of law that gives priority to showing that law's authority is based on
structures belonging to the sacred and a vision of society in which '[l]ife is
condemned to expend, to squander itself on the other side, formlessly, sub-
terraneanly and buried from sight as refuse or waste' (Goodrich 1990:175).
It will be argued that the postmodern vision of modern political and legal
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institutions is overly narrow in that it eliminates the social and neglects the
other side of democratic institutions, i.e., associations within civil society. It
is argued that these groups serve to channel its normative claims into the
political system.
I.
9.1 The Specter of Enlightment Rationality and the Modernist
Response
Rationality, as a species of modem thought, is highly controversial and has
generated a significant body of scholarly discourse. The basic assumptions of
the rationalist discourse emerged in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, and
provided the philosophical foundations for the next two centuries of political
and legal culture. The Enlightment culture articulated a vision of a civic project
which attempted to deploy the concepts of reason, truth, and knowledge in
order to make modern political philosophy more effective in overcoming
skepticism. The liberal vision of the Enlightment was supplemented by a
scientific culture which assumed that political institutions might be made more
rational if its assumptions could be employed explain the individual's motiv-
ations and the workings of democratic institutions (Rapaczynski 1987: 8). In
this interpretation, the political philosophical project of the contractarian
tradition attempted to derive the rationality of human institutions based on a
concept of human rationality. In this respect, the struggle to develop a liberal
political tradition is closely associated with positivism in natural science
(Hobbes) and a philosophic project of refuting skepticism (Locke) (Shapiro
1990: 44). The Enlightment project of political philosophy employed an
epistemic vision in order to overcome the problem of skepticism and establish
liberal institutions based on objectivity. As a result, the Enlightment project
produced a highly ambitious project based on the production of institutions
founded on the standpoint of knowledge which is absolutely valid.
The normative ideals of the Enlightment were crucial role in justifying modem
legal and political institutions and supplying a conception of citizenship based
on rational agents freedom to choose.
In this respect, liberal theory conceived of human beings as individuals first
and then they were constituted as members of governing communities. An
individual was thought to be capable of engaging in dialogue and deliberation
regarding different goals and values and the rational self is capable of distin-
guishing between specious and truth claims. Early liberal theory combined the
normative standpoint of citizenship with the pure reflective consciousness of
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the self. On this view, subject-centered reason was understood as independent
of particular groups constituting the political community and particularistic
discourses which are subordinated to the cognitive orientations of reason
(Bridges 1991: 49). By assigning the subject both cognitive and political
authority, the Enlightment culture of rationalism affirmed ego-centered reason
as the locus of truth and reason (Schiag 1989: 1210-1213).
Liberal political institutions are based on the cognitive standpoint of the
universal and objective reasoner who was thought capable of offering justifica-
tions for those institutions based on logical foundations. The development of
liberal political institutions was founded on first principles which reflected a
particular cognitive background and vision of public life (Shapiro 1990: 208).
The task of justifying political institutions depended on a mode of rational
thought and an appeal to the optimistic aspects grounding the Enlightment
project. The essential identifying rhetoric of the Enlightment political
standpoint was its attempt to locate the substantive foundations for political and
legal institutions in a universal and neutral form of reason. Rorty (1979) has
shown that there was something amiss about the foundationalist story of the
Enlightment. That is, the foundationalist story was based on an anti-historical
account of reason which made it possible to generate consensus on the norms
guiding and justifying liberal political institutions.
The cogency of the Enlightment vision is challenged by modernists who find
the cognitive discourse of liberalism unpersuasive. Essential to this view is the
proposition that the construction of freedom and choice are the products of
historical communities and not abstract reasoning processes of disembodied
agents. The Enlightment project was committed to the individual and the notion
of community and social relations were irrelevant to the rhetoric of justifica-
tion. The modernist culture which replaced Enlightment rationalism is based
on a socialized individual which is the product of a particular historical tradi-
tion and community of judgment. In this regard, the individuals is the product
of social relations and emerges from different backgrounds, distinguished by
class, ethnic, gender, and religious orientations. As a result, preferences are
adaptive and reflect changing institutional structures, consumption patterns,
information availability, and social and cultural constraints. In short, individ-
uals are shaped and structured by the norms and customs of a particular
community (or sets of overlapping communities) and their identities are
contingent (Rorty 1989:23-43).
This vision of the subject challenges the rationalist view that individuals are
free and equal Citizens and make free choices regarding the form and content
of legal rules based on neutral and universal values. The modernist argues that
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there is an important relationship between the identities of subjects and the
social structures of diverse ethnic, religious and class-based communities.
Modernists reject the rationalist view that there is a divide between particularist
communities and the political institutions of democracy. They also reject the
divide between individual and social structure, and insist that there is no
external, objective standpoint to support the liberal ideals of freedom and
autonomous reason (Schlag 1989: 1216). Modernists reject the vision of a
neutral, liberal state grounded by the norms of the Enlightment. We shall now
turn to examine and assess a current of modernist thought as it is expressed
in the context of English public law.
9.2 Modernism and Public Law: 'Critical Public Law'
The analysis within this section will be structured in the following manner.
First, we shall examine the modernist critique of the public law framework
developed by Tony Prosser. This inquiry will be divided into two parts. In the
first part, we will discuss the role of the state and its importance for challeng-
ing the formalist conception of public law. There will also be a discussion of
Prosser's broader criticisms of public law and his endorsement of Habermas'
theory of communicative action as a basis for a redefined public tradition. In
the second part, the cogency of Prosser's proposal will be considered.
The modernist picture of public law, as developed in England by the Tony
Prosser and the Sheffield School of public law, attempts to offer a theory of
political legitimation based on the potential moral content of the properties of
positive law. Following the insights of the Frankfurt School, particularly the
early work of Habermas, the Sheffield theorists employ an inimanent critique
as a method of subjecting rival theories to internal criticism by employing their
own substantive criteria as a means to reveal errors, aporia, and conceptual
errors in reasoning. By exposing rival theories to a review of their own
conditions of production, the Sheffield theorists show that the limitations of
a particular theory and offer, as well, a normative basis for transcending the
theory. The emphasis on an appearance versus reality framework supports the
view that the concept of critique can assist the task of constructing an alterna-
tive theory, which could pave the way for a qualitatively superior social
arrangement. By resorting to a theory of communicative rationality, the
Sheffield School impliedly assume that new, more coherent, normative struc-
tures will emerge.
Prosser in the early 1980s offered a programmatic statement sketching out a
theory, of public law which accounts both for the state's actions and offers a
normative perspective by which to evaluate the actions of the state. In analyz-
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ing the tradition of English public law, Prosser (1982) points to the noticeable
absence of the state in the empiricists' planning model. Prosser's objective is
to draw in the state. Pros ser rightly argues that the positivist conception of law
is linked to the liberal state which is based on precedent and statute. Due to
changes in society, Prosser believes that we have entered a post-liberal era
which is characterized by the wide use of discretion by the executive and the
proliferation of new forms of govermnental-administrative forms. This change
is regarded by Prosser to have produced a crisis in public law. The crisis
concerns the failure of the traditional constitutional-administrative model to
adapt itself to the new forms of state action and regulation without the intro-
duction of fragmentation and indeterminacy at the level of doctrine.
For Pros ser, the formalist model of Dicey was insufficiently flexible to address
itself to the changed nature of the state. The concept of the interventionist state
must be theorized in order for public law theorists to adequately explain the
changed nature of state/society relations. This is an important issue now that
state action is based on administrative discretion. The problem of discretion
introduces us to the problem main problem which concerns the Sheffield
School, the problem of public accountability and the legitimacy of state action.
The implication is that if there are few rules to serve as a restraint on state
action the democratic process will have been usurped by the state which is not
accountable to parliament or the public. Graham and Prosser (1991) have
attempted to illustrate this point in the context of the privatization process in
Britain. They argue that the comparative success of the British government's
privatization program is the result of the use of a broad range of legal forms
which operate free from judicial review and constitutional supervision. It was
the exercise of 'dominium' power which was a crucial factor in the successful
disposal of state assets (Craig 1990: 189).
Prosser proceeds to explore in detail the politicization of the state and the
legitimation problems that it causes. He explains that the state's two principal
functions, legitimation and accumulation, conflict with one another. The
increasing penetration of the state within the economy threatens the legitimacy
of capitalism in that it substitutes political for market criteria and in the process
delegitimates the state's neutral position vis a vis the market. To say that there
is a deficit in legitimacy of state action means that the operations of the state
no longer appear to benefit the public interest generally. Prosser offers an
alternative version of public law which provides for a new theory based on
unconstrained discourse and public accountability. The new critical public law
is founded on both a procedural and substantive basis which will secure the
implementation of public policy on a legitimate footing.
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Prosser readily admits that his proposal is informed by a set of arguments
flowing from Habermas' view of a rational society. Habermas' view of
legitimation is structured around the moral content and properties of law. For
Habermas, the source of legitimation is founded on the idea of impartiality
which forms the core of practical reasoning. An important thread running
through Habermas' thought is rational consensus which is based on the values
of free and unconstrained discussion of reasonable persons. Norms which arise
from communication secure the footings of the legal system. Habermas
believes that norms are crucial for settling impersonal conflict and realizing
political goals. The idea of legitimacy, based on legality, is established on by
the claim that morality is core of positive law. Such a conception of law is
based on the view that moral argumentation has been internalized within the
legal process. A crucial further point is the proposition that political institutions
can become accountable and operate with the principles of political legitimacy
only if there is active citizen participation and information is public and widely
available. A reformulated public law, based on the critical force of communi-
cative competence, is the theoretical framework for a critical public law.
Prosser's shift to a critical public law is founded on a modernist approach to
law. The concept of rational communication provides, as we have seen, the
central methodology for achieving legal rationality in a change world of highly
interventionistic state action. It is used to justify both the principle of demo-
cratic accountability, as a basis for state action, and the principle that norms
ground legitimacy. There are problems with the conception of public law that
emerges.
The first is that the concept of society and politics offered by Prosser, and
1-labermas, is based on a concept of subjectivity which is problematic. The
hallmark of Habermas' concept of (inter-subjectivity is based on the view that
the actual exchange of views between agents can lead to a rational consensus
and a claim to universalization if an actual agreement occurred. A fundamental
aspect of Habermas' view is argument that speakers possess the ability to
distinguish a valid claim in the context of a conversation in which the force
of the claim will be accepted by reference to the ground and support given to
arguments. For Habermas, the neutral procedure is said to draw upon the
values of general practical reasoning. Habermas' communicative structure
looks to the universality of truth claims which provides criteria for evaluating
cognitive claims. Habermas' theory of democratic legitimacy provides an
objective and rational basis which attempts to link together positive law and
social norms.
A fundamental axiom of this concept of politics is the claim that public dis-
course will create a rational foundation underlying political and legal institu-
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tions. The weakness of this view of politics has been expressed by Elster
(1983: 42) who states that 'one cannot assume that one will get closer to the
good society by acting as if one had already arrived'. The cooperative public
search for consensus may not produce consensus however. Indeed, it may be
that there are circumstances where 'arguments cannot be stated publicly in a
public setting' (Elster 1983:35). Or, even if people are confronted with the
truth, they may not be in a symmetrical position and therefore will be unable
to locate a compromise. There may, in fact, be situations in which there is no
compromise to be had. The theory of communicative action depends on the
principle that discourse is carried out with rational subjects offering a full
exchange of information. It is often the case that the disclosure of information
is partial and linked to an agent's specific interest.
It may be that rational deliberation involving the channeling of information
between the parties may not produce greater legitimacy. Parties may prefer
to be less informed (Fitts 1990: 920). Less information may even lead to more
efficient outcomes. Under the general conditions of political competition,
deliberation may not lead individuals to subordinate their private, subjective
preferences to the collective good. Another view is one that suggests the
'deliberation educates preferences and makes them more general: It leads to
the broadest agreement at a particular time. But it stops there, leaving conflicts
unresolved' (Przeworski 1991: 18). A more realistic view of democratic
politics is based on the argument that groups tend to engage in dialogue in
order to secure their own political position. This process does not lead nat-
urally to an undistorted exchange of information based on the generalized
concern to create some long-term benefits for the public good.
The second difficulty with Prosser's critical public law proposal relates to the
attempt to offer a normative theory of legitimation. Prosser endorses
Habermas' (1976: 29) view that 'every effective belief in legitimacy is assumed
to have an immanent relation to truth ... that can be tested and criticized'. This
particular theory of legitimation is based on the claim that the substantive
aspects of legitimacy are drawn from the normative structures located in civil
society. This model assumes that the political and legal institutions are capable
of limiting the negative effects of power. Here power relations are defined as
strategic and are centralized in juridified structures. Some of the difficulties
with this view have been revealed by Foucault who has encouraged us to see
that modern society is shaped by diverse power relations which involve
techniques (of normalization) that are not limited to the administrative state.
Now I do not believe that all power is localized at the micro level, I think that
it is less meaningful today to only speak of legitimation based on the juridical
system and parliament.
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Critical public law is premised on the modernist vision that the debunking
ideological claims by reference to truth will be a powerful legitimating force.
From a normative standpoint, the argument assumes that individuals are
committed to action based on reasons which are true and undistorted. It might
be that the requirement of truth is too demanding. That is, we all live in
particular communities of judgment which are constituted by speakers who
recognize the same norms of daily life. There are many different communities
which are 'overlapping' (Rawls 1987). I do not believe that conditions always
exist for overlapping communities of judgment to converge on certain norms
of agreement. Critical theory's stress on the right outcome is, of course,
context-dependent but its emphasis on normative validity as a theory of legit-
imacy implies that we have a good rationale for believing that conflict and
disagreement can be resolved by dialogue. This assumption is distinctly
modernist and difficult to accept.
9.3 Immanent Critique, Communication, and the Public Sphere
Other theorists working in the public law tradition also offered an immanent
critique of the constitutional-administrative system based on Frankfurt school
social theory. Employing the technique of immanent critique, Harden and
Lewis (1986) attempt to demonstrate that, by exposing the weaknesses and
salient features of the British constitutional system, they could identify the
structural components of a new constitutional system. The development of a
reconstructed rule of law, based on democratic deliberation and collective
learning, is linked up to the view that public participation will tend to produce
a rational and accountable state. The benefits of participation depend on
increasing the flow of information to citizens in order for them to educate their
participation. Critical evaluation of this model can best proceed by considering
the substantive legal reforms, involving administrative review reforms. I will
also evaluate Harden and Lewis's arguments for establishing a constitutional
system based on communicative rationality.
For Harden and Lewis, the foundation of a reconfigured constitutional-adminis-
trative system is based on the introduction of a variety of reforms which
operate to force legal decision-makers to consider many different points of
view. Harden and Lewis' aim is to introduce a 'hard look' doctrine as a
mechanism to promote greater government accountability. The insight here is
that the present techniques are not considered responsive to differing interests
and a hard look approach will ensure greater informational input and lead to
outcomes which are the result of careful consideration of the available alterna-
tives. It is also argued that there should be a general obligation that administra-
tive bodies give reasons for their decisions. In general, Harden and Lewis are
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concerned with generating greater access to public participation in government
decision-making. The concern for greater accountability through the introduc-
tion of structural provisions mentioned above is based on a belief that the
pathologies associated with government decision-making will be limited. We
may doubt whether the reform of the administrative system is possible given
the resources and tradition of public law in the U.S. There is no reason to
believe that the existing system, insofar as it offers a substantive test of
reasonableness, in the context of the review of agency decision-making, does
not employ reasoning similar to the kind employed by courts applying the
doctrine in the United States (Craig 1990: 184-187).
At the most basic level, Harden and Lewis attempt to employ immanent
critique to dislodge Dicey's positivist vision of public law from the English
constitutional imagination. It is hoped that the demystification of fonnalism
will expose the classic weakness of British constitutional politics. In the main,
Harden and Lewis argue that Dicey's conception of the constitutional frame-
work has failed to produce satisfactory decision-making or public
accountability over those decisions. In an apparent attempt to reverse and
restore the fortunes of the British constitutional tradition, they offer a theory
of constitutionalism which is premised on a rational political morality tied to
an ideal constitution. The belief in a reformed constitution anticipates greater
responsibility for the courts in ensuring quality control for the legislature.
Like Prosser, Harden and Lewis contend that increased governmental effective-
ness is related to the introduction of constitutional procedures which enhance
public participation and provides for greater range of input into the decision-
making procedure. The introduction of effective collective decision making
structures will, on this account, perform a vital role in transforming private
into public interest. Fostering effective participation and flexible and open
constitutional arrangements should offer the basis for promoting greater
governmental effectiveness. It is no doubt true that in a diverse, complex
society a well-functioning democracy requires limits on the powers of the
government. Rights provisions and structural limitations are important since
they restrict the government's range of permissible actions and ensure that a
deliberative sphere of public debate is protected. Harden and Lewis' reform
model is structured on a theory of communication which serves as a basis for
modernizing English constitutionalism.
Adherents of the Habermasian theory of communicative action might accept
the view that rational deliberation is essential to a well-functioning democracy.
Murphy (1989) has argued that Harden and Lewis' reliance on Habermas has
lead them to produce a highly distorted reading of the British constitutional
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tradition. He claims that consensual will formation, located exclusively in the
hierarchical political elite, was the dynamic force which developed the British
constitutional system. Murphy believes that Harden and Lewis, in developing
their reconstructive project, have isolated the most salient features in the
British constitutional tradition in order to justify their communicative model
of deliberative democracy which is allegedly immanent within the constitutional
tradition. Murphy's argument goes further. He argues that Harden and Lewis,
like Prosser, by relying on the resources of the civil society to reform the
state, tend to confuse and conflate the etatist overcomings of the reified
political system with the complexes of normative structures in the sphere of
civil society. Put another way, normative structures located in the 'life world',
such as post-conventional morality and communicative rationality, can not
easily be substituted for the political logics which control and regulate the
realm of political engagement. Murphy is skeptical of proposals that depend
upon the deliberative capacities of free and equal agents to transform the
political system. Murphy concludes that it is Harden and Lewis' reliance public
participation and accountability which is curiously self-defeating since this
strategy may paradoxically undermine the foundations of democracy.
Like Luhmann (1981; 1982; 1990) Murphy thinks that the normative dimension
of civil society is obsolete, and that the institutionalization of power allows for
the replacement of normative with cognitive expectations in the political
system. It might also be argued that Murphy (1991) has redefined the notion
of political society so as to include within the state those mediations which
were once considered part of civil society. This strategy, which reduces the
normative character of political system, means that Murphy is concerned more
with the specialized role of the political system in stabilizing expectations and
maintaining complexity rather than dealing with the highly charged domain of
pluralist politics and democratic engagement. I find Murphy's argument less
than convincing. At fault is his assumption, following Luhmann, that the
media-coordinated sub-systems must be completely reduced to the logics of
integration. Murphy's argument is based on the claim that society's differenti-
ation is an empirical proposition. There have been numerous arguments which
challenge the Luhmann's formulation of the differentiation of societal
subsystems (Cohen & Arato 1992; Haverkamp & Schmid 1987; Munch 1992:
1463). The difficulties with the autonomy of subsystems approach is that
'empirical differentiation cannot be conceived of in terms of autopoiesis,
because the autonomy of societal subsystems operating in the real world is
permanently being produced and reproduced by a multiplicity of action
elements which are both inside and outside an analytically defined subsystem
(Munch 1992: 1463).
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Harden and Lewis' vision of democracy reflects a liberal bias in favor of
public dialogue and information exchange. It is optimistic in that it repackages
liberalism by reference to normative value exchange will functions as a mech-
anism of resolving fundamental disagreement. The coherence of this modernist
story is challenged by postmodernists on other grounds. Schlag (1990: 181),
for example, states that 'it's really nice to think that we are all self-directing,
coherent, integrated, rational, ordinary selves who are engaged in rational
conversation in which we aim to resolve disagreement by resort to normative
dialogue. ... It is all very nice. It is also absolutely unbelievable'. While
proponents of the dialogic view of democracy believe that politics is something
more than the world of the struggle of special interest groups which enter the
political market in order to secure influence over govermnent behavior,
postmodernists are hard pressed to find anything more than bureaucratic
practice, domination, and repression in the name of freedom.
In the end, hopeful modernists, like the Sheffield School, believe that it is
possible to apply criteria to determine which substantive position is correct in
order to transform private preferences in rational politics. There may be actual
limits to Harden and Lewis' concern to enhance greater participation by
promoting greater access to information. The requirement of more information,
combined with reasoning giving and the consideration of more points of view,
may not, in the end, facilitate greater dispersion of power or limit govern-
mental discretion. Rather, it may be that a political system that promotes truth
finding and continual discussion will ironically reduce the amount of informa-
tion available and parties will seek to resolve their conflicts through
opportunistic means.
II.
9.4 Transforming the State: Indeterminacy and Administrative Law
So far we have concentrated upon the ways communicative action and
improved information exchange might enhance and improve the entire demo-
cratic constitutional process. We now turn to consider a slightly different
modernist approach, one which concentrates on the indeterminacy of law as
a source to generate a critique of legal rationality.
In the United States of American, early proponents of cls developed the
indeterminacy critique as a means to challenge the liberal legal orders claim
to rationality, i.e., concerning the autonomy and coherence of reason. These
theorists attempted to demonstrate that formalist abstractions are necessarily
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self-defeating and circular, and that the incoherence of doctrine could not be
patched together by appeals to morality. Liberal thought was subjected to a
vast array of modernist arguments offered to prove that law is contradictory
and that the political project of modernity is exhausted. For cls proponents,
liberal theory requires 'trashing' because it assumes that the law is basically
determinate and this fact guarantees the requirements of the rule of law. These
theorists believe that by undercutting the determinacy of law, i.e., its claim
to reason, they will, in the process, delegitimize the role of courts and reveal
that beneath surface of legal form swells the same ideological controversy
which pervades the political sphere. Like their rationalist opponents, they
believe that judges are constrained by legal forms although their decisions are
based on their ideological preference orderings. The cls critique reflects a
progressive belief that theory will assist them uncover the different forms of
domination and provide the groundwork for an alternative, progressive view
of the law (Fish 1993).
One strand of the British scholarship which emerged in the late 1 970s to mid-
1 980s was heavily influenced by the theories Unger. For over a decade and
a half, Unger has attempted a grand critique of liberalism based on a sociologi-
cally-informed theory stresses the importance on the indeterminacy of both
legal doctrine and social context. Unlike the indeterminacy critique advanced
by Kennedy, which posits an irreducible conflict between rules and standards,
Unger's theory moves from the insight that there is no constant human nature
and to the proposition that the self has the capacity to transform both the
external world and is able to perpetually transform itself. This existentialist
view of human agency is crucial to Unger' s program of radical social
empowerment, and the possibility of social transformation is based on the
capacity of the self to achieve individual self transcendence. Unger's British
followers, like Collins (1987) and Loughlin (1978), draw on his analysis of
liberal legalism. This is an analysis which states that legal doctrine is ultimate-
ly indeterminate, contradictory, and subjective. Unger's (1987) concept of
indeterminacy is based on a claim that the social structure, rather than lan-
guage, is indeterminate. That is, where there is a conflict in underlying
principles, Unger rejects the move to higher order norms or principles to
resolve conflicts. He thinks that the conflicts in doctrine reflects a deeper set
of divisions within society and it is hopeless to appeal to a higher level norms
where none exists (Collins 1987: 398).
Applying the critique of liberal legalism to administrative law, Unger argues
that public law is contradictory and indeterminate because the liberal forms
can not be maintained as a result of the transformation of the state into a
modern regulatory corporate state. It was the extension of the state into private
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domains which structured and transformed the law in that its regulatory
function involved a movement toward procedural and substantive conceptions
of justice and a particularistic interest balancing approach to adjudication.
Unger traced the transformation of the classical liberalism of the 19th century
to the super-liberalism of the early-to mid-2Oth century. Modern legal doctrine
contains individualistic and paternalistic elements and the irrationality of
modern law results from the conflict between these principles. Unger believes,
however, that an alternative vision of society can be worked out from the
implications of indeterminacy. Locating the transformative potential in some-
thing he calls "negative capability," Unger maintains that it is our capacity to
break though a specific context of action which presents the possibility for us
to reappropriate the alienated political and economic domains and, at the same
time, guarantees the possibility for personal transformation and freedom (i.e.,
changing the structures of social life presents the possibility of freedom
concretised, which makes possible the reconciliation with the self and other).
For Unger, liberal legal forms can not be maintained and justified because of
the transformation of the liberal capitalist state into a modern regulatory state.
The first instance of Unger-inspired theory appeared in the U.K. in the late
1970s in the form of Martin Loughlin's (1978) early work on procedural
fairness in the administrative state. For Loughlin, the classical model of liberal
legality is specified in terms of its capacity for autonomous action, which
guarantees that each person is treated equally before the law. There are two
propositions that follow from this insight. First, the function of law is basically
to ensure autonomy, which is seen as the free formation rather than the
implementation of preferences. Second, political power is concentrated in the
state and collective intervention as a rule is illegitimate if the relevant actors
are content. A respect for the voluntary agreements of agents and divergent
conceptions of the good is understood as an important guarantor of liberty.
Against this background, the state recognizes individuals as abstract rights
bearers and exercises power through formal rules. Following Unger, Loughlin
tells the now-familiar story of the growth of state intervention into previously
private domains which causes a revision of the liberal legal order. Regulatory
intervention transforms the liberal state into a welfare state and at the same
time, modifies the form and substance of the abstract rule of law model.
Because the state has new regulatory tasks, the law must be more policy-
oriented and flexible. The bureaucratization of the law disrupts the apparent
logic of the liberal model and leads to decay and a crisis of legitimation. The
interventionist social state creates a new, informal, flexible concept of pro-
cedural fairness which produces contradictory results when applied within the
traditional, formalist method of legal discourse. Loughlin contends that the
introduction of the informal mode, based on a purposive style of legal reason-
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ing, subverted the basis of certainty and symmetry which characterized the
traditional model.
For Loughlin, a change in state and the new form of law which emerges
requires a reorientation of public law theory. In order to locate new theoretical
bearings, we must study welfare state law in terms of the law of administra-
tion. From this standpoint, Loughlin claims that we can avoid the problems
of law-centeredness and eclecticism. Loughlin' s argument is unpersuasive. His
strategy is to expose certain confusions in procedural fairness that were created
as a result of the changes in the state. However, he impermissibly extends, by
analogy, this claim to cover the entire argumentative machinery of the public
law, a typical mistake of early writings by American cls theorists. However,
a deeper problem with Loughlin' s explanatory framework is traceable to his
naive assumption that the liberal rule of model was sufficiently coherent that
the introduction of informality, as a result of the development of welfare state,
exacerbated the logic of the liberal model. Loughlin' s discussion of the welfare
state is also flawed by the fact that, like Unger, he is committed to a logic of
ideal types. That is, Unger's analysis of liberal-legalism implicitly endorsed
a form of essentialism manifested in the assumption that the liberal legal
system would collapse if its essential elements were displaced. Like Unger,
Loughlin's analysis of the contradictions of the modem regulatory state
depends on a highly overgeneralized logic of social forms which he then
attempts to provide a new systematic vision of public law in order to work
through the contradictory legal doctrine (Collins 1987). In this respect,
Loughlin' s critical project is distinctly modernist in that it attempts, via theory
hope, to offer a different theoretical program to critique the state of modem
state practice.
9.5 Late Modernism: Systems Theory and the Central-Local State
Loughlin later modified his views when he turned to consider the relationship
between the central and local state. He continued to argue for a theoretically-
oriented conception of public law, embracing functionalism in his attack on
the new normativists (1992: 184-229). Loughlin is no longer committed to the
modernist dualisms of individual/society and state/society. Such dualisms, in
particular the state and society divide, attempt to create a false unity while
distorting our capacity to adequately capture a coherent vision of society.
Further, the problem with the state/society duality is that it entails political
neutrality in the non-state spheres. Loughlin's attack on the unitary state is an
integral component of his functionalist theory of public law.
Loughlin endorses a version of functionalist theory which is derived from the
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modern systems theory, as it has been developed by Luhmann (Loughlin 1992:
250-260). As we have seen, Luhmann (1981) argues that with the shift to a
society dominated by the market, it is no longer possible to understand society
simply in terms of a political or normative conception. Luhmann's theory is
party based on a historical understanding of the development of society since
the 18th century. He states that an important consequence of the decline of
simple segmentary society is the passing of the importance of legitimation or
consensus. With the emergence of the hierarchical form, based on internal and
external differentiation, a different approach to the environment develops
(Luhmann 1981, 1982). As the social order becomes increasingly more compli -
cated and differentiated along subsystem lines, there is less need for social
consensus and more need for system internal modes of communication
(Luhmann: 1981: 125-29). Society, from this point of view, is now composed
of a series of differentiated subsystems which are based on their own means
of integration. From the systems point of view, the differentiation of the
political system entails the decomposition of civil society and its role in
mediating the conflicts between the economic and political system (Luhmann
1981). The implication of Luhmann' s claim is that a functionally differentiated
social system does not generate external standards by which to evaluate the
behavior of the political and legal systems.
Following Luhmann, Loughlin believes that liberal normativism is obsolete and
serves no useful purpose in framing public law discourse. Liberal normativism,
or even the primacy of a generalized morality, as a basis for legal reform, is
now a thing of the past (Laughlin 1992: 243). The difficulties and ambiguities
which beset normativism are related to its failure to account for the changed
forms of the modern political-administrative state. Thus, Laughlin argues that
the language of liberal normativism depends on an 'ideological grid' from an
earlier era which is unable to adequately recognize the new social or legal
forms emerging in the later part of this century. Loughlin offers evidence for
this claim. Laughlin looks to the local state/government conflict over control
of local state activities as an example. He argues that the move by the central
state to employ a range of legal forms to regulate the local state reveals a shift
away from an internal system of regulation to a system of external intervention
based on judicial review and administrative rules. It was the national state's
introduction of financial accountability and reduced financial expenditure which
was instrumental in the growth of the 'normative gap' between the internal
complexity of the local, administrative system and the legal and political
language used to describe it. Laughlin's point is that social structures in
England have changed over time and the meaning of concepts like democracy,
sovereignty, and law have changed dramatically so that they no longer mean
what they did to Dicey (Laughlin 1992: 230-3 1). For Laughlin a functionalist
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public law offers numerous advantages over the liberal, normative model. His
thesis is ultimately pragmatic: functionalism gives public lawyers an interpreta-
tive theory which most closely approximates the changes in modem society.
Louglin's account of political society is directed against modernist's accounts
of politics which look to the collective pursuit of associationally determined
goals as the legitimate basis for the regulation of action. Louglin's functionalist
program reflects a general decline in confidence in the use of the law to
promote social change. In the 1980s, there was, as we have seen, a tendency
on the part of the British government to avoid the full legislative process in
matters of financial importance to the government (Graham and Prosser 1991:
3 4-70; Craig 1990: 187-92). Loughlin contends that the normativist accounts,
their new reform projects, depend on a reality which has been carefully eroded
and which no longer exists. On the other hand, functionalists believe that the
positivization of law has broken the connection between law and social reality
and, as a result, modern societies are no longer based on a pre-mediated
concept of justice. On this vision, the legal system operates to institutionalize
norms, which are defined in tenns of counterfactually stabilized expectations.
The legal system operates to stabilize expectations through the use of sanctions
and procedures. Unlike the normativists, who look to dialogue and reason to
foster reform, functionalists, like Luhmann and Loughlin, insist that all talk
about principles can be translated into norms that regulate the production of
norms.
A theory of public law informed by functionalism is intended to redefine the
relationship between law and the state, where the normative dimension is only
relevant in terms of explaining how new networks of power operate. However,
Loughlin' s treatment of the positivization of law may not be an adequate
reason for abandoning certain advantages of normativism. To be sure, I agree
with Loughlin (1992: 260) that there have been changes in the structure and
function of the modern state which 'has directly confronted our traditional
government structures and has led to major changes in the organizational
frameworks of government'. The new legal measures introduced have, for the
most part, been the result of political and economic considerations. I am not
convinced, however, that the problems of modern law in Britain can not be
adequately addressed by reference to normative investigations regarding the
form and nature of public participation in government. In contrast, I believe
that it is crucially important to consider new intermediate political institutions
which might serve to filter or launder the preferences of individuals. It seems
that one of the principal tasks is to design a new set of constitutional institu-
tions which incorporate elements of pluralism and the ideals of civic virtue
which make participation a significant part of a well-functioning democracy.
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Laughlin's central point is not always clearly linked to the fortunes of function-
alism. This can been gleaned from his recent account of functionalism (1992:
264). Loughlin, after challenging all the new normativist initiatives which call
for constitutional reform, exhorts public lawyers to adopt, as their 'principal
focus[,] the examination of the manner in which the normative structures can
contribute to the tasks of guidance, control and evaluation of government'.
Despite his attempt to close law off from its normative sources, Loughlin finds
it hard to defend his functionalist position without turning to the substantive
principles of normativism and their claims to validity. This can most easily be
seen in his discussion of Bromley L.B. C. v. Greater London Council, where
Laughlin (1992: 262-63) is more concerned with attempting to get right the
appropriate standard of review and understanding of the government grant
system than pointing out that the right answer is only relevant to the extent that
it assists in the smooth processing of the legal system. This apparent contradic-
tion in Laughlin's position is a result of being caught in more than one cogni-
tive framework. The irony is that Loughlin employs a thorough going post-
modernist argument to deconstruct public law but, after he has pulled out the
ladder from under the normativists, he attempts to redraw the ladder of
normative thought, despite himself.
III.
9.6 Nihilism and the End of Law
During the last decade the efforts by legal scholars to develop an alternative
jurisprudence has given rise to an interest in post structuralism, deconstruction-
ism, and semiotics. This cluster of contemporary philosophical movements
have been described as 'postmodern' because they see themselves as challeng-
ing the philosophical tradition of the Enlightment. The implications of the
postmodernist model can be highlighted by focusing on Peter Goodrich's work.
Postmodernists offer a radical and far-reaching argument against the Enlight-
ment's claim to rationality and objectivity. It challenges the modernist reliance
on identity logic. The role of the subject, as an autonomous agent capable of
generating her own source of meaning, is challenged. The subject is shown
to be socially constructed and their subjectivity is thought to depend on institu-
tions and organized scientific discourses which rationalize society. On this
view, the subject is no longer the source of meaning and change in society.
Indeed, the autonomy of the subject as a source of rationality is viewed as a
pretension of the Enlightment which should be abandoned.
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Postmodernists, like Goodrich, embrace nihilism as a critical standpoint against
the Enlightment tradition. While Goodrich notes that the traditional concept
of nihilism, as it has been traditionally employed by cls theorists, is theoretical-
ly impoverished, he offers a theoretically more robust notion. For Goodrich,
nihilism is defined in terms of the 'generalized loss of belief in the order and
breakdown in legitimation of dominant general theories of the good and
institutions in society' (Goodrich 1986: 548). Nihilism addresses the problem
of modernity by challenging the dominant values embodied in legal texts and
disrupts the dominant view that law and morality are co-extensional. The
rationale for nihilism is that it is the last hope in the face of an oppressive and
dominant tradition of reason. Let's consider what a critique of law, based on
nihilism, amounts to. Goodrich's thesis is evident from the preceding para-
graph: a critical legal theory involves a rejection of legality and the substitution
of justification for a textual-based strategy, based on the deconstruction of the
common law tradition. Like most modernists, Goodrich believes that a
methodological technique, like the concept of legal discourse, will reveal
something about the relationship between the legal system and power.
Having rejected the Enlightment vision of legality and the suprahistorical
perspective of grand theories, Goodrich proceeds to articulate his own theory
of law. He advocates a theory based on a concept of legal discourse which
serves to show that legal meaning is constructed, structured, and disseminated
by a regime that, despite local resistances, controls and shapes persons and
knowledge. In its essentials, the argument is that the normative juridical
discourse conceal relations of domination which are the real foundations of the
institutional practices of modern law. Discourse analysis is principally con-
cerned with the strategic interpretation of the law. It would appear that
Goodrich's concept of legal discourse, while explicitly rejecting the aims of
immanent critique, retains a part of the modernist aspirations of theory in that
he believes that the power of discourse analysis can be strategically interpreted
for the use of the other, which appears to a disguise for the return of the
Kantian subject. Thus, the discourse model, based on nihilism, is a
reconstructive exercise which is ironically similar to Unger's context-smashing,
deviationist doctrinal work.
Recently Goodrich has returned to the addressing the problem of the authority
of law. When Goodrich (1987) comes to the characterizing the nature of legal
authority he states that the social order can not be grounded on the authority
of law because the center of the legal system is 'pure mythology', more
rhetorical than actual. Like Foucault, Goodrich argues that the legal system
operates through rhetoric to divert attention away from the actual social facts
that determine its substantive rules. By avoiding the distinction between
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legitimate and illegiate sources of power, Goodrich directs us to look at how
power is localized in particular discourses. The law is principally a discourse
of power which conceals its conditions of production through a series of
rhetorical techniques. Goodrich wants us to look directly at the real forms and
techniques of power. He, like Foucault, believes that the source of law's power
is located in extra-legal sources which the rhetoric of law systematically denies.
With this conception of the liberal-legal system, Goodrich's (1990: 17) critique
of law amounts to focusing our attention to uncovering the forgotten or sup-
pressed 'history of another possibility', a failed history which 'maps another
possibility'.
The most prominent type of criticism which has been levelled at Goodrich is
that the project of uncovering the practices which have been forgotten 'is no
more free of forgettings than the project which he excoriates'. (Fish 1993: 71).
The task of attempting to take everything into account, in fashioning an
interdisciplinary critique of law, is self-defeating. Fish (1993: 71) regards
Goodrich's attempt to locate a more inclusive discourse unlikely to improve
the functioning of law, which he declares is 'simultaneously declaring and
fashioning the formal autonomy that constitutes its precarious, powerful being'.
The force of Fish's critique is that Goodrich is seeking to locate, on a more
abstract level, a unity in law which is directed towards something quite outside
the function of law. It is, therefore, a normative exercise which has something
more to do with the bureaucratic practices of the academic world than the
needs of actual legal practice, which are based on a series of 'rhetorical tricks'.
Much of Goodrich's discussion is an attempt to generate a better, more inclus-
ive, view of the law. Despite his protestations, Goodrich appears to be practis-
ing a version of modernist theory.
9.7 The English Common Law and the Social Contract
If we turn to Goodrich's more recent work (1990) it would appear that he has
abandoned his reform-minded, interdisciplinary project and adopted a more
thorough-going, postmodern account of law. In Languages ofLaw, he employs
a semiotic method and French-inspired psychological theory (Lacan and
Legendre), to unravel the forms and appearances of the law and attempts to
show how its different forms legitimate the practice of law for the legal
subject. A semiotic theory focuses on how the law creates a space for com-
munication and the different modalities it employs to render meaning intelli-
gible.
Goodrich's theory of law is based on a reconstruction of the English common
law. The English common law is a set of norms or practices which together
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constitute a single, unified tradition (Goodrich 1992: 7). That is, the English
common law is 'a tradition tied to the land and the people, a memory of the
past that extends beyond "the memory of mean". [Central to the common law
tradition is the view that] 'the law itself is a religion' (Goodrich 1992: 13). The
English common law is also an expression of 'how things are done' and the
common law establishes not only religion but truth and authority. The common
law is a system of memories, 'a time immemorial usage' in which the norms
and practices of the past are found embedded within legal language. The
common law is also the law of a nation and it is the excellence of the common
law which is 'a political argument against foreign influence' (Goodrich 1992:
15).
In approaching the history of the common law, Goodrich's aim is to
deconstruct the myth of the common law and demonstrate how it sustains its
authority through 'a mixture of image, myth, oral memory and written text,
custom and judicial legislation' (Goodrich 1992: 8). It involves a critique of
the normative conception of legitimation, law, and rights. Following Foucault,
Goodrich explains that the modern technologies of the state and law are linked
to a discourse which played a central role in establishing the monarchy and
constitution. Goodrich (1990: 227) states that: 'The two principles of English
constitutionalism, those of monarchy and secrecy, of an aura or display of
power that simultaneously hides the logic of its practice, can be traced without
difficulty or too great a degree of digression into the common law itself'. The
authority of law is linked to a myth which structures the symbolic points of
reference for all legal subjects and establishes an institutional order in which
the truth is the foundation of legal discourse.
A highly stylized vision of the English common law system is the background
against which Goodrich describes the development of the secularized discourse
of modern democracy. Like Derrida, he understands.the law of the constitu-
tional state as a legitimating discourse by virtue of its reliance on norms,
rights, and justice. Postmoderrnsts, like Goodrich, believe that the normative
principles of right and legitimacy are anachronistic. They follow Nietzsche's
(1954: 160-61) claim that the: 'State is the name of the coldest of all cold
monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and the lie crawls out of its mouth: "I, the
state, am the people." This is a lie!' In particular, postmodernists deny that
the modern forms of procedural democracy, which was initially developed by
Rousseau, are not sustained by the consensus of citizens but rather the legit-
imating force is the imposition of the law is founded elsewhere, i.e., external
to the social. The founding of the law is based on a text which 'can be con-
sidered as the theoretical description of the State, considered as a contractual
and legal model, but also as the disintegration of this same model as soon as
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it is put in motion' (de Man 1979: 253).
In reality, the system of constitutional democracy is based on a tradition which
attempts to base its legitimacy on the voice of the people, although the paradox
is that the people are absent and that the contract is based on an agreement that
never occurred (Goodrich 1990: 322). Goodrich, like de Man before him,
contends that the social contract is a simulacrum. That is, 'the sender and
receiver of the message are one and the same; the contract separates the parties
to the exchange simply so as to unite them indissolubly, textually, legally'
(Goodrich 1990: 171). De Man (1979: 274-75), points out that '[t]he meta-
phorical substitution of one's own for the divine voice is blasphemous,
although the necessity for this deceit is implacable as its eventual denunciation,
in the future undoing of any State or any political institution'. The paradoxical
quality of the social contact is the source of law itself. Indeed Samuel Weber
(1990: 1536) defines that problem of the law, defined in terms of the Social
Contract, 'can be formulated, accordingly, as that of translating an uncondi-
tional (anonymous) promise into a conditional (nominal) one. 'According to
Goodrich (1990: 171), the law is closed off in the sense that 'the contract is
that which excludes, it is that which immunizes us against other discourses and
precludes that we even think of any other law'.
Goodrich's account of the social contract and democratic institutions leads, I
think, to a deeply disturbing concept of the law and the modern democratic
state in which there is a complete loss of the social and the normative resources
of civil society. He explicitly attacks the system of mediation which is respon-
sible for producing the juridical and political transformation of modern society.
Goodrich, by returning to Rousseau, is challenging the juridical foundation of
the modern state which he contends is masked and mystified through the
paradoxical concept of the general will. He wishes to deny the modernist
distinction between legitimate action and the exercise of power in order to
challenge the claim that civil society and its normative resources are the
foundation for right. Here again, we must see that Goodrich is not attacking
civil society but the separation of civil society from the state. Postmodernists
are committed to defending the proposition that civil society is not separate
from that state but intimately bound up with it.
Ironically, Goodrich selects Rousseau as the contractarian whom he wishes to
single out as the theorist who represents the enclosure of the political world
by reference of a displaced metaphysical other. Indeed, it was Rousseau who
was a fierce critic of the contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke. The origin
of society, for Rousseau, was not to be founded in a contractual agreement
(Rapaczynski 1987: 254). Against Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau therefore
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denies the natural rights tradition's claim that the individual can be understood
scientifically. Rousseau differentiated state from civil society in order to show
that only a high degree of normative development makes possible the reflexive
structure of the social contract (Rapaczynski 1987: 254). Recently, Preuss
(1993: 658-59) has argued that Rousseau's contract involves a high degree of
social cooperation which is 'necessary for the inherent justice and orientation
towards the common good and society'. Preuss believe the conditions of the
general will, measured in terms of social cooperation, will ensure that the
social contract tracks the interests of the members of the community. Interest-
ingly, Preuss (1993: 659) argues that Rousseau's social contract reflects the
concept of the nation built on a constitutional state which presupposes 'a
minimum degree of prepolitical sameness and homogeneity of the constituent
power'. It is this vision of the nation, in particular England, which Goodrich
(1992: 9-15) finds disturbing. In England, constitutionalism has been built on
a rather narrow set of beliefs which have been justified by a series of legal
symbols which are embedded in a closed and sterile symbolic field of endless
repetition. In this regard, I agree with Goodrich that the English tradition has
meant the exclusion of the idea of pluralism and democratic input.
I disagree with Goodrich, however, when he attempts to extend his analysis
by construing all democratic society as nothing but the effect of power rela-
tions. At this point the idea of plurality drops out of his analysis and he offers
a genealogy of the legal subject as an attempt to demonstrate the normative
bankruptcy of democratic participation. The upshot is that liberal institutions
are incapable of granting citizens a space where they can deliberate and self-
reflectively constitute their society. I find that Goodrich's account is too highly
politicized. I agree with him that legal institutions are exclusionary and limiting
but this proposition does not conflict with the idea that they operate to process
the normative claims of diverse groups in society.
It seems to me that modem society is organized into many diverse overlapping
communities of judgment (Rawls 1987). The different identities of individuals
are taken into account by constitutional structures and protected to a certain
extent. In this regard, constitutions provided the basis for preserving a common
identity (Holmes 1988: 29) To a certain extent, constitutionlism is committed
to a different constitutional identities due to its commitment to equality (Rosen-
feld 1993: 526). The accommodation of different identities is reinforced by
constitutionalism commitment to toleration which involves mutual respect
(Gibbard 1990: 243-246). While I am not persuaded that constitutionalism is
the only meta-discourse which can harmonize the normative conflicts among
the various groups, I tend to think that certain constitutional structures are
more effective in producing compromises than others. A self-limiting, political
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concept of constitutionalism is best understood as a post-liberal theory which
relies on certain modernist and postmodernist arguments. It has less to do with
the concerns of truth and rationality and is more concerned with developing
a practical and pragmatic structure for fostering agreements on political, social,
and economic questions.
Unlike rationalist or modernist theory, a post liberal view of constitutional
politics is based on an anti-foundationalism which, at the same time, is not
committed to relativism (West 1988). Eschewing theoretical language based
on metaphysics or epistemology, a post liberal theory is accepts the hard
realities of normal politics and attempts to introduce new reforms to make
political competition based on a regulative ideal that serves to reinforce
political equality at the level of institutions (Beitz 1989: 17). It has been argued
that constitutionalism based on interest group bargaining is a relatively low cost
way for under-resourced groups to express their normative standpoint and it
provides an expressive means for registering the intensity of a preference not
otherwise accounted for within the traditional processes (Cohen & Rogers
1992: 412). On this view, a system of pluralist representation suitably
reformed to provide fairer representation and access to political resources,
offers a suitable mechanism to launder the preferences of groups without
relying on a theoretical standpoint grounded in objectivity or communicative
rationality (Cohen & Rogers: 1992; Beitz 1989). An effective constitutional
democracy offers an effective structure for institutionalizing preferences and,
at the same time, operates to channel potentially destructive disagreements
(Holmes 1988:23). Thus, I would argue that a post liberal constitutionalism
is more likely, in a highly competitive and diverse society like our own, to
promote limits on majoritarian rule and promote the representation of minority
interests. In this regard, the institutions and procedures are likely to be rein-
force commitment depending upon their success in limiting conflict and
ensuring effective representation.
9.8 Conclusion
I suspect that the warm reception of postmodern theory in British cls is based
on the popular view that it provides a basis for purging our thought of its
foundationalist visions based on Enlightment concepts of the subject and
rationality. This view ignores the fact that postmodern theory appears to reject
the possibility of political institutions based on the internalization of norms.
However, there appears to be an inconsistency between the postmodern
suspension of the normative dimension of politics and their recourse to a pure
discourse of power. Postmodernists must either ignore the norms generated
by associations or conceive of them as strategic and therefore not democratic.
MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVES
	 409
It would appear that the postmodern theorists is unable to refer to positive set
of norms to articulate a radical alternative. What emerges is a highly political
argument which understands modern democratic institutions as defective and
disabling. A more productive alternative would be to recognize that political
institutions have a strategic and normative dimension and that the democratic
structures are still capable of processing the preferences of interest groups and
the new demands of political movements and shadow interest groups.
CHAPTER 10
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE PARADOX OF
TRANSITIONS: BARGAINING, DISAGREEMENT,
AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN'
10.1 Introduction
Nearly everyone considers themselves a democrat today. Yet, there is very
little agreement regarding what it means to design democratic institutions that
are responsive to and respectful of the diverse ethnic, social, and economic
groups that are competing for position and material advantage. 2
 This is par-
ticularly clear in highly differentiated societies in which the ethnic, religious,
and political conflicts can lead to the fragmentation or even the re-drawing of
political boundaries. 3
 While the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern
and Central Europe created an opening for the development of new institutional
arrangements and the expression of constitutional norms, we are now
witnessing difficulties in the democratization process, due to re-newed national-
ist conflict fuelled ethnic clashes and distributional conflicts.
The current transformations are taking place in the shadow of discredited
yet established institutions which though disintegrating had their own institu-
tionalized pattern of vested interests. In certain instances, the pattern of reform
has been slowed because of the political pressure various groups are able to
bring to bear on the politicians. 4
 Because the commitment to the introduction
of modern democratic constitutionalism depends on the degree of interest group
support for the new system of property rights and democratic representation,
the level of support for change varies across states, given the economic
This chapter appeared in K. Itoh, Democratization in the 1990s (Nagoya: University
of Nagoya Press, 1997).
2 J• Elster, 'Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe', University of Chicago Law Review,
58, 2 (1991) 480-1.
A. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Sumter to Lithuania
and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), esp. ch. 1.
M Dewatripont and G. Roland, 'The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty',
American Econo,nic Review 85, 5 (1995)1207-23.
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circumstances, ethnic composition and the history of constitutional decision
making.5
Yet, the crucial aspect of the project of democratization process involves
not merely changes in the 'rules of the game' but also the replacement of the
old norms and practices with a new set of values and assumptions. For
example, the introduction of modern constitutionalism changes the relationship
between the identity and diversity of the agents engaged in the political pro-
cess. 6 Modern constitutionalism relies on an abstract and concrete constitu-
tional identity, which finds its legitimation from the political actors who
reached the original coalitional agreement. Hence, in a modern constitutional
regime, the system of fundamental rights operates at an abstract level as a
backstop to impose a structural constraint dictating the protection of all funda-
mental rights. It is almost certainly true that modern constitutionalism accounts
for a range of different identities as far as they can be interpolated within the
protection of fundamental interests. To be sure, the relationship between
identity and difference can be unstable and the institutions of a constitutional
democracy will tend to reflect the tensions between identity and difference in
society. But the real problem is that some of the new structures are incomplete
in that they do not really resolve these underlying cleavages in political society.
There is a sense in which the problem goes beyond mere incompleteness.
For the most part legal and political theorists have had little to say about the
conditions under which a set of stable democratic structures could be created
in societies in wich territorial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or economic divi-
sions make it difficult for institutions to enable individuals to effectively engage
in deliberative politics. They tend to focus on the contract device or a single
constitutional mechanism (e.g., Madisonianism) for devising a scheme which
secures democratic legitimation. 7
 This static way of attempting to accom-
modate the abstract moral principles of equality and liberty with the diverse
political and bureaucratic processes without, for example, an investigation of
the barriers to constitutional practice (e.g., society's ethnic divisions), tends
to produce a functional model of democracy.8
To be sure, the search for a justification of generalized conceptions of
See generally, I. Pogany, 'Constitution Making or Constitutional Transformation in
Post-Communist Societies?', Political Studies 44, 3, (1996), esp. 579-89.
6 Michel Rosenfeld, 'Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diver-
sity: An Introduction', Cardozo Law Review 14, nos. 3-4 (1993), esp. 508-14.
See generally, J. Elster, 'Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris',
Cardozo Law Review 14, 3-4, 549-75.
8 u Preuss, 'Constitution Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the
Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitutions', Cardozo Law Review 14, 3-4
(1993) esp. 648-59.
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democracy itself is complicated by the fact that there are a plurality of political
principles which could serve to legitimate the constitutional decision-making
process. And because these models are generally static and take preferences
as given, the purely functionalist account does not look to new conditions
which shape our preferences. At the same time, we are unlikely to find legal
theorists supplying reasons for choosing one set of institutions over another.
For now, we are left with arguments about what democracy requires (i.e.,
constitutional constraints, judicial review, etc.) or how concerns regarding how
a transitional constitution-making body can legitimate it procedures (e.g., the
amendment procedure) to create new institutions. This leaves many questions
unanswered about the relationship between liberal political principles and
organizational design.
To be concerned with the design of constitutional mechanisms for the
coordination of crosscutting cleavages in society entails that we must begin to
look for broader and deeper theoretical approaches which engage not only with
the conditions for the development of democracy, but examine the social and
political sources of constitutional decision-making. In saying this, however,
I am not denying that this work has not already commenced. There are reasons
to suspect that the recent contributions of rational choice theorists on the
subject provide a basis for thinking that this conception of democratic analysis
is beginning to take shape.9
This influential perspective purports to offer an account about how political
institutions evolve and an objective explanation about the transition to demo-
cratic institutions. Rational choice theorists insist that constitutions are complex
mechanisms designed to coordinate society)° They rely on an instrumentalist
account of preferences to show how the conflicts over political choices can lead
to coordination problems. However, proponents of rational choice theory
emphasize that political institutions may evolve to equilibrium, based on the
optimal selection of social choice rules. But they insist that the instability
inherent in majority rule makes this outcome uncertain. Political institutions
can serve to stabilize expectations. Rational choice theory tells us that the
instabilities created by ethnic conflict, redistributive politics and other deep
cleavages can be accommodated by the traditional range of democratic mechan-
See, P. Ordeshook, 'Some Rules of Constitutional Design', Social Philosophy and
Policy 10, 2, (1993) 198-232; A. Przeworksi, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
I use the term 'rational choice' in the general sense. It is now well established that there
are a range of literatures (i.e, public choice, social choice, positive political economy, etc.)
which are easily grouped under the rational choice rubric. D. Green and I. Shapiro,
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, A Critique ofApplications in Political Science (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) xi.
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isms.
Could rational choice theory do a better job in designing constitutional
structures which stabilize the expectations of the diverse and often conflict-
ridden groups than the theories of constitutional law supplied by lawyers?
Presently none of the standing legal theories supplies the necessary arguments
for the design of alternative institutional devices which could coordinate these
cleavages. In this respect, any successful account of understanding the process
of institutional transition must begin to draw on a variety of new institutional
approaches which draw on such devices as punishment strategies, reputation,
and other-regarding norms to foster insights about the shape of institutional
arrangements)' By examining human conceptions of attitude, rather than
behavior, we are alerted to the fact that political outcomes are not just the
product of rational expectation. They involve broader concerns which may not
easily fit within the traditional models of social choice. I shall argue that the
rational choice description relies on a narrowly focused account of political
actors' motivations and cannot supply an adequate interpretation, in the broad
sense, of the social dimensions of collective decision making.' 2 Any claim
about how democratic institutions can resolve moral and political conflicts
must, therefore, be based on an interpretation of expressive meanings and
practices in the context of institutional choice, and not in some isolated way
from the evaluation of democratic institutions.'3
The theme of this paper is that the development of institutional structures,
based on diverse and conflicting values, provides for a feedback mechanism
required for regulating democratic systems. This vision involves a recognition
that the formation and coherence of the constituent power of society can not
be the creation of a social contract of individuals. It is argued that a democra-
tization is best understood as consisting of a bargaining process which, depend-
ing on the diversity of political settings and identities, occurs in the context
of existing institutional arrangements, and subject to the constraints of normal
politics. Hence, the task of designing new democratic institutions, which reflect
a compromise between the competing groups, must be struck on the basis of
pragmatic process and structure principles, which work to further enhance the
institutionalization of constitutional decision-making.
The upshot of the discussion is to show that in conflict situations, where
W. Riker and D. Weimer, 'The Political Economy of Transformation: liberalization
and property rights', J. Banks and E. Hanushek (eds.) in Modern Political Economy, Old
Topics, New Directions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 93-99.
2 Rational choice theory pursues a behavioral strategy in trying to derive cooperation
(i.e., resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas).
' See generally, Philip Pettit, 'Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives', Ethics
100, 4, (1990) 742-750.
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there may be proposals from many different groups, it is possible to explain
conflict and cooperation by reference to a norm-based approach.' 4 A satisfy-
ing account approach to democratization links norms to their contextually-
generated rule-making decisions. Accordingly, this model offers a more robust
alternative to the individual behavior approach to political choice. This model
seeks to explore the function which precedent-based institutions (i.e., constitu-
tions) provide for opening up the space for the establishment of social roles,
and the institutionalization of historical and contextually-based actions.
10.2 Procedural Theories of Democracy and Moral Conifict
The proponents of the institutionalist version of radical democratic change
conceive the task of establishing new institutional structures in Eastern and
Central Europe so that they may reflect the will of the people. The new
regimes have a common objective: to incorporate the ideals which initially led
to revolutionary transformation of society. The radical-institutionalist solution
depends on an optimistic view of democratic structures. That is, majority rule,
once implemented, will continue work to successfully to produce political
outcomes that manage to reflect the preference that the majorities of the people
(who made the revolution) would prefer.
This section will argue that the idea of populist democracy is essentially
static in that its defence of majority rule relies on a set of stable and fixed
preferences. The majority rule requirement which lends weight to the claims
of the greatest numbers works to institutionalize exclusion of the minorities
which disagree on the claims of the majority. My task is to show that this
model leaves no room for resolving the potentially conflicting concerns about
the terms of democratic politics.
We begin by critically assessing the radical institutionalist view that demo-
cratic institutions must satisfy a substantive conception of procedure in order
to legitimate the products of political and lawmaking institutions. Traditionally,
the popular will vision of democracy asserted that democratic outcomes should
be made by reference to the will of the people. A central premise of this
perspective is that the coherence of a polity is predicated on the individual's
decision to consent to participate in a group concerning the direction of the
common good of society. It is assumed that the members of civil society have
achieved a certain level of pre-political unity in order to satisfy the level of
' See e.g., G. Garrett and B. Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing
the European Community's Internal Market', in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds.) Ideas
and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993) 181-87.
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cooperation necessary to transform the people into a constituted power.' 5
 The
weakness of this assumption is obvious. In many countries undergoing reform,
the lack of shared belief systems has led to costly disagreements over the terms
and pace of the transition.
The radical institutionalist view asserts that democratic consequences have
significance only if the political outcomes are derived from the individual
judgement of citizens. Proponents suppose that the structure of decision making
must be based on the actual individual judgments of the people. This is a
instrumental claim about social decision procedure serving merely to translate
the judgements of the citizens for the purpose of legitimating political deci-
sions. Proponents argue that the majority rule method is the best decision
procedure since it connects the principle of procedural fairness to political
outcomes. The paradigm apparently has a straightforward explanation for how
political decisions of democracy are deemed legitimate: a fair social choice
procedure which conforms to the general will. The model's policy prescription
supports a general presumption favoring legislation which is the result of
majority decisions.
With the populist picture we get a simple mechanism for resolving complex
moral disagreement. The institutionalization of substantive political equality
means that the majority has the right to resolve the moral and political conflicts
of the polity. Under this view, majority rule serves only to resolve substantive
moral conflicts on procedural grounds. In effect, the device of numerical rule
imposes duties on the minority to consent to the resolution of conflict. Hence,
under a purely procedural arrangement the requirement of political equality
supplies the norm which resolves the substantive moral and legal conflicts
among groups.
But the plausibility of the populist's presumption in favor of majority rule
decision making depends on the robustness of its assertions that there is
evidence of a connection between the general will and social choice
procedures. That depends, in turn, on the coherence of the model's conception
of democracy and its view that public confidence is linked to the fairness of
procedures. The proceduralist model, in fact, is well know for its weaknesses.
First, the majoritarian framework relies on decision procedure which is unable
resolve most moral conflicts without introducing substantive values regarding
the democratic process itself. Populists acknowledge that while the majority
rule model offers all citizens an equal right to participate, the majority prin-
ciple works to transfer power so as to create hierarchies and institutionalize
advantage. In response, most theorists accept that procedures must be modified
' U: Preuss, 'Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on
the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution', ibid. p. 642.
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in order to produce some more favorable outcomes.' 6 Because substantive
moral and political conflicts are resolved by reference to voting rules and other
kinds of democratic institutions, proceduralists supply criteria of fairness to
assess the structural characteristics of political procedures.
On this view, democratic politics requires a set of institutions which foster
deliberation based on the expectation that every citizens could accept the
outcome of the terms of participation. Thus, by introducing normative con-
siderations, in order to harmonize the interests of minorities, the procedural
democrats are drawing on a substantive value to justify the outcomes of
democratic decision making. It turns out that the proceduralists, rather than
resolving the problem of moral and political disagreement, have merely
responded to the dilemma by coming up with their own view about which
commitments a democracy should support and respect. And so it turns out that
the procedural model can not provide an adequate solution to the complex
problem of moral and legal conflict.
But the problem goes beyond mere resolution of moral conflict, for the
procedural model of democratic choice is inadequate for satisfying citizens'
preferences. In particular rational choice theorists show that there is a very
weak (if non-existent) connection between the popular will and the lawmaking
activities of the government. It is doubtful that the democratic rules of collec-
tive action can achieve fair and meaningful results.' 7
 Arrow's Possibility
Theorem showed that under certain conditions, no unique majority will
emerge. The Arrow result demonstrated that when there are three alternatives
on the agenda and two or more individuals, there exists no social choice rule
which satisfies the minimum fairness conditions will produce a transitive social
ordering.'8
The Arrow model is a generalization of the paradox of voting which was
first discovered by Condorcet and is now construed as the problem of cycling
majorities.' 9
 Arrow's insights were extended by McKelvey's 2° global cycling
theorem, which shows that when there is no majority winner, then any two
6 C. Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 76-91. See
also, A. Gutman and D. Thompson, 'Moral Disagreement in a Democracy', Social Philos-
ophy and Policy 12,1, (1995) 96-99.
' William H. Riker, Libe ralism Against Populism (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982).
Riker's results have been challenged, see generally, Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn,
'Democracy and Social Choice', Ethics 97, 1 (October 1986), 6-25, esp. pp. 18-24.
18 K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1951) 12-13.
' Charles Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 68.
° Richard McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Ifliplications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory 12 (June 1976), pp. 472-82.
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points in space will belong to a cycle. The fundamental idea of the voting
paradox is that cycling is possible when taking a decision. Thus, for example,
if we assume majority rule, is possible to cycle through different preferences.
Assume that there are three players, A, B, and C and three alternative out-
comes, a, b, and c, and the following preference rankings: A:abc, B:bca;
C:cba. The result is a lack of transitive social ordering (ie., cycling). 2' It may
be that some cycles are less likely to emerge due to a range of factors, includ-
ing the normal operation of the political process. However, in other respects,
instability is a feature of the democratic system. The concept of global cycling
has important implications: Cycling calls into question the possibility that
democratic procedures can render a fair and stable arrangement. Under this
diagnosis of the infirmities of democratic procedures, proponents go on to
argue that the 'public interest' can not be meaningfully articulated in the first
place, much less utilized as a template for regulation.
It can now be said that Arrow's result creates a problem for the populist
conception of democracy. As pointed out earlier, we know that because
majority rule does not lead to a unique social welfare function, it follows that
democratic theory should not rely on the idea of the popular will as the
principal basis to legitimate political outcomes. Breaking the link between
voting and the general will opens up the question whether there is a basis for
democracy institutions formed by reference to the coherence of a social
group . Clearly the arguments just presented support the conclusion that the
popular will conceptions of democracy are incoherent, and the proper aim of
democratic theory is to design effective institutions.
2 As noted, the voter's paradox occurs only when there is a multi-peaked distribution
of preferences. To be sure, Arrow's paradox depends on the assumption that we ignore the
measure of intensity with which preferences are held by individuals. Recently, Binmore has
argued that if this condition was less stringent, a conception of the common good could be
expressed by looking to cardinal utility information. He makes an interesting suggestion
that if we respect Von Neumann and Morganstern rationality conditions, it is possible to
observe the preferences of two agents over a set of lotteries in which the two agents have
preferences over social states, see Playing Fair (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) 132-3;
280-1.
W. Riker, LiberalismAgainst Populism, id. at 238-239. To be sure, numerous theorists,
in response to Riker's claim, have attempted to design legislative frameworks without
relying on a majoritarian or foundational basis to legitimate the outcomes of a democratic
system. See generally, J. Cohen, 'An Epistemic Conception of Democracy', Ethics 97, 1
(1986) 26-38.
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10.3 Rational Choice Visions of Democracy
The purpose of this section is to provide an account of the key features of the
rational choice approach to democracy. Like the populist approach, the rational
choice model looks to substantive political principles to coordinate social
conflicts . 0
 Our interest in the rational choice framework is to show that the
boundaries of the cooperative scheme tend to exclude certain groups (and their
non-strategic concerns) as partners in cooperation. I shall argue that under
certain conditions rational actors will fail to ground their actions in contracts
or bargains. First I will try to separate out the conception of democratic
politics that is embedded in rational choice theory. In this section I go on to
show that the rational choice vision rests on a model of politics which stipu-
lates that political choices should reflect the utility maximization of the individ-
ual. I argue that this framework, based on constrained maximization, breaks
down. It is suggested that the rational choice vision of democratic institutions
cannot adequately account for the historically contingent political and social
processes.
10.3.1 Contract: Between Rationality and Morality
Under the rational choice theory dominant in political theory for the last twenty
years, political theorists have employed the contract device to argue for the
legitimacy of political institutions, which have a specific purpose and structure.
This theory derived from the theory earlier developed in philosophy by
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant attempts to determine the goods which could be
secured by people based on rational agreement. It asserts furthermore that the
terms of the agreement (i.e., principles of justice) serve as the neutral
standpoint for assessing social structures. 24
 Ironically, rational choice theo-
rists, despite the lack of actual bargaining, insist that the principles of justice
are the product of a bargain between the parties in an original choice situation.
The theory, as originally articulated, asserted that there exist no mechanisms
for enforcing agreements or promises. In this sense, compliance is thought to
be spontaneous or decentralized. A self-enforcing agreement is a sequence of
outcomes in which neither player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from
his equilibrium strategy. However, because there are conditions when individ-
23 A. Arato, 'Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy', Cardozo Law
Review 17, 2, (1995) 222-3.
24 There is a slight difference in views around this point. Rawis insist that parties agree
on the principles for assessing social structures, whereas Gauthier has them agreeing on the
design of the social structures. See, K. Binmore, Playing Fair, Game Theory and Social
Contract, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) 12-16.
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uals could benefit form pursuing a strategy of noncooperation, collective action
problems emerge. A central task for the theory, therefore, is to explain why
individuals would pursue a cooperative strategy, particularly when there is
insufficient information or asymmetric rewards.
The rational choice model endorses the hypothetical bargain rationale as a
regulative ideal for dealing with the problem of conflict and cooperation.
This model, as it has been deployed by contractarian political theory, tests the
circumstances under which rational individuals (e.g., at least minimally
rational) would agree to a particular social arrangement. The features of justice
are thought to follow from the course of self-interested bargaining.
The hypothetical agreement is based not on actual but counterfactual con-
sent, i.e., what rational, forward-looking parties with perfect information
would do for achieving their goals. An important assumption is that individuals
make their choices independently and simultaneously. The nature and extent
of actors' rationality, along with how much information they have about
possible outcomes and the resources they possess, will shape and structure their
choices. Under the contract principle, individuals are free to pursue their
rational self interest in choosing other agents to pursue mutually advantageous
behavior. Accordingly, the primacy of contract implies that state is the product
of like-minded individuals that form cooperative enterprises to advance their
self-interest.
Contractarianism is not without its shortcomings. Given the assumptions of
rationality and perfect competition, there is little reason for utility-maximizing
individuals to give up their potential gains in favor of agreement and compli-
ance with a joint welfare maximizing strategy. 26
 In a sense, the general struc-
ture of hypothetical individuals in the hypothetical scenario will produce a
Prisoner's Dilemma. A Prisoner's Dilemma does not always arise is the
response of rational choice theorists. Many contract theorists have argued that
there is a potential solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma if we take into account
the role of morality to season the dispositions of self-interested agents to
comply with agreements made.
The morality school of rational choice theory looks to forge a link between
rationality and principles. The substantive claim is that the principle of justice,
which are the product of rational bargaining, provide the foundation for agents
complying with the agreement. That is, proponents rely on an instrumental
approach to the role of moral rules to provide a foundational vision for guiding
G. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986) 2 1-26.
26 e can assume, in this situation, that for highly rational individuals noncooperation
is the dominant strategy for each party in a single-play Prisoner's Dilemma. In this regard,
rational action leads to a Pareto-inferior outcome.
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conduct and regulating continued social cooperation. The principles of justice
consist of a set of principles which persons could employ to publicly justify
their actions and to assess the conduct of other citizens. 27 Accordingly, it is
argued that political institutions of democracy should be structured so as to
induce rational actors to reach a reasonable agreement about a set of principles
by which to guide our political behavior. The presence of free acceptability
and mutual benefit are the grounds by which rational actors agree to be bound
by moral considerations.
David Gauthier is the most prominent exponent of this approach. Gauthier's
central insight is the introduction of moral constraints on the utility-maximizing
behavior of individuals which may be used to secure a solution to the single-
play PD, in that it maximizes expected utility for the person to act according-
ly.28 To put the point in specific terms, when markets fail, constrained com-
pliance is a rational disposition for an actor since compliance would produce
to everyone an expected utility higher than if everyone directly maximized her
expected utility. The concept of rational agreement to principles, required to
constrain utility-maximization, is informed by the idea that compliance and the
disposition to comply would be rational for fully-rational, idealized bargainers.
On Gauthier's view, the purpose of securing an agreement has little to do with
providing public claims for individuals' well being. The function of agreement
is to establish optimizing constraints on utility maximization.
The idea of direct interaction between moral principles and individual action
supposes that there is a relationship between the motivational theory of individ-
uals and the structure of human actions. Yet, why would it be rational for
individuals in the state of nature to comply only with moral principles? It might
be objected that this claim is an inadequate argument for explaining the
motivation of rational agents to comply with bargains, particularly if the initial
bargaining procedure failed to rectify (or contributed to) the gains to some in
greater proportion than others.
Gauthier responds by arguing that for a rational agreement to arise, individ-
uals must be assured that equal advantage is secured through procedural
fairness, otherwise outcomes might be perceived to be arbitrary. The process
of stable compliance, then, arises from agreement among rational persons that
the controlling practices would create mutual benefit. On this account, stability
27 T. Scanlon, 'The Significance of Choice', The TannerLectures on Human Values (Salt
Lake City: Utah University Press, 1987), 149-216.
28 To resolve the PD problem, Gauthier looks to the distinction between directly and
indirectly utility-maximizing behavior. The idea is that, in order to overcome the PD, it
is rational to comply with utility-maximizing agreements, even though there will be
exceptions when compliance yields less utility. See D. Gauthier, Morals By Agreement
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 177-79.
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is achieved not by coercion but on the considered judgment of individuals. But
the constrained solution to the failure to secure agreement is too simple.
Gauthier's approach does not produce a reason why a rational agent would find
it rational to selectively cooperate when it would it would make sense to
defect. We should notice that Gauthier is attempting to locate a rational basis
for agreement based on the insight that compliance can be achieved by an
internal solution. 29
 The idea of an internal solution is achieved by a change
in prefernce by the individual agent.
These theories suppose that the compliance problem is resolved when a
sufficient number of individuals are disposed to toward compliance. Given the
assumptions of self-interest and morality, and the dominance of noncooperation
on a single play, it follows, according to Gauthier, that a player will cooperate
in the state of nature only if doing so he believes that the bargain is fair and
impartial. It follows that a fair scheme will tend to induce cooperation of a
large number of players which will make everyone better off. This argument
can be generalized in two ways. First, only schemes that are fair will attract
compliance. Second, it follows that if there is every reason to cooperate on
that play, then it is rational for all players to cooperate, provided that compli-
ance is rational.
This argument is paradoxical. It seems that for truly rational parties it would
be implausible that in all circumstances inducing cooperation would be rational.
This is because the parties would only move together under the most unrealistic
assumptions about their starting point in the state of nature. We must assume
that, players, in order to determine whether cooperation is optimal, will make
a realistic estimate of the benefits of cooperation versus defection. 3° Hence,
if players are somewhat irrational (by choosing short term gains over long
term) we can expect that they will not follow a cooperative strategy. 3 ' It
should be clear by now that contractarian theorists are unable to avoid the free
rider problem by recasting the solution in terms of compliance with moral
principles. We have seen that Gauthier's bargaining outcome is unlikely to
create a unique equilibrium in the name of justice.
29 J. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 54.
3° J. Coleman, Risk and Wrongs, p. 56.
' The problem with this approach is that it is static. It depends on there being a suffi-
ciently low probability of conflict between direct and constrained maximizers. However,
if there is a sufficiently high rate of increase in the population of direct maximizers, due
to shifting dynamics in favor of uncompromising strategies, the relative value of compro-
mise will decrease. See G. Kavka, 'Why Even Morally Perfect People Would Need
Government', Social Philosophy and Philosophy 12, 4, (1995) 12-13.
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10.3.2 Constitutional Contracting
It would seem that the overall strategy based on rational bargains and rational
agents is unlikely to lead to realistic insights about the strategic structure of
conflict and cooperation which is at the heart of constitution making. That is,
many of the coordination problems regarding political power, the distribution
of resources, the production of public goods, etc. take place in political society
where actually rational individuals select political structures which reflect their
wealth and place in society. The problems of collective action are resolved
based on the ability of the majority to institutionalize its particular conception
of the good. The procedural rules are, along with material resources, organiz-
ational skills, and information, important factors in determining which group
is able to surmount its collective action problem to exercise disproportionate
influence in negotiating the institutional structures of government. The political
system is characterized by the competition among different groups to strike
a bargain which is stable and self-enforcing.
How, given the contractarian's limitations, can we safely assume that
rational actors ground their political choices in cooperative arrangements? If
that assumption is unsafe, it may be that the problem of finding coherent
principles of justice for the most important political institutions of the state
cannot go forward based on rational actors being in a hypothetical choice
situation. It is not self-evident that questions of cooperation are solved by
reference to rationality or fairness. Moreover, we cannot simply isolate the
mechanism of cooperation from the distributional dimension which political
players face. In particular, how can we understand the ability of individuals
to sustain cooperation without looking to their environment, whether or not
their potential cooperators are part of the same political community, etc. We
cannot hope to explain the dynamics of democratization, which involve conflict
and cooperation, without recourse to the setting in which democratic deliber-
ation is undertaken.
In developing an alternative explanation for the design of democratic
institutions, liberal theorists have, in devising a principle-oriented perspective,
incorporated the personal characteristics of the parties, their competitive
environment and the particular political, economic and preference-shaping
influences. Late Rawlsian theory, for example, looks to the promising idea
that, under great uncertainty and with much at stake for the participants, the
actors engaged in the bargaining would more be more likely to agree on a
minimum condition if the veil of ignorance was partially lifted. This analysis
turns out to be satisfactory when applied to the actual constitution-making
process insofar as the selection process derives from some of the ideas of
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society and political views of the constitution makers. 32 Employing the
insights of Rawls' political liberalism, Arato, for example, argues that the
diverse Eastern European Round Tables were designed to account for what the
participants thought of themselves despite the pluralism that defines those
societies. 33
 Naturally, Arato argues that, constitution-making, in order to
achieve its mission, must be the object of properly constitutional assemblies
in order to strike the proper balance of power in producing an outcome which
is reasonable and suitable for public justification.
This section can be summed up as follows. Social contract theories attempt
to explain the conditions under which a utility maximization outcome can be
achieved. Hypothetical individuals in the state of nature confront the problem
of cooperation. Given that these actors have very real incentives to defect,
since the potential gains are large, rationality requires that they act in their own
interests. However, an internal solution to the problem, based on the individual
changing her motivation or preference, does not solve the collective action
problem. We have seen that Gauthier's theory does not explain why in many
situations it would be very costly for all members of the community to cooper-
ate. The conclusion is that the solution to the problem lies with institutions and
a liberal decision making procedure which is capable of taking account of the
social, cultural and political contexts and which become represented in the
constitutional regime.
10.4 The Social Context of Political Conifict and Cooperation
In their discussion of sovereignty by institution, rational choice theorists, as
we have seen, are primarily concerned with analyzing the internal conditions
under which individuals would agree to engage in forming institutions. The
central premise of the rational choice perspective is that the coherence of a
polity is premised on the individual's decision to consent to participate in a
group concerning the direction of the common good of society. It is assumed
that the members of civil society have achieved a certain level of pre-political
unity in order to satisfy the level of cooperation necessary to transform the
people into a constituted power.34
32 Rawls' constructivism has been extended to constitution making. J. Rawls, Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 127.
A. Arato, 'Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern
Europe', Cardozo Law Review 14, 3-4 (1993) 676-80.
It is not surprising that attempts to reinterpret the constitutional transitions in Eastern
Europe along popular will have failed to provide viable insights about the design of
constitutional provisions to deal with subgroup conflicts. See generally, U. Preuss,
'Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations
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In this section, I will show that the rational choice conception must be
revised to account not only for a wider view of rationality. I go on to suggest
that consequence-oriented approach to rationality, which relies on a single
utility assumption, is unable to account for the incommensurable public values
which are important for constitution making. Among the alternatives to rational
choice theory, I look to the normative-expressive approach as a basis for
understanding social action. This strategy acknowledges that public values may
often be in conflict and, as a result, there may be situations in which political
choices are made despite the deep disagreement of certain groups about the
values at stake. An approach which looks to norms rather than a conse-
quentialist logic opens up the way for a concept of democratic choice which
acknowledges competing claims and judgments about the relative worth of
public policy options.
10.4.1 Conflicting Visions of Rationality
As we have seen, the rational choice perspective focuses on the mechanisms
of individual and collective choice in order to show how agency behavior leads
to social outcomes. Social decisions are described in terms of social welfare
functions. A social welfare function serves to evaluate states of society in terms
of their highest welfare function in the aggregate. The theory goes on to
emphasize that the ordering of political outcomes is not connected to desirabil-
ity of the social outcome. In this regard, social choice functions reflect individ-
ual preferences about different political outcomes. The consequence of this
argument is that public choice is defined along one line of value.
But, the fact that a large number of political actors hold a range of diverse
values which can not be expressed in terms of a social welfare function
suggests that the view of rationality, endorsed by rational choice, is insuffi-
cient. The crucial step is that groups may have beliefs whose contents, while
significant and cause for conflict, may not be assimilated within the outcome-
oriented conception of rationality. Of course, if we look in more detail to the
values of different groups and their particular expression, it might be possible
to develop an account of political choice which is divorced from outcome-
oriented rationality. The attractiveness of this viewpoint is that the introduction
of diverse, and often conflicting values, means that individuals will select
courses of action consistent with their backgrounds and assumptions. As a
result, the principle of instrumental rationality is challenged.
The rational choice literature assumes that an instrumental conception of
individual rationality - social choices are the result of a single preference
between Constituent Power and the Constitution', ibid. 656-659.
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ranking - is the best mechanism to explain social practices or institutions It
is assumed that an ordinal preference ranking could be constructed which
reflected the rational choices of individuals in society. The possibility of
ordering preferences is informed by assumption that preferences are transitive.
Transitivity here means only that there is consistency with regard to preference
orderings.35
At the same time, because preferences are ordinal, it is assumed that
preference intensity is irrelevant. Preferences are also thought to be stable over
time. As it stands, rational choice theory is informed by the assumption that
each individual's private preferences are fixed and stable and, given sufficient-
ly full information, they will be able to select the course of action which reaps
the highest expected utility. 36
 Proponents argue that rational action requires
that some preferences schedule is maximized. Thus, rationality, in this sense,
means roughly that an individual's preferences can be translated into a single
preference ranking, in which choices are measured in terms of their social
consequences. Hence, the aim of rational choice theory is explain consequences
in terms of the maximizing actions of individual agents.
Recently, the traditional conception of rationality has been revised along
two lines. In the first place, the image of rationality itself has changed. First,
it has been noted that even the term 'rational' is ambiguous. 37
 We must be
clear what type of rationality we are talking about. Gibbard imagines that there
To make this discussion less abstract, an example of a transitive preference ordering
is the following: If A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, A is preferred to C.
The question of how much information that the individual should have goes to the
concern of maximization of outcome. If there is too much information, which creates the
opportunity for conflict, the level of information should be restricted. This is the route
which Rawls took to overcome theoretical problems in the model. More recently Gibbard
argued that even if an individual agent has full information, which she often does, only part
of it will be employed in making a rational decision. Gibbard urges that we think of the
full information requirement in terms of advisability; that is, rationality, thus defined, means
'acting in full and vivid awareness of whatever information one has'. A. Gibbard, Wise
Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 19.
For example, Elster observes that there is no fundamental model of preferences and
rational belief. Extending this argument, he notes that there is no clear idea of what
irrational beliefs and action mean in politics. This argument is sceptical of the view that
political action stems only from the acting out of reason. While individuals try consciously
never to act against their own self interest, Elster furnishes us with the insight that political
action often arises from weakness of the will. There should be nothing to surprise us about
this conclusion since there are numerous democratic mechanisms or precommitment devices
that have been designed to stabilize society against certain actions that are the result of
political irrationality. J. Elster, Solomonic Judgements, Studies in the Limits of Rationality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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are two levels of discourse about what the word rational means. The first is
the ordinary semantic level: what does the term rationality mean. If you
disagree with the definition of rationality, it may be that you have a different
view about what it means to be rational. However, it would be wrong to
confuse the definitional question with the substantive issue of the nature of
rationality.
At the second level, according to Gibbard, rationality should be tied to
social norms. In tying rationality to social norms, Gibbard thinks that individ-
uals acquire their rational aims by following a norm which they care to be
governed by. His position is interesting because it involves an expressive
account of rationality: That is, rationality reflects the expression of an attitude.
The expression of attitudes is not a theory of truth about rationality since it
looks only to individuals expressed valuations and not the truth about what is
rationality. The importance of the norm-expressive account of rationality is that
it rejects an agent centered view of rationality, that is, it emphasizes that social
norms (contexts) are the mechanisms of rationality. At the same time, it injects
scepticism about the whether there is an determinate property of rationality.
It is easy enough, based on Gibbard refutation of the narrow self-interested
theory of rationality, to insist that the hypothetical rational individual, endorsed
by rational choice proponents, is no longer a plausible basis upon which to
develop a theory of rationality. Once we make this adjustment, the level of
rationality attributed to the individual, to the extent that it impacts choice, is
significantly reduced.
10.4.2 The Commitment to Other-Regarding Values
The idea of a direct impact between social norms and rationality suggests a
new approach to rational action. It would seem that this new project, which
redefines the concept of rationality, must look to all forms of norms as a
mechanism to solve problems of outcome-oriented social choice.38
A more acceptable notion of rationality might be one in which nonconse-
quentialist norms could be a motivation for behavior. 39
 This account suggests
that norms may be individually rational to follow and allows for the fact that
certain norms may be more be more contribute more for individual action than
others. Indeed, the mixed model of rationality, significantly, acknowledges that
outcome-oriented motivations are very effective in guiding behavior. But the
38 J• Elster, The Cement of Society, A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989) 97-151.
See generally, D. Schmidtz, 'Reasons for Altruism', Social Philosophy and Policy 10,
1 (1993) 52-68.
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scheme breaks ranks from rational choice theory by proposing to account for
behavior which is not exclusively guided by rational considerations. The
implication is that certain values will not easily translate into a hierarchical
preference ordering.
To make this idea concrete, consider the problem of political participation
in the transition to democracy. At outset of a revolutionary process, the
rational actor, according to rational choice theory, always endorses the status
quo and leave political action to others. Yet it is widely accepted that revol-
utionary movements tend to attract a range of individuals who have their own
incentives for joining a movement (from non-instrumental to self-interested
behavior). This presents a problem for rational choice theory. In order to avoid
this objection, proponents insist that participation is guided by incentives,
which accounts for their involvement over time. But this precisely leaves out
altruism as a motivation. Elster suggests that it is possible to envisage a
situation in which the revolutionaries, by committing themselves to future
behavior which could turn out to be against their self-interest, are affected by
complex motivations (e.g., altruism). 4° Thus, we must recast political choice
not in terms of issue by issue decision-making, conceived in terms of instru-
mental ends, but as the process of individual interaction which is embedded
in social relationships which are capable of altering the payoff structure of the
agent.
As we have seen, norms often coincide with self-interest as they shape
actors' conduct, but they never fully reduce to explanation in self-interested
terms. With this last point, the pluralist approach asks us to reconsider the
rational actor itself. Given the need for the stabilizing role of norms, it follows
that an exclusively egoistic model of the actor suffices as a basis for explana-
tion no better than does an exclusively altruistic model. Only a mixed model
of the actor works well. This complex actor still may be conceived as a utility
maximiser: He may derive satisfaction from counterpreferenital choices, a
satisfaction stemming from a balance of self-interested and social motivations.
Consider a political community's judgement about whether to invest
resources into a particular program. The decision to invest could just as easily
be linked to a community's other-regarding concerns (i.e., source of pride,
commitment to a shared well-being, or a conception of the future) which does
not yield a cost-benefit calculation. 4 ' To see how this challenges the rational
choice view, recall that earlier discussion of preferences. Having policy options
that are based on incommensurable values suggests that a determinate prefer-
° J. Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 19.
41 R. Pildes and B. Anderson, 'Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics', Michigan Law Review 90, (1990) 2160-2162.
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ence ranking reflecting the collective choice is not possible. Should there exist
significant disagreements over the course of a political action, the presence of
inconsistencies may only reflect a disagreement over the options. But, if the
disagreement is fundamental and there is no rational ranking of options poss-
ible, it follows that a collective choice could not be made which reflects the
rationality of the collective.
We have seen that the rational choice account of rationality states that
individual action is guided by preferences which are linked to the realization
of a Pareto-efficient outcome. Under optimal conditions, we can say that actors
will engage in utility-maximizing behavior, and it would be irrational for them
to pursue different goals which are incompatible with self-interested behavior.
Since we know that the utility-maximizing behavior of individuals can lead to
Pareto-inferior outcomes, 42
 we have looked to norms to coordinate expecta-
tions. In place of individual rationality, we conclude that social norms and
practices provide the background against which individuals make value
rankings. In this regard, rationality is not solely linked to one hierarchical
value but rather is the result of a range of social and political practices. This
section describes the idea that a source of value can be the commitment which
political actors have for principles which reflect our feelings and concerns.
They may involve larger concerns which involve a potential for political
reflection.
10.4.3 Pluralism and the Limits of Value Reductionism
The traditional model has been criticized for attempting to reduce collective
and individual aspirations and values to one motive. According to rational
choice theory, the content of public policy and the shape of institutions must
be based on a single evaluative structure. Much of the critical discussion of
rational choice theory can be seen as attacking the single utility assumption.43
Critics argue that there are multiple utility frameworks which reflect the
diverse values and social roles of individuals. On this account, because there
is no standard method of determinate ranking, conventional accounts of
rationality are, at best, limited or, at worst, mistaken. That is, insofar as there
is no all-encompassing measurement or ranking which can be employed to rank
alternatives involving different values, there is no ex ante decision procedure
for lexically ordering between higher and lower order public values. Hence,
42 J• Kraus and J. Coleman, 'Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice', in P. Valten-
tyne (ed.) Contractarianism and Rational Choice, Essays on David Gautheier 's Morals By
Agreement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 256.
J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 322-28.
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the existence of incommensurable values challenges the claim that the consist-
ent and transitive preference ranking is theoretically the most appropriate
vehicle of social choice procedure, particularly since certain values and
perspectives are inevitably not incorporated into value rankings.
Note that these theorists argue that the idea of incommensurability does not
mean that values can not be ordered and compared. To the extent that it is
inevitable that certain values are going to be ranked suggests that there is a
weak sort of comparability operating. Indeed, it would appear that trade-offs
are possible. However the problem, in practice, with trade-offs is that they are
done so in an inconsistent fashion. Furthermore, the fact that there are trade-
offs reflects that only a certain range of comparisons are permissible. The
defence of diversity, and the respect of groups or collective goals, is founded
on the concept of toleration. Thus, in the face of no higher order system of
ranking values, diversity is tolerated on considerations of faimess.
The upshot, is that value pluralism, unlike the rational choice-centered
approach, insists that the political institutions must treat people equally and that
neutrality operate as a regulative political ideal. Pluralism, unlike social choice
theory, operates to ensure the possibility of political legitimacy in the face of
a mixed system of values and interests. We have seen that pluralism offers an
alternative framework to rational choice theory. This approach argues that
institutions unavoidably interfere with and contribute to the deliberative choices
of individuals. Most obviously, the fact that individuals' preferences are
adaptive and dependent on a wide range of considerations, including utility-
maximization, suggests that the motives for action are the result of a cluster
of social norms, which are not easily reduced to an instrumental calculation.
Moreover, the fact that individuals are part of a culture which supports diver-
sity and differentiation lead us to the conclusion that 'individual rationality
cannot be realized simply through private reflection on one's personal prefer-
ences; it emerges from social and political struggles that reshape the meanings
and demands of our roles and practices'
No doubt these arguments supply strong reasons for preferring an account
of democratic decision-making based on multiple preference frameworks and
a socially-grounded conception of the individual that is structured by social
norms and institutions. While there may remain certain advantages in applying
rational choice techniques to collective action problems, I have argued that the
Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness' reflects a commitment to a political conception
of justice which eliminates the so-called metaphysical ideals and substitutes it with a
practical framework in which a shared public basis for the justification of society's institu-
tions will emerge. See generally, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
R. Pildes and E. Anderson, 'Slinging Arrows at Democracy, ibid. 2178.
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framework is not sufficiently robust to capture the diverse causes which
influence our decisions and under certain conditions leads to irresolvable
conflicts.
10.5 From the Rationality of Contract to Institutions
The analysis so far has considered the case of the rational individual. In reality
of course the actors are not abstract individuals but rather political organiz-
ations, interest groups and other associations which join together to overcome
collective action problems in order to obtain public goods, etc. Rational choice
theory assumes that any social group will construct a coherent collective will
and pursue an agenda based on a preference ordering. Yet in the real world,
groups rarely maintain a collective and coherent general will. Their preferences
are formed within the context of democratic institutions which contributes to
their ability to engage in political choice. Recent work has suggested that
institutions are crucial for solving the problem of democratization. This section
will critically evaluate Przeworski's rational choice approach to democratic
transitions. I question whether his analysis of institutions completely solves the
problem of conflicting visions of the democratization process.
10.5.1 Democratic Transitions
When social and political conflicts emerge, as they did with the Eastern and
Central European revolutions of 1989, the political groups leading the trans-
formation process will endeavour to secure their achievements by establishing
an institutional framework that reflects the new distribution of power. Transi-
tions to democracy are negotiated with the incumbent forces and the dominant
groups involved in social change. The negotiation process is determined by
the underlying distribution of economic and social resources, as well as the
existing institutional arrangements. 46
 A democratic transition is characterized
by interest group bargaining over the precise contours of institutional choice.
Przeworski's account of democracy is conceived in terms of a competitive
struggle amongst the political forces engaged in a conflict over design of the
rules of the game. His defence of democracy is premised not on philosophical
justification about people's ends. Rather, the principle at work here is an
instrumental conception of political institutions. The orienting idea is that since
there are diverse political ends in society, democracy requires that there should
be as many institutional arrangements available for groups to pursue their own
A. Przeworksj, Democracy and the Market, Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.81.
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ends without penalty. Przeworksi's notion of a constitutional transition to
democracy is premised on the intuition that a democratic outcome can be
achieved only if the conflicting and competing political organizations can agree
to a compromise framework that permits constrained competition, and self-
enforcing compliance with the rules of the game.
But, democratic transitions are difficult to organize particularly since
political associations, which are created to obtain benefits for their members,
must, despite the individual rationality of their members, cooperate with other
groups to create new political institutions. For rational choice theory, the
problem is thought to require a self-enforcing solution to what is essentially
a one-shot Prisoner's Coordination problem. 47 But, as earlier noted, a resol-
ution of the Prisoner's Dilemma, even under conditions of perfect information
and full rationality, will not emerge with conditional strategies. Rather, it is
the existence of ongoing institutions and informal enforcement mechanisms
(e.g., reputation) which offer a more serious attempt of resolving the
coordination problem.
Typically transitions involve intense interest group bargaining over the
voting rules, structure of government, associational rights, the judiciary, and
other decision-making powers. We can not expect a compromise because the
political actors are aware that the newly developed institutions will affect not
only the distribution of resources and power, but influence, as well, the future
rounds of political bargaining. Typically, parties will, in the course of negoti-
ations, pursue their own self-interest, and engage in a coordination game in
order to pursue optimal outcomes. But since the groups have different informa-
tion and commence bargaining from different material positions, it is unlikely
that the search for a unique equilibrium will be facilitated by an open exchange
of information and trust between the parties. Rather, given that the bargaining
process is about absolute competitive gains, the tactics of the parties are
unlikely to produce a normative solution which is compatible with cooperative
gain. In other words, the outcome of the democratization process is not only
a matter of efficiency.
The search to establish an institutional agreement creates difficulties in that
the legitimacy of an outcome does not depend on all groups acquiring the same
disposition to cooperate. To be sure, to win control in the political competition
depends on the creation of a significant majority of the groups which, despite
their diverse preferences, agree to a compromise. But, the reintroduction of
democracy is possible only if the agreement is institutionalized into the political
structure that reflects the strategic interests of the parties to the agreement. In
effect, the competing groups will not acquire a disposition to cooperate unless
" See P. Ordeshook, 'Some Rules of Constitutional Design', ibid. 200-1.
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they are similarly disposed or there already exists monitoring devices and
institutions to enforce the agreement. The outcome of the transitional process
therefore reflects the successful strategies of political groups which are linked
to interests via the process of institutional choice. In this regard, the hard-
wiring of the design and structure of the legislative and administrative institu-
tions by the newly formed coalition can work to limit the chances that future
changes in the social and political circumstances can upset or alter the original
framework.
We have seen that neither contracts nor pacts are sufficient to enforce
democratic compliance. This is not a happy result for rational choice theory.
But the introduction of a punishment strategy could deter actors from cheating
and promote the emergence of a decentralized compliance. Recent contribu-
tions of game theorists have led to a simple set of punishments and rewards
that yield the maximal cooperation which can be supported given the possibility
of defection. The theory is based on a punishment path which punishes harshly
for just enough periods so as to wipe out the original gains from cheating and
then forgives totally and reverts back to the cooperative path. 48 Credible
punishment strategies support the insight that cooperation can work in less than
perfect conditions. The upshot is that compliance can be self-enforcing if there
is an institutional structure which is designed to satisfy the information require-
ments to enhance effective compliance. Przeworski argues that democracy is
consolidated only when the institutional framework is self-enforcing.
The reintroduction of uncertainty is a defining feature of a successful
transition to democracy. Not only must political outcomes be indeterminate
but there can be no guarantees that ensure that one group prevail at the end
of the day. Democratization represents the credible commitment of social
forces, embedded in the institutional structure, to regulate and promote politi-
cal competition while ensuring, at the same time, the production of contingent
consent. But, can this view of democracy be defended? I don't think so. Such
an account of democracy is founded on the idea that the political framework
is sufficiently plastic and free of the path dependent evolution of institution
practices that it can be re-wired from time to time in order to release the forces
of political competition. To put it simply, the problem is that once an institu-
tion becomes embedded in society it gains strength not only from its efficiency
but from its development and interdependence with other sub-systems. Thus,
democratic reform not only entails costs of establishing a new set of rules but
the problem of releasing a chain reaction in the other components which
remain in place.
D. Abreu, 'External Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames', Journal of Economic
Theory 39 (1986) 191-225.
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In practice, it would seem that the political institutions have played a central
role in constructing the context against which democratic reforms have mean-
ing or cohere. That is, in the course of a democratic transition, the success of
large-scale economic reforms and their speed is crucially dependent upon
political constraints. 49 On this view, democracy is understood in terms of a
brokerage system in which interest groups and suppliers are brought together,
through informal agreements based on incentives, reputation, and punishment
to promote durable institutional arrangements which secure a stable level of
welfare for the groups party to the agreement. The problem with this argument
is that it concentrates on linking design and political interest while it offers
very little in the way of evaluating the efforts at institution-making. One might
try to defend Przeworski's account of the transitional process by arguing that
linking the role of interest to institutional design he has opened up the way for
an account of political institutions which is based on a historically contingent
political process.
But, the major problem with Przeworski's account is its reliance on an
instrumental model of rationality. By linking self-interest to motivation, he
narrows the range of motivations by which individuals and groups might act.
This approach is partial, in that it excludes other-regarding values and is
committed to an economic explanation for the explaining the structure of
choice. The commitment to democracy is complex. It emerges from a range
of commitments, including preferences which are not strictly linked to self
interest. While strategic goals play an important role in explaining our experi-
ence in politics, it is a simple fact that people are driven by principles, integ-
rity and even justice.
10.6 Conclusion: An Normative-Institutional Approach
Let us return to the issue of the rational choice understanding of political
institutions. I have argued that the self-interest assumption on which the theory
is based is not appropriate for all our commitments. Indeed the individualist
approach to rationality runs into problems in that what is rational is not
commonly understood by every participant in the political struggle. We have
seen that Gauthier's contractarian argument of rational action understood, in
terms of the constrained maximization of expected utility, is unsound because
it presupposes the level of rationality required to resolve the Prisoner's
Dilemma.
At the same time, the that the rational choice approach does not account for
M. Dewatripont and G. Rowland, 'Economic Reforms and Dynamic Political Con-
straints', Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992) 703-30.
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nontrival reasons for other-regarding motivations. The diversity of values and
commitments, which may incorporate both self-interest and other-regarding
concers, are not easily reduced to the satisfaction of a single transitive prefer-
ence. We have seen that the process of political choice often involves a
complex mix of these concerns. The commitment to democratic choice should
be to cultivate these commitments. Rational choice theory fails to recognize
that mulitiple preference rankings can be reconciled by a range of mechanisms:
role differentiation, decentralized political institutions, and political associ-
ations. It is not plausible to expect that these structures can create solutions
for all the substantive disagreements regarding politics or national identity.
But, again we should recognize the that the institutional design is crucial in
creating the conditions that enhance the further expression of these values.
From the point of view of pluralism, we have seen that the establishment
of new democratic processes requires the forging of institutions which can
effectively coordinate the expectations of diverse political groups. In designing
agreements, the problem of enforcement is crucial. The device of contract can
not solve the self-enforcment problem. Rather, it was argued that the institu-
tions which emerge are usually the product of interest group bargains, which
tend to exclude the interests of the relatively weak members from influencing
the design and direction of democratic structures. Constitutions can provide
the basis (e.g., property rights) to induce an equilibrium. It was argued focal
point norms (and other carrot and stick strategies) can also serve to support
self-enforcement where there are multiple outcomes are possible.
The problem with relying on the focal point concept is that it fails to
provide a mechanism for how a significant group of individuals come to follow
a norm, nor does it explain why people adhere to it. It follows from our earlier
discussion that it may be possible to expand on the focal point concept, using
a wider variety of social norms to supplement the missing explanations in the
theory. 5° Thus, the norms of reciprocity, equality, and cooperation could
operate much like focal points in that they can induce predictable outcomes.
Some of the devices are even consistent with the rational expectations frame-
work mentioned earlier. But, it was argued that while norms may coincide with
self-interest, they never fully reduce to explanation in self-interested terms.
Hence, the introduction of norms provides a realistic basis for remodelling the
rational actor itself based on a mixed model of rationality.
We have also argued that the reliance on norms to enhance coordination
requires effective institutions. Institutional tend to reduce asymmetric informa-
° S. Majeski, 'An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of Norms',
in K. Cook and M. Levi (eds.) The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990) 273-81.
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tion (by identifying past mistakes, opportunism, etc) and limit transaction
costs. 5 ' We have seen that in the real world of politics, institutional structures
also provide a low cost basis for the members of a political community to
establish differentiated social roles. With this last point, we should begin to
think of the task of resolving conflicts in terms of a problem of the design of
institutions since they often provide the material foundations for the emergence
norms of cooperation.
' G.Garrett and B. Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', ibid. 176-77.
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